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# WAR DIARY

## German Naval Staff Operations Division

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PART A

VOLUME 30

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WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF  
(Operations Division)

PART A

February 1942

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr. h.c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Fricke
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Captain Wagner

Volume 30

begun:	1 Feb. 1942
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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 30 is the fourth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the micro-film library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.  
1948



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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

As was to be expected, London recognizes neither Quisling's appointment to the post of Norwegian Prime Minister, nor the peace treaty which he will sign, because the Supreme Court which should ratify the appointment went out of existence in December 1940.

Tunisia:

An American Consulate was recently established in Tunisia. However, French Government officials and officers are not allowed to have any contact with North Americans.

Egypt:

In Parliament there was a debate on Franco-Egyptian relations. During the course of the debate it was pointed out that the treaty of alliance with Britain does not entitle her to force Egypt to break off relations with France. It should not be forgotten that France enjoys a preferred status in Egypt because of the cultural, financial, and political services she has rendered that country.

South Africa:

Large-scale sabotage acts are said to have occurred in the gold mines of Johannesburg.

Eire:

The U.S. newspapers are taking a strong stand against De Valera and Eire. They say the time is ripe for the American people to cut this "Gordian knot". The U.S. can defeat the Axis powers only on their own soil. For this purpose the expeditionary troops in Ireland will gradually be built up into a powerful army.

Spain:

On the occasion of his trip to Catalonia, General Franco also gave his views on the question of the monarchy. Wholehearted support by the people must be the first step toward a restoration of the traditional Empire, which has always lacked such a firm foundation. The Falange must be the keystone of the entire structure.

U.S.S.R.:

According to reports from various sources, the Russian Government no longer seems to consider its own position nearly as favorable as it tries to convey to outsiders. It is said that the Russian power of resistance will be unable to withstand a strong spring offensive. For this reason the striking power of Germany should be weakened by means of propaganda in order to demoralize both front troops and rear echelons as well as the occupied territories, especially in the Balkans. The anxiety of the Allies that the rulers in Moscow might be willing to conclude a separate peace with Germany after all is thus



supposed not to have diminished any more than Russia's fear of being left in the lurch by her allies. Therefore each side is carefully watching the others by means of numerous missions.

Serbia:

According to a report from the German Legation, the Bulgarian occupation of southeastern Serbia has not led to serious incidents so far, although there has been some friction.

Turkey:

In a speech the Prime Minister pointed out the increasingly precarious economic situation which is forcing home production to a maximum. According to the report of an agent, which was sent by the Naval Attache at Istanbul, it may be inferred that in Russia the Soviet regime has understood how to surmount opposition to the system by encouraging Russian patriotism and has thereby rallied the entire country to extreme resistance. Russian losses are said to be considerable. The fanaticism of Russian youth is supposed to be so intense that the war against Russia will demand great exertions even from an army as perfect as the German one. The report that the Turkish military intelligence service claims to possess information regarding a Russian lightning raid into Turkey during the summer of 1941 appears to be especially noteworthy. This raid is supposed to have been prevented only by the German attack on Russia. In Turkey most people are convinced that a strong and well-armed Russia is the most dangerous enemy from which only a German victory could save them. President Ismet is said to be deeply concerned about the Russian penetration into Iran and the concessions which the British have made to Russian demands there. This would imply that a corresponding compliance at the expense of Turkey could start up the Dardanelles question, in spite of the assurances given by British Ambassador Knatchbull.

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Special Items:

I. In a personal letter to the Commander in Chief, Navy Admiral Riccardi proposed to regulate fuel oil deliveries from Hungary also by means of a German-Italian pact.

Thereupon the Commander in Chief, Navy informed Admiral Riccardi of the results of renewed conferences between Germany and Hungary: Because of accelerated home production Hungary has agreed to forego her claim as established by treaty on the importation of about 8,900 tons of fuel oil. Thus for all practical purposes she is giving up imports from Rumania so that this quantity of fuel oil can be allotted to Italy. The German Navy will receive a total of 1,500 tons in one delivery from Hungary. The Commander in Chief, Navy assures Admiral Riccardi that he is continuing his efforts to assist the Italian Navy by assuring her an adequate supply of fuel oil.

II. The Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section requests the opinion of the Naval Staff concerning the proposal for establishing an amphibious engineer company in the 800th Brandenburg Experimental Regiment on special duty. This company would have to be trained by the Army and the Navy in cooperation for use on special de-

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molition, assault, and sabotage missions. A cadre of naval volunteers would be incorporated into the company.

The Naval Staff, Operations Division fully endorses the proposal and points out that an assault vessel with weapons and trained personnel belonging to this unit could also be considered as an auxiliary weapon for auxiliary cruisers. The special weapons developed by the Italian Navy can also be considered for the missions of the company.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch is requested to keep in touch with further developments in the matter. Corresponding reports are to be made to the Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence and Espionage Division.

III. The Naval Ordnance Division, War Economy Branch reports that further nickel ore shipments from Kirkenes to Germany are desirable, since the planned smelting installation at the mine would at present still be too exposed to enemy attack. Copy of report in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XII as per 1/Skl 2437/42 Gkdos.. Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway have been informed by the Naval Staff.

IV. Personnel losses of the Navy from 1 Sept. 1939 to 31 Oct. 1941 (26 months):

5,467 dead (including 288 officers)  
4,160 wounded (including 116 officers)  
2,870 missing (including 107 officers)  
2,672 prisoners of war and internees (including 119 officers)

A total of 15,169 (including 830 officers)

The crew of the BISMARCK is listed among the missing.

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Situation 1 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Atlantic Ocean:

Radio monitoring intercepted submarine warnings from enemy steamers in areas where none of our units are stationed at present (near Haiti and Freetown).

Pacific Ocean:

According to radio monitoring, U.S. vessels were given a rendezvous point south of the Marshall Islands on 1 Feb. and received orders to speed up their attack. A U.S. carrier task force was located in the same area.

A Norwegian vessel sent a raider distress signal about 250 miles southwest of the coast of San Salvador.

2. Own Situation:

A search at the place where the SPREEWALD was sunk has been



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unsuccessful so far. For details see Submarine Warfare.

One of the submarines operating there reported a British destroyer in the vicinity.

Report on the Enemy Situation by Radiogram 1832.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers were located in the sea area northwest of Ireland near the Tory Islands. The destroyers were on a southwest course. There are 3 steamers between the Orkney and the Faroe Islands, bound for the Faroes. A U.S. destroyer of the CONNOR class was sighted in the Bristol Channel.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

A ground mine was swept in Camaret Bay (Brest).

#### Channel Coast:

Because of weather conditions destroyer "29" and the FRIEDRICH IHN stopped at Le Havre en route from Rotterdam to Cherbourg. The torpedo missions of the 2nd and the 6th PT Boat Flotillas were discontinued for the same reason. On route "Lila" off Dunkirk a mine blew up in the sweeping gear of the 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, a British plane reported having located what is evidently the convoy en route from the Arctic Ocean 25 miles southwest of the Shetland Islands. Air reconnaissance located 9 patrol boats on a southerly course between Kinnairds Head and Firth of Forth. Convoys varying in size up to 40 steamers were sighted off the Humber, east of The Wash, north of Great Yarmouth, off Great Yarmouth, and near Harwich.

#### Own Situation:

Aside from the special mission of the 13th Mine Sweeper Flotilla and the 5th and 8th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotillas in preparation for operation "Cerberus", there was no mine sweeping because of ice conditions.

According to a report of the Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer decided the following:

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1. Troop transports to Norway are not to be routed via the North Sea in accordance with the judgement of those on the spot. The Fuehrer stressed emphatically that the organization of the transports via Denmark must be accelerated in every way possible.

2. Goods for the supply of Norway are to be transported via the North Sea in the necessary quantities. However, it is essential that each ship carry only small quantities of particularly valuable goods, such as flame throwers and aerial torpedoes.

3. So far as the supply situation will permit, fuel is not to be transported via the North Sea because of its scarcity. (See Telegram 2206.)

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

On 31 Jan. submarines were sighted close to shore near Rodvoey and Gaasoey. Air reconnaissance located 3 cruisers 15 miles north of Gorodetski. In the evening of the same day radio monitoring located Russian units north of Varanger Fjord.

Own Situation:

On 31 Jan. the ULM laid mine field 7. The steamer WALTER OHLROGGE (1,924 GRT) has been missing since 21 Jan.. She was en route to Kristiansand South. Search has been unsuccessful so far.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers "24" and "25" left Stavanger, bound south through the North Sea.

On 1 Feb. U "134", coming from Kirkenes, proceeded to the attack area between 19° and 20° E and 74° 20' and 73° 40' N. Commanding Admiral, Norway intends to station U "584" and U "585", which are now north of the coast of Murmansk, south of U "134", in case there continues to be no results in the present attack area. The enemy seems to have changed his system of approaching the Murmansk coast because of the late attacks, and now apparently distributes his convoys along the entire coast line. Now the operation is to be supported by air reconnaissance extending farther north. For corresponding report from Commanding Admiral, Norway, see Telegram 2330.

Admiral, Arctic Ocean requests from the Naval Construction Division, Equipment and Budget Section that an adequate number of skilled workers be provided permanently for the repair ship SUEDWIND. A copy of the request is sent to the Naval Staff, Operations Division. Experience has shown that it is impossible to repair all the light escort vessels in the Arctic region at shore repair bases, since most of the vessels are in extremely bad condition. If the workers are transported back and forth only when they are needed during intensive operations in the northern area the result is often a loss of 6 to 8 weeks of work.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Ice conditions are unchanged. West of Anholt the icebreaker CASTOR and the DONAU were again frozen fast in 80 cm. of ice for several



hours. The convoy commander received instructions to proceed with the CASTOR and DONAU either to Copenhagen or to a Norwegian port, depending on the situation. The icebreaker EISBAER is en route from Goeteborg to Copenhagen. The departure of the 7th transport group of the 7th Mountain Division for Hangoe must be postponed because of ice conditions. The ILLER, carrying men on leave, had to return to Turku. The requested hospital ship cannot be sent to Turku because of a lack of icebreakers. Therefore the hospital ship PITEA, which was intended for that purpose, has been ordered to Libau (see Telegram 1212).

The Operations Division of the General Staff, Army is now investigating the problem of how to occupy and later to hold the islands in the Gulf of Finland. Because of the high current requirements on its eastern front, the Northern Army Group has no forces to speak of available for this task. Therefore the Naval Staff is requested to report in the near future what forces it can provide to aid in the occupation and the defense of the islands. (See Telegram 2400.)

## V. Submarine Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

#### Northeast Atlantic:

Little air activity in the rendezvous area. Radio monitoring intercepted a mine warning sent by the Panamanian steamer BONITA in the North Channel. According to a report of an agent a convoy of 10 steamers and 2 tankers with 1 cruiser and 6 destroyers as well as an air escort of 4 planes was located on a westerly course in the Strait of Gibraltar on 31 Jan.. According to radio monitoring, the Dutch tug THAMES is en route to Horta in order to tow or escort the LLANGIBBY CASTLE.

The embassy in Lisbon reports the appearance of the steamer CRESSADO bound for Britain with a tungsten cargo, which was still in Leixoes on 30 Jan.

#### American Coast:

The U.S. tanker PAN AMOCO (9,862 GRT) sent out a submarine alarm southeast of Cape Fear. The British Admiralty issued a submarine warning for the area 300 miles east of Cape Charles.

#### Mediterranean:

U "402" made a futile attack on a British destroyer in the Azores area. Aside from U "333", the submarines U "84", U "582" and U "701", which are homeward bound, and also the outgoing U "105" and U "332" are ordered to proceed to quadrant BE 7125 where the SPREEWALD sank. U "133" and U "754", returning from the Azores area, were also dispatched to that quadrant. The first 5 vessels are expected to arrive at the specified location on 2 Feb.

In contrast to previous days, radio monitoring intercepted only a few submarine warnings. South of the Bank of Newfoundland U "82" is shadowing a convoy of transports. In the Mediterranean 1 of our sub-



marines is also shadowing a convoy of 2 steamers and 4 mine sweepers northeast of Tobruk.

A supplementary report on the situation may be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding the sinking of the SPREEWALD, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports in detail the orders which the commander of submarine U "333" had received concerning our ship movements. He also reports that before the submarine left port the flotilla commander, according to orders, had in giving instructions for operations expressly called the attention of the submarine commander, Lt. Cremer, to our ship movements in the area in question and had warned him on this account.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines states further that all these orders and instructions did not suffice to make clear to the inexperienced officer on his first voyage that he acted incorrectly. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines believes that the only way of preventing such incidents would be to prohibit in the areas concerned all attacks against merchant ships which are not sailing in convoy. He suggests, however, that in view of the great disadvantages which such an action might entail, as for instance at the appearance of an enemy auxiliary cruiser, the decision about such an order should be postponed until the commander of U "333" returns. (See Telegram 1310.)

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VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

3 enemy planes were certainly shot down during the night of 31 Jan. and 3 more probably were (cf. War Diary 31 Jan., Western Area). Armed reconnaissance attacked the airfield at Sumburgh Head and observed gratifying results, and also reported damaging 2 steamers and 1 tanker on the east coast. During the night of 1 Feb. Pembroke was attacked as alternative target. For results of reconnaissance see Situation West Area and Situation North Sea.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our air forces made successful attacks on the airports near Marsa Matruh at Ain el Gazala and El Adem. Reconnaissance activity over Cyrenaica. For observations of sea reconnaissance see Warfare in the Mediterranean, Enemy Situation.

3. Eastern Front:

No special reports have arrived from the army fronts. Reconnaissance activity over the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean. For observations see daily situation report.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

According to German air reconnaissance, 3 submerged submarines were located 45 miles northeast of Cape Carbonara (Sardinia). More submarines were sighted near Leukas and Cape Spartivento. Italian air reconnaissance sighted 2 westbound convoys off Alexandria, one of 2 tankers and one of 3 steamers, each with escort forces. Italian radio monitoring intercepted a signal from a British plane reporting sighting a steamer, apparently the NAPOLI, with cruiser escort, lying to near Mahdia. Italian radio monitoring also located a British submarine about 40 miles south of the Peloponnesos.

2. Situation Italy:

An enemy air raid on Tripoli during the night of 31 Jan. caused no military damage. Benghazi will not be available for large steamers until 2 weeks from now.

The Swiss steamer GENEROSO (1,437 GRT) has been overdue since midnight, 29 Jan., after departing from Genoa.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer NAPOLI is riding at anchor off Suda, awaiting tug boat assistance from Messina on. The steamer GIOVANNI BATTISTA which was damaged by aerial torpedo is afloat. The transport submarine MICCA was attacked by 3 enemy planes while en route from Tripoli to Taranto and was somewhat damaged.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:Enemy Situation:

A submarine was sighted near Keos.

Own Situation:

Mine sweeper L "15" ran aground near Rethymno, Crete.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Aerial photographs show vessels in ports as follows:

Batum: Training vessel KOMINTERN, 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 1 submarine, 1 tanker, 8 merchant ships.

Poti: 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 transport, 1 floating dock.

Tuapse: 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, 11 submarines, 2 tankers, 11 steamers.

Novorossisk: 1 destroyer, 1 mine sweeper, 11 steamers.

1 large transport and 1 submarine on a west course were located near



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Sevastopol and Cape Khersones. 10 steamers, partly in convoy, and 1 cruiser were also sighted there.

Own Situation:

Unchanged.

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VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to a report from Japanese Headquarters, Japanese troops in Malaya have pushed forward as far as the Johore road. According to press and radio reports, the large floating dock of Singapore has sunk as a result of Japanese air attacks. Japanese forces are said to have landed in Pontainak (Borneo) and on the island of Amboina.

According to radio monitoring, Madras broadcast submarine warnings on 1 Feb. for a point 120 miles south of Colombo. This indicates that Japanese submarines are operating in the Indian Ocean.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The situation on the Crimea remains unchanged. Enemy attacks were repulsed in the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group. We succeeded in advancing. The situation on the 6th and the 2nd Army sectors remains unchanged.

Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks southwest of Byelev were repulsed. Our units in the area Bolkhov-Byelev had to be supplied by air because of snow drifts. The enemy brought up additional forces to the gap near Medyn. Enemy attacks on the 2 divisions which we brought up from the north and the south for closing the gap were repulsed. Behind the front lines there was vigorous fighting against partisans who are supported by paratroops. In the area around Rzhev there is heavy fighting under strained supply conditions. Enemy attacks near Velizh and Velikiye Luki were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

The lost position near Kholm was retaken in a counterattack. There is heavy enemy pressure in the Staraya Russa sector. Enemy break-through attempts between Soltsy and Lake Ladoga were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The situation remains unchanged.

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3. North Africa:

The enemy is continuing to withdraw from Cyrenaica. By evening German troops reached the area of Cirene after overcoming stubborn enemy resistance near Marawa.

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Items of Political Importance

Japan:

Foreign Minister Togo announced in Parliament that should any of the South American countries declare war Japan would retaliate in the same manner. At present Japan is at war only with the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

Japanese officials have again issued stern warnings to France concerning the anti-Japanese policies of De Gaullists in East Asia and in the Pacific Islands. They have not stopped agitating in Indo-China, either. The Vichy Government denied these accusations in an official declaration, pointing to the loyal attitude of Governor Degoux. They said that the French Government is not well enough informed about conditions in the Pacific Islands to be able to make a statement concerning them.

Great Britain:

According to press reports, Eden has called Stalin the new "Peter the Great". He also pointed out that Hitler and Churchill agree that there will be no peace in the near future.

Australia:

According to an Italian report, Australian soldiers expressed their conviction that the U.S.A. is responsible for the war in the Pacific by thrashing the U.S. consul-general in Beirut.

Chile:

Ibanez lost in the presidential elections. The representative of the Popular Front was elected. These election results might mean that Chile will join the Allies in breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.

U.S.A.:

The subcommittee for aviation in the House of Representatives suggested that the bases which are leased from Britain in return for destroyers should be acquired outright at some future date.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports on the basis of the log of U "334" that on 27 Nov. the BARHAM task force was located by sound-detectors at a distance of 18 miles.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports on the requests of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships for reinforcing anti-aircraft batteries of the torpedo boat flotillas in preparation for operation "Cerberus". The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to this proposal.



III. On the basis of experiences gained in the enemy raid on Maaloe, the Chief, Naval Staff points out that it is intolerable that the Navy and the Air Force use different grid charts. He orders that steps be taken once more to remedy the discrepancy.

IV. Concerning the sailing of ship "28" the Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Branch reports on the problem caused by the fact that the cruising radius of the auxiliary cruiser permits her to sail only 4 months without being supplied, instead of the calculated 6. Should the ship sail according to plan and it is not possible to supply her at sea, she would be forced to return at an unfavorable season. However, since there is a possibility of withdrawing into the area under Japanese control, the Naval Staff believes that the risk should be taken and suggests that the vessel leave port as planned during the new moon period in March. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

V. An account is given of the report from the German General at the Italian Armed Forces High Command to the Commander in Chief, Army concerning the order which General Cavallero issued to the Italian High Command in North Africa on 27 Jan. According to this order, the Duce empowers the latter to occupy the area of Benghazi with a few mobile forces but without withdrawing the bulk of the armored forces from the area of Agedabia. A corresponding directive was also sent to General Rommel. Cavallero is of the opinion that General Rommel cannot move the motorized troops freely until a few weeks from now when the Italian Infantry Divisions have been brought up to strength and are able to occupy the Agedabia position, thereby establishing an adequate supply base in that area. Everything possible should be done to ship supplies by sea in spite of the scarcity of fuel oil. The Italian High Command cannot give permission for a further advance into Cyrenaica until supplies, especially fuel, have been assured; a reverse brought on by a scarcity of supplies might lead to our losing the whole of Libya. On 27 Jan. there was only enough fuel for German and Italian motor vehicles in all Libya to keep them running another 800 km.

The reasons why General Rommel has not conformed with the above directive are not known.

VI. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports on the problem of organizing the command of the forces in Norway. In case the ships at Brest are transferred to northern Norway, the Fleet Commander and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships will be stationed in Trondheim or in Narvik. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean will remain in Kirkenes. Group North will have to direct the forces of the Fleet Commander, and the Commanding Admiral, Norway those of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The problem of command over the fleet forces remaining in home waters is still to be cleared up at the conference between the Chief of Staff of the Fleet, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines scheduled for the afternoon of 2 Feb. Concerning submarines, those out on operations will be directed by Group North, and those with stationary assignments by the Commanding Admiral, Norway or the admirals of the various coastal sectors. The submarines in the area of the Hebrides can be controlled by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.



Special Items:

The Chiefs of Staff of the Fleet, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Chief, Operations Division of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines conferred with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. The Chief, Quarter-master Division, Naval Staff, the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff, and a number of experts also took part in the discussions. During the course of this conference the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff presented a detailed account of the Fuehrer's conception of the situation and of the necessary measures to be taken in the north Norwegian area in consequence, as the Fuehrer had expressed it to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. A written report and directives to this effect have already been given to Group North, the Fleet Commander, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines as per l/Skl 222/42 Gkdos. Chfs. (See War Diary 27 Jan.) The statements made by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff correspond with the report which was already in the War Diary of 24 Jan. under "Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff", and with the preliminary written report of 22 Jan. by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff (see War Diary 22 Jan.). The purpose of the statements is mainly to give the front commands an idea of the background of the whole problem, and to make clear to them that the Fuehrer will not compromise on this critical point.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff also stated the following: The transfer of the naval forces at Brest to northern Norway as desired by the Fuehrer depends on his final decision, which has not yet been reached. The Fuehrer believes that it should be possible to complete repairs on the GNEISENAU and to train the crews in Norway. The Fuehrer sharply criticized the length of time taken to repair the ships.

The Fuehrer has neither accepted nor rejected the suggestion of transferring the 1st PT Boat Flotilla to Norway after completion of operation "Korsika". Therefore the current instructions are to remain effective for the time being.

Since the Fuehrer considers the area in northern Norway to be decisive to the outcome of the war, the ships may have to be put into all-out action without delay.

During the conference a proposal arrived from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships suggesting that operation "Mandarine" be postponed until the new moon period in March. In case it should be necessary to do so, or if for some reason the ships at Brest can get only as far as the North Sea, the SCHEER will have to be transferred to the northern area immediately.

In discussing the separate measures to be carried out it is agreed that the fleet forces and the submarines are to be under the authority of the commands recommended by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff in his conference with the Chief, Naval Staff. On 31 Jan. the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff cleared up this point with the Fleet Commander and the Chief of Staff, Group North, also.

Concerning the small cruisers, the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff points out that these vessels could not be used when the focal point of naval warfare shifted to the Atlantic, but they can be used now if the Arctic Ocean and the North Sea are to acquire primary importance once more. The Naval Staff is preparing a study on the Fuehrer's intention to oc-

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copy the Rybachi Peninsula. If necessary, the Commanding Admiral, Norway will adjust his mine-laying projects accordingly. A lengthy debate arose on the problem of the organization and command of the fleet forces remaining in home waters. Special attention was paid to training, for which the appointment of a commander of training vessels within the fleet seems to be indicated. Finally, the representatives of the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Fleet Commander also pointed out the necessity for procuring adequate oil reserves and other supplies. The Chief, Operations Division of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines stated that of the 100 operational submarines as of 1 Feb., only 50 will remain for carrying on the war against merchant shipping in the Atlantic after 20 have been transferred to the Mediterranean and 30 to the northern area. This seems to correspond with the Fuehrer's wishes, as reported by Captain von Puttkamer in connection with the submarine successes on the American coast.

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Situation 2 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an Italian report, 2 convoys with about 140 steamers left Britain between 20 and 24 Jan. They are said to be bound for Australia and the Persian Gulf, and are to make a stop at St. Helena. This confirms other information we have received.

South Atlantic:

On 8 Jan. at 6° S a cruiser of the OMAHA class and a destroyer stopped and searched the Norwegian steamer TERCERO en route from Norfolk to Buenos Aires. During her voyage the TERCERO encountered no other naval vessels but sighted many tankers. The Naval Attache in Buenos Aires reports that on 4 Jan. the steamer CAPO DE HORNOS, while lying to in Trinidad, observed near the island 3 British destroyers, 2 troop transports of 14,000 GRT each, 5 tankers, and 2 steamers, as well as night air patrols. 1 cruiser made port on 8 Jan. A concentration of 15 armed merchant vessels, some with planes, seemed to indicate that a convoy was being formed.

Pacific Ocean:

According to a report of 31 Jan. from the Military Attache in Santiago, a U.S. convoy of 20 to 30 vessels bound for New Zealand or Australia is en route. It will follow the west coast of South America up to about 43° S and will then turn west. On 30 Jan. it was at about 38° S, 82° W.

The BIRMINGHAM has left Punta Arenas, allegedly to join the convoy. The Naval Staff believes this improbable.

2. Own Situation:

So far a submarine has picked up 24 Germans and 54 British from the SPREEWALD. The search is being continued.



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The blockade-runner RIO GRANDE left Kobe on 31 Jan.

Instructions regarding radio monitoring aboard ship are sent to ship "10" by Radiogram 1834.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, 2 transports are en route from Lerwick and 3 steamers in convoy formation are en route from Londonderry, all bound for Glasgow. 6 steamers in convoy are en route to Ayr (Firth of Clyde).

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

#### Channel Coast:

See Telegrams 1145 and 1620 for brief reports from the 2nd and 6th PT Boat Flotillas concerning operations during the night of 1 Feb. In the upper left-hand corner of quadrant 8275 the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla sank a Dutch steam trawler which was sailing without lights. The crew was taken aboard. Weather conditions forced both flotillas to discontinue their missions.

Destroyer "29" and destroyer IHN are continuing their voyage to Brest from Le Havre. In the evening the 4th PT Boat Flotilla attacked an eastbound convoy in quadrant BF 3256. The 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla swept 29 mines east of route "Lila 2", probably moored influence mines. Other mines were swept by the 4th and 5th Mine Sweeper Flotillas, the latter operating on route "Lila" near 2° 21' E.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted 5 convoys between Flamborough Head and Lowestoft. Of these, 6 steamers were observed entering port and 37 departing. A convoy of 4 steamers with 1 anti-aircraft cruiser was located off Peterhead.

#### Own Situation:

Destroyer "24" has reached Wesermuende. Destroyer "25" and torpedo boat "16" are en route to Rotterdam via the Heligoland Bight. The 14th Mine Sweeper Flotilla, the 5th and 8th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotillas, and mine-detonating vessels "145" and "147" performed security missions in preparation for operation "Labyrinth".

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Our convoys proceeded according to schedule without unforeseen incidents. Ice conditions in the river estuaries and in the Heligoland Bight remain unchanged.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 1 Feb. the COBRA laid flanking mine fields 5 and 6 as planned. In the sea area off Kirkenes, Bugoe Fjord, Jar Fjord, and Kjoe Fjord were mined according to plan. Similarly a mine field was laid off the Selboe and Bjoerne Fjords in the Bergen area.

On 1 Feb. 8 vessels of the 11th Subchaser Flotilla made port in Bergen. The Norwegian tanker PARAT (50 GRT) sank south of Bastoe because of damages sustained in the ice. The icebreaker THOR II is being employed for oil shipments between Steilene and Oslo.

According to a report from the Ordnance Division, War Economy Branch, the high-grade iron ore mine at South Varanger near Kirkenes has been shut down because the 2,000 tons of coal per month necessary for its operation have not been delivered. Since accumulated supplies of ore will last for more than 3 years if they are shipped at the rate of 151,300 tons per year as in 1941, there is danger of losing the staff of skilled workers who have been painstakingly brought together over a period of 15 years.

It is regrettable that our shipping facilities are not equal to this transport problem.

Copy of a brief report regarding the Norway situation which the Commanding Admiral, Norway made to the Chief, Naval Staff on 2 Feb., as per 1/Skl 2660/42 Gkdos., is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Group North calls the attention of the Naval Staff to the foreword of the ice report No. 40 of the German Naval Observatory, according to which ice conditions have become even more critical than is usual in mid-February of a very severe winter. Since in very severe winters ice conditions in the Baltic Sea are at their worst during March (when the surface water reaches its lowest temperature), even a moderate continued frost can be expected to freeze the Baltic Sea to a degree not yet experienced in this century. Never in all its history has the German ice observation service witnessed ice conditions as bad as these.

The steamer DONAU froze fast in the ice north of Hesseloe while en route to Oslo. The icebreaker CASTOR has not yet been able to free the ship. The icebreaker EISBAER made port in Copenhagen.

The steamer ABRAID of the 5th group, and the 6th transport group of



the 7th Mountain Division should reach Hango by 2 Feb.

Possession of the islands in the Gulf of Finland is so important for checkmating the Russian fleet that it is planned in spite of misgivings to occupy them with naval personnel after they have been captured by the Army. Corresponding instructions were sent to the Armed Forces High Command and the High Command, Army via the Naval Liaison Officers through Telegram 1313, with the remark that only the 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion, which is now being requested by the Northern Army Group for coastal defense missions, is available for this operation. These troops cannot participate in the assault on the islands, since they lack the necessary specialized training. The Admiral, Baltic Countries states that the 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion is at this time in Reval, comprising about 800 men, including 170 men returning via Riga. They have small arms and heavy weapons but not much transportation equipment. They could be transferred in 2 days' time. Replacement personnel is to be sent by the Second Admiral, Baltic Station from Memel on 12 Feb.

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## V. Submarine Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Little to moderate air reconnaissance in the rendezvous area. Radio monitoring reports that the steamer CORRIRIA was torpedoed in quadrant BD 71 on the American coast, and that the Dutch tanker CORILLA was torpedoed 90 miles east of Halifax. Halifax relayed a submarine distress signal from an unknown vessel which reported that she was sinking in quadrant DC 27.

### 2. Own Situation:

1 of our submarines spotted and reported the transport LLANGIBBY departing from Horta with an escort of 2 destroyers and 1 corvette, sailing at 11 knots on a 70° course.

3 boats and 3 rafts with 24 Germans and 58 prisoners of war were picked up in the search for survivors of the SPREEWALD. 1 boat with 2 captains, 1 of them the captain of the SPREEWALD, is still missing. The search continues.

We are maintaining contact with the transport convoy southeast of the Bank of Newfoundland, which is sailing at 14 knots on an 80° course.

A supplementary report on the situation may be found in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The five Focke-Wulf 200's employed in the search for survivors of the SPREEWALD have been unsuccessful so far. Armed reconnais-

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sance reported sinking 3 steamers totaling 10,000 GRT and badly damaging one 3,000 GRT steamer out of convoys on the British east coast. A large industrial plant southwest of Leuchars was attacked effectively.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

According to data from the Army General Staff, Intelligence Division, West, which is based on allegedly authentic original documents, former mine fields laid in the Suez Canal have proved most effective. The Canal was blocked for 6 weeks out of 8. The enemy fears supply difficulties through renewed mine laying.

Softened airfields handicapped take-offs of our planes in Cyrenaica, and thus impeded their action.

The torpedo factory at Cala Francese on Malta was raided effectively by two SC 1000's. 2 enemy planes were shot down. Numerous plane wrecks and bomb craters were observed at the airfield in Lucca. The airfield at Halfar was attacked repeatedly in the evening. Aerial photographs show 95 planes at the 4 airfields on Malta: Lucca, Gudia, Halfar, and Cala Francese. 3 other airfields, including Venezia, were unoccupied.

This shows that the island has not yet been paralyzed as far as aircraft is concerned.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

A DIDO class cruiser reached Gibraltar from the west. On 1 and 2 Feb. 2 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, 10 submarines, and 6 merchantmen were lying to in Valletta.

Surface vessels and submarines have also not been driven from their base in spite of continuous air raids by the German and the Italian Air Forces.

No further reports are available.

2. Situation Italy:

An Italian convoy bound for Messina was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine at the southern entrance to the Strait of Messina. The depth charges dropped by a torpedo boat were probably effective. On 1 Feb. an enemy submarine attacked an Italian convoy bound for Patras near the island of Leukas. The steamer ABSISTER was hit by a torpedo. The crew abandoned ship.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer NAPOLI is still anchored off Susa. The steamer BATTISTA was beached east of Tripoli. The other transports proceeded



according to schedule without unforeseen incidents.

In his report concerning the situation in Benghazi on 1 Feb. the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, North Africa demands that our steamers unload in Benghazi. A landing craft must be provided to be used as a lighter until further equipment is brought up and a channel free of mines is established. The naval radio station at Benghazi has been incorporated into the broadcasting system of the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports (see Telegram 2001).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

According to the report of the Naval Attache, the tanker ALBARO has left Istanbul, and she passed Canakkale during the morning of 2 Feb. There is no report so far about her rendezvous with torpedo boat LUPO.

A subchaser flotilla and 3 vessels left Piraeus on 1 Feb. on a sub-chasing mission. The net barrage at Candia was moved 25 meters by a storm on 27 and 28 Jan. Mine sweeper L "22" ran aground near Mudros. L "15" is being salvaged.

See Telegram 2150 for the message from the Foreign Office concerning the ships DUMLUPINAR and TUN and their distinguishing characteristics; they are to substitute in the transport of food to Greece for the steamer CURTULUS, that was sunk.

Group South and the Admiral, Aegean Sea are informed by the Naval Staff, Operations Division.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance over Sevastopol during the morning reported heavy incoming and outgoing traffic of merchant and naval vessels up to the size of destroyers. The listening service of a country allied to us informed the Air Force as follows: The Admiral of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is probably staying in Batum; the damage which our air raids caused in Tuapse has been repaired and 2 vessels have been raised; and finally, 2 transports were severely damaged in the port of Novorossisk on 29 Dec. In addition, various radio messages lead us to suspect that the Chemical Factory No. 5 in the Donets basin has been transferred to Sverdlovsk.

Own Situation:

In answer to the request of Group South (see War Diary 26 Jan.) the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is establishing a third naval shore command for the Black Sea under the name of Naval Shore Command W; it is also dissolving the Naval Liaison Staff, Bulgaria and placing Varna under the command of the Admiral, Black Sea. Naval Shore Command U will henceforth be known as Naval Shore Command, Crimea, and Naval Shore Command V as Naval Shore Command, Ukraine.

No other reports are available.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

Among other news the U.S. Navy Department announced that surface and air forces made surprise raids on Japanese fleet and air bases on the Marshall and Gilbert islands of Jaluit, Wotje, Kwajalein, Roi, and others. Admiral Nimitz reported that naval air forces and gunfire sank and damaged numerous enemy auxiliary vessels and dealt heavy blows to enemy coastal installations, while the U.S. suffered only slight damage to 2 vessels and lost 11 planes.

The Australians and the Dutch report a fourth air attack on Rabaul, and an enemy landing on Amboina on 31 Jan. with the support of cruisers and destroyers. Batavia reports that a Japanese submarine was sunk by depth charges.

New York estimates Japanese strength in Malaya to be 6 divisions with 100,000 men.

In Tokyo it is thought that enemy resistance in the South Pacific area has become more systematic since air and naval forces are operating jointly. The time of unopposed Japanese advance is past.

2. Situation Japan:

Japanese Headquarters reports the following: Severe enemy losses and damages inflicted by Japanese air attacks on the port of Padang on 27 and 28 Jan., and on Singapore on 27 and 29 Jan; the Japanese occupation of Pamangkat and Samban and the airport at Ledo in the western part of Dutch Borneo after a successful landing on 27 Jan. by a joint Army and Navy operation.

According to reports from the Attaches in Tokyo and Bangkok, the enemy in Burma is withdrawing to new defense lines between Moulmein and Rangoon. In Malaya the Japanese will employ 4 divisions in the attack on Singapore. The dam at Johore has been blown up. 1 Japanese and 1 Dutch submarine were sunk off Balik Papan. The Japanese prepared for a landing on Amboina by heavy air attacks and gunfire from cruisers and destroyers. Enemy strength in the Philippines is estimated at 35,000 men. A Japanese demand for surrender remained unanswered.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Our attack at the 17th Army sector north of Kramatorsk is progressing satisfactorily. Northeast of Dropopolye enemy cavalry succeeded in breaking a gap between 2 of our combat units. Counter-attacks at this point and our own advances in the Kuibyshev valley were successful. In the Donets valley at the 6th Army sector all enemy break-through attempts near Balakleya or south of Krasnograd with the purpose of encircling Kharkov failed due to the stubborn resistance of our infantry.



Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks in the Bolkhov area were repulsed and a small penetration southwest of Byelev was corrected. Heavy enemy artillery fire on the highway between Demyanskoe and Yukhnov. A counterattack closed the gap between 2 of our units west of Medyn. The enemy units and partisans who had penetrated south of Vyazma were forced back to the south. We took 2 villages, 1 of them Blokhina. The Smolensk-Vyazma highway was mopped up and will be available for traffic again as of 3 Feb. On the rest of the Army Group's front our attacks gained varying amounts of territory, while enemy attacks were repulsed. Enemy attacks on Velizh and Velikiye Luki were unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

No fighting near Kholm. Southeast of Staraya Russa, Kolbichina was evacuated in the face of strong enemy pressure. Attacks on Staraya Russa were repulsed, and the enemy suffered heavy losses. In enemy attacks south of Yukhnov, enemy automatic mortars were observed for the first time.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged. The German transportation deputy in Finland reported that all naval shipments will be interrupted for about 6 weeks because of ice conditions. The following units of the 7th Mountain Division have arrived in Finland: The supply troops, the engineer battalion, and 2 companies of a mountain infantry regiment without equipment, horses or vehicles.

3. North Africa:

The enemy withdrew the 11th Indian Division in the direction of Derna. The 5th Brigade, which is retreating near Matuba, was attacked and defeated in the afternoon by our troops 20 kilometers southwest of Derna. The enemy's 1st Armored Division seems to have reached the area of El Mechili. Radio monitoring intercepted the information that the 1st South African Division and the 150th Brigade are being transferred from Marsa Matruh to the area of Tobruk.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The French Legion of Volunteers staged a well-attended anti-Bolshevik rally, during which the Legion was pronounced France's vanguard on the way to her alignment with a new and reunited socialist Europe under Adolf Hitler's leadership. Marshal Petain's adherence to the policy of Franco-German cooperation was noted with satisfaction.

Great Britain:

The resignation of the Sirry cabinet in Egypt is blamed on the friction which the break of diplomatic relations with France caused between King Farouk and the Prime Minister. Sirry was considered very pro-British. He had neglected to obtain the King's approval before he acted.

Australia:

In a speech on 2 Feb., Prime Minister Curtin attacked the indignation which the Australian public shows towards Britain. He attempted to present it as an attempt by enemy propoganda to drive a wedge between mother country and dominion.

Switzerland:

In the course of diplomatic negotiations between the Reich and Switzerland concerning a more decisive stand against the U.S. black list system, the Foreign Office pointed out that it is most essential to show European solidarity towards North America.

Spain:

According to a report from the Embassy, the population gave Franco a cool and indifferent welcome while he was in Catalonia and on his return to Madrid.

Portugal:

According to a report of the Embassy, the recently exposed underground movement against Salazar was organized by liberal circles under the leadership of the former minister of war and by Anglophile legitimists led by the monarchist leader Bela. There is said to be a difference of opinion at the British Embassy as to whether one should overthrow Salazar or try to win him over.

U.S.A.:

In a speech on 2 Feb., Secretary of the Navy Knox pointed out the difficulties which the lack of skilled workers presents to the naval construction program. He said that America needs time to increase her strength to the point which will permit her to wage a two-ocean war. The main task of the fleet, however, is to maintain a steady flow of shipping to Britain and Russia across the Atlantic.

Chile:

Simultaneous with the election of the Popular Front candidate Rios as



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President, it is announced that a treaty was signed according to which the U.S.A. is to purchase almost all of the copper and mercury produced in Chile.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the conference of Field Marshal Milch with the Fuehrer during which it was suggested that raw material allocations for airplane construction be increased at the expense of anti-aircraft artillery production. Since the Fuehrer, in accord with his well-known attitude in this respect, probably will not permit a decrease in the production of anti-aircraft weapons, it must be expected that an attempt will be made to divert Navy raw materials to the Air Force. The Naval Ordnance Division has already inferred from a number of inquiries that have been made that the Armed Forces High Command is considering more reductions. He said that in all other respects the general picture of allocations of raw materials for the Navy is more favorable than was anticipated.

II. The commander of ship "16" stated at one time that according to his observations our submarines had made such extensive use of their radios that the enemy has been greatly aided in his observations. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Branch reports on the results of the investigation conducted with regard to this situation. However, this report does not get to the core of the problem since it concerns only the radio messages known to the Naval Intelligence Branch and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, and does not deal with radio communications of the southern vessels to each other, which Captain Rogge observed. These signals are not strong enough to reach our more distant stations; however, enemy vessels and naval stations in the South Atlantic can intercept them. The Chief, Naval Staff considers it most meritorious that the commander of ship "16" has drawn attention to this problem.

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Situation 3 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Indian Ocean:

A French source reports that U.S.A. torpedo boats were patrolling between Lourenco Marques and Capetown in December. According to radio monitoring, Colombo confirmed submarine distress signals of the British steamer SPONDITUS which reported having been torpedoed about 60 miles west of the southern point of Ceylon.

2. Own Situation:

The continued search for survivors of the SPREEWALD remained unsuccessful.

Radiogram 1231 informed all forces in foreign waters of the results of the Rio conference.

Report on Enemy Situation by Radiogram 1920.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

About noon, air reconnaissance located 2 eastbound convoys with a total of 25 steamers near Land's End.

According to an intelligence report of 18 Jan. from Madrid, the British are said to plan employing submarines to transport tungsten and other valuable metals from Spanish ports. For details see Telegram 1717.

The Naval Staff believes this to be very doubtful.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyers "29" and IHN reached Brest.

Channel Coast:

More mines were swept by the 3rd and 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotillas.

Organization:

The seaworthy vessels of the harbor patrol flotillas are to be transferred to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West as part of Group West's plan to reorganize authority between the Commanding Admiral, France and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

The Naval Staff welcomes this plan. Further details are to be worked out by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Ice conditions have slightly improved.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 2 Feb. enemy air raids on Petsamo and Kirkenes. About



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100 bombs were dropped on Kirkenes. Reports of damage are not available.

Investigations as to the whereabouts of steamer OHLROGGE remain unsuccessful. She is probably lost.

Group North requests that for the present at least 4 large and 2 medium-sized tankers with maximum fuel oil cargo be put at its disposal at the earliest opportunity, so that it may meet the increased supply demands and compensate for the loss of the tanker SAARBURG. (See Telegram 1803.)

The following is an extract from the report of the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning the British attack on Maaloe: The landing was carried out exactly according to the British landing directions in Naval Regulations No. 944. The landing exposed a number of defective preparations or measures on our part, which could, however, be remedied. Examples are the alarm and communications procedures, the position of batteries, preparations for infantry protection, the organization of command, etc. We made valuable observations concerning the effects of enemy artillery and bombing attacks against our coastal batteries and the effectiveness of our 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns against armored assault craft. We can count on making effective hits on ships at sea only with guns from 10.5 cm. and larger. A rapid rate of fire is a prerequisite.

The Naval Staff relayed the observations to all Group Commands; Commanding Admirals; Admirals, Rome and Aegean Sea; Armed Forces High Command; High Command, Army; and Commander in Chief, Air.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Ice conditions are unchanged and still very critical. Goeteborg again reports that the Norwegian ships which have not been seized are planning to depart. However, these reports must be verified.

The Commander, Mine Sweeper Flotillas, North reports that the following troop transports were carried out between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1941:

1. Troop transports to Riga and Libau: 29 transports of 165,787 GRT (15,965 soldiers, 5,443 horses, 2,445 vehicles, 1,870 sleds, 1,270 tons of troop equipment)

2. Troop transports to Finland: 13 transports of 67,104 GRT (6,940 soldiers, 1,845 horses, 1,075 vehicles, 1,992 tons of equipment, 390 prisoners)

3. Movement of men on leave and of recruits between Libau and Neufahrwasser: 30 transports of 92,458 GRT (12,432 men)

4. A grand total of 72 transports of 325,349 GRT.

A Finnish reconnaissance squad clashed with the Russians near Lamanskallio on Hogland. A mine-free sea lane was discovered between Lavansaari and Hogland. A Finnish observation tent was pitched 14 km. south of Someri for watching ship movements between the islands.

On the basis of a corresponding report of the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland, the Naval Staff informs Group North; the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland; the Admiral, Naval Station Danzig; Naval Station Stettin; and Naval Transport and Supply Station, Finland that for the time being troop and supply shipments to Finland must be stopped because of ice conditions between Gotland and the Swedish coast.

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#### V. Merchant Shipping:

The establishment of a joint British-American Shipping Commission has created a kind of large shipping pool which incorporates all vessels within the area under enemy control. Thus it will make no difference with respect to tonnage where a ship is sunk or damaged, since she will have to be replaced from the pool. In practice at any rate, shipping losses suffered in the near future in the Atlantic and the Europe-Africa area will probably be replaced by ships now in the Pacific. One main center of enemy shipping lies in the Red Sea or in the Persian Gulf. In connection with these observations, the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch has drawn up the following figures:

The total cargo space in the area under enemy control, including 700,000 GRT of Russian ships is 33,500,000 GRT.

Subtracting those normally being repaired (1,900,000 GRT), those used for coastal traffic (5,300,000 GRT), and those used for military purposes (6,600,600 GRT), there remain for overseas shipping 19,700,000 GRT. Of these, about 10,000,000 GRT are now supplying Britain directly.

America's entry into the war and the consequent throttling and rearranging of imports will probably, according to the calculations of the War Economy and Armaments Branch, save some 3,200,000 GRT of cargo space. However, most of this will be absorbed by the increased military demands.

In any case, it seems certain that there is sufficient cargo space for supply shipments for the beginning of 1942.

The planned new constructions of about 7,200,000 GRT for this year, and the consistent unified distribution of vessels by the Shipping Commission will no doubt bring about a considerable improvement. In order to do away with the new constructions alone, the Navy and Air Force will have to sink 600,000 GRT per month.

The ships which are now overseas in the French colonies, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and in the Goeteborg traffic, amounting to about 900,000 GRT, will afford a last resource to the enemy.

In 1943 new constructions can be expected to amount to 9,000,000 GRT.

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#### VI. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:



Very little air reconnaissance. Radio monitoring located British vessels 180 miles west-northwest of Brest, 420 miles west of Brest and about 600 miles west of Brest; also a convoy 150 miles south-east of the Faroe Islands, which is being tracked by one of our planes.

Chatham reported that the British mine sweeper SILVERAY (4,535 GRT) was torpedoed off the American east coast in quadrant BB 7415.

## 2. Own Situation:

The search for survivors of the SPREEWALD was continued but without further success. Contact with the LLANGIBBY CASTLE convoy was maintained until evening.

In the evening we also lost touch with the convoy southeast of the Bank of Newfoundland. 1 submarine was able to attack successfully.

In the Mediterranean, also, our submarines attacked the convoy north of the Gulf of Sollum successfully. 1 destroyer was probably sunk, another probably hit.

For a detailed situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

## VII. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

An attack on a convoy of 4 steamers between the Shetlands and the Orkneys was unsuccessful. Lacking ship targets, armed reconnaissance attacked Falmouth as alternative target.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Attacks on the torpedo factory at Cala Francese on Malta were repeated. Fighter defenses made observations impossible. In the night of 2 Feb. we also attacked the torpedo dump at Misida, without clear observation of results. The nuisance raids on Valletta and airports on Malta were continued. In an enemy attack on Palermo and Naples during the night of 2 Feb. the German supply center in the latter city was hit.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Air reconnaissance did not locate any shipping in the southeastern Black Sea. Weather conditions made it difficult to support Army operations from the air, especially in the south. The focal point of attack of the Central Army Group was north of the Yuhnov-Medyn highway. An airfield south of Kaluga was attacked with great success.

### 4. Special Items:

The Air Forces Sea Rescue Service reports: From 1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1941 the Air Force rescued: 1,211 men in combat areas; 111 men in home waters; 1,322 men altogether, of which 546 are Air Force personnel.

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In 534 cases the rescues were executed by sea rescue planes, in 6 cases by planes of the Commander, Naval Air, in 576 cases by the vessels of the Air Force, and in 156 cases by vessels of the Navy, the Army, and others. The losses of the Air Force Rescue Service amount to 28 dead, 4 missing, and 19 badly injured. We lost 18 sea rescue planes and 1 PT boat.

## VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 2 Feb. the Italian Navy sighted submarines near Otranto, and on 3 Feb. near Cephalonia and north of Kerkenna. Radio monitoring intercepted a British plane tracking 1 of our merchantmen near Lampedusa and 1 of our planes tracking an eastbound enemy convoy off Tobruk.

### 2. Situation Italy:

Unchanged.

### 3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

### 4. Area Naval Group South:

#### Aegean Sea:

Tanker ALBARO joined our convoy going to Kavaliani. The "Siena" group, comprising 3 steamers with DRACHE, BARLETTA, and 2 torpedo boats, left Piraeus bound for Suda.

According to a report from Group South, the inadequate number of planes available to the X Air Corps makes the hitherto effective subchasing in the Aegean Sea impossible. In view of the present lack of vessels suitable for subchasing, it is essential that aerial subchasing be intensified so that the renewed and increased danger from submarines may be suppressed. The Naval Staff relays this request to the Commander in Chief, Air, Operations Staff recommending that, in the interest of the supply situation in the Aegean area and Crete, the demand for planes from Group South be complied with as far as possible. (See Telegram 2121.)

The Naval Staff was informed of the report of Group South to the Navy High Command, Naval Construction Division that 100 auxiliary sailing vessels can easily be provided for the Admiral, Aegean Sea and 50 for the Admiral, Black Sea to cover their needs, and that in general construction of auxiliary sailing vessels, particularly those of 350 tons, is most desirable (see Telegram 1205).

#### Black Sea:

Nothing to report.



5. Situation France:

The Naval Staff recommends that the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff approve the transfer and repair of the battleship DUNKERQUE as requested by the French at the German Armistice Commission.

IX. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

British troops on Malaya were able to withdraw without interference and cross the Johore dam in perfect order. Malayan units were left behind unarmed. In Burma 2/3 of the population of Rangoon have been evacuated. According to Reuter, 9 enemy planes and 1 British plane were shot down during air combat near Balik Papan.

2. Situation Japan:

Japanese Headquarters reports an attack by enemy vessels, including carriers, cruisers, and destroyers in the Marshall Islands area. (See War Diary 2 Feb., Enemy Situation.) Japanese forces severely damaged 1 cruiser and other enemy vessels. 1 Japanese auxiliary vessel was slightly damaged. No other ships or shore installations were damaged.

According to the report from the Japanese Naval Attache, Japanese submarines are arranged in the following 4 groups:

1. Sea area Hawaii - San Francisco - San Diego. Should there be sufficient submarines, some will proceed to the area off Panama.
2. In the Coral Sea and the Tasman Sea.
3. South of Java.
4. In the Bay of Bengal, including Ceylon.

It is planned to shift the focal point to the Indian Ocean after operations in the South Seas and against the Dutch East Indies have progressed further.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

The situation in the Crimea and at the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group remains unchanged. Our attacks gained territory at the 6th and 2nd Army sectors. An enemy attack south of Balakleya and Kroszorovka were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

Vigorous fighting in the pocket south and west of Byelev. The situation along the highway is tense. Supply is possible only by single vehicles. The attacking wedges which are to close the gap west of Medyn have established contact with each other. Our tank formations are surrounding and attacking the enemy advancing southwest of Vyazma. An enemy attack was repulsed west of Moscow and near Rzhev. In an attack towards the west between Rzhev and Sychevka we took 19 villages. There is no news from one of our units which is surrounded near Dimidov.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy pressure on the positions near Kholm and Staraya Russa continues. A Russian attack south of Yamno was repulsed with heavy losses.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The general situation remains unchanged. There was some fighting on the islands in the Gulf of Finland. See Situation Baltic Sea.

3. North Africa:

The 4th Indian Division withdrew towards the south. The 1st Armored Division withdrew from El Mechili about 40 km. to the east. In the triangle Tobruk-Ain El Gazala-Bir Hakheim, 1 armored division, the 4th Indian Division, the 70th Division, 2 armored brigades, and 5 other brigades seem to be forming a British defense line. German forces advanced to the Via Balbia near Martuba.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Eden informed the Lower House about the Anglo-Abyssinian treaty of 31 Jan. 1942 concerning the British stabilization loan and military convention. According to this convention British troops will remain in Abyssinia for strategic purposes and in order to transport Italian prisoners of war out of the country. The Abyssinian Army will be equipped with captured materiel. A law for the abolition of slavery is to be drawn up with the aid of British legal officials. The independence and the borders of the country are to remain untouched.

During a debate in the Upper House concerning India the government declared itself ready to hand over the administration as soon as all Indians show themselves willing to cooperate. As regards the demands of the All-India Congress it must be remembered that half of the Indian soldiers are Mohammedans who want to have nothing to do with these demands. The country cannot be given self-government, however, unless the leaders agree among themselves.

It's the same old story!

Eire:

De Valera declared that after 2 1/2 years of war the fight is really just beginning, and that 4 more years of increasing hardships must be anticipated. The Irish will defend their liberty against anyone.

U.S.S.R.:

According to the report of a Bulgarian diplomat the Russian people are depressed but show no opposition to Stalin. The Army is well equipped and well disciplined. He added that numerous troop transports are still arriving from Siberia in the area of Kuybishev.

According to reports from prisoners of war, the food situation in Leningrad is terrible. Daily rations are 125 gm. bread, 5 gm. of vegetable fat, and 25 gm. of groats. Each noon some water soup is distributed from a soup kitchen in return for fat and groats coupons. Factory workers receive 250 gm. of bread. Almost all cats and dogs have been eaten up.

Bulgaria:

According to a report from the Embassy the government and the people are reconciled to the idea that Bulgaria will have to fight Turkey under the new European order. Therefore they do not want to waste their strength in a war against Russia. Aside from this, many people sympathize with Russia and believe in communism, in spite of the generally accepted cooperation with Germany.

Argentina:

The government, especially Vice President Castillo, claims to have prevented a full success of the U.S.A. at the Rio conference by clever

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diplomacy, in the interest of future freedom of action for Argentina. In any case, they say that Argentina is determined not to follow Brazil's example and that she will forego taking any drastic measures against Germans in the country, come what may.

Japan:

According to the report from a reliable agent, a Russo-Japanese war is expected to break out during March or April of this year. In East Asiatic circles a separate peace at some future date between Japan on the one hand and the U.S.A. and China on the other is still considered possible.

Thailand:

The Prime Minister declared that Thailand will continue to render strong support to Japan. He has not yet lost hope of informing Chiang Kai Shek of Japan's real intentions, however.

South Africa:

According to press reports, the Senate voted down the declaration of independence 20 to 5.

Finland:

In his speech at the opening of Parliament Prime Minister Ryti stated among other things that the Finnish war is clearly developing more and more into a war for the defense of the entire North. A Sweden with a strong economy and a strong army is important for Finland. Germany, however, is the only great power which has exactly the same interests in the East as Finland. The difference between their internal political and social forms should not be allowed to have any influence on their relations with one another. Finland considers it understood that no outsiders are to interfere with her internal affairs.

Spain:

According to press reports the question of Suner's resignation either from his post as Chief of the Party Council or as Foreign Minister is being discussed once more. It is probable that he will give up his office in the party.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Naval Staff, Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports that the Japanese have inquired as to Germany's attitude if they should occupy Portuguese Timor. The German reply points out that such a step would have undesirable repercussions with regard to the occupation of the Portuguese and Spanish islands in the Atlantic.

II. The Naval Staff, Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports on the French request to the Armistice Commission to stop dismantling the DUNKERQUE and to transfer the ship to Toulon for structural and engine repairs. The Italians have already given their con-



sent. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the suggestion of the Naval Staff to recommend approval of this request at the Armed Forces High Command. (See War Diary 3 Feb.)

III. According to the report of Captain von Puttkamer, the Fuehrer has suggested that the POTSDAM and the GNEISENAU be used as troop transports to Norway. The 2 ships are now being used as living quarters for submarine crews in Hamburg. It will take 3 to 4 weeks to get them ready to sail again. The Fuehrer also brought up the question of intensifying warfare on supply traffic by abandoning any consideration for the crews of the enemy steamers. The Navy does not wish to approach this point on its own initiative for obvious reasons - among other things the effect which such a policy would have on our crews.

IV. The Commander in Chief, Navy has informed the Fuehrer directly about the general aspects of his discussion with Admiral Darlan. This eliminates the necessity of an additional report.

V. The Naval Intelligence Division reports on the restriction in the distribution of foreign news received by the Foreign Office from the Seehaus service. This makes it impossible for the branches of the Armed Forces to obtain the necessary comprehensive view of the overall situation. In this connection the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff says that this problem has already been presented to the Armed Forces High Command, but without success. The Chief, Naval Staff is willing to speak to the Fuehrer about the matter.

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Special Items:

I. Situation Norway: The Commanding Admiral, Norway presented an extensive report as of 8 Jan. on the strategic situation in Norway, and consequently the tasks of the Navy and the conclusions to be drawn by the Navy. Starting with the strategic importance of Norway, he sketched briefly the possible operations by the 3 branches of the Armed Forces. It was pointed out that the Navy will be unable to fulfill its duties because it lacks the necessary forces. The country's importance to Germany's war economy and the problem of political conquest of the Norwegian people were touched on. As a most important strategic factor in the war against Great Britain, Norway offers the enemy a continual provocation for attacks for the purpose of eliminating the danger to Britain from this German stronghold, of tying down heavy German forces, and of reinforcing Russian defenses in the north. From the offensive point of view such operations by the enemy might have the effect of throttling the entire German ship traffic in the North Sea area, capturing economically valuable areas and establishing a political and military connection with Sweden. Since the present enemy situation definitely provides opportunities for accomplishing these plans, the Commanding Admiral, Norway believes an attack more than probable, in the form of a Russian offensive via Finland combined with a British naval attack. Judging by an investigation of the possible points of attack, the main blow may be expected to strike against the Narvik sector beginning at Harstad, and against Kirkenes-Petsamo. Concerning our defensive readiness, the situation analysis discussed the value of using naval forces, PT boats, and submarines, and pointed out the effectiveness of extensive mine fields. In view of these weak forces at the disposal of naval warfare, the



report demands the development of a coastal defense aimed at forming a new Siegfried line, with all the necessary construction, supply sources, and the like which are necessary to this goal. The report then states in detail how far, in spite of all the work accomplished up to now, the Navy's present defensive preparations are still removed from the requirements and plans. The measures necessary to carry out the Fuehrer's Directive No. 37, as reported to the Armed Forces High Command by the Naval Staff, are in part impossible to fulfill, and can in part be fulfilled only to a limited extent or are not anywhere near sufficient to relieve the critical situation because they cannot be executed in time. The Commanding Admiral, Norway regards with great anxiety the development of the supply situation and particularly the supply of the Mountain Corps, as well as the decrease in strength of Army units and the air forces in the Norwegian area, since this shifts the entire load of the defense more and more onto the shoulders of the inadequate naval forces. In conclusion he states as follows: "The defense of Norway has reached a critical stage at present. An attack would not have to be very strong to break it. Even though the present world situation is causing the enemy severe difficulties, we must anticipate a major attack on Norway some day, probably soon."

On 26 Jan. Group North states in detail its opinion on this issue, stating that the original plan for operation "Barbarossa" had intentionally avoided using our surface vessels in the Arctic area in order not to challenge the enemy to countermeasures or attacks. However, the prerequisite for this move was the immediate capture of Murmansk. It was the failure of the Army's plans on this point which brought about the changed situation which forces us to take very extensive measures today with which we may hope to decrease the danger of a large enemy action which would probably be directed against the area between the Lofoten Islands and Petsamo; we cannot, however, be sure that we can prevent such an attack altogether.

Group North correctly recognizes that a basic change in the conditions in northern Norway can be brought about only if the Army reaches the goals set in 1941 as soon as possible, and thereby deprives the enemy of the bases for attack. The Group also rightly sees an essential operational goal in the demolition of all Russian naval and commercial harbors. This concerns the harbors in the Norwegian Sea and the Arctic Ocean as well as those in the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, just as in the south the Russian supply shipments cannot be stopped by the mere capture of Sevastopol. This estimate of the situation concludes quite correctly that we must reach the old goals in the North during the approaching warm season, since it is most doubtful otherwise whether we shall be able to meet the transportation and escort demands during the winter of 1942-43 in the same manner as heretofore.

For the estimate of the situation by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, Report No. Gkdos. 295 AI Chfs. (1/Skl op 130 Gkdos. Chfs.), and the position of Group North, Report No. 70/42 Gkdos. Chfs. (1/Skl op 232/42 Gkdos. Chfs.), see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

II. The Walther Submarines Project: On 3 Feb. the Naval Construction Division and the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff reported on this project to the Commander in Chief, Navy, after having reached an agreement with the viewpoint of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines on 18 Jan.

The following models are in the final blueprint stage:



V 200 (a smaller boat)V 300 (Atlantic boat)

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <p>1. <u>Armament:</u></p> <p>2 torpedo tubes<br/>4 torpedoes</p> <p>2. <u>Engines &amp; Motors:</u></p> <p>2 turbines for intermittent operation<br/>1 Diesel engine<br/>1 electric generator for crawling</p> <p>3. <u>Speed:</u></p> <p>Underwater speed is 25-26 knots for 4 hours<br/>Underwater speed is 18 knots for 9 hours</p> <p>4. <u>Cruising range:</u></p> <p>Surface range at 9 knots - 1,500 miles<br/>Surface range at 6 knots - 2,500 miles</p> | <p>1. <u>Armament:</u></p> <p>2 torpedo tubes<br/>6 torpedoes</p> <p>2. <u>Engines &amp; Motors:</u></p> <p>2 turbines for intermittent operation<br/>2 Diesel engines<br/>2 electric motors</p> <p>3. <u>Speed:</u></p> <p>Underwater speed is 19 knots<br/>(at 50 m. depth only 16 knots)<br/>Surface speed is 9.3 knots</p> <p>4. <u>Cruising range:</u></p> <p>Underwater range at top speed - 205 miles in 10.8 hours<br/>Surface range at 9.3 knots - 2,330 miles<br/>Surface range at 6.5 knots - 4,000 miles</p> |
|---|--|

The Naval Construction Division proposes to construct one V 300 and two V 200's as experimental vessels, but with only 5 m. torpedo tubes. (Completion by 1 Jan. 1944.)

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines approves the project of the V 200; here the underwater speed of 25-26 knots for 4 hours and the surface cruising range of 1,500 miles at 9 knots and 2,500 miles at 6 knots are particularly important.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines comments very favorably on this plan and considers its accomplishment of decisive importance. He believes that we must even accept a decrease in the construction of C VII boats in favor of the Walther submarines. He demands that work on one V 300 and two V 200 experimental boats be started immediately, the latter by Blohm and Voss.

Decision of the Chief, Naval Staff: The decisive importance of the Walther project is recognized. Whether these boats can still be put to practical use during this war is not certain. However it is the duty of the Navy to do everything possible to further this new project, which could change the conditions of submarine warfare decisively to our advantage. Therefore the following measures are to be undertaken:

1. Two V 200's and one V 300 are to be constructed as experimental vessels as soon as possible.

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2. Due to the present lack of 5 m. torpedoes for the time being provision must be made for both 7 m. and 5 m. torpedoes.

3. Concerning their assignment to shipyards (at Blohm and Voss or at Luebeck) the decision will be made in 3 weeks.

4. The construction of C VII's at Blohm and Voss is not to be interrupted.

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Situation 4 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to an agent's report of 3 Feb. from Bissau, numerous naval and merchant vessels are lying to in Freetown, Bathurst, and Lagos for the transport of troops, probably to the Far East. Convoys are expected to depart within the next few days.

Indian Ocean:

2 distress signals on 4 Feb. from Colombo and the Bay of Bengal indicate that armed merchant raiders are still harassing merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean.

2. Own Situation:

The ELSA ESSBERGER encountered 20 ships in all in the Pacific and the Atlantic during her voyage from 16 Nov. 1941 to 11 Jan. 1942. Information to all vessels in foreign waters including points where enemy vessels were sighted by Radiogram 1532.

Report on enemy situation by Radiogram 0551.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

An enemy plane was shot down in quadrant BF 5215. The commanding officer of the plane was taken prisoner.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla operated during the night of 4 Feb. without results. No enemy vessels were sighted. For a brief report



see Telegram 0840. A convoy of 2 auxiliary coastal sailing vessels proceeding from Alderney to Cherbourg, which had not been reported to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, has not arrived at its destination. Contrary to orders there were troops aboard. The naval signal station at Cap de la Hague observed gunfire at sea at 0140 and a subsequent distress signal, so that the loss of the vessels must be anticipated.

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### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring located an unidentified British vessel, probably a submarine, about 85 miles west-southwest of Stadland. A British plane reported 1 of our submarines off North Foreland, later off South Foreland.

##### Own Situation:

Ice situation: Heavy drift ice before river estuaries and off the islands. Navigation is possible in most cases only for large steamers, at times only with the aid of icebreakers. The northbound convoy, which was icebound, was freed and continued its voyage. Mine-sweeping activities on mine field I in preparation for operation "Cerberus" could not be continued because of ice conditions. Sea lanes were swept by mine-detonating vessels "145" and "147". Mine sweeper "1408" has been raised.

#### 2. Norway:

##### Enemy Situation:

In the morning radio monitoring located a number of patrol vessels, probably Russian, approaching the White Sea and 1 vessel northeast of Svanvik. At noon, air reconnaissance located 9 fishing schooners off Torshaven on various courses and reported that Bear Island is surrounded by ice.

##### Own Situation:

Only 11 instead of 100 high-explosive bombs were counted in the enemy air raid on Kirkenes reported on 3 Feb. During the night of 3 Feb. enemy planes raided Kirkenes again. The medical supply depot was burned out. On 4 Feb. there was enemy air activity over Petsamo. On 3 Feb. the mine sweeper PARIS cut and detonated a Russian inertia contact mine in quadrant 7294 AC (where the steamer INGOE sank). Since 3 Feb. about 1,300 fishing schooners have been fishing for herring between Floroe and Stavanger. The icebreaker CASTOR and the troop transport DONAU arrived in Oslo.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway intends to employ the OSTMARK, which is to be placed at his disposal after she is repaired, to transport mines from Swinemuende to the northern area.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Finland, the Norwegian steamers in Goeteborg are expected to depart, probably on 5 or 6 Feb. They will be met by British naval forces off Lysekil. According to the observations of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, the ships which have not been seized, of which 5 are in Goeteborg, 5 in Malmoe, and 1 in Landskrona, are not to leave before authorities have a court decision as to the rightful ownership of these vessels.

2. Own Situation:

Ice situation: In the Skagerrak the drift ice in the open sea reaches westward almost as far as the southern point of Norway. There is occasional pack ice in the Kattegat. In the Great Belt and the Samsøe Belt the east wind has started parts of the ice cover moving. However, the conditions in general are still most difficult. The Gjedser-Warnemuende ferry is operating under difficulties.

The patrol line in the Skagerrak is again being guarded by 2 patrol boats. The icebreaker EISBAER will require 4 days in Copenhagen for boiler repairs. Group North has ordered that the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN be repaired with all possible means, even if only 2 boiler rooms can be used and the speed is reduced correspondingly.

The Army General Staff has requested that the 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion be used for coastal defense. In the opinion of the Naval Staff, Operations Division this request can not be refused, since the unit is in an area which is endangered by possible Russian landings. The Commander in Chief, Navy has agreed. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is informed of this standpoint and is asked to inform the Army General Staff and to arrange further details. However, it must be pointed out that the unit comprises the skeleton for a larger unit to be set up, which is to be employed for the occupation of the islands in the Gulf of Finland. (See Letter 1515.)

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V. Merchant Shipping:

The Goeteborg traffic continued without friction throughout Dec. 1941 and Jan. 1942 in spite of the entrance into the war of the U.S.A. and Japan. Only 2 ships the cargo of which was intended for Central America had to sail to South America in ballast. A survey of the Swedish ships and their cargo which entered and left the area under German control, as well as a report on Swedish merchant ships outside of the German control area, and on Dutch tonnage in the southeast Asia traffic, which is estimated at 950,000 GRT, is in Report No. 4/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

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VI. Submarine Warfare



1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a German submarine was rammed and sunk on 3 Feb. by escort vessels of the steamer LLANGIBBY CASTLE 1 mile south of the island Pico (Azores). The crew was machine-gunned while swimming in the water. Only 1 officer was saved. Several British warships were on patrol near the Azores since a convoy is expected.

No corresponding report is as yet available from our side.

Reykjavik broadcast a submarine warning for the Denmark Strait after a plane sighted a submarine. A subchaser reported sighting another submarine in the Iceland area. This report was followed by extensive radio traffic. According to an intelligence report from Spain, the troop transports BATORY and CHROBRY with troops aboard arrived in Gibraltar from the west escorted by 3 destroyers. It was observed from Ceuta during the night of 2 Feb. that a considerable number of depth charges were dropped in the Strait of Gibraltar.

Radio monitoring intercepted a directive sent from the American east coast to the Norwegian steamer SPERO, ordering her to proceed alone if she does not meet the convo- (probably HX). It also intercepted reports from the same source that the Panamanian steamer SAN GIL (3,627 GRT) was torpedoed about 55 miles south-southeast of Cape May, and that the U.S. steamer COLLAMER was being pursued by a submarine about 300 miles south-southwest of Bermuda. The steamer SINCLAIR was hit by a torpedo and went up in flames about 65 miles northeast of Charleston. The steamer TRONTOLITE (7,115 GRT) was attacked about 750 miles east of Cape Hatteras. A distress signal of this steamer, at the same location but under the name MONTROLITE (11,309 GRT) was relayed by another station. The U.S. tanker W.W. BRUCE was pursued by a vessel lying low in the water (evidently a submarine) 140 miles northeast of Charleston.

2. Own Situation:

We lost touch with the transport LLANGIBBY CASTLE. Continuing the search for survivors of the SPREEWALD, 3 departing submarines were ordered to search quadrants BE 58, 82, and 85 on 5 Feb. and then to proceed on their voyage. On the evening of 4 Feb. the vessels in the search area were instructed to return to their assigned positions. A plane is to pick up a shipwrecked person who is seriously ill. 1 submarine operating in the area from Vara to Cape Hatteras reports sinking 4 steamers of 31,785 GRT in all. The boat encountered heavy north-south traffic and moderate air patrol activity northeast of Cape Hatteras. The point of intersection of traffic for Britain coming from Cape Hatteras and South America bound for convoy assembly areas is presumed to fall in quadrant CB 50.

Further submarine situation reports in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

In answer to an inquiry of the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports as follows:

1. In view of the ice situation in the Baltic Sea, the submarines which are ready to be used at the front are to be transferred to the western Baltic to perform work still outstanding (Kiel 21 boats, Hamburg 5, Stettin 4, Luebeck 2, and Wilhelmshaven 1).

2. Training vessels should primarily complete work still outstanding, so as to make the most of prevailing ice conditions (Koenigsberg 9 boats, Danzig 2, at the 27th Submarine Flotilla 7 boats).

Training at the Submarine Training Divisions continues.

Concerning the occupation of the Norwegian area, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines suggests employing the submarines being completed in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, which are almost if not entirely ready for action, the number used to be decided by the Naval Staff. Of these the following will become available during February: U "436", U "456", U "251", U "377", U "403", U "405", U "592", U "88", U "589", U "593", U "594"; after these, additional submarines which are being completed in Kiel.

The possibilities for submarine bases in Norway lie in Bergen, Trondheim, Tromsø, and Kirkenes. They will permit stationing 16 to 19 vessels, supplying 13 to 15, and completely overhauling 5 submarines.

The Naval Staff agrees with the reported measures and plans, and orders that Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø (or Narvik) each be occupied by 2 submarines that are ready for action, if possible by 15 Feb. Besides, the submarines in the Arctic Ocean should be increased to 6, as ordered. The Naval Staff informs Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway of this directive, with a copy to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

Copy of the corresponding telegrams as per 1/Skl Iu 240/42 Gkdos. Chefs. and 1/Skl Iu 262/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

By operations order "Westindien" of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, the submarines U "67", U "129", U "156", U "161", and U "502" are selected for a simultaneous surprise attack off the main bases of Aruba and Curacao on the ship traffic in the direct vicinity of the West Indies. The submarines receive the order to report fuel situation and location by short signal on crossing 40° W. On the basis of these reports the Commanding Admiral, Submarines will determine the date of the first simultaneous attack. The Naval Staff informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines on 1 Feb. that this operation can be carried out according to plan, since political considerations relating to the Rio conference are no longer necessary.

## VII. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids on Malta were continued. The detonation of a bomb mine type 1000 at the submarine base in Valletta was observed. 6 more bomb mines type 1000 were dropped without observation of results. 2 enemy fighters were shot down east of Malta.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Effective action on all army fronts. In particular roads



were strafed during heavy night action; aside from this there were attacks on the airport near Kaluga, and on railway and industrial targets in Gorki and Rybinsk.

4. Organization:

The Air Force General with the Commander in Chief, Navy, on the request of the Naval Staff, attempted without success in Dec. 1941 to clarify with the Air Force Operations Staff the question of whether the development of carrier planes must be started anew, since it is not feasible to try to adapt planes from present production. The Quartermaster General merely reported on 23 Dec. that the Commander in Chief, Air would make available to the Commander in Chief, Navy fifty BF 109 T's, four Ju 87 C's, and thirteen F1 167's for the carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN. This number of carrier planes, which would at best suffice for the first preliminary tests, is not sufficient to justify the Commander in Chief, Navy in completing the aircraft carrier, since he will probably receive no more planes after the preliminary tests.

The Commander in Chief, Air believes that further construction of the above types is impossible. In view of this fact, the Naval Staff asks the Commander in Chief, Air, Operations Staff and the Minister of Aviation for information as to whether new investigations of technical nature have meanwhile shown other possibilities or whether development of new carrier plane models has been ordered.

A copy of the corresponding letter of the Naval High Command as per l/Skl 2389/42 Gkdos. to the Commander in Chief, Air and Minister of Aviation is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

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VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report concerning enemy shipping. An intelligence report states that a state of panic continues to exist in Egypt. Wild rumors, e.g., of landings by parachute troops and revolts of Indian troops in Derna are circulating.

2. Own Situation:

In the night of 3 Feb. 2 of our submarines attacked an east-bound enemy convoy or destroyer group in the area north of Gulf of Sollum. Both boats reported hits. 1 destroyer was most likely sunk.

3. Situation Italy:

On 3 Feb. a British submarine attacked and slightly damaged an Italian patrol vessel near Cephalonia by gunfire.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

In the afternoon of 3 Feb. an enemy submarine torpedoed the steamer NAPOLI off Susa. The ship is afloat and is to be beached or towed in. Otherwise nothing to report.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

During the evening of 3 Feb. the tanker ALBARO was temporarily grounded west of Euboea, and then continued her voyage to Piraeus. The "Siena" group arrived in Suda at noon.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance without new observations.

Own Situation:

At the conference on 14-15 Jan. in Garmisch, Admiral Riccardi offered to deliver for use in the Black Sea 4 small submarines of type CB at once and 2 more later, as well as 4 tourist motor boats in the first part of May 1942. In addition the Italian Navy offered 4 of their PT boats, which are too wide for railway transportation but can be sent to the Danube via the Rhone and the Rhine after the ice has melted. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and the Naval Staff, Submarine Division will take the necessary steps. Concerning midget submarines the Italian Navy seemed to have little inclination to provide this type for the Black Sea. At the moment it has allegedly only 6 men trained for these vessels.

IX. Situation East Asia:

According to the report of 3 Feb. from the Military Attache in Bangkok, the Japanese are achieving especially good results with demoralizing night attacks along the Burma front. Japanese air attacks were directed against the east and west coasts of Borneo with the focal point at Pontianak, and against the islands south of Singapore.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

According to statements by prisoners of war, a large-scale attack is to be launched in the Crimea. A temporary enemy penetration on the northern part of the front was mopped up by a counterattack. The Von Kleist Army Group drove back the enemy while advancing on Aleksandropol. Enemy attacks west of Slavyansk and near Krish-topovka were repulsed. On the 6th Army sector the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines north of Balakleya. The situation is tense.

Central Army Group:

Combat continues in the area west and southwest of Byelev. We withdrew our positions east of Yukhnov. We are continuing to close



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the pocket west of Medyn. The enemy enclosed in a pocket near Vyazma is being annihilated. In an attack toward the west in the Rzhev area we took several villages. Enemy attacks on the other front sectors were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy pressure on our positions east of Staraya Russa. Enemy concentrations between Yamno and Novgorod were broken up by artillery fire. Enemy units which broke through northwest of Novgorod were shattered.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No important change in the situation. In the sector of the Mountain Corps, Norway air reconnaissance observed unusually heavy motor traffic on the enemy supply road to the Murmansk front on 2 Feb. This might indicate an impending enemy attack.

3. North Africa:

The enemy seems to be building a defensive front under camouflage along a line extending from Ain el Gazala to the south. On 4 Feb. our combat groups gained the area west of Ain el Gazala while pursuing the enemy.

In the evening of 3 Feb. we took Derna.

During Jan. 1942 the following were destroyed or captured: About 370 tanks and armored cars, 193 guns, 122 motor vehicles, generally armored, and 50 planes which were shot down by Army units. 3,300 prisoners were taken.

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Items of Political Importance

Germany-Poland:

According to foreign press reports the German administration in Poland has ordered that all the inhabitants of Poland who are not German citizens shall henceforth be considered stateless.

France:

According to a report of the Embassy in Paris, both the U.S.A. and Japan are at the moment trying hard to make the French Government take a definite stand in favor of either one or the other of the belligerents. The French Foreign Ministry believes that France must straddle the fence as long as possible since she would risk losing her colonies if she should decide for either side.

Great Britain:

On 4 Feb. a change was brought about in the British cabinet. Beaverbrook was made Minister of War Production and will in this capacity belong to the inside circle of the war cabinet. It is noteworthy that Cripps has not as yet received a portfolio.

Portugal:

According to an Embassy report, Salazar has declined all conferences with Britain concerning Timor until a withdrawal of Allied troops has once more restored her sovereignty. Portuguese troops have been ordered to proceed to Timor. The offer of a British naval vessel as escort was refused.

U.S.A.:

Secretary of the Navy Knox declared that it will take considerable time before the U.S.A. will be able to take the initiative against the Axis powers on the high seas. The main thing at the moment is to hold the present positions.

Chile:

According to a report of the German Embassy in Rome, the Chilean Ambassador there, who himself is close to the Red front in his country, told Count Ciano that he is convinced that Chile will continue to follow the same policies as heretofore, and that she wishes under all circumstances to avoid breaking off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.

Egypt:

Mahumed Halein Bey was put in charge of the organization of the government. The Wafd party has decided in principle to join a national coalition cabinet, but it makes its cooperation depend on new elections.



Syria:

According to the Daily Telegraph, British authorities are installing new fortifications along the border between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria so as to prevent the Germans from pushing forward to Mosul. According to a report from Ankara, numerous prominent members of the so-called National Arab Group in Syria were imprisoned.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The German Armistice Commission reports on the provisional French Army and the labor service. The German-French agreement according to which the French are to deliver 5/6 of their plane production to Germany, has been modified to the advantage of the French for the first year (to 1 Jul. 1942) so that they are, as an exception, to receive 40% of the yearly output, i.e., 500 planes. In return for this, the French are to deliver 1,600 tons of various tank parts. The motor vehicles which were bought for the German Africa Corps have now been taken over in Tunis.

II. The Naval Staff, Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section reports on the opinion of the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy concerning the inactivation of the staff of the Commander, Naval Air and the suggestion to subordinate the Air Commander, North Sea to the 3rd Air Force, in order to have him obtain experience for a possible future naval air force. Group North's opposition to the plan is also reported. (See War Diary 30 Jan.)

The Chief, Naval Staff states his belief that the whole procedure is nothing but the culmination of a carefully prepared plan to place the last remnants of a naval air force entirely in the hands of the Air Force; it has progressed so far that a refusal is now out of the question for objective reasons. He refuses, however, to agree to the proposal of the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy, who did nothing during the entire development of the affair to preserve his own position, which should have been on the side of the Navy; therefore it is unnecessary to discuss the question again, since it has been decided by actual developments.

III. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on Group West's operational directive concerning operation "Cerberus".

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees in principle with the directive and the operational plans of the Group. The Chief, Naval Staff approves certain remarks of the Naval Staff, Operations Division in connection with specific points (e.g., the assumption that it might be necessary to return the ships to Brest, the use of weapons, air escort protection, etc.) and sends them in a telegram to Group West. Copy as per 1/Skl Ia 256/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary Files "Mandarine".

Special Items:

Deliberations on the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Battle-

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ships concerning postponing operation "Mandarine" until the new moon period in March in view of ice conditions in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea have led to the following conclusion:

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships is skeptical about the advisability of letting the battleships, in case it is impossible for them to withdraw into river estuaries, proceed through the North Sea and the Shetland-Bergen area to Trondheim in their present state of combat readiness and training condition. He considers previous training in the Baltic Sea necessary.

The Naval Staff agrees that the risk involved in a transfer of the ships in their present condition is comparatively great. Just as in the Iceland Passage, along the Norwegian coast the ships are exposed to encounters with superior enemy forces, without being adequately prepared for combat. Aside from that, there is a possibility that the situation will develop in a way which requires that the TIRPITZ leave Trondheim in order to support the GNEISENAU, and there will be no fast escort forces for her protection. Therefore such a transfer involves taking a very great risk. In spite of that, the operation cannot be postponed as the Commanding Admiral, Battleships has suggested, particularly since ice conditions are expected to become worse in March, rather than improve. The Naval Staff recognizes in principle the need for training the GNEISENAU group. It would be preferable to train in the Baltic Sea, but ice conditions there might make this impossible. Measures for transferring the ships to Norway immediately following the first part of the operation (as ordered in sk1 Ia 234/42 Chefs.) must therefore be taken in advance, especially since there is a definite danger that river estuaries in the North Sea will become absolutely inaccessible. The transfer of ships that are ready to sail to home waters where ice conditions make training impossible would mean simply wasting time; therefore, the plans for transferring such ships to the northern area must be adhered to.

Transfer to the northern area must be considered as a separate operation for which all requirements such as weather conditions, anti-aircraft protection, etc. must be taken into consideration when Group North makes the necessary preparations.

A corresponding telegram is sent to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, Group North, Group West, and the Fleet Command.

A copy as per 1/Sk1 251/42 Chefs. is in War Diary Files "Mandarine".

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Situation 5 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to Daventry, a U.S. general is to have supreme command over all British and U.S. troops in Trinidad, should the war reach that area.

The German News Agency reports from Lisbon that the Brazilian Govern-



ment has given the U.S. permission to enlarge the port of Natal for military purposes and to station U.S. forces there. The enlarging of the British bases in West Africa at Bathurst, Freetown, Accra, and Lagos is said to be progressing well.

The severe limitation on shipping to South America by the U.S.A. has caused great difficulties to postal service between the South American countries.

Pacific Ocean:

According to the German News Agency, the Japanese Government plans to create new shipping lines in the southern areas, which will however be controlled by the Japanese Navy for the duration of the war.

Reuter reports combat between the armed steamer MONOWAI and an enemy submarine near New Zealand.

According to an Italian report from Santiago, Chile, U.S. destroyers and sea planes, which executed numerous reconnaissance missions along the Chilean coast, departed on 2 Feb., destination unknown.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1901 advised ship "10" of the locations of ships suitable for camouflage purposes.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The Admiralty reported that light naval forces sank 2 German vessels near the Norman Islands.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

A directive is sent by the Naval Staff to the Naval Attaches in Madrid and Lisbon to inform the offices concerned of the probable arrival of a sailing vessel with civilian crew members from the SPREEWALD, and to arrange for their transportation home. The Naval Staff sees no way of preventing the liberation of prisoners in neutral territory. Therefore no measures are to be taken on this point. (See Telegram 1919.)

The Naval Staff sends a directive to the Admiral, France and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with a copy to Group West, asking the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to announce the time and port of arrival of the survivors of the SPREEWALD (24 German crew members and 58 prisoners of war) to the Naval Staff, Group West, and the Admiral, France so that they can be provided for. The survivors are not to know that the SPREEWALD was sunk by one of our own submarines; this knowledge should be limited to the fewest possible people. The prisoners are to be transported to prison camps immediately and are to be isolated there as well as possible. The liberation of any neutrals

should await decision by the Naval Staff. Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed of the arrival of the Italian blockade-runner PIETRO ORSEOLO and the OSORNO, which are expected in Irun and Bordeaux on 21 and 23 Feb. respectively. To protect these 2 ships, submarines have strictest orders not to attack any vessels sailing alone on route "Anton" from 13 Feb. on until further notice. The ORSEOLO is to be brought in like the BURGENLAND.

Copy of directives concerning OSORNO as per 1/Skl Ik 273/42 Gkdos. Chfs. and Ik 274/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Channel Coast:

Search for the auxiliary coastal sailing vessels HERRMANN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN by the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast remained unsuccessful. The vessels had permission to depart only if no troops were aboard. An investigation is being made as to what naval stations were responsible.

The Commander, Destroyers reports as the result of new observations that since an enemy mine field has been located east of route "Lila" it is certain that the HEINEMANN was sunk by 2 mines, and not by a torpedo hit by a PT boat or airplane.

The Commander, Destroyers agrees with the statement of the Commander, 5th Destroyer Flotilla that it is impractical for destroyers to sail through the Strait of Dover during a moonlight night and in a rough sea, since they would thus lose their best defense against PT boats, which is their speed.

The last check of the degaussing gear on the HEINEMANN was made on 24 Jan. 1942. The reasons for not making a change in the degaussing loop as suggested by the degaussing authorities is being investigated. (See Telegram 1440.)

It is noteworthy that in spite of the many mines found in this area only the HEINEMANN was hit, whose degaussing gear was apparently out of order.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Concerning the Fuehrer directive passed on by the Naval Staff (see War Diary 1 Feb.) Group North points out that ice conditions make fuel shipments through the Baltic Sea as well as through Baltic Sea approaches almost impossible. The increased fuel supply can only be sent via the North Sea.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, 26 vessels, of which 2 were large ships of 8,000 to 10,000 GRT, were stationed in the port of Mur-



mansk on the morning of 4 Feb. No shipping traffic along the Murmansk coast as far as Iokanga. The Commanding General, Norwegian Theater notified the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast that fishermen in Karmoe have stated on the basis of supposed reports from Britain that a British raid against herring fishing must be expected soon. The report seems plausible, since for the last 2 weeks increased air activity has been observed over the area of the coastal islands west of Bergen.

Own Situation:

As a defensive measure against a possible enemy raid, the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast suggests temporarily transferring a submarine to the west coast. She should move as conspicuously as possible in the fishing area in order to discourage an enemy attack, since we lack surface forces for protecting the fishermen. The Air Commander, North has been asked to provide plane protection.

In this connection the Commanding Admiral, Norway points to the importance of this problem with regard to the food supply, and requests investigation as to whether one of the submarines intended by the Naval Staff for reinforcing the northern area could not be provided immediately to relieve the urgent need in the area of the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast. (See Telegram 1645.)

The increased air reconnaissance observed by the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast is probably due not only to fishing activities but also to the presence of the TIRPITZ in Norway. However, the Naval Staff fully recognizes the importance of protecting fishing; ways and means will have to be found to do this effectively with the forces at our disposal.

Submarines U "584" and U "585" are south of Bear Island en route to the operational area as planned.

The German steamer KONSUL SCHULTE was torpedoed by an enemy submarine while entering the Porsanger Fjord. Patrol boat FRIESE attacked the submarine with depth charges.

The enemy raided Aalesund on 5 Feb.; slight damage was caused. Enemy air activity over Molde, Kristiansund North and in the area of the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast, without dropping bombs. Pamphlets were dropped reporting on the raid on Maaloe.

Measures for the defense of Norway:

1. The COBRA laid flanking mine fields 8 and 9 on 4 Feb. as planned.
2. The Commanding Admiral, Norway approved the request of the Admiral, Arctic Coast to lay the mine fields at Kvalsund and Langsundet in the Tromsøe area now, since in the event of an alarm this might become impossible. Permission was given to announce the location of the corresponding declared areas. (See Telegram 1830.)
3. The 11th Subchaser Flotilla left Bergen for the north.
4. For a report of measures by the Economic Staff, Norway to assure gasoline and fuel oil supply in spite of ice conditions in

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the Baltic Sea and the approaches to the Baltic Sea by making the necessary quantities available in Hamburg see Telegram 1900.

5. According to a report of the Armed Forces High Command the Fuehrer demands that in the future surprise raids and attacks against the Norwegian coast be forestalled as far as possible by reinforcement and strict control of our reconnaissance. In view of the limited forces of the Air Force and the Navy, the long stretch of coast to be patrolled, and the difficult weather conditions, this demand cannot be carried out in its entirety. Therefore the work of the intelligence service will be of special importance in this task.

The Foreign Intelligence Section of the Armed Forces High Command is asked for information on the following points:

a. What ways and means are available for obtaining information on planned actions?

b. What is the prospect of getting this information promptly and reliably?

c. What plans have been made for reinforcing and improving the information service?

The Air Force and the Navy are both asked to announce how well their present means will allow them to carry on reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast, paying special attention to the endangered sectors, and what plans they have to improve those means within the realm of what is possible. A map is requested of the areas now covered by reconnaissance under both favorable and unfavorable weather conditions.

The Naval Staff sends a corresponding directive to Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway.

See Telegram 1516 for a directive of the Naval Staff concerning proper provision for reports on mine fields.

Group North requests that a safe lane in the planned flanking mine fields near Stadland be provided to assure safe passage for our forces.

See Telegram 1515 for the directive of the Commanding Admiral, Norway, according to which it will suffice to omit mine field 8 for this purpose; he states that the gap is not to be closed by lengthening mine fields 6 and 9.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Nothing to report.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring located 54 airplanes in the rendezvous



area. A British plane reported 1 submarine on the southern point of Rockall Bank, probably tracking a convoy. A British vessel was located near a convoy 50 miles west-southwest of Rockall Bank. According to an Italian report, a British plane reported a convoy near the Azores bound for Gibraltar on 4 Feb. According to an intelligence report from Portugal, the British steamer EMPIRE PANTHER from Lisbon joined a convoy comprising 3 steamers, 1 destroyer, and 1 escort ship coming from the south. According to an attache report from Lisbon one of our submarines was sunk on 2 Feb. at 0600 near the Azores 5 miles southwest of Candelaria (Pico). Lt. Walter and Walter Sitik (?), who swam to Pico, are named as the only survivors.

The U.S. fruit steamer SIXAOLA (4,693 GRT) was pursued by a submarine about 170 miles southwest of Cape Hatteras. Submarines were also sighted in the general area of Cape Hatteras by the tankers C.O. STILLMANN and NIOBE, as well as by an unidentified steamer. The NIOBE reported that the submarine was attacked by a plane with 3 aerial bombs, and that oil was seen floating on the surface.

## 2. Own Situation:

### Distribution of submarines:

1.	In the zone of operations Scotland-Iceland:	7 vessels
2.	In the North Sea proceeding to the zone of operations:	4 vessels
3.	In the zone of operations off the North American coast:	10 vessels
4.	Proceeding	
	to the West Indies:	6 vessels
	to the area east of Newfoundland:	2 vessels
	to North America:	6 vessels
5.	Returning to Western France:	19 vessels
6.	In the zone of operations in the Mediterranean:	4 vessels
7.	Returning from the Mediterranean:	3 vessels
8.	Proceeding to the Mediterranean:	1 vessel

No further reports regarding the search for survivors of the SPREEWALD.

Supplement to the situation report in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

In Telegram 1619 the Naval Staff informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that Portuguese shipping from Portugal to North America will be resumed.

The Naval Staff gives up the idea of occupying the area west of Gibraltar near the Azores since it is strongly defended and chances of success are small. A corresponding report is sent to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Armed reconnaissance reported 1 steamer of 3,000 GRT near the Faroe Islands, probably damaged. 1 steamer of 6,000 GRT sunk out of a convoy in the Humber estuary, and 1 steamer of 3,000 GRT damaged off Cromer. Lacking targets at sea, a plane of the 5th Air Force at-

tacked a moving express train from a height of 20 m. on the east coast of Scotland at 2015, and destroyed it completely with three SC 500 bombs.

Our air activity during the night had no results.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

2 hits on submarines and more hits close alongside other submarines in Valletta were reported from operations of 5 Ju 88's. A light cruiser in dock at French Creek was attacked with explosive and incendiary bombs. The dock was not hit.

Further missions were undertaken for effective support of the German Africa Corps. An enemy air raid on Benghazi demolished part of one of the fuel dumps.

3. Eastern Front:

With improving weather conditions there were stronger operations in support of the Army.

4. U.S.A.:

A report regarding the U.S. air route via South America to Africa, with a table of distances and a survey map, is in News Analysis No. 7, Naval Staff, Foreign Navies Branch.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

According to reports from Italian agents, the transports BATORY and SOBIERKI unloaded about 6,000 infantrymen in Gibraltar. The British steamer EMPIRE HEATH left Gibraltar for the east, with an escort of 3 vessels. Air reconnaissance located considerable convoy traffic between Marsa Matruh and Derna. 1 eastbound and 2 westbound convoys of 3 to 4 steamers each with cruiser and destroyer escorts were observed. Radio monitoring intercepted a report of air attacks on one of these convoys. 2 light cruisers, 7 destroyers, 7 submarines, and 6 merchantmen are in Valletta.

2. Own Situation:

In view of the land situation in Libya and the weakened enemy position in the Eastern Mediterranean, which prompt us to take energetic action, the Naval Staff is considering measures in addition to submarine operations which could injure enemy supply and escort activities, in spite of the handicap in the fuel situation. Under the circumstances, PT boats from Benghazi or Derna could possibly be used temporarily.

The 2nd Group of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla with 4 vessels arrived in Augusta. PT boat "58" remained in Gaeta for the time being, and will then carry out experiments with LMF mines. Enemy planes attacked Tripoli during the night of 4 Feb. While leaving Palermo on 4 Feb. the steamer TRAPANI was attacked by an enemy submarine with 3 torpe-



does, all of which missed.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer TRAPANI is en route from Palermo to Tripoli.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted 4 merchantmen putting into Sevastopol in the afternoon.

Own Situation:

With regard to the inquiry of the Commanding General of the 11th Army as to whether it is possible to provide support from the sea to aid the attack on Sevastopol planned for 15 Mar., Group South has issued the following statements:

1. Since the promised German PT boats cannot arrive before May, and the only Rumanian submarine will not be ready for combat before April, active, effective support for this operation is not possible at the date given.

2. No effective relief and support can be expected from the other Rumanian naval forces because of their well-known inferior quality and because there are so few of them. The Group believes that the main task of these units is to perform escort, mine-sweeping, and patrol tasks for the Army operations area and toward the Bosphorus. Therefore, they consider it more important to concentrate the Rumanian fleet on these tasks - and even for these tasks its forces are very limited - rather than to use them for the above purpose. The forces available could not offer any sort of adequate support, anyway, particularly when the large risk of losses is considered.

3. Smaller operations, which might at least have the effect of diverting forces, are being prepared, as well as mine laying. Their execution depends on sea conditions on the day in question.

4. A conference in the near future of the Naval Liaison Officer with Group South and the Admiral, Black Sea concerning these and other problems of employing forces would be very welcome.

Copy of the telegram as per 1/Skl 2797/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Otherwise nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to reports in Tokyo, the following British reinforcements are expected in East Asia:

From Britain	about 10 divisions
From the Near East	about 4 divisions (3 Australian div.)
From North Africa	about 2 divisions

5 of the 10 divisions are already aboard ship and on the way from Britain. The transfer of 3 divisions from the Near East has already begun.

2. Situation Japan:

According to confidential information, the Japanese Naval Ministry has declared itself ready to place a special (2 man) submarine at the disposal of the German Navy, to invite the German Naval Attache to inspect such a submarine and to empower the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin to give out information about the boat.

We must await the official notification through the Japanese Naval Attache in order to hear what demands are made in return for this favor.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

In general the situation remains unchanged. It has proved to be impossible to clear the roads of the immense quantities of snow which fell during the 10-day snow storm. Friend and foe are greatly handicapped in their movements. In spite of that it was possible to make local gains at some positions.

Central Army Group:

The enemy made a futile attack between Novosyl and Byelev with heavy forces. Heavy enemy pressure north and south of the highway, from the direction of Medyn. Northwest of Sichevka our advancing armored division succeeded in establishing contact with our forces coming from the north at the railroad about 25 miles west of Rzhev. All enemy attempts to pierce our lines were repulsed. In an enemy air raid on Smolensk during the night of 4 Feb. the railway station was badly damaged.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy pressure on Staraya Russa continues. Otherwise the situation is unchanged.



2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Enemy and own situation unchanged.

The railroad is being extended beyond Marsa Matruh to the west. On 23 Dec. the section at Ridotta Maddalena was under construction.

4. Special Items:

A British commission of officers from all branches of the services travelled from Cairo to the Crimea at the beginning of January in order to evaluate landing experiences.

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Items of Political Importance

Netherlands:

According to a diplomatic report, Japanese successes have had a very depressing effect on the population. Since the people are aware of the danger of losing their colonial possessions in the Indies, they are still hoping for an ultimate Anglo-American victory, if only in order not to be entirely dependant on Germany in the future Europe. If on the other hand the Axis powers should win, they hope that German negotiations with the Japanese about the Dutch East Indies at the conclusion of peace will save at least some of their investments in that territory.

Norway:

According to foreign press reports, Quisling's appointment to the post of Prime Minister has brought forth a wave of assassinations and sabotage acts in the country.

Great Britain:

Beaverbrook's appointment as Minister of Production does not seem to have come about without considerable internal friction. In any case, it is certain that the Ministry of Labor, under Bevin, is not subordinated to him. Cripps is expected to join the unofficial opposition. It is said that Canada and South Africa do not wish to make use of their chance of being represented in the War Cabinet. Churchill has announced that the Lower House will hold a secret session concerning the merchant shipping situation.

Cripps declared in a socialist newspaper that the only way of defeating Germany's Army is by the Red Army; the war can be won by cooperative efforts of the Allies; it is essential for the future of mankind that the alliance of Hitler's enemies be converted into free cooperation between Great Britain and Soviet Russia for the reconstruction of Europe after the war.

According to the report of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the combat value of the Indian troops in Cyrenaica has lately become negligible, due to political instability.

According to the London radio, Goering's visit to Italy is being associated with an imminent attack on Malta.

Egypt:

The leader of the Wafd Party, Nahas Pascha, was appointed to the post of Prime Minister. New elections are to be expected.

The governmental change brought about by the King hereby assumes an importance which surpasses the original formal motives and is unwelcome to the British.

Croatia:

According to the report of the German Embassy it cannot be expected



that the revolt in the East Bosnian area will be suppressed in the near future.

Africa:

See Political Review No. 31, Paragraph 6 for a report concerning U.S. attempts to make Central Africa, especially the Congo area, an American sphere of interest, so as to protect South Africa and prevent a later German penetration.

Japan:

The German Embassy reports in detail concerning the future Japanese attitude towards occupied territories. The central core of the new organization is to be formed by Japan, Manchukuo, and Nanking-China. As to the fate of the other territories, see Tojo's speech in parliament in War Diary 22 and 26 Jan. The military goal will be a southward push to the Dutch East Indies and Australia. This is more important than an immediate heavy attack on India, whose lack of internal unity makes its control so very difficult that there is danger that it will fall prey to bolshevism. Relations with Russia are determined by the neutrality pact. Agreements concerning fishing will be renewed this year, too.

The conspicuously frequent emphasis on this inoffensive attitude towards Russia is evidently intentional. German opinion in Tokyo assumes that military preparations against Russia have been in progress for quite some time in Manchukuo. Not alone in Tokyo does the opinion prevail that this sudden agreement between the Army and the Navy by which the latter will be able to execute the southward push has been reached only at the price of a subsequent push to the north to accomplish the Army's goals of occupying Vladivostok, the coastal province, and Sakhalin. The more surprising is the attack on the Russians, now lulled in security, the greater is the chance for a quick victory. It is to be hoped that the attack will be made soon.

The Japanese Government made known in Buenos Aires and Santiago, Chile that she has great esteem for the courageous attitude of the two republics in the face of U.S. pressure.

Spain:

Spain continues to maintain a friendly, non-belligerent attitude in spite of economic and political blackmail by the Anglo-Americans. The internal political situation remains highly unstable, although Foreign Minister Suner's position seems to be at least somewhat more certain. The Falange, the Army, and the Monarchists are opposing each other. The Anglo-Americans are spending much money in an attempt to overthrow the government. The economic situation is very strained, especially because of difficulties of distribution, caused intentionally by the enemy who has throttled the oil supply. Since Germany is at the moment not in a position to aid her, Spain still has very little, if any, political freedom of decision.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

No special reports or decisions.

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Special Items:

I. For Group West's suggestion to improve the metereological service for about 5 days in order better to direct operation "Labyrinth", and the corresponding directive sent by the Naval Staff to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning reinforcing the metereological service by submarines from 9 Feb. on until further notice as per 1/Sk1 281/42 Gkdos. Chefs., see War Diary Files "Mandarine".

II. The Ministry of Food urgently requests the Armed Forces High Command to forego inducting coastal fishermen who are now in deferred categories, due to the strained food situation. The fishermen brought in about 60,000 tons of salt water fish in the second year of the war.

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Situation 6 Feb. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:

A summary of the enemy reports intercepted by radio monitoring up to 4 Feb. 1942 is in Report No. 5/42 of Naval Staff, Communications Division, Radio Intelligence Branch.

South Atlantic:

According to the report of a French agent there were 5 U.S. cruisers and 3 destroyers in Capetown in the middle of December. (Before this we knew of only 2 cruisers there.)

Pacific Ocean:

The Military Attache in Santiago confirms the Italian report that U.S. planes and merchantmen left Quintero Bay near Valparaiso on 2 Feb.

2. Own Situation:

The Do 24 which was sent out to fetch a badly injured person from the SPREEWALD crashed while trying to land on the water near the submarine and had to be scuttled. The crew was taken aboard the submarine.

Etappe Japan is informed of the fate of the ELSA ESSBERGER by Letter 1818. Letter 2020 instructs Etappe Japan to give a copy of ship "41's" war log, which was lost with the SPREEWALD, to a departing blockade-runner; in case of an encounter with the enemy the log must absolutely be destroyed.



All forces in foreign waters are informed about the situation in Spain by Radiogram 0627, about observations by the ELSA ESSBERGER concerning reception and use of foreign weather reports by Radiogram 2021, about the employment of Japanese auxiliary cruisers in the Tasman Sea and Japanese submarines near the Fiji Islands by Radiogram 1144, and about various enemy reports by Radiogram 0434.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted heavy shipping and convoy traffic along the English south coast and in the Bristol Channel.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

The enemy attacked Brest from the air from 2107 to 2148 without inflicting damage. Mines were probably laid.

At the instigation of the Naval Staff, Operations Division, special measures as follows are being taken in France, planned for a three months' period, of which the Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division has no knowledge:

The counterespionage personnel and the secret military police are being reinforced in Brest. A sudden tie-up of communication and transportation facilities in all of occupied France is being tried as an experiment.

A directive is sent to the German Intelligence Station, France ordering that all wishes and demands of Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships be complied with as far as possible.

#### Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla left Boulogne at 1925 to attack a westbound convoy which had been previously located. Weather conditions forced the flotilla to return without carrying out its mission. From 2029 to 2104 the "Siegfried" and "Grosser Kurfuerst" batteries fired on the located convoy vessels with partial salvos without observation of results.

About 140 persons (soldiers and personnel of the Todt Organization) were lost when the motor coasters HERMANN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN sank.

Since British mine sweepers can detonate acoustic mines in advance by placing a source of noise at the bow, the Mine-laying Experimental Command suggests laying mines with fuzes delayed about 20 seconds as a countermeasure.

The Naval Staff sends a corresponding directive to Group West, for the information of the Commander, Torpedo Boats, as per 1/Skl I E 2856/42 in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted very lively convoy activity along the east coast. A vessel of undetermined size was observed sinking at 53° 45' N, 00° 50' E, probably due to striking a mine. Heavy mine-sweeping activity between Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft. 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers were east of Yarmouth about noon, bound south. Between 1055 and 1555 eight convoys in all, with 94 north-bound and 39 southbound steamers, were sighted between Flamborough Head and the Thames.

Own Situation:

Ice Conditions: In general unchanged. Shipping conditions on the Elbe and the Weser Rivers are somewhat better in places. Enemy air activity over the Frisian Islands in the afternoon. Convoy and escort service proceeded according to plan with no unforeseen incidents. Sweeping in barrage I and check sweeping by a mine-detonating vessel and mine sweeper "3400" as planned.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

On 5 Feb. one of our planes sighted a submarine west of Skudesnaes. At noon on 6 Feb. submarines were located near Nordkyn.

Own Situation:

The steamer KONSUL SCHULTE was sunk. The ship was carrying barracks for Kirkenes. Patrol boat NORDLICHT, 3 subchasers, and 4 tenders of the 12th Subchaser Flotilla carried out extensive subchasing near Syaerholt. On 5 Feb. all ships, including fishing vessels, were prohibited from sailing north of the line connecting the light-house Nordre-Loeksund at 70° 09' N, 20° 47' E with the point at 70° 25.2' N, 21° 40.3' E.

The Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (Navy) asks the Naval Staff's opinion concerning the viewpoint that the difficulty in protecting convoys is seriously endangering the supply of Kirkenes and Petsamo, and has led to a dangerous congestion of supply ships in Tromsø as well as to an insupportable delay in the time required for round trips. The Armed Forces High Command considers it absolutely necessary to reinforce convoy escorts immediately, as the Commanding Admiral, Norway has already urgently requested. (See Telegram 1015.)

The Naval Staff is aware of the difficult convoy situation in the Norwegian area. However, reinforcements cannot be provided at present because of the scarcity of suitable vessels. It is planned to strengthen convoy escorts in northern Norway as soon as the vessels are no longer needed for other tasks which were ordered by the Fuehrer and are known to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. See Telegram 1515 for the corresponding message to the Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command.



Telegram 1620 informs the Naval Staff of the sensible request which the Commanding Admiral, Norway has made to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, that he set up a scale of priorities for all sectors, since petitions are coming in from all sides demanding urgent priority for certain convoys.

The Admiral, North Norwegian Coast requests that the mined area be announced so that the Froi Fjord may be mined and the enemy be discouraged from penetrating into the Fro Havet, as per Radiogram 1130.

In view of the air reconnaissance report about forces stationed at Murmansk on 4 Feb., the Army believes that attacks in that area might possibly be made within a short time. Stronger enemy patrol activity, strong fighter defense, and various reports on forces at Murmansk also seem to indicate this possibility. Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean are informed accordingly by Radiogram 1618.

The Naval Staff does not share this opinion entirely. Perhaps this is merely normal supply traffic, particularly since the ice situation on the Archangel route would lead one to expect a stronger concentration of steamers in Murmansk.

Measures for the defense of Norway:

1. The Naval Staff issues a directive for the rapid completion and transfer of ships "13" and "24" for employment in northern Norway in Telegram 2222 to Group West, Group North, and the Commanding Admiral, Norway, with a copy to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

The vessels are in the shipyard at Brest and will be ready for duty at the end of February.

2. The opinion of Group North with respect to the problem of reinforcing reconnaissance over coastal waters is as follows (see War Diary 5 Feb.):

a. Patrol of coastal areas to prevent surprise forays is valuable only if carried out on a permanent basis.

b. It is useless to consider drawing on the already absolutely insufficient number of vessels for escort and convoy duty.

c. However it might be possible to execute a continual patrol by advanced fishing vessels, of which as many as possible should carry portable radio equipment. Optical signal instruments should be installed on the others.

d. Group North has in mind about 30 locations along the Norwegian north and northwest coast; at all times 2 vessels from each base would be out at sea, while 2 others and 1 reserve vessel would lie in port.

e. Similar plans were refused before, since no vessels were released because they were needed for the food supply. However, since it is now a matter of an order from the Fuehrer, the Commanding Admiral, Norway must receive immediate permission to seize 150 fishing smacks and other suitable vessels so that the planned

measures may get under way without further delay. (See Telegram 1503.)

Just after the directive of the Naval Staff (222/42 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary 27 Jan.) was sent out, a report came in from Group North which, with reference to Churchill's statements, is based on the idea that warfare in 1942-43 will be mainly concentrated against the Axis powers in Europe. The Group believes that the large operations for which preparations have supposedly already been started will, considering the position of France, be directed against northern Norway and not against North Africa. The Group expects that this action will start in the northernmost part of Norway (North Cape-Murmansk) about 1 Apr. This means that defensive measures must be completed by about the middle of March. Therefore the necessary naval forces must be in Norway and ready for action about a month earlier than the forces needed for warfare in the Baltic. The mine laying planned by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean must also have been practically completed by that date.

Directive 222/42 Gkdos. Chfs. of the Naval Staff has already taken care of most of the various demands for forces and suggestions for reinforcement of the northern defenses. In view of the large number of submarines to be controlled it is again requested that a submarine staff officer be appointed. Group North believes that in case of conflict with Sweden other forces besides the LEIPZIG, the NUERNBERG, and 4 torpedo boats, namely the HIPPER, LUETZOW, and torpedo boats as well as submarines and mine forces should be stationed in the Baltic area.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from Stockholm, the Norwegian ships will be temporarily released from internment on 6 Feb.

According to Finnish radio monitoring Moscow ordered Russian air forces to get their war gas equipment into perfect shape for offensive and defensive purposes. For details see Radiogram 1835.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Ice conditions have improved in the Skagerrak, but are unchanged in the Kattegat, the Belts, and the Sound. Solid ice has increased in the open sea of the southern Baltic. Ferries to Trelleborg and Gjedser are still operating, but with difficulty. The situation in the central and eastern Baltic is unchanged. 4 vessels are patrolling the Skagerrak. Icebreaker CASTOR with the DONAU departed from Oslo bound for Copenhagen. She is to bring 4 transports from Stettin on 9 Feb.

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#### V. Merchant Shipping:

1. In view of the repeated delays in the completion of the supply ship WESERLAND in the Bordeaux shipyards, Operations Division, Naval Staff points out to the Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch the basic importance of adequate blockade-runner traffic. The Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section and the Naval Staff, Fleet Branch are also informed. For the maintenance of the



German economy and of the power of resistance during the winter half of next year probably 150,000 tons of scarce goods will have to be shipped to western France from the area under Japanese control. Of this amount, 80,000 tons are absolutely necessary for continuing the war. This task can be accomplished only if at least half of the necessary shipping space is available in Japan by the beginning of the next shipping period. It is estimated that about 25 ships will be needed for the entire transportation task, without counting possible ship losses on the trip to the Far East. This means that at least 12 ships must be ready in Japan by the start of the next shipping period. At the moment only 6 ships are there, however, so that all means must be employed to transfer 6 or 7 more ships from Germany to Japan this winter. Since our cargo space is already inadequate, attempts are being made to use Japanese and French ships for the purpose, besides Italian and Finnish ones. In view of the lively shipping traffic of motor freighters between Western France and Japan which is to be expected next winter, the Naval Staff points out the necessity of making adequate repair facilities available, and requests that, considering the blockade-runners which are still to arrive this winter, the necessary facilities be provided at once.

2. Naval Staff, Operations Division agrees with the suggestion made by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch not to comply with the Italian wish as pronounced at Garmisch to increase the speed of the 6 freighters being constructed in Italian shipyards to 14 knots, but to keep the type with 11.5 knots as planned, so as to prevent a delay of several months in their completion. The lower speed will not matter since small fast transport vessels are to be constructed in addition to these ships. The fuel situation makes conversion to oil fuel or motor power out of the question. Conversion to increase speed should be considered only if there is a lack of shipways and in consequence the delay allows sufficient time.

## VI. Submarine Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

A British vessel was located 280 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank. According to an Italian report an auxiliary vessel attacked a submarine in the evening of 5 Feb. north of Cape Spartel. 5 armed British steamers are said to have departed from Lisbon with tungsten, canned goods, and sugar cargoes, bound north to join the convoy coming from Gibraltar. According to an intelligence report, this convoy was observed on a northerly course west of Cabo de Roca. The British motor tanker POMELLA reported a submarine 350 miles northeast of Bermuda.

### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "402" gave a belated report of scoring 2 probable hits on the transport LLANGIBBY CASTLE while returning from the Azores area on 16 Jan. On her return trip from America U "82" contacted a southbound convoy of 20 steamers in BE 7429 at noon on 6 Feb. 3 more submarines were sent out to this convoy.

Submarine U "103" (Lieutenant Winter) has been operating east of Delaware Bay since 2 Feb. and has sunk 3 tankers and 1 freighter with

altogether 26,539 GRT in that area. Submarine U "106" (Lieutenant (j.g.) Rasch) sank another steamer of 8,000 GRT with her last torpedo and guns, and has thereby raised her total success to 40,154 GRT. The first attack in the West Indies area is to take place on the morning of 16 Feb.

Supplement to the situation report is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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## VII. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Armed reconnaissance damaged 4 steamers with altogether 14,000 GRT from convoys off the Humber estuary. We sank 2 steamers of altogether 10,000 GRT from convoys in the Bristol Channel. The airfield at Leckonfield was attacked with observed success.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Attacks on Malta are being continued. 1 submarine is believed to have been destroyed while in port. 30 fighter planes are again stationed at the airport of Venezia. In Cyrenaica motor pools in the area Tobruk-Ain el Gazala were attacked very effectively.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Planes were used to support the Army in combat and to transport troops, ammunition, equipment, and fuel as well as wounded men.

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## VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

The news service of the Air Force reports from a Japanese source that U.S. naval forces will soon be transferred to the Mediterranean. 6 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 small naval vessels, and 1 hospital ship were in Tobruk on 5 Feb. Considerable convoy traffic was observed between Alexandria and Sidi Barrani. According to radio monitoring planes attacked the British refrigerator ship LLANDOVERY CASTLE (10,640 GRT). British air reconnaissance located the Italian steamer MONVISO off the east Tunisian coast en route from Tripoli to Naples. According to our radio monitoring the British attacked the Italian steamer TRAPANI with aerial torpedoes.

The Admiralty announced the sinking of the submarine TRIUMPH. The Italians believe that the submarine was sunk by an Italian torpedo boat in the Aegean Sea on 3 Nov. 1941.

An intelligence report from a French source states that the VALIANT was sunk in the port of Alexandria. The QUEEN ELIZABETH was severely damaged, and repairs will take a year.

Further investigations were ordered to verify this report.



An intelligence report of 27 Jan. from a Turkish source states that the VALIANT was damaged and is in dock for repairs. The QUEEN ELIZABETH is said to have run aground in the port of Alexandria.

These reports at least seem to confirm the supposition that 1 of the 2 vessels was badly damaged, and that probably both ships were damaged.

According to the Italian intelligence service, British naval circles in Alexandria are dismayed about the fleet's inability to disturb Axis convoys to North Africa. They are trying to keep secret the severe damage which Malta has suffered as a result of German air attacks. They believe that the situation in North Africa would become critical should the Axis troops now stationed in southern Italy be transferred to Libya.

New war materiel and new tanks are said to be on the way from Britain to Egypt in order to repulse the expected Axis attack in the valley of the Nile.

This uniquely advantageous situation in the Mediterranean should be exploited by utmost activity of Axis forces. For deliberations of the Naval Staff concerning the use of the PT Boat Flotilla and the Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla see War Diary 5 Feb.

2. Own Situation:

The entire 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla has arrived in La Spezia.

The Suez Canal is of increased importance as a connecting passage for British forces of all kinds in the present stage of the war. The Naval Staff therefore believes that mining to the greatest possible extent is of utmost importance just at the present time, and that, in view of their observed effect, aerial mines would be most advantageous. Japan has expressed the same opinion and the same desire to the Naval Staff. The Naval Staff believes it will be necessary to use Fab XI mines with a magnetic device, some responding to an increasing, some to a decreasing field, and equipped with ship counters set to let several ships pass before detonating, in order to make mine sweeping, which is easy in the narrow canal, more difficult. The corresponding order is sent to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and to the Commander in Chief, Air, Operations Staff, with a copy to the General Staff, Army via Telegram 2323.

3. Situation Italy:

Unchanged.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing to report.

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IX. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to the statements of prisoners taken after their bombers, based on the U.S. carrier YORKTOWN, were forced to make emergency landings, submarines are sending up smoke with daily changing color as recognition signals for their own planes. 18 pursuit planes, 15 dive bombers, 15 reconnaissance planes, 12 multiple-purpose planes, and 2 amphibians are aboard the YORKTOWN. The maximum altitude at which torpedoes can be released is 45 meters, running range is 5,500 meters, and speed is 30 km. Duration of flight with torpedo is 3 hours and with bombs 5.

2. Situation Japan:

According to reports from the Naval Attache in Tokyo, the Japanese naval Air Force sank a cruiser of the JAVA class off Surabaya, and severely damaged another of the same class and the cruiser DE RUYTER. According to a confidential report from the staff at the Admiralty, it has been agreed with the General Staff that a Japanese-Russian conflict is to be avoided as long as possible, and that Vladivostok is to be attacked only if it is ascertained that the U.S. is planning air attacks from there. The fact that operations in the South require all forces has had a great influence on this decision.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Snow storms are making combat and shipment of supplies more difficult. There is fighting east of Slavyansk. On the 6th Army sector enemy attacks west of Balakleya were repulsed; however the situation near Bolkhov is strained.

Central Army Group:

Attacks from both sides could not change the situation for either side.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy pressure on the positions south of Kroszyno. We are still fighting the enemy units which broke through the lines. Enemy attacks on the other sectors were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The Murmansk railway was again interrupted at Parandovo.

3. North Africa:

The day passed quietly. Numerous trucks in an army motor vehicle park were damaged in an enemy air attack on Tripoli during the night of 5 Feb.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

According to foreign press reports, the Russian trade union leaders have strongly criticized the accomplishments of the British armaments industry. They say that employers do not pay enough attention to the suggestions of their workers and that, in contrast to Russia, too few women are employed in industry. British newspapers report this criticism with a certain amount of embarrassment.

In contrast to the official agencies, the north-Irish nationalists follow De Valera in criticizing strongly the occupation by U.S. troops; they label it an attack against the entire Irish nation.

Eire:

The government presented a note in Washington which, without containing a formal protest, states Eire's opposition to the American occupation of the northern counties. The bureau of information in Dublin strongly denies reports according to which Eire is supporting German forces. A delegate of the opposition sharply attacked Germany in the Irish lower house. The German Government has lodged a protest against such accusations.

Egypt:

The new Prime Minister Nahas asked the British Ambassador for a written statement of Britain's willingness to cooperate honestly with Egypt without interfering in her internal affairs. For his part, Nahas declared that he would not rule as a dictator, but through a freely-elected new Parliament and that he would loyally carry out the Anglo-Egyptian agreement.

Finland:

The Foreign Ministry reports that Helsinki considers Finnish-Swedish relations very satisfactory. The Swedish attitude has improved, but has not yet reached the point where Sweden treats Finland as a non-belligerent.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt explained the task of the war councils established in Washington and London. In contrast to the tactical problems of Wavell in the southwest Pacific they must deal with the long-range solution of strategic questions. Purely military and naval matters are to be turned over to the so-called joint staffs, and political problems to the Allied governments. The war council in London is to report its decisions to Washington. Should differences of opinion arise, the authority of the U.S. President or of the British Prime Minister must be called upon. At the same time the U.S. War Department announced the establishment of a joint body of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries, to be situated in Washington. It is to coordinate the war effort of both countries and to regulate the distribution of war materials. Aside from that, this body must keep in touch with the 3 Chiefs of the General Staff of the 3 branches of the

Armed Forces in Britain.

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Special Items:

I. The employment of small cruisers: With respect to the directive of the Naval Staff concerning security measures in the north Norwegian area (cf. Report No. I a 222/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary 27 Jan.), Group North requested on 2 Feb. that besides the LEIPZIG, the NUERNBERG and 4 torpedo boats be left for the time being in the Baltic at the disposal of Group North. Situations requiring stronger surface craft may arise at any time, just as last year. The LEIPZIG alone, with her limited speed of 21 knots, would then be inadequate. To comply with the wishes of the Group, materiel and personnel must be so disposed that the 2 cruisers are ready for operation by 20 Apr. The torpedo boats must be ready for combat by the same date; at least 4 of them must be provided for use as escort forces.

The Naval Staff basically agrees with the opinion held by Group North. Nevertheless the Naval Staff reserves decision on the employment of the NUERNBERG for the time being, since the ship will not be ready for operation before about the middle of May. Group North is instructed accordingly, with a copy to the Fleet.

As for the rest, we will have to see to what degree the Fuehrer's great apprehensions about the effects of enemy operations against northern Norway on the Baltic will materialize. In the case of such an attack, even more extensive measures than those proposed by Group North will have to be taken in the Baltic. However, the Naval Staff does not believe that this is very likely to happen.

Group North informs the Naval Staff of demands made on the Fleet concerning the number of men needed in order to bring up the complements of the cruisers NUERNBERG, LEIPZIG, KOELN, and EMDEN to full strength by next spring. Recognizing the great difficulties of such a task, Group North suggests the following as the one and only solution for these difficulties: Men who served on the ships before and at the outbreak of the war should be contacted by the various personnel offices and ordered back aboard the ships without consideration for any possible change in their personal status.

The Naval Staff also believes that these very unusual measures can be justified in view of the special circumstances.

II. Concerning moored non-contact mines: The Naval High Command, Underwater Obstacles Branch ordered the Mine-laying Experimental Command to prepare the moored non-contact mines immediately; this work is to receive the highest priority possible. Since it has so far been impossible to ascertain the real cause for the failure of some of these mines to explode, the construction of mines modeled after the British moored influence mines (EFA) must get under way without further delay.

Copy of the order as per 1/Skl 31 55/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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Situation 7 Feb. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:South Atlantic:

Monrovia reports that at present convoys are leaving Freetown every Saturday. U.S. steamers are unloading large quantities of ammunition.

Uruguay is treating Great Britain and the Allied countries as non-belligerents. The Uruguayan Minister of War stated that the U.S. is going to send 3 light cruisers for the protection of the coast.

Argentina announced intensified patrol of her coast by naval forces.

According to an Italian report 3 battleships (RODNEY, RAMILLIES, and ROYAL SOVEREIGN) 2 carriers, several cruisers, and 10 destroyers passed Capetown eastbound during January.

The report will have to be verified.

Indian Ocean:

In the Gulf of Oman, an unidentified steamer sent a submarine distress signal which was canceled later.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" is instructed by Radiogram 1600 to obtain from either the REGENSBURG or the TANNENFELS the charts of the sea lanes in the Pacific which have been decided on in cooperation with Japan, and also the radio directive "Kirschbluete" for radio communication with the Embassy in Tokyo; Radiogram 1600 also contains sailing instructions for prize ships which might have to be released beforehand, and instructions concerning the armament of such ships, an early report of whose release is especially important.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

The Naval Attache, Madrid and the Spanish Navy consider the intelligence report according to which raw materials are transported by British submarines as highly fantastic, since the British have better means of transportation than submarines. (See Telegram 1919.)

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla briefly reports on its mission in

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the evening of 6 Feb. It is stated that the boats were first spotted by the enemy 11 miles off South Foreland. Both the microwave transceiver and the 40/70 watt transceiver clearly responded to the enemy radar. At the same time radiations of enemy origin caused our boats to emit a clearly visible, glaring, phosphorescent glow from aerials, rails, and other wet protrusions. (Tr.N.: This was later explained as an atmospheric phenomenon.) The microwave transceiver was not used for transmission, but was tuned to reception. (See Telegram 0720.)

3 mines, presumably British moored influence mines, were swept 7.5 miles west of route "Lila 3", one mine 6.5 miles west northwest of route "Lila 3", one ground mine was swept 1 mile northwest of route "Rosa 16", one 1.7 miles north of "Rosa 16", and one 1.5 miles north-east of "Rosa 15".

The SCHOEMANN's break-down forced her and destroyer "25" to dock in Flushing.

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### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

##### Own Situation:

The 13th and 18th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotillas worked on mine field I. Mine-detonating vessels "145" and "147", and 3 vessels of the 14th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla executed a special task. Convoys proceeded as planned with no special incidents to report. Enemy air activity over the coastal area of the German Bight at noon. The release of aerial bombs was observed north of Norderney, Juist, Langeroog, and Wangeroog (quadrants 9851, 9573, and 9596) 3 miles east of lightship D and 1 mile north of lighthouse Roter Sand. 1 ground mine was swept in each of quadrants AN 6969, 6962, and 6678. Mine-detonating vessels "15", "16", "17", "161", and "138" carefully checked route "Braun". An enemy air attack on mine-detonating vessel "15" was repulsed. Our pursuit planes shot down 16 enemy planes in all.

#### 2. Norway:

##### Enemy Situation:

Afdonbladet reprinted from British newspapers a series of news commentaries under such headlines as: "The Fall of Singapore Might Affect the Situation in the North", and "London is Already Anticipating the Battle for the Arctic Ocean". Press statements point out that the fall of Singapore has endangered the routes to the Persian Gulf and to Russia, leaving Britain only the route around the North Cape, which is already exposed to severest German attacks.

On 6 Feb. radio monitoring located in the polar area 1 submarine between the Rybachi Peninsula and Vardoe, 1 bound for the Tana Fjord, and a third between the North Cape and Nordkyn. Air reconnaissance in the morning of 6 Feb. observed 4 merchantmen in the outer Kola



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Bay, 3 in the inner, and 7 merchantmen and 2 destroyers in the port of Murmansk.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "563" temporarily ran aground while leaving Bergen. Naval Signal Station Floeroe reported an unidentified fast vessel of torpedo boat size coming into sight at 0830; she extinguished lights and turned back north when called. Air reconnaissance was unable to locate her.

Enemy air activity over Vardoe at noon on 6 Feb. In the afternoon enemy air forces made an unsuccessful attack on the convoy ESPANA near Bud.

Group North reports the number of unescorted, singly-routed vessels between 1 Jan. and 31 Dec. 1941 as follows:

In the area of Admiral, Polar Coast:	57 with 119,392 GRT
In the area of Admiral, North Norwegian Coast:	187 with 275,160 GRT
In the area of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast:	166 with 265,521 GRT
In the area of Naval Shore Command, Oslo Fjord:	251 with 249,419 GRT

(See Telegram 1452.)

Defense Measures in Norway:

1. Commanding Admiral, Norway asks for permission to lay 2 flanking mine fields protecting the sea lane near Hustadriken immediately after the mines arrive, and requests prompt announcement of declared areas. For details see Telegram 1030.

2. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA, order 1/Skl I op 2802/42 Gkdos. for attitude and proposal of the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch concerning the directive of the Naval Staff for transferring a PT boat flotilla to Norway with its approval, foregoing the transfer of the PT boat training flotillas to a Norwegian port; it is also pointed out that the 8th PT Boat Flotilla will soon have to be brought up to the strength of 8 vessels.

3. The Naval Staff sends Naval Staff, Submarine Division, Anti-Submarine Branch a directive concerning the defense of Trondheim and Narvik against submarines by setting up coastal listening posts. Copy as per 1/Skl I E 2771/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Ice conditions unchanged.

The CASTOR and the DONAU arrived in Copenhagen. The directive of Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch concerning the employment of icebreakers EISBAER and CASTOR (the latter to be repaired in Hamburg first) orders troop transports from Copenhagen to begin on 14 Feb., after EISBAER, in place of CASTOR, has fetched 4 transports from Stettin. See Telegram 1900 for details.

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V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring located 28 planes of the 15th and 19th Air Groups, 3 of which were located near Brest. In addition to these, another British plane was observed west southwest of Brest at noon. According to an intelligence report from Spain, a British convoy of 11 freighters and 5 escort vessels passed Cape Spartel on an easterly course. Off the American east coast the steamer ATLANTIAN reported being fired on by a submarine 40 miles south of Halifax. The U.S. steamer AMERICAN AMRON reported sighting a submarine near the Oregon Inlet. Radio station Annapolis reported a shipping obstacle northwest of Cape Charles. According to a special warning, all entrances to the Narragansett Bay are mined. The steamer EMPIRE SUN was torpedoed east of Liverpool, Nova Scotia. According to press reports submarines sank the U.S. tanker INDIA ARROW (8,328 GRT) off the U.S. Atlantic coast and the Norwegian motor tanker PAN NORWAY on her trip from New York to Lisbon. The steamer URUMEA, chartered by Switzerland, was sunk in the Gulf of Genoa, apparently by a British submarine. According to Daventry, the commander of an Italian submarine which was sunk in the North Atlantic arrived in Gibraltar with 52 men of the ship's crew.

According to the London radio a U.S. passenger steamer sighted 3 German submarines near the West Indies. The ship made an unsuccessful attempt at ramming.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "109" (Lt. Bleichrodt) announced sinking a total of 4 steamers of 29,330 GRT. 2 of the steamers, totalling 15,000 GRT, had been reported previously. 3 of these ships are the HALCYON (3,531 GRT), the MONTROLITE (11,909 GRT), and the TACOMA STAR (7,924 GRT). Unfavorable conditions prevail in the operating area of submarine U "98" south of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; there is no shipping traffic there, and thus very little patrolling.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports the following operational plans:

1. For Admiral, Arctic Ocean, including the stretch from Narvik to Tromsoe:

a. Submarines U "134", U "584", and U "585" are now operating in that area.

b. Submarines bound for that area: U "456" now in AF 90, U "436" now in AN 40, and U "435" now in AE 50.

c. Furthermore submarines U "592" and U "377" will be ready for action at Heligoland by about 16 and 17 Feb. respectively.

2. For Trondheim: Submarine U "454", which was in the Arctic Ocean up to now and is now in Trondheim, will be ready for action about 24 Feb. Furthermore submarine U "403" will be ready for action at Heligoland about 26 Feb.

3. For Bergen: Submarines U "589" and U "593" will be ready for operation at Heligoland by about 27 Feb.



## 4. For area Hebrides-Iceland:

a. In the operational area submarines U "455", U "352", U "213", U "586", U "591", and U "136". Furthermore submarine U "435", which will leave for the Arctic Ocean (see point 1).

b. Submarine U "752" which is en route after leaving Heligoland on 7 Feb.

c. Furthermore submarine U "405", ready for action at Heligoland by about 26 Feb.

5. In case of special need we could draw on the boats of Type IX which are leaving the home ports, intended for action in the American area.

The following submarines are leaving Heligoland: U "158" on about 7 Feb., U "154", U "155", and U "162" on about 11 Feb., and U "503" on about 14 Feb. These submarines are not equipped for the Arctic Ocean.

6. Aside from the above submarines, none are available to protect herring fishing.

The Naval Staff is in accord with the reported intentions. Use of the submarines mentioned in point 5 will depend on the development of the situation. Copy of the corresponding telegrams as per l/Skl I u 287/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV. Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For a report on enemy air activity over the Heligoland Bight see Situation North Sea. Otherwise nothing to report.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Effective nuisance raids were continued against air fields on Malta. Less plane activity over Cyrenaica because of bad weather. A successful attack was launched on a supply base west of Marsa Matruh.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Effective action by bomber and fighter planes on all fronts. Altogether 284 bomber planes and 136 fighter planes were employed.

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance and radio monitoring revealed no special changes. 3 submarines were sighted in the central and eastern Medi-

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terranean. The number of submarines stationed in Valletta was not ascertained. According to an agent report from France, the REVENGE arrived in Alexandria at the end of January, coming from the Cape.

This report has not been confirmed and must be investigated.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was transferred from Augusta to Porto Empedocle during the night of 5 Feb. The transferred vessels of the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla will probably not be ready for combat for 3 weeks.

3. Situation Italy:

Repeated enemy air attacks on Tripoli during the night of 5 Feb. The harbor suffered no military damage.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer TRAPANI and the tanker RONDINE are en route to Tripoli as planned. The tanker was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy torpedo planes at 0320. The steamer MONVISO during her return voyage from Tripoli had the same experience at 0045.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The "Siena" group is en route from Suda to Piraeus. An enemy submarine was sighted 16 miles north of Cape Sparta (western Crete).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

About 6 mines detonated east of Cape Midia (north of Constanta) between the evening of 6 Feb. and noon of 7 Feb. Group South attributes the detonations of our mines to ice formation.

On the inquiry of Group South, the 4th Air Force reported its observations of the actions of anti-mine escorts of Russian naval and merchant vessels while entering port. This indicates that Russian fleet units are using degaussing equipment in areas where mines are suspected. The Naval Staff suggests using period delay mechanisms as countermeasure. Copy of the corresponding telegrams as per 1/Skl I E 3064/42 and 3085/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

In connection with the request of the Army High Command to the Naval High Command for reinforcement of Crimean coastal defense to the greatest possible extent, the Commanding General, 11th Army asked Group South to provide 25 naval units for coastal protection. Pointing out that the Navy is equally responsible for coastal defense he requested that the Navy do everything in its power to reinforce the defense still further. To clarify the problem of responsibility for



coastal defense, Group South pointed out to the Commanding General, 11th Army that the task was given to the Naval Shore Commander, Crimea by the Commanding General, 11th Army as a personal request in which the Army also carries responsibility for providing adequate forces. Therefore it cannot be concluded that the Navy, as a branch of the Armed Forces, is to take all the responsibility for coastal defense and provide all the necessary forces, although the Navy will, of course, do everything in its power to aid the Army indirectly by strengthening the forces of Naval Shore Command, Crimea and the port commanders. The Group states further that the Naval High Command is already setting up 1 naval artillery battalion with guns captured in Nikolayev, but that these forces will not be strong enough to be able to take over alone the defense against large-scale landings and to permit the Army to withdraw its forces. The Group asks the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to confirm the fact that the Naval High Command shares this opinion. (See Telegram 2250.)

On 5 Feb. the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division had already ordered that the 601st Naval Artillery Battalion be set up in order to reinforce the coastal defense in the Crimea; 3 batteries of 3 guns each were provided for at first, and later 4 batteries, with the guns captured at Nikolayev. At that time the Quartermaster Division pointed out that no more units can be expected there this year. The Armed Forces High Command, the Army High Command, Army Group D, and Station N were notified accordingly and were informed that the 601st Naval Artillery Battalion had been part of the forces intended for operation "Felix".

The Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division discussed the matter with the Army General Staff on 6 Feb., giving a detailed explanation of the reasons why the Navy is unable to provide 25 infantry units; the matter was, by the way, unknown to the Army General Staff.

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#### VIII. Situation East Asia

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

##### 2. Own Situation:

The Japanese have finished assembling forces before Singapore. Heavy air raids on Singapore. 4 Japanese planes attacked Port Moresby in New Guinea. Japanese submarines operated in the latitude of New Zealand. Japanese Headquarters reports a successful air attack against a Dutch East Indian-American fleet formation in the Java Sea on 4 Feb., in which the Japanese Naval Air Force sank the cruisers DE RUYTER and ITOM, severely damaged another cruiser of the Java class and the U.S. cruiser MARBLEHEAD, and sank a Dutch merchant ship of 5,000 tons. (Tr.N.: A cruiser named ITOM cannot be located.)

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#### IX. Army Situation

##### 1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

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On the 6th Army sector heavy enemy attacks in the area of Balakleya were repulsed. Only slight combat activity on the other sectors of the Army Group.

Central Army Group:

Heavy attacks and counterattacks in the area west of Bolkhov. In the area of the 4th Army there is intense fighting in the positions along the highway near Yukhnov. We have transferred tanks there. The other attacks along the fronts of the 4th and 9th Armies resulted in only 1 enemy penetration southeast of Gzatsk, which is now being cut off. The newly-formed pocket south of Rzhev is being drawn together in spite of strong enemy attempts to break through.

Northern Army Group:

A new Air Force field regiment was established southwest of Kholm. Heavy enemy pressure continues southeast of Staraya Russa. The town is under artillery bombardment.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

According to statements of prisoners of war, new enemy units have arrived on the Murmansk front. It is assumed that attacks are planned against the Norwegian Mountain Corps.

3. North Africa:

The enemy Air Force has increased low-level attacks against our approach routes during the last few days. We continued moving the Italian divisions in Trento and Bardia as well as the 90th Motorized Division up into the new areas northeast of Agedabia. We have started to mine the paths leading to El Mecheli and Tmimi from the southeast.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

As concerns the political atmosphere, it is reported that the government's "wait and see" policy is being adopted by an ever increasing number of persons. The fact that the armistice has not yet resulted in a final peace treaty is said to cause great disappointment. Big industry as well as the high clergy and the propertied classes are in favor of collaboration with Germany because of their antipathy toward bolshevism. The great majority of the people, however, is said to have not yet been won over to the idea. Food and coal shortages are a foremost thought in everybody's mind. The tendencies towards a Catholic conservatism are said to be remarkably strong.

A report from the Embassy in Paris states that rumors to the effect that the conference between General Nogues and the Spanish High Commissioner of Morocco was directed against Axis interests are not plausible.

Australia:

The Minister of War declared that Australia must become the citadel of the Allies from which the campaign for the reconquest of Asia and the Pacific is to be launched.

Egypt:

King Farouk ordered dissolution of Parliament and new elections before the end of March.

This step seems to have been caused by the new situation in the Mediterranean and in North Africa in connection with Japanese successes. It obviously is a clear indication of a departure from pro-British policy.

Portugal:

Madeira is under strong British influence. British propaganda and espionage are extremely active.

Sweden:

In answer to the criticism of the German press concerning the Swedish attitude towards latest developments in Norway, the Swedish press denies all jealousy with regard to Norway's alleged supremacy among the Nordic countries. The Nordic peoples can contribute to European cooperation only by working together as free nations in a free society.

U.S.S.R.:

A report from the Kremlin states that Russia is threatening to revise her war policy unless the U.S.A. will send larger shipments of war materiel.

Greece:

According to a report from the Legation, Greek patriots appear to have founded a secret organization, in which ex-officers and former followers of Venizelos have banded together to prepare for the liberation of the country from its conquerors.

Spain:

According to press reports, a large explosion claiming many victims occurred during the unloading of a British tender arriving from Gibraltar. The first impression is that the unidentified originators of the explosion intended to disturb either Spanish-German or Spanish-British relations.

Japan:

According to reports of the Vichy Telegraphic Service in Tokyo, Togo declared in the Diet that the government has taken steps for ratifying the Russo-Japanese commercial pact of 1941 and for reaching a provisional fishery agreement.

U.S.A.:

The radio broadcast a United Press report forecasting tremendous efforts on the part of the U.S. to provide so many more troops and ships for the future expeditionary force of this war than were available in World War I, that the Axis powers will have to succumb to their superiority in the Russian, Near Eastern, Indian, and Australian theaters of war. By the end of 1942, 2 new ships will be launched daily. The Naval Affairs Committee is said to have ordered 968 ships totalling 6,000,000 GRT. As Churchill has already announced, U.S. bombers will soon participate in an all-out air offensive against Germany.

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Special Items:Improvement of Coastal Defenses:

a. For the year 1942 the High Command, Navy is providing 3 heavy and 29 medium-caliber coastal batteries for coastal defense. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division informs the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Planning and the Army General Staff of its plans for installing these batteries in Norway, Holland, Flanders, France, on the Baltic Sea coast, on Crete, and on the Black Sea coast. Copy of the letter as per 1/Skl 3230/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

b. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Operations Division forwards the following Fuehrer directive:

1. The defensive strength of the very heavy coastal batteries is to be reinforced by immediate allocation of antitank weapons (3 cm. antitank guns with red tracer ("Rotkopf") ammunition, or 7.5 cm. guns), of flame throwers and some mortars. The batteries themselves are to provide crews for these weapons. The Army and Navy High Commands are to arrange the delivery of the weapons among themselves.



2. In improving fortification of these battery installations it is imperative that obstacles be erected on their periphery. If necessary, they are also to be protected by mine fields.

3. Insofar as these batteries are not located within the immediate vicinity of infantry strongpoints, they are to be reinforced by special infantry units.

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Situation 8 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an Italian report, the British tanker DUNGLEDALE left Ponta Delgada on 2 Feb. with the destroyers EXMOOR and GROM (according to previous data both classified as war losses), en route to the Far East via the Panama Canal.

Indian Ocean:

A considerable increase in British and American ship movements in Lourenco Marques has been observed lately. 55 steamers totalling 350,000 GRT made port there between 18 Dec. and 24 Jan.

Pacific Ocean:

According to an intelligence report, at least 2 U.S. battleships, 1 of them presumably the MISSISSIPPI, have been ordered to proceed to New Zealand.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our auxiliary cruisers and blockade-runners.

Enemy situation report via Radiograms 1101 and 2203.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

2. Channel Coast:

The following transfer operations will begin this evening: Destroyers Z "25", KONDROR and JAGUAR from Flushing to Le Havre; the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla from Brest to Le Havre; the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla from Rotterdam to Dunkirk; PT boats "51" and "69" from Ostende to Dunkirk; and PT boats "39" and "108" from IJmuiden to Boulogne. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla will operate against whatever targets have been located.

During January, escort service for 405 vessels totalling 294,000 GRT

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was furnished in the area of Group West.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the morning lively air activity in the direction of the West Frisian Islands and the southern tip of Norway. Radio monitoring intercepted a warning against a wreck drifting in the Thames estuary.

Own Situation:

Ice Conditions: Generally unchanged. Navigation on the Elbe and the Weser has improved in some places but is extremely difficult in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.

Convoys proceeded according to plans with no incidents. Work on mine field I, control of shipping lanes by mine-detonating vessels, and mark-boat service for operation "Cerberus" proceeded as planned. Mine-detonating vessels "15" and "17" were damaged. 6 ground mines were swept on route "Braun" and 1 at 53° 56.1' N, 6° 57.2' E.

The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla was transferred from Hook of Holland to Flushing.

The anti-submarine training unit proceeded from the Elbe to Kristiansand.

In the Hubert Gat, harbor patrol vessel "602" shot down an enemy plane during a low-level attack. While crashing, the plane tore the ship's signal bridge overboard. 1 man was killed and 2 were badly wounded.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a report from a British plane, according to which 2 bombs are presumed to have hit 1 of our east-bound convoys consisting of 5 steamers and 1 escort vessel off Lindesnaes.

Own Situation:

A supplementary report states that bombs caused slight damages near a battery on the signal hill during the air raid on Vardoe on 6 Feb. All convoys were discontinued because of bad weather (blizzard). The concussion caused by a nearby bomb hit damaged the engines of the steamer LUGA. The ship has been towed to Farsund.

Concerning the imminent enemy attack which the Army High Command inferred from the many ships sighted at Murmansk, the Commanding Admiral, Norway points to the possibility of an erroneous observation by the plane which was hardly suited for reconnaissance. He also indicates other possible reasons for a concentration of ships in Kola Bay. Convoy traffic may have been increased in order to take



full advantage of the longer nights; after the recent submarine attacks, the ships might be waiting for more escort forces; or shipping which previously proceeded to Archangel is now being directed to Murmansk. (See Telegram 0210.)

The reason mentioned last seems to be the most plausible of the 3.

Measures for the Defense of Norway:

1. Submarines U "456", "436", and "435" have been assigned to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and are en route to the northern area.

2. The 7 vessels of the 11th Subchaser Flotilla arrived in Trondheim on 7 Feb.

3. The Naval Staff directs Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with a copy to Commanding Admiral, Norway, to see that in and outbound submarines proceeding through the herring fishery areas between Floeroe-Haugesund and Kors Fjord-Sognesjoen are sure to be spotted by the fishermen working there. (See Telegram 1323.)

In this connection Group North requests the Commanding Admiral, Norway to inform the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group North immediately about the boundaries of the fishery areas in question. (See Telegram 2254.)

4. For details concerning the allocation of coastal batteries, see Special Items, Paragraph b.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Ice conditions have become worse. Shipping in the Baltic Sea entrances and in the entire Baltic Sea had to be further limited.

The icebreaker CASTOR is proceeding from Copenhagen to Kiel.

The Army General Staff has directed the Northern Army Group to seize the islands Seiskari, Peninsaari, Lavansaari, Ita Matala, Tytersaari, and Pien Tytersaari before the thaws. This will permit the Navy to blockade Kronstadt Bay by means of mine fields. Navy personnel will occupy the islands after their seizure by the Army. Copy of the directive as per l/Skl 3259/42 Gkdos. in War Diary Files "Barbarossa".

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V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring an SC convoy was located close to the rendezvous area on 7 Feb., presumably northwest of the Hebrides. An intelligence report from Spain states that a convoy of 10 steamers with 2 destroyers and 4 gunboats arrived in Gibraltar on 7 Feb. At the same time steamers entered ports on the southern coast of Spain. 3 destroyers and 8 gunboats departed from Gibraltar on 8 Feb. in westerly direction. A very heavily escorted passenger ship, presumably the LLANGIBBY CASTLE, arrived in Gibraltar during the afternoon.

A supplementary report states that on 1 Feb. all U.S. merchant vessels in the Atlantic were ordered to hug the coast between Key West and Cape Hatteras and to pass through the Wimble Shoal, Winter Quarter Shoal, and Diamond Shoal by day. They were directed to proceed on zig-zag courses during the day. The Mona Passage was closed on 1 Feb. after a submarine had been sighted 100 miles to the north.

Several steamers reported having sighted submarines off the American coast on 8 Feb. 1 of these submarines was falsely reported in the Gulf of Mexico. The steamer OCEAN VENTURE was reported sinking east of Cape Charles.

Submarine U "654" reported sighting a southbound convoy of about 15 steamers with few escort vessels east of the Bank of Newfoundland. The convoy had apparently begun to disband during the course of the day. The submarine reported sinking 1 corvette and torpedoing 1 steamer.

Submarine U "108" reported the sinking of the steamer OCEAN VENTURE. The submarine sighted nothing on its outbound voyage and encountered much bad weather. A submarine near Nova Scotia reports primarily fast-moving unescorted vessels and only few air patrols as well as large ice formations and drift ice. Another submarine in the same vicinity reports little coastwise shipping by day, which occasionally becomes heavy by night, likewise with only a few escorts. All main beacons are operating. This submarine, the U "751", sank the tanker SILVERAY and the steamer EMPIRE SUN and torpedoed the tanker CORILLA; however, because of strong enemy defensive action the submarine did not observe the sinking of the CORILLA.

Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Via Telegram 1925 the Naval Staff informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that the Portuguese steamer LIMA is sailing from Lisbon on 8 Feb., carrying troops for Madeira and the Azores.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids against Malta continued. Bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance planes supported the operations of the German Africa Corps.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

### 4. Special Items:

Concerning the suggestion of the Naval Staff for the mining of the Suez Canal (see War Diary 6 Feb.), the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Planning Staff reports that the Air Force High Command, Operations Staff has ordered the X Air Corps to act on the suggestion of the Naval Staff and resume mining of the Suez Canal as far



as its forces will permit. (See Telegram 1300.)

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

An intelligence report from Spain states that Admiral Cuninghame stopped over in Gibraltar during his flight to England.

Reconnaissance over Gibraltar, Malta, and Tobruk sighted no particular change in the number of ships lying in those ports.

According to radio monitoring, British planes reported a westbound French convoy of 4 steamers and 2 destroyers east of Kerkenna Island, and a supposedly successful attack against a submarine northwest of Marsa Matruh. Italian reconnaissance reports submarines east of Augusta and south of Policastro.

According to Italian air reconnaissance 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers were at sea in the Alexandria-Marsa Matruh area.

Statement by British prisoners of war allege that the destroyer DEFENDER was sunk in Nov. 1941 in a dive-bombing attack off Tobruk.

### 2. Own Situation:

The intensified attacks against Malta ordered by the Duce began early in February.

The directive of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and supplementary directive No. 1 reached the Naval Staff through the Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command. Copies as per 1/Skl 307/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The present successes of the Rommel offensive indicate the possibility that the Armored Group, recognizing the operational and tactical inadequacy of the defeated enemy and the comparatively weak enemy forces behind the front, will not be satisfied with its present gains. Therefore a surprise attack on Tobruk is not altogether out of the question. It is interesting to note that the British press is already mentioning a new threat to Egypt. In surveying all potentialities of this situation, it should be considered whether it is still justifiable to continue holding our PT boats in reserve for operations in the area around Sicily or Malta, or whether transferring them at once to Derna for fighting light enemy naval forces and transports in the Tobruk-Bardia area would be more important. In the latter case we would have to abandon some of our current plans for mining the Malta area. The possibility of using motor mine sweepers along the North African coast as escort for our own greatly increasing coastwise transport movements could only be considered as an alternate solution. The advantage of applying such a procedure would probably not be great enough to outweigh the disadvantage resulting from inadequate mine-locating and sweeping services.

The German Admiral, Rome is being informed of these conclusions by the following telegram: "The unexpectedly favorable development of the military situation in Africa suggests the expediency of temporarily using even single PT boats based in the Benghazi and Derna areas. The Naval Staff believes that a surprise attack holds promise of success and will have a particularly deterring effect on the

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enemy. Opinion and plans are requested."

In answer, the German Naval Command, Italy reports that the suggested PT boat operations as well as operations by PT boats based in the Gulf of Suda had been investigated some time ago and were rejected for the following reasons:

1. Weather will greatly limit PT boat operations until the end of spring.
2. The fuel shortage will permit the use of only 3 PT boats.
3. No repair or overhaul facilities are available in Africa.
4. Only Benghazi can be used as a base.
5. In all African ports the PT boats are very much exposed to air raids.
6. Participation in the offensive against Malta is still the principal task of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla.

(See Telegram 1540.)

3. Situation Italy:

The torpedo boat SAGITTARIO reports having rammed and sunk an enemy submarine near Cape Dusato (Leukas). The enemy air raid on Tripoli during the night of 7 Feb. caused no military damage.

The Supply and Transports Office, Benghazi reports daily enemy air raids on Benghazi. No report concerning damages has been received.

1 plane was shot down during a raid on the tanker RONDINE (see War Diary 7 Feb.).

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer TRAPANI and tanker RONDINE reached Tripoli on 7 Feb. 2 of 7 auxiliary sailing vessels en route to Tripoli were sunk during the night of 7 Feb., presumably by British destroyers. The others have arrived in Pantelleria. Enemy planes attacked and damaged an Italian mine sweeper sailing from Tripoli to Benghazi near Cape Misurata.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An enemy air raid in the area Athens-Salamis during the night of 7 Feb. caused only small damage. The "Siena" group has arrived in Piraeus.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report concerning the naval situation.

Complying with the Naval Staff's request Group South submits the following brief situation estimate:



1. During the recent period lively traffic by naval and merchant vessels was observed around Kerch and especially around Sevastopol. Since daylight air reconnaissance is only able to spot part of the ship movements, today's report of 6 inbound and 7 outbound vessels does not necessarily prove that traffic has appreciably increased. Such increase might rather be concluded from the fact that at night the docks are brilliantly illuminated, obviously in an effort to keep the heavy traffic moving on schedule. The report of 8 Feb. which particularly mentions fighter escort for inbound steamers, implies that valuable cargo such as troops, tanks, and fuel is being carried.

2. The Group believes that supply transports to Sevastopol and Kerch carry Russian reinforcements for the Crimea. Ice conditions north of the line from Ak-Mechet to the Danube make it improbable that the Russians are planning any landings, for instance in Odessa, as our intelligence service once reported. It is all the less likely since the Russians are presumably aware of the fact that only very few of the great number of mines which they had laid in the port of Odessa have been removed.

3. The unconfirmed intelligence report about the departure of 22 vessels from Sochi cannot be considered very important since Sochi has only an open roadstead with a small pier. It would be illogical for the Russians to use this port for embarkations of an extent required by large-scale operations since they have larger and better ports at their disposal. The intelligence report probably concerns only small coastal vessels.

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#### VIII. Situation East Asia:

Japanese planes set 26 oil tanks afire in Selatan. The Military Attache in Bangkok reports that bomb hits were scored on 5 steamers and on the dock installations in the port of Singapore. The Allies have only weak naval forces in the area of Singapore. According to radio and press reports from Britain and America, the Japanese landed on the west side of Singapore Island and occupied the island of Pulau Ubin.

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#### IX. Army Situation

##### 1. Russian Front:

##### Southern Army Group:

The 11th Army reports the arrival of 3 large freighters in Sevastopol. Otherwise only little fighting in the Crimea. At the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group our troops took Alexandrovka and Alexandropol. The Army Group is expecting another enemy attack against its northwestern salient in the Losovaya area. In launching an attack, the western wing of the southern front of the 6th Army crossed the Orel River in easterly direction towards Probrashenskoye. Our forces also gained territory west of Balakleya. Enemy attempts to widen the break-through northeast of Balakleya were repulsed. The conduct of our troops during the heavy fighting between Slavyansk and Losovaya at the 2nd Army sector merits highest praise.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks against the 2nd Panzer Army between Mtsensk and Byelev were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. The road from Orel to Byelev is still not passable despite the fact that 3,600 workers are engaged in repairing it. The supply situation is critical because of the impassable roads. The highway at the 4th Army sector is under enemy artillery fire. The attacks launched against the road-block west of Medyn and the positions near Yukhnov were repulsed. Successful fighting against partisans south of Vyazma. The pocket southwest of Rzhev was further reduced. Russian attempts to break out of the encirclement as well as their attacks at all other sectors of the 4th and 9th Armies were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy troops are exerting heavy pressure on the flanks of the forces southeast of Lake Ilmen. The enemy has also advanced south of Staraya Russa and has blocked the supply road.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The Commanding General, Lapland has received no further reports of imminent enemy attacks.

3. Balkans:

A British Major and 3 men who had parachuted from a British plane were captured near Sokolov in Croatia.

4. North Africa:

Enemy attempts to advance to El Mechili with small units were repulsed.

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9 Feb. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Sir Stafford Cripps delivered two speeches, dealing mainly with the problems of British aid to Russia, in which he inserted a few remarks criticizing the British Government. He revealed the interesting fact that in Russia the Armed Forces alone are still entitled to receive clothing allotments but that in spite of all hardships no one is even thinking of a compromise with Hitler. Hitler who, in contrast to Napoleon, was even unable to reach Moscow, will renew his offensive for possession of the Caucasian oil fields in April. An Allied victory will remain doubtful so long as Russia is not being supported to the greatest possible extent. Sir Stafford Cripps continued, saying that the creation of a new European order is the joint responsibility of Britain and Russia if they are to save the world from new chaos. The Atlantic Charter does not define the peace aims with sufficient clarity.

Turkey:

The former Turkish Ambassador in London has been dismissed at his own request, apparently because he would have preferred a more pro-British attitude of his government.

Brazil:

German nationals in Brazil are being treated differently in the various states. In Rio de Janeiro the German churches, schools, and clubs were closed.

According to a report from a diplomatic source, Foreign Minister Aranha is said to have suggested to the Brazilian Government that Natal be converted to serve as a U.S. base for the attack on West Africa. President Vargas supposedly agreed to the proposal, despite the objections of the Minister of War.

Japan:

According to the German Embassy, Japanese diplomatic circles are stressing their desire to reach an agreement concerning Chungking but declare that it will still take time before Chiang Kai-shek will be ready to negotiate. The morale of the Chungking troops is said to be as high as ever. Authoritative German circles believe that Chiang Kai-shek only tries to postpone the start of negotiations because he hopes to obtain much more favorable terms in view of the Russo-Japanese conflict which he expects to break out this spring.

U.S.A.:

Press reports state that a Pan-American Defense Council is about to be established in Washington.

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Special Items:

I. During the conferences between the Chief, Naval Staff, Operations

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Division and the Army Chief of Staff, all pending questions concerning both branches of the Armed Forces were thoroughly explained and clarified, so that the Army General Staff is now completely informed about the possibilities for naval operations in Norway, in the Gulf of Finland, and in the Black Sea.

During the subsequent report to the Fuehrer, the latter strongly emphasized and explained in detail his belief that the German position in Norway is of decisive importance and that the threat to it is acute. This opinion conforms to the views he expressed to the Chief, Naval Staff on 29 Jan. He mentioned, however, that in view of Britain's tremendous need for ships to carry goods to Russia, a large-scale offensive against Norway might now have become doubtful. Among other things, the Fuehrer inquired particularly about the repairs on the LEIPZIG, the transfer of PT boats to the Black Sea, and the transfer of the SCHEER to Narvik.

A discussion with General of the Artillery Jodl concluded the conference. Among other things, the General declared the resumption of sea transports to Finland and Norway to be particularly important.

Minutes of these conferences as per 1/Sk1 313/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Files "Barbarossa" Vol. II.

II. Notes taken by Group North on points discussed between the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commanding Admiral, Group North in Kiel on 9 Feb. may be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIIa.

III. Via Telegram 1313 the Naval Staff ordered the Group Commands, the Commanding Admirals France and Norway and the various Naval Stations to reinforce the defensive strength of the heavy coastal batteries in accordance with the Fuehrer directive (see War Diary 8 Feb.).

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## Situation 9 Feb. 1942

### I. War in Foreign Waters

#### 1. Enemy Situation:

A summary of reports concerning Iceland as an Anglo-American base is contained in News Analysis No. 8 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch.

#### North Atlantic:

The steamer FORT VILLE MARIE of 7,000 GRT, the keel of which was laid in Canada on 4 Oct. 1941, made her maiden voyage and arrived in England with cargo on 7 Feb.

According to press reports, Canada has reached Great Britain's ship building capacity by the wartime addition of shipyards. Roosevelt signed a bill appropriating \$750,000,000 for new shipyards which are to build 1,799 warships.

#### 2. Own Situation:

Nothing particular to report.

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II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

An enemy reconnaissance plane flew over Brest at noon.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "15" and "17" arrived at Dunkirk; destroyers Z "25", KONDOR, and JAGUAR, as well as torpedo boats T "11", "2", "5", "12", and "4" of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived in Le Havre. 4 ground mines were swept on route "Rosa". 10 moored mines were swept on route "Lila". The latter probably belonged to the northern or the southern wing of the mine field in quadrant AN 7996 which had been swept in Sep. and Nov. 1940, and was the first in which British moored influence mines were found.

Route "Lila" was closed to shipping between points 1 and 2.

A belated report about a hitherto unknown type of British mine caused Group West to issue a directive via Telegram 1130 to the Admiral, France and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West that observations of this nature which are important to the operational commands be included in the daily situation reports of the mine sweeper units. Group West also points out that the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is responsible for all mine sweeper and motor mine sweeper operations, and that he must always be in a position to estimate in detail the mine situation in the coastal areas. The Naval Staff has received a copy of the directive.

The Air Command, Atlantic Coast orders preparations to get under way for transferring all serviceable planes and some ground personnel of the 106th Bomber Group to the Netherlands. The Bomber Group is to participate in the joint operation "Cerberus".

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Ice conditions and shipping situation generally unchanged. Even heavy steamers require icebreakers for sailing on the Elbe, Weser, and Ems. Heligoland continues to be free of ice.

Convoy missions and preparatory tasks for operation "Cerberus" have been carried out according to plan. Mine-detonating vessel "15" is out of commission. Mine sweeper "1301" was damaged by a mine explosion during sweeping operations in mine field 1. Attempts will be made to tow her in.

2 vessels of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla have been transferred from Hook of Holland to Dunkirk.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

A submarine (periscope) was sighted in the entrance to the Varanger Fjord. A Norwegian stated that the Norwegian submarine B "3" was scuttled by her own crew in Gavl Fjord on 9 Jun. 1940, at a point where the water is 60 m. deep.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity over Trondheim, Stavanger, and Bergen on 8 Feb. as well as an enemy air raid on 5 medium-size transport trawlers accompanied by M "1106" south of Lister, during which the steamer LUBA suffered slight damage. (See War Diary 8 Feb., Enemy Situation, Norway.)

Destroyer Z "23" sailed from Trondheim in southerly direction. The anti-submarine training unit departed from Kristiansand South on 9 Feb. en route to the North.

Defense Measures in Norway

1. The Boek Fjord off Kirkenes has been mined.
2. Commanding Admiral, Norway intends to mine the Vefsenfjord to protect Mosjoen and Highway No. 50. This task will be completed in a few weeks, after Norwegian mines have been delivered. (See Telegram 1225.)
3. The Commanding Admiral, Norway submitted the following opinion concerning the reinforcement of patrol services in the coastal areas (see War Diary 5 and 6 Feb.).
  - a. Patrol vessels or fish cutters scattered over 30 points of the long stretch of the Norwegian coast offer no military protection against surprise raids. Even if the ships were to be stationed about 10 miles off shore, the lapse of time between our sighting and reporting an enemy force and its approach is so short that an advance warning would essentially be of no value. Optical signal devices are effective only in the immediate vicinity of the coast.
  - b. The food shortage prohibits the diversion of another 150 fish cutters from the already extremely strained Norwegian fishing industry.
  - c. Since international law will not permit the employment of Norwegian auxiliary personnel as crews for coastal patrol vessels, this can be done only on a very small scale. Radio technicians for operating portable radio stations cannot be furnished because there are already 450 vacancies in this category in the Norwegian theater.
  - d. Intensive patrol activity permits no fishing, even to a limited extent.
  - e. The suggestion of Group North (see War Diary 6 Feb.) is therefore considered impracticable.



4. Concerning the operations planned by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, which have been approved by the Naval Staff (see War Diary 7 Feb., Submarine Warfare), the Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that of the total of 12 submarines assigned to the Norwegian area, 6 are to be assigned to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and the remaining 6 are to be used in the principal bases at Narvik-Tromsøe, Trondheim and Bergen of the Coastal Defense Commands. As for the strategic and tactical command of the submarines, the Commanding Admiral, Norway suggests the following:

a. The 6 submarines which are to be assigned to the Arctic Ocean are to operate against enemy convoy routes in the Arctic region, concentrating their efforts on convoys carrying cargo to Russia. These submarines will be under the tactical command of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

b. The 6 boats which are to be assigned to the main bases are to serve to **protect the Norwegian coast, and will operate** in westerly direction in support of the planned operations of the naval forces of Group North. All vessels will be under the tactical command of Group North in accordance with the uniform character of this task.

c. In view of the lack of adequate technical facilities, it is impracticable to place the submarines also under the command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway as a third authority. The Commanding Admiral, Norway will direct special requests connected with the employment of submarines to Group North. For the time being, he asks that submarines U "597" and "377", which will be ready to sail from Heligoland by 16 or 17 Feb., remain in the area of the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast for a few days to protect fishing vessels in that area as proposed (see War Diary 5 Feb.) and then be sent to the Lofoten area.

Copy of the radiogram from the Commanding Admiral, Norway as per 1/Skl 312/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

5. The Commanding Admiral, Fleet, in answer to the question of employing fleet forces in the North, is emphasizing primarily the great threat to the ships from air attacks launched from bases in Scotland, Iceland, and Murmansk. He demands that adequate air reconnaissance be furnished for attacks against enemy convoys and naval forces, so as to prevent hit-or-miss operations. The Commanding Admiral, Fleet believes that the heavy vessels in Trondheim and Narvik will hardly be able to arrive in time to prevent enemy landings. An increase in the number of reconnaissance, bomber, and fighter planes of the Air Force is not only a prerequisite for naval operations; it is also indispensable for protecting and escorting the vessels. Since the Fuehrer considers Norway to be the "Zone of Destiny", the Air Force can under no circumstances fail to concentrate its efforts on that area - if necessary, at the expense of other theaters of war. The fact that Norway's geographical location is particularly well suited for operations of our Air Force is not to be ignored.

The Fleet Command believes that the TIRPTIZ and the SCHEER have completed their training to a degree which enables them to participate in operations, while the other battleships and cruisers still need more or less training before they are fully able to cope with the tasks at hand. However, we must accept the risks involved in transferring these inadequately trained vessels to Trondheim. The Fleet Command also points out that the lack of adequate escort forces will handicap whatever training will be necessary in Norway. Provided

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that training will at all be possible in Trondheim, Narvik, or the Vest Fjord, it is imperative that adequate air forces as well as anti-submarine defenses be made available in those areas.

Aside from the above requirements, the Commanding Admiral, Fleet believes that only the Baltic Sea is suited for a really thorough training of the Fleet. Whatever alternatives are being employed at present, the ships will have to proceed to the Baltic Sea at a later date to complete their training. In employing these vessels in the North, certain allowances will have to be made for the inadequate degree of training which can be achieved for the time being. As concerns vessels which are temporarily remaining in home waters, they will be ready for operations after a training period of 3 to 4 weeks, as soon as ice conditions permit, provided that the necessary equipment and personnel are available. It is also highly desirable that the destroyers and torpedo boats which are about to be commissioned participate at least once in Baltic Sea maneuvers before they are sent into action, despite the fact that training facilities for these vessels are better in the North.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Ice conditions in the Baltic Sea entrances and in the entire Baltic Sea have become still worse.

According to an agent report, 9 Norwegian vessels are said to be ready to depart from Goeteborg. 12 British captains and 200 Norwegian sailors are in town at the moment. Icebreaker CASTOR arrived in Kiel.

Group North reports via Telegram 1129 that Swedish ships which have received permission to sail from Goeteborg are not to carry any special identification marks, since Norwegian blockade-runners might use them to conceal their own identity.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, the MALAYA, 1 DIDO class cruiser, and 10 destroyers left Gibraltar during the night of 8 Feb., destination unknown. On 18 Jan.(sic) **radio monitoring** picked up the navigation and approach directives and submarine warnings issued between 30 Jan. and 7 Feb. for unescorted American vessels in the Western Atlantic. On 9 Feb. reports were also intercepted that submarines had been sighted east of Long Island by the steamer JESSICA VE II and north of the Mona Passage by the steamer EMPIRE HOPE.

The Admiralty announced the loss of the destroyer MATABELE which had last been located departing from Ponta Delgada on 19 Dec.

The press reports that on 6 Feb. the U.S. tanker CHINA ARROW (8,403 GRT) was sunk by submarines, and that a submarine sank the Swedish motor ship AMERIKALAND (13,355 GRT) off the American coast. The sinking of the Greek freighter MARIA (4,707 GRT) was reported without indicating the location.

The U.S. Navy Department announced that Axis submarines are continu-



ing their operations in the open Atlantic, and that also the coastal waters of the U.S. are part of their operations area. The report adds that U.S. anti-submarine forces are increasingly successful in their operations.

The British Admiralty reports 3 recent, supposedly entirely unsuccessful German air raids on British convoys, in which at least 2 planes were shot down and others were damaged. The naval vessels PITCHLEY, MENDIP, LEEDS, PUFFIN, and the steamers HIGHWEAR and HELDER participated in the successful defense. On 24 Jan., the U.S. submarine S "26" sank near Panama in waters 90 m. deep as the result of a collision during maneuvers.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "586" torpedoed 1 tanker (8,000 GRT) several times northwest of the Hebrides but could not wait to observe the sinking because of defensive action.

Submarine U "581" picked up 4 more survivors from a British vessel.

The convoy located east of the Newfoundland Bank has completely dispersed. Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The Commander in Chief, Air Force gave the Danish Ministry permission for public participation in ice rescue air service after corresponding advance notice. Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

At 1830, 14 Ju 88's attacked an enemy convoy of 6 vessels north of Sidi Barrani. 10 direct hits were scored: 2 each on a light cruiser, a destroyer, and an 8,000 GRT steamer, and 4 on a 4,000 GRT steamer. Further damage by near misses is probable.

The nuisance raids against airfields on Malta were continued. An air raid on the depots and barracks in Marsa Matruh was effective.

3. Eastern Front:

Weather conditions are making operations extremely difficult. Despite this fact the final battle at the Central Army Group sector was heavily supported.

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VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from Ceuta, 20 vessels, including 2 heavy ones, passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on an easterly course at 2300 on 8 Feb. The Italians report having sighted submarines off the northwestern tip of Sicily and east of Cape Carbonara (Sardinia). In the Eastern Mediterranean, morning air reconnaissance

sighted 3 convoys of 2 to 4 steamers each, with escorts of 1 to 2 cruisers and 2 to 3 destroyers, in the area between Alexandria and Marsa Matruh. In the evening radio monitoring intercepted several urgent tactical radiograms indicating contact with the enemy, evidently in connection with the attack of the 1st Group of Air Wing 1 on the enemy naval force north of Sidi Barrani.

A telegram sent from Cairo to the War Department in Washington on 19 Jan., which was intercepted by the radio decoding service, indicates that the R.A.F. seems to be most hesitant about reporting its observations of enemy forces to its American allies. According to the telegram, the R.A.F. spotted altogether only 36 planes in Sicily but expects a gradual reinforcement of the German Air Force, beginning 1 Apr., to a total strength of 1,000 bombers by the end of spring. The principal target of the German Air Force based on the **Peleponnesos** is said to be the sea traffic from Alexandria to the Cyrenaica, by means of which the British allege to have transported daily totals of 1,200 tons to Tobruk, 200 tons to Derna, and 600 to 800 tons to Benghazi. The R.A.F. fears that this traffic will prove to be too expensive for the R.A.F. and the Navy in the long run. All bombers are said to have been withdrawn from Malta and only fighter planes remain. On 26 Dec. more than 30 planes were completely destroyed on Malta airfields and much of the ground personnel was lost. It is anticipated that the Germans aim at an ultimate occupation of the island, to be followed by rendering the base of Alexandria ineffective by mine, air, and submarine operations. The British estimate that about 70 Italian, 25 German, and about 25 British submarines are in the Mediterranean, and it is feared that from now until 1 Apr. the British Mediterranean Fleet will be gradually weakened, after which time it will probably be exposed to the most concentrated German air offensive.

2. Situation Italy:

A still unidentified steamer was torpedoed by a submarine in the vicinity of Sardinia. Other reports have not been received.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 8 Feb., enemy planes raided the Athens area, concentrating their attacks on the oil dump at Perama. No military damage. The "Siena" group left Piraeus bound for Suda.

Black Sea:

A belated report states that on 8 Feb. air reconnaissance sighted 6 inbound and 7 outbound vessels in Sevastopol. Lively traffic was also observed in the sea area of Sevastopol on 9 Feb. 3 steamers arrived, 6 steamers and 1 destroyer were observed leaving port. According to a report of the Bulgarian coast guard station at **Ahtopol**, in the afternoon of 9 Feb. a column of 3 ships proceeding on northeasterly course, and a little later 2 other ships, were located off the coast. 3 detonations were heard in the direction of the ships which had disappeared in the fog.

2. Own Situation:

2 naval batteries were installed south of Odessa.



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Via Telegram 1715, the Naval Staff has been informed about a request of Group South, submitted to the High Command, Navy, Officer Personnel Division, concerning the assignment of a qualified liaison officer to the operations department of the 4th Air Force. This request had been made upon the suggestion of the 4th Air Force in view of the planned large-scale operation against Russian naval and merchant vessels and the imminent transfer to the Black Sea of the PT boat flotilla and submarines, which will require strategic and tactical cooperation with the 4th Air Force.

The Naval Staff considers the assignment of a qualified and energetic officer extremely necessary.

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### VIII. Situation East Asia

#### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to statements by prisoners, the U.S. naval forces which attacked the Marshall Islands consisted of 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 20 destroyers. The cruisers and carriers came from San Diego. A tanker refueled them at sea. Spirited American air attacks were carried out despite intense anti-aircraft fire. The Japanese fighters arrived too late to participate in the defense.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that New Zealand has evidently become the main enemy supply base. Japanese auxiliary cruisers observed convoys in that area. Shipping to Port Darwin has increased considerably.

According to the report of the Military Attache in Rome, 250 R.A.F. planes have so far been scheduled for transfer from the Mediterranean to the Far East.

#### 2. Situation Japan:

As concerns the attack on Dutch and American vessels in the Java Sea, the Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that on 4 Feb. Japanese planes based on Kendary spotted the naval force south of Kandeian while it was apparently proceeding to Darwin. 1 vessel of the JAVA class sank after having been hit by two 250 kg bombs. The DE RUYTER sank 2 hours later. The damaged U.S. cruiser has been identified as the HOUSTON. In order to speed up the fall of Singapore, the Japanese are planning to occupy parts of Sumatra opposite the island. According to a Japanese report to the Ambassador, 1 Japanese cruiser was lost off Amboina during an enemy air raid. Another cruiser and a submarine were damaged. A Japanese submarine sank an enemy destroyer in the Java Sea. The Japanese forces on Luzon are not pressing their offensive in order to avoid unnecessary losses.

Special military efforts in the Singapore campaign are expected for 11 Feb., which is the 2602nd anniversary of the foundation of the Empire. According to a report from the Naval Attache in Tokyo, the Japanese Navy considers the rescue and, above all, the promotion of the captain of the REPULSE to be a serious indication of the decline of morale in the British Navy. The traditional view according to which it is dishonorable to be captured, even against one's will, is again being strongly emphasized. The Japanese Armed Forces will not create a new decoration for immediately rewarding bravery because there is no need for extraordinary incentive and because it would be impossible to award it to all those who deserve it. Feats beyond the call of duty will be rewarded only years later, and only after a thorough investigation. The extreme arrogance of Japanese officers resulting from the great initial victor-

ies, which interfered with German-Japanese cooperation, has given way to a more realistic attitude on their part and thus helped in reestablishing the old spirit of comradeship.

LX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The Von Kleist group and the 6th Army established contact near Pereshchepino. Our forces advanced further west of Balakleya. Enemy attacks near Byelgorod were repulsed in a counterattack.

Central Army Group:

West of Bolkhov our forces gained territory in northerly direction despite strong enemy resistance. At the 4th Army sector all enemy attacks west and north of Yukhnov were repulsed. Engagements with partisans around Vyazma are continuing. Strong enemy attacks northwest of Rzhev were repulsed with dive bomber support. The enemy suffered heavy losses. A Russian ski unit attempting to encircle our forces near Byeloi was likewise repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy snow handicapped operations near Kholm. Strong enemy pressure in the pocket southeast of Staraya Russa. Enemy attacks near Yukhnov and Yamno, and a tank-supported attack launched from Leningrad were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

The day passed without particular incidents. In trying to establish contact with the enemy, advance elements of the Italian Motorized Corps reached the area 30 km. north of El Mechili and the German Africa Corps the area east of Maraua.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In another speech on Russia, Cripps declared that while communism is an admirable system in many respects, it also embraces much which would be undesirable for one's own country. He said that after an Allied victory Soviet Russia would without doubt be the strongest power in Europe, and would presumably establish herself in Berlin. Should Great Britain fail to meet her on friendly terms, Soviet Russia will determine the future of Europe by herself. Despite all admiration for Moscow, it would be better if this were done in cooperation with the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

Due to the increasing oil shortage, the rationing of soap and soap powder is to go into effect immediately. Bread and potato rationing is expected to be introduced in the near future.

The Pacific War Council held its first meeting in London. Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and New Zealand were represented.

Portugal:

The Foreign Ministry is said to have been informed that the Union of South Africa is preparing a military operation against Mozambique. Aside from this, she is said to be planning a special action against Madagascar with some of the troops intended for North Africa. The increasing food shortage in Portugal is so much in the limelight that it has overshadowed the interest in foreign affairs.

Hungary:

The government has presented the draft of a bill regulating the appointment of a vice-regent. Horthy's son is being mentioned in this connection.

Turkey:

Turkey attributes special importance to the events in Egypt. The re-appointment of a nationalistic government is considered to be a heavy blow to the British. Certain parallels are being drawn to developments in Iraq.

U.S.A.:

The former Chief of Naval Operations, 70 year old Admiral Standley, was appointed Ambassador to Moscow.

South America:

One of the more interesting resolutions reached at the Rio conference is the one according to which all the Republics of the New World which are at war are to be considered nonbelligerents. However, any American country may make special concessions in this respect to any non-American nation at war with the Axis. For other resolutions see Political Review No. 34, Paragraph 9.

China:

According to Reuter, Chiang Kai-shek is in India at the moment for conferences with important British authorities.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Naval Staff, Communications Division reports that the production of communications equipment for the various branches of the Armed Forces has not yet been hit by the raw material shortage, since the Reich postal system has considerable reserves of material available. However, the problem of personnel is all the more serious. Lt. Gen. Fellgiebel is to submit a proposal to the Fuehrer that the situation be remedied by employing more women than heretofore.

II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports about temporary work stoppages in some shipyards due to the lack of power and fuel.

III. The report of the Naval Staff, Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section deals with the question of declaring the Gulf of Finland the only operations zone in the Baltic Sea.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff, Submarine Division reports that the transfer of the 23rd Submarine Flotilla from Salamis to Pola has been postponed until the middle of April because the preparations in Pola will not be completed before that time. He further reports that the anti-submarine training school has been transferred to Norway in view of prevailing ice conditions. The training flotillas, however, will remain in the Baltic Sea for the completion of unfinished construction work or urgent repairs. In this way, no time will be wasted in having to bring back the large amount of training equipment from Norway to the Baltic Sea when ice conditions change.

V. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports concerning the overall situation estimate of the Armed Forces High Command, according to which the command, as well as the troops have the most critical stage behind them. He also reports about the possibility of a new spring offensive at the southern sector of the Eastern Front.

Continuing his report, the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff mentions the operations orders for the Channel break-through of the vessels at Brest and the subsequent transfer of some vessels to Norway, which Group North has submitted to the Naval Staff (key word "Sportpalast"). His further report deals with the operations orders of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships for the Channel break-through.

VI. The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff suggests that the steamer CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN depart from Las Palmas for the immediate purpose of supplying auxiliary cruisers, possibly proceeding to Japan as an ultimate destination. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

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Special Items:

I. Telegram 2245 informs the Naval Staff about the renewed urgent request of the Fleet Command to the High Command, Navy, Officer Personnel Division to cancel the order, which was to become effective at the end of February, for transferring observers assigned to ship-



borne aircraft from battleships and armored cruisers, unless equivalent replacements are furnished.

## II. Concerning operation "Korsika".

a. In line with the preparations for this operation, the Naval Staff ordered the following measures concerning allocation of escort forces, aside from those already mentioned:

23 Jan: Directive to the shipyards to give priority to requests for tugs from the Group Commands, even if no particular reasons are given. (The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch was to make this request to the Chief, Naval Construction Division in person.)

23 Jan.: The Commander in Chief, Air Force has been asked to direct the 3rd Air Force to provide fighter-bombers also for the training voyages of the vessels at Brest. The Commander in Chief, Air Force reported on 29 Jan. that the 3rd Air Force has been ordered to furnish air protection for operation "Cerberus", and for that purpose has been put under the command of Chief of Fighters, Colonel Galland. The 3rd Air Force has been instructed to arrange further details directly with Group West.

29 Jan.: In compliance with the request of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section was asked to improve the intelligence service in the Brest area, which is inadequate as far as personnel and organization are concerned.

### b. Operations Orders:

1. On 6 Feb. Group West forwarded the orders of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West concerning the disposition of his forces. These orders constitute Appendix No. 7 to the operations orders of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. They provide that on D-day the route which the Brest group is to follow for its Channel breakthrough be swept in sections by the 2nd, 12th, and 1st Mine Sweeper Flotillas, and the 2nd and 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotillas.

In case of bad weather the 4th Mine Sweeper Flotilla will supplant the 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla. Otherwise, the 4th Mine Sweeper Flotilla is to remain on alert in Boulogne. The 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla will be on alert in Calais. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to have 2 steam trawler-type vessels each in readiness in Cherbourg, Le Havre, Fecamp, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Ostende. Aside from this, orders have been issued for manning marker positions A to G.

2. Operations orders of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships as issued on 4 Feb.: The task at hand is the eastward passage through the Channel, to be accomplished under all circumstances. The vessels will take full advantage of the new moon phase by proceeding at top speed. The operation will not take place if none of the vessels but the PRINZ EUGEN is ready to sail. Participating forces: From Brest: SCHARNHORST as flagship of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships; GNEISENAU; PRINZ EUGEN; destroyer Z "29" as flagship of the Commander Destroyers; BEITZEN as flagship of the Commander 5th Destroyer Flotilla; JACOBI; IHN; SCHOEMANN; and destroyer Z "25".

From about point Q: The 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas with 5 vessels each. Beginning approximately at 1300 of D-day plus 1 (Cape

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Griz Nez): 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with 5 vessels; vessels of the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas; defense forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North; fighter planes of the 3rd, 2nd, and Heligoland Bight Fighter Commands; reconnaissance forces of the 3rd Air Force, the 5th Air Force, and the Commander, Naval Air; and bomber units of the 3rd Air Force and sea-rescue vessels of the 3rd Air Force and of the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area.

Strategic command ashore will be exercised by Group Commanders West and North. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships will be in tactical command while the vessels are at sea.

Col. Galland will be in command of fighter planes. Col. Ibel will be aboard the SCHARNHORST to direct operations of the 3rd Fighter Command.

The 3rd Air Force will be in charge of reconnaissance and bomber operations. A large number of planes is scheduled to raid Southampton at dawn of D-day plus 1, prior to which date dive bombers are to raid the PT boat bases at Dover and Ramsgate. The naval forces are not to seek enemy engagements; they are to join battle only if such action is in the interest of executing the operation. No paravane-equipped escort force will precede the group so that the vessels may proceed at top speed.

III. Operational directives of Group West of 1 Feb. contain, among other things, the orders of the Chief of the 3rd Air Force and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West for operation "Donnerkeil", as well as instructions concerning communications and navigational data. All directives concerning the operation and its execution have been incorporated in the operations order of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships.

IV. On 7 Feb., Group North issued a supplement to the operations order of Group West. The supplement concerns the advance of the naval force under the command of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships within the area of Group North. It also contains a description by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North of route "Prachtstrasse" and its continuation to Heligoland Bight, data concerning fuel supplies in the ports of destination, and the distribution of tugboats.

All vessels participating in the operation and available for further assignments will refuel as soon as they have arrived at their ports of destination (SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU in Wilhelmshaven; PRINZ EUGEN in Wesermuende; destroyers and torpedo boats in Heligoland). All ships are to expect assignment to further duties approximately 3 days after their arrival. Torpedo boats must be prepared to sail 2 days after their arrival.

For the Naval Staff's endorsement of the operations directives issued by Group West see War Diary 5 Feb. On 7 Feb. Group West replied to pertinent notes which the Naval Staff had made concerning certain points in these directives. In addition, on 8 Feb. the Naval Staff requested Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West to confirm that the vessels have been routed via points 14 and 15 for very definite reasons despite the known danger from British air mines. These reasons make it impossible to follow the suggestion that the route be shifted to deeper waters, as had been proposed during the conference between the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and the Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section of the Naval Staff, Operations Division.



Situation 10 Feb. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:North Atlantic:

A war shipping board was established in the U.S.A., which is to be in charge of all merchant ships for the duration of the war. The board is headed by an Admiral.

South Atlantic:

A Spanish Naval officer reports that an average of 20 to 25 fairly large tankers can always be seen in Curacao. The port is said to be neither guarded nor blacked out nor protected by mines. Many vessels, mainly transports are calling at the port of Trinidad where U.S. cruisers and destroyers are based. No convoys were observed. This port is also said to be fully lighted and not protected by mine fields.

Indian Ocean:

According to an Italian report a convoy of 20 vessels carrying troops and materiel has assembled in Durban.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Madrid is being informed that sailing orders for the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will arrive in Madrid by the end of the week, and that the departure of the ship is scheduled for 22 Feb. at the latest. The Attache is to arrange for the necessary preparations.

Report on enemy situation by Radiograms 0552, 1949, and 2211.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance a convoy of 14 steamers and 2 escort vessels was located south of Falmouth at noon, first on westerly, and then on northerly course.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

According to a report from the Naval Attache in Madrid the tanker BENNO is definitely lost. The remaining members of the crew will go to Bordeaux on 11 Feb. A British plane flew over Ferrol on 9 Feb. at 1430 and was met by a salvo from Spanish guns. An enemy air raid on Brest lasting from 2047 until 2207 caused no particular damage.

Channel Coast:

In the course of an exploratory sweep during the night of

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9 Feb., a mine was located in quadrant BF 3538. It is presumed that it was either a mine which had risen to the surface or a British moored influence mine. Mine sweeper M "1208" hit a mine in quadrant 3562 and sank. The captain and 25 men are missing. A drifting mine Mark XVII was swept west of the Ile de Batz. It is of a completely new type and is equipped with a timing device set for a period of 38 days.

Destroyers "25" and SCHOEMANN were transferred from Le Havre to Brest.

Torpedo boats KONDOR, JAGUAR, and ILTIS were transferred from Le Havre to Flushing and torpedo boats "13" and "16" from Rotterdam to Dunkirk.

4 men debarked from a British vessel in Baie de la Seine early in the morning. The men and the vessel escaped. Enemy planes flew over Cherbourg and Boulogne at noon, evidently for reconnaissance purposes. 27 planes approached the Channel Islands. No reports are available. The mine situation has led Group West to order the rerouting of operation "Cerberus". The route between point "Rosa 15" and point AE will be changed to lead from point B to point "Lila la". Marker boat positions will be changed accordingly.

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### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

Ice conditions remain almost unchanged. At noon enemy planes reconnoitered the North Sea coast up to Langeoog. The 18th Mine Sweeper Flotilla is bound for the Jade from the Oster Ems with the damaged mine sweeper M "1801". Mine-detonating vessels swept shipping lanes according to plan. The 13th Mine Sweeper Flotilla had to interrupt operations because of bad weather.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North believes that the mines which were swept on route "Braun" had been laid only during the last few days and for a special purpose. He expects renewed concentrated mine laying as soon as the enemy has found a worthwhile target. We must allow for the fact that some mines might be equipped with ship counters and delay clocks. It has been definitely established that the mines on route "Schwarz" were laid only recently, possibly near the marker-boats. The detonation below mine sweeper M "1801" in water 28 m. deep indicates highly sensitive magnetic mines, acoustic mines, or faulty degaussing gear. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships considers route "Schwarz" less dangerous than route "Braun". Both routes will continue to be swept.

In view of the above, Group North intends to use route "Schwarz" for operation "Cerberus" and requests Group West to inform the Commanding Admiral, Battleships accordingly. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North is to report on the possibility of changing from route "Prachtstrasse" to route "Rot", or from route "Braun" to route "Hellrot", and from route "Schwarz" to route "Braun" should the situation require such action.

In answer to this, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North reports that route "Prachtstrasse" and route "Schwarz" seem least hazardous but that route "Schwarz" might have become contaminated by mines from mine field I which has been swept up to 3.5 miles north of route "Schwarz".



There are no swept channels between the individual routes. The entire route "Hellrot" is of doubtful value because of its shallow waters and limited freedom of movement. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North believes that it would be less dangerous to turn seaward from route "Braun" if the need arises.

In compliance with the request of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has ordered the activation of the 5th Defense Division. It will comprise all vessels of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North which had been assigned to his command before the 1st Defense Division became part of his forces. Headquarters of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, North Sea will remain active for the time being in order to execute the tasks arising in the Baltic Sea, and will be renamed Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea. Headquarters of the permanent representative of the Commander, Patrol Vessels, North in Wesermuende and of the Deputy Commander, Mine Sweepers, North, as well as the headquarters of the Commander, Convoy Services under the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, in Cuxhaven, will be deactivated. Companies assigned to the bases of the Commander, Patrol Vessels, North, of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, North, and to the home base of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, are to be consolidated into a single detachment of defense forces in Cuxhaven. This detachment will be under the command of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 9 Feb. enemy planes reconnoitered the Trondheim and Bergen areas.

Via Telegram 1558 Group North informs the Naval Staff about the negative reply received from the Commanding Admiral, Norway regarding the use of trawlers for reconnaissance duty in coastal waters (see War Diary 9 Feb.).

The Admiral, Arctic Coast has ordered publication of the announcement that the waters of Kvaloe and Langsund are mine-infested (see Telegram 1630).

The Naval Staff once more outlines the tasks of the 8 submarines located between northern Scotland and Iceland, as follows: The submarines are to operate in the sea area between the enemy bases in northern Scotland, North Ireland, and Iceland, as well as on presumed approach routes from said bases to northern Norway. The submarines are to direct their efforts at intercepting and impairing enemy landing attempts and transport movements at an early date. They are also to keep the situation in the above areas under constant surveillance. Advantageous opportunities for attacks on ships proceeding west from Scotland may be exploited if the submarines are not forced to leave for several days the areas which had been designated in accordance with their main task.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that in about 2 to 3 weeks the Submarine Staff Officer for the Arctic Ocean will be ready to take his post.

According to the report of the Naval Construction Division construction of the following berths has been completed: A coastal berth for battleships in the Aasen Fjord on the north side of the Faetten Fjord; an anchorage for battleships in the southeastern part of the Lo Fjord; and a coastal berth for cruisers on the south coast of the Lo Fjord. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division informs the Naval Construction Division that it is necessary to speed up with all possible means improvements on the battleship berth on the south side of the Faetten Fjord and the dolphin berth for a battleship in the entrance to Hopla Elven. Construction of a second coastal berth for battleships in the Lo Fjord will be temporarily postponed.

#### Defense Measures in Norway:

1. In order to protect the shipping lanes between Kristiansand South and Stavanger, the Commanding Admiral, Norway plans the laying of 4 anti-submarine mine fields, adjusted to a depth of 15 m., in the areas in which enemy submarines are operating during the long Arctic days. The total length of the mine field is to be 19.1 miles. 700 anti-submarine mines type B will be needed. The Commanding Admiral, Norway requests the approval of the Naval Staff, Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, particularly in view of the fact that the safety of our own submarines will be affected if the mine fields are laid as planned.

2. Group North informs the Commanding Admiral, Battleships of the Fuehrer's estimate of the situation in northern Norway and of the measures which have been carried out or are being planned for reinforcing the northern defenses. Within the scope of these measures the Commanding Admiral, Battleships is responsible for the following tasks:

a. Discouraging an enemy landing by the presence of a naval force in northern Norway.

b. Actively participating in the annihilation of a landing fleet in case of a landing attempt.

c. Seizing any opportunity for attacking enemy naval forces which might participate in raids against the Norwegian coast.

d. Attacking enemy shipping between Murmansk and Archangel.

Within the framework of tasks b-d above Group North considers it particularly important that heavy enemy vessels, aircraft carriers, and cruisers which have appeared on the scene be destroyed. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships is also being informed about the plans for allocation of escort forces and light naval forces. Readiness of 3 hours for ships and 4 hours for destroyers and torpedo boats, has been ordered by the same directive. Order of Group North as per 1/Skl 341/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IIa.

#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

The previously announced operations area in the Baltic Sea will be limited to the Gulf of Finland. Its western boundary is to be the connecting line from Cape Ristna to Lillenaarw. Otherwise nothing to report. Ice conditions generally unchanged.



V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring located 47 enemy planes reconnoitering the rendezvous area and 1 awaiting an inbound convoy in the Tory Islands area. A British vessel was located near Rockall Bank. The steamer KINA II (9,823 GRT) reports having sighted a submarine about 700 miles north of the Azores. A warning was issued for that area.

We intercepted a number of reports about submarines sighted off the American East Coast. 1 of them came from a plane 140 miles off Cape Charles. The Norwegian steamer ANDERSON asked for aid after having run aground near the Great Bank of Newfoundland. The British steamer VICTOLITE (11,410 GRT) was torpedoed 260 miles north-northwest of Bermuda.

2. Own Situation:

Situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Distribution of Submarines on 1 Feb. 1942. (The figures of last month are in parentheses.)

Submarines in the zones of operations	101	(91)
Submarines at the Submarine Acceptance Command	40	(39)
In training and preparation for operations	60	(61)
Training submarines	57	(57)
	<hr/>	
Total	258	(248)
Sent to the operations zones in January	15	(16)
Commissioned in January	15	(22)
Reported missing in January	5	(10)
Probable number of submarines to be commissioned in February	20	(15)

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

2 steamers of 3,000 and 4,000 GRT respectively were sunk, and 2 of 8,000 and 3,000 GRT respectively were badly damaged during a raid on a convoy along the southern coast of England. Returning to Brest from an unsuccessful mission, three He 115's of the 406th Air Group became total losses after having been forced to make crash landings while a smoke screen was still covering the city. 1 plane raided a chemical plant near Berwick with visible success.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids against Malta were continued. The Italian Air Force reports that at noon on 9 Feb. a convoy was attacked north of Sidi Barrani. A cruiser of the CUMBERLAND class was damaged during the raid. Our planes attacked an enemy cruiser off Tobruk and reported 2 hits, after which the target was seen listing.

### 3. Eastern Front:

On 9 Feb. our planes raided British ships in the port of Kamish Burun and scored several direct hits on 2 steamers. No reports were received about operations on the Army fronts.

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

No reports are available concerning the whereabouts of the MALAYA and the DIDO class cruiser. The eastbound convoy of 20 vessels which had been reported off Ceuta on 9 Feb. was not located again. The German Naval Command, Italy believes this to have been a false report. Italian air reconnaissance in the Western Mediterranean repeatedly sighted an eastbound heavy cruiser and destroyer off the Algerian coast. According to radio monitoring, British vessels are reporting air raids in the same area. These messages may have come from the heavy cruiser and the destroyer. Photographic reconnaissance over Valletta shows no changes. The area between Alexandria and Tobruk shows the normal volume of supply shipping being carried on mainly by unescorted vessels. Radio monitoring indicates heavier traffic in the area of Alexandria, Haifa, and the Suez Canal. The 7th Cruiser Division is presumably at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean. The British hospital ship LLANDOVERY CASTLE reports an unsuccessful air attack north of Marsa Matruh. Confirming Italian photographic evaluation of 7 Feb. German air reconnaissance observed on 10 Feb., 2 British battleships in Alexandria, 1 of which is definitely damaged. This implies that the REVENGE is not in Alexandria.

### 2. Situation Italy:

Nothing to report.

### 3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

There was no supply traffic on 10 Feb.

### 4. Area Naval Group South:

#### Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

#### Black Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed that ship movements in the sea area and the port of Sevastopol are continuing on a fairly large scale. About 7 large inbound vessels and 2 outbound ones were reported from that area. 10 small and 2 medium-sized merchant ships were observed in Kamish Burun.

#### Own Situation:

Enemy air raids on the coast south of Eupatoria caused no damage. Group South reports that the port entrance and the piers at Mariupol and Berdyansk are clear. The wrecks of 2 sunk Russian PT boats are preventing larger vessels from entering the port of Taganrog.



The obstacles are being removed.

In view of the shortage of vessels of all types, Group South requests the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division to improve the design of the Siebel ferries. For text of the request see Telegram 1945.

See Telegram 2000 for measures requested by Group South for the employment of the PT boat and submarine flotillas in the Black Sea (improvement of the Constanta base, assignment of escort vessels for PT boats and submarines, activation of a motorized company to be stationed at the base).

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### VIII. Situation East Asia

#### 1. Enemy Situation:

Radio Daventry reports that the floating dock "King George V" was sunk in Singapore.

#### 2. Situation Japan:

The Japanese Military Attache in Berlin reports that by 10 Feb. Japanese troops had occupied one third of the island of Singapore. Further decisive results are expected on 11 Feb. According to press reports, Japanese troops landed in Macassar and near Bandjermasin on Borneo. In Burma, Martaban fell into Japanese hands. The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that Japanese submarines will begin to operate in the New Zealand area by the middle of February. The Japanese Navy demands that at least northern Australia be occupied. Due to the manpower shortage, however, the Japanese Army is still opposed to that idea for the time being and wants to postpone an attack against southeastern Australia until the Russian problem has been fully solved. 15 Japanese submarines are now stationed in the Indian Ocean off Rangoon, in the Strait of Malacca, and in the passages between the islands. An attack on Ceylon is considered to be of primary importance. The Japanese Navy has urgently requested pertinent German data. The Commanding Admiral of the Japanese Fleet mentioned that he can hardly wait to see action in the Indian Ocean.

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### IX. Army Situation

#### 1. Russian Front:

##### Southern Army Group:

At the 6th Army sector our units east of Krasnograd advanced to the east and southeast and captured horses, sleds, and materiel. Otherwise the situation remains unchanged.

##### Central Army Group:

At the 2nd Army sector heavy fighting took place west of Bolkhov and south of Sukhinichi. Our troops gained ground during the attack. Our defense proved successful at all other sectors of the Central Army Group. All enemy attacks were repulsed.

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Northern Army Group:

Strong enemy pressure in the pocket south of Staraya Russa is continuing. All enemy attacks were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Enemy attacks on the Karelian east front near Velikaya Guba were thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy.

3. North Africa:

German and British reconnaissance activity. The general situation remains unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to Reuter a stern U.S. note containing a protest against the delivery of war materials to Axis powers was presented in Vichy. It refers especially to the transportation of Army trucks to Tripoli via Tunis, and the passage of an Italian tanker and a steamer with grain cargo through Tunisian waters to Tripoli.

The French Ambassador in Washington claimed that France is not guilty of such offenses. This matter was also brought to discussion in the British Lower House.

Admiral Darlan contested the enemy's propaganda, according to which the African population is wavering in its feelings towards the motherland.

Indo-China:

According to a report from a diplomatic source, Franco-Japanese negotiations concerning handing over the Indo-Chinese merchant fleet to Japan have not been concluded so far. French shipping circles are not entirely opposed to the idea of chartering to Japan the 25 ships in question.

Great Britain:

Churchill explained in the House of Commons the tasks of the new Ministry of Production. The Government White Book indicates that labor matters are not included in Beaverbrook's responsibilities.

A well-informed German source reports that while the British attitude is by no means defeatist, the great disappointment concerning the blows received in East Asia is making itself felt everywhere. Everyone resents the North Americans, and Roosevelt is openly reproached for his clumsy politics which resulted in Japanese successes at an unfavorable time. The entrance of the U.S. into the war, which was so anxiously desired, has only brought more losses to the British than ever before.

U.S.A.:

Thinking, no doubt, of his Moscow ally, Roosevelt vetoed the bill which places a stricter control on foreign propaganda in the U.S. The hostile attitude towards Japan is steadily growing in the U.S., while the interest of the population in the war in the Atlantic is decreasing visibly; now there is said to be a certain opposition to Roosevelt's policies which supposedly give primary importance to Atlantic warfare.

Chile:

According to a statement by the new President, Rios, he expects that relations with Germany can remain unchanged.

China:

Chiang Kai-shek's visit to India at the invitation of the viceroy, which is attracting so much attention, is said to have the purpose of discussing problems of joint defense against Japan and of transportation of war materials after the Burma road can no longer be used.

Another important reason for the trip is said to be his desire to get in contact with Nehru. The ultimate goals which this Chinese intends to accomplish by this trip cannot yet be determined. We have no way of telling at this time whether his main purpose is to arouse Pan-Asiatic feelings against Japan, or to determine the internal defensive strength of the Empire so as to adjust Chinese policies accordingly.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the order of the General Staff, Army regarding greater secrecy of Army situation reports.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the present icebreaker situation and the plans for 22 new ships for next winter. He also reports how far the installation of the coastal batteries has progressed. Whatever work was done in this connection during the last few months, especially along the Norwegian coast, was accomplished entirely through the efforts of the Navy. The reproach that the Navy ignored the directive of the Fuehrer on this matter is absolutely unfounded. The Navy undertook and did whatever was possible. Copy of a survey of the coastal batteries is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

Furthermore the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that it will take 90 days to transfer the 6 PT boats intended for the Black Sea from northern Germany to their destination.

After the vessels were measured, the transfer of the 4 Dutch motor minesweepers RA "51", "52", "54", and "56", which are to be assigned to Group South with their crews after completion of shipyard repairs, was found to be possible only via the state highway (Reichsautobahn) and the Danube. (Length 23 m., width 4.5m., draught 1.1 m., total height of the ship's body after being dismantled as far as possible 3.5 m.) The Construction Division was informed accordingly on 5 Feb.

III. The Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division Naval Staff reports on the notification which the Foreign Office sent to the Argentine and Chilean governments upon the suggestion of the Naval Staff asking them to provide their ships with neutral markings as a protection against submarine attacks. The Italian and Japanese Naval Attaches were informed at the same time.

A further report concerns the plans of the German Armistice Commission to request the French Government to remove to unoccupied France the large quantities of ammunition which are now in occupied areas in danger of air attacks and which are of no use to us; they will be handled there by the Italians.

Concerning the problem of Timor, a further report states that the Japanese are still planning to occupy the Portuguese part of the island, since it is indispensable to them in their advance toward Australia. The occupation is to go into effect before the expected arrival of Portuguese troops (end of February). The Fuehrer will define our attitude in this matter.

IV. The Commander in Chief, Navy received a letter from Commissioner Terboven, who states, surprisingly, with regard to the Fuehrer's decision on dealing with Norwegian ships according to prize law that it never



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occurred to him to protest against the capture or sinking of Norwegian ships. The Commander in Chief, Navy will clarify this matter in an unequivocal letter. Copy of this letter as per 1/Skl 3412/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

V. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the route planned for the break through the Channel by the Brest vessels, based on the present operational orders and the opinion of the Naval Staff Operations Division. (See War Diary 10 Jan.) Concerning the supposition of the Naval Staff Operations Division that the route further off the coast, as suggested by the Naval Staff, was rejected for valid reasons, Group West states in a radiogram of 9 Feb. that there is less danger from ground mines on the stretch 14-15, which is continually being swept, than on the alternate route between 15 and Aegir. Aside from this the depth offers no real advantage if the ships are routed further off shore. Besides, the decision was influenced by the desire to stay as far out of the range of the enemy radar detection and coastal artillery as possible.

The rerouting ordered by the Group on 10 Feb. (see War Diary 10 Dec.) comes somewhat closer to the views of the Naval Staff; however, the Group makes no reference to this fact in its report.

A further report concerned the directive of Group North and the operational order for the transfer of forces to Norway. (Code word "Sportpalast".) The Chief, Naval Staff points out that if there should be an encounter with the enemy, the use of the TIRPITZ might become inevitable. The Naval Staff will clarify this point with Group North.

The Chief, Naval Staff is notified that Group West has announced that the word for the break through the Channel will be given on the evening of 11 Feb.

Report on the telegram of the Naval Attache, Tokyo concerning Japanese plans for the near future. (See War Diary 10 Feb., Situation East Asia.)

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### Situation 11 Feb. 1942

#### I. War in Foreign Waters

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 0413 informs ship "10" of Japanese operational orders concerning cruiser warfare (see Situation Japan).

Radiogram 2025 contains the sailing orders of blockade runner OSORNO. Etappe Japan is informed in Letter 1414 of the effectiveness and the shortcomings of camouflage.

The Naval Staff issues an operational order for the supply ship CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN. The ship is to supply auxiliary cruisers. The date of her departure from Las Palmas is still to be ordered. The ship will first sail west by south to about 35° W and will then sail to a waiting area which is still to be assigned.

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Copy of the order as per 1/Skl I k 340/42 Gkdos. Chef's. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

At 1220 Group West gives the cue for the Brest vessels to begin the break through the Channel. Group West orders a further change in the routing because mine sweeper M "1208" struck a mine (see War Diary 10 Feb.). The change will be made from point "Oese" to "Rosa" 25 A, 25, 24, and point "Viktor" (49° 56' N, 00° 21' W.).

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are advised by Telegram 1632 of the sailing orders of OSORNO as per Radiogram 2025. They are also informed by Telegram 1900 of a special recognition signal and of the directive for rendezvous of OSORNO with a submarine after 0800 on 14 Feb.

Channel Coast:

The destroyers and torpedo boats were transferred as planned. (See War Diary 10 Feb.) On 10 Feb. at 2357 a single plane unsuccessfully attacked the SCHOEMANN near point "Rosa" 27, strafing the ship and dropping bombs. On 11 Feb. at 1048 an enemy plane attacked the JAGUAR off Ostend, causing loss in personnel and inflicting damages. The ship will not be seaworthy till 18 Feb. Motor mine sweeper R "42" sank off Ambleteuse after running into a wreck. There was no loss in personnel. A ground mine was swept west of Calais outside of route "Rosa".

Channel Breakthrough:

On the evening of 11 Feb. 67 enemy planes flew over the area of western France, concentrating on Brest. An air raid warning was sounded in Brest between 2035 and 2217.

The departure of the Brest vessels (Commanding Admiral, Battleships aboard the SCHARNHORST, the GNEISENAU, the PRINZ EUGEN; Commander, Destroyers aboard destroyer Z "29"; Commander of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla aboard the BEITZEN; the JACOBI, the IHN, the SCHOEMANN, and destroyer Z "25") was therefore delayed from 2035 to 2200, and then proceeded according to plan.

The 6th PT Boat Flotilla departed in two groups for a torpedo mission off Folkestone and Beachy Head. Radio monitoring intercepted continuous enemy reports about locating both task forces. A British motor gunboat flotilla leader was located 7 miles southwest of Dover.



III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Ice conditions: In spite of occasional improvements in the ice situation, shipping conditions are generally as difficult as before. However, the Dutch ports, the river estuaries in the Heligoland Bight, and the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal are navigable.

Mine detonating vessels "173", "147", and "184" had swept 10 ground mines off Hook of Holland by 0800.

The 18th Mine Sweeper Flotilla arrived in Wesermuende with the damaged mine sweeper M "1801". Mine detonating vessels and one section of the 18th Mine Sweeper Flotilla continued sweeping during the day. The 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla departed in the evening for a special assignment west of route "Rot" between Hook of Holland and point "Toni"

Enemy planes attacked in the coastal area off Holland and the Heligoland Bight during the night of 10 Feb. and the next morning. Severe damage to gas works, lighter damage to the electric power plant in Emden.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

According to a report from a Japanese source 2 British submarines of the T class and 3 Russian submarines of the M class were observed in the submarine base of Murmansk.

According to the Naval Intelligence Division the PQ convoys leave Iceland (probably Seydis Fjord), sailing to the southern point of Bear Island, then to the east to about 38° 40' E, then south to about 70° N, where they split before approaching Archangel and Murmansk. The returning QP convoys seem to be routed further south or east, the ships bound for the British Isles possibly steering directly for Scotland. The PQ and the QP convoys seem to leave their ports of departure simultaneously. The 8 to 10 day rhythm observed at first seems to have been slowed up, and is now believed to be fifteen days. The time required for the voyage between Iceland and Murmansk or Archangel is said to be 9 to 10 days. The convoy strength is presumed to be an average of 10 to 15 ships.

Own Situation:

The anti-submarine training units reached Stavanger on 10 Dec. and began training in the Bukken Fjord on 11 Dec. Patrol vessel THUERINGEN shot down a British plane near Bud on 10 Feb. Destroyer Z "23" arrived in Bergen.

In Telegram 0940 the Commanding Admiral, Submarines agrees to the laying of the mine field between Kristiansand South and Stavanger as planned by the Commanding Admiral, Norway (see War Diary 10 Feb.).

The Commanding General, Norwegian Theater emphasized to the Commanding

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Admiral, Norway the gravity of the situation and the great responsibility which rests with the naval stations in charge of sea-going transports in view of the present lag in supply shipments due to the scarcity of escort forces. The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports on this situation to the Naval Staff and Group North, with copies to the Commanding General, Norwegian Theater; Commanding General, Lapland; 5th Air Force; Admiral, Arctic Ocean; and Admiral, Arctic Coast. He points to his description of the critical situation and of the impossibility of reinforcing escort forces at present, contained in his current requests to the Naval Staff. The report states that the larger fuel oil quota for February will now make it possible to commission the escort vessels which have been laid up; therefore the 5 best and most seaworthy escort vessels have been assigned to the Admiral, Arctic Coast so as to alleviate the critical situation in the arctic region. The Commanding Admiral, Norway points to the increasing importance of escort duty by the Air Force because of the longer daylight periods and states that it is urgently necessary to provide suitable planes in view of the lack of escort vessels. (See Telegram 1700.)

#### Security Measures in Norway

1. The BRUMMER laid a mine field in the Boek Fjord between Kjelvesoen and the mainland between 69° 51' N and 69° 53' N for the protection of the approaches to Kirkenes.

2. Group North requests that aside from the 16 barges to be converted for carrying mines, 4 to 6 more of the same kind be so equipped as to permit their use in the Norwegian area for mining assignments as well as transportation tasks. (See Telegram 1538.)

Further measures will be effected by the Quartermaster Division.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

For the organization of Russian naval forces as of 10 Feb. according to the statement of Naval Staff Communications Division see War Diary Annex: Make-up of the Russian Baltic and Arctic Fleets.

##### 2. Own Situation:

The Army High Command has ordered the Commanding General, 18th Army to assign 5 commissioned and 25 noncommissioned officers for duty as training personnel with the 531st Naval Artillery Battalion. (See Telegram 0010.)

Due to the urgency of troop transports to Oslo, Kristiansand, and Hangoe, and of the supply shipments to northern Norway, every possibility for speeding up these transports must be exploited. Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea are therefore directed to take the necessary measures promptly, even if changing weather should influence ice conditions. If the weather in the north and the northwest remains unchanged, conditions around Copenhagen must be expected to become worse, while the situation around Aalborg will improve. Corresponding directive in Telegram 1832.



Group North requests that radio intercept service against the Russian Baltic fleet be made ready to go into effect at the end of the ice period (about the end of March). Since no definite conclusions can be drawn concerning the future operational plans of the enemy, especially concerning submarines, Group North is asking for a direction finder station for the eastern and central Baltic Sea, in addition to one for the entire Gulf of Finland. The Group places special value on radio intercept, since we must expect that air reconnaissance over water will be as inadequate this year as before.

The Naval Staff refers the request to the Naval Intelligence Division with its wholehearted endorsement.

Icebreaker STETTIN departed from Swinemuende with 4 troop transports which will have to be transferred to the EISBAER at point "Gruen 06" for the rest of their voyage to Copenhagen.

## V. Submarine Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring again located 47 reconnaissance planes in the submarine rendezvous area; among these a number of planes of the 15th Group were participating in the protection of an incoming convoy. One crew of the 19th Group was in distress in the Bay of Biscay. In the morning one British vessel was located 150 miles southwest of Rockall Bank and another 300 miles west of Brest. According to a report from Lisbon, on 26 Jan. the steamer NORTURETON reached Madeira badly damaged. An intelligence report from Spain states that troops were reembarked in Gibraltar. Following this, the steamers BATORY, ULSTER MONARCH, and ROYAL SCOTSMAN departed in the evening of 10 Feb., destination unknown.

An intelligence report states that due to submarine danger unescorted vessels are no longer allowed to sail between the United States and Canada. This will affect supply shipments to Newfoundland.

The piers of St. John's and Halifax are overloaded. Orders have been issued to ship food supplies, wood, and cellulose by train to Boston, New York and New Jersey, while ammunition and weapons will continue to be taken aboard in Halifax. All Canadian destroyers and corvettes have been ordered to the danger areas. A large convoy is said to have departed some time between 5 and 7 Feb. The following vessels are supposed to be escorting it: DIOMEDE, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, and several destroyers and escort vessels; 1 battleship is to join the convoy after it has passed Newfoundland.

### 2. Own Situation:

Of the total of 106 operational submarines available on 11 Feb., 32 are in ports outside of the Mediterranean, 21 are in the Mediterranean area, 18 are in the Norway, Scotland and Iceland areas, and 35 are operating along the American coast.

From the beginning of the war to the end of January we lost altogether 73 submarines. Detailed situation report in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

Changing and supplementing previous orders, the Naval Staff has issued a directive concerning the boundaries of the operations areas for submarines in the North and South Atlantic, for the prize routes "Anton" and "Bruno", and for the protection of surface forces during their passage through the submarine operations areas. (The directive was prompted by the loss of the SPREEWALD.) Copy as per 1/Skl I u 354/42 Gkdos.

Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

In view of the situation with regard to the fuel tank installations on Aruba and Curacao, as well as the strong northeast tradewinds which prevail in that area till the end of April, it would seem that submarine guns might successfully use incendiary shells against these oil-storage depots.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is advised to that effect by telegram.

Political reasons may call for a direct contact with Japan through submarines. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore receives the directive to investigate in advance and to report what prerequisites would be necessary for such contact. The ex-Turkish submarine BATIRAY should be considered in this connection. We can count on receiving supplies in Japanese bases in the Pacific or in Penang, and Singapore, and possibly also at sea from the supply ship DOGGERBANK.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is informed of the distribution of Japanese submarines in 4 groups over the operations areas and of plans to reinforce bases in the Indian Ocean as per l/Skl I u 352/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

According to the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, the ex-Turkish submarine BATIRAY and the Dutch submarines UD 3 to 5 are not suitable for carrying gasoline, since they have riveted pressure hulls. Any submarine may be used unchanged for carrying mixed cargo, but not gasoline. Heavy Diesel oil may also be transported and delivered without any special changes. Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The enemy penetrated with 30 to 40 planes into western and southwestern Germany during the night of 11 Feb. For a report on further flights over the area of western France see Situation West Area. There is nothing to report concerning action by our planes.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Five Ju 88's attacked a cruiser of the DIDO class and a destroyer southeast of Malta. The planes were equipped with 1,000 kg. bombs, since they were in search of the MALAYA. One of these bombs is said to have hit the bow of the cruiser. Since the cruiser was attacked again later without success, the first attack may have been ineffective also. Attacks on Malta were continued.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Weather conditions handicapped the Air Force on all fronts in supporting the Army.

### 4. Organization:

The directive of the Commander in Chief, Air indicates that the 4th, the 30th, and the 55th Bomber Groups and the 1st Training



Group are to carry out aerial minelaying.

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## VII. Mediterranean Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

The heavy cruiser and destroyer reported on an easterly course on 10 Feb. were sighted again on the same day at 2100 by an Italian submarine about 50 miles west-northwest of La Galite and were last located by air reconnaissance on 11 Feb. at 1115 at the southern tip of Malta. They were observed making port in Valletta.

### 2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff indicates to the German Naval Command, Italy that the anti-submarine mine type B would be an acceptable substitute for the torpedo mine type A which is not ready for use at the present time, considering the types of enemy ships in question. See Telegram 1629.

The Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch is directed to make sure, in direct cooperation with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, that the aerial mines which are to be used are all equipped with period delay mechanism 1. Copy as per 1/Skl I E 3311/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

### 3. Situation Italy:

In view of the MALAYA's departure from Gibraltar the defense bases on Sardinia and in the Gulf of Genoa were alerted on 10 Feb. Submarines and PT boats were deployed in waiting positions. On 9 Feb. an enemy submarine sank the steamer SALPI out of an Italian convoy of three steamers near Cape Ferrato.

### 4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

There was no shipping traffic either to or from North Africa.

### 5. Area Naval Group South:

#### Aegean Sea:

The Siena group arrived in Suda. No details have come in as to the enemy air raid on eastern Crete (the Italian part).

#### Black Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed no changes in shipping traffic in the Sevastopol area.

#### Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

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VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to the report of the U.S. War Department, Japanese attacks on the position on Corregidor were repulsed. However, the situation of the Americans on the Bataan peninsula is critical due to new Japanese reinforcements.

Reuter reports that the first units of the U.S. Fleet have reached Wellington, New Zealand, and that American reinforcements have landed on the bases between Hawaii and New Zealand.

The evacuation of the civilian population was continued in Rangoon. Burning oil was prepared as defense against Japanese swimming troops at the Johore Strait. An intelligence report from Spain states that during the last few days more than 200 transports, presumably from the British Isles and America, departed in the direction of East Asia.

2. Situation Japan:

The Japanese broke into the city of Singapore. In Burma they crossed the Salween River. On Borneo the Japanese are advancing from Balikpapan in the direction of Bandjermasin. The Japanese carried out air attacks on Port Darwin as well as on New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

Japanese operational orders provide for the following:

a. Cruiser warfare against surface vessels according to international law.

b. Submarines in waters around Japan, along the coast of Russia, along the coast of South America, and south of Peru may undertake cruiser warfare against neutral shipping according to international law. In all other waters unlimited submarine warfare is permitted. Soviet ships may not be attacked.

c. Captured ships are to be brought to prize court ports, or sunk if this is not possible. Prisoners are to be sent to Japan.

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IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

On the Slavyansk sector the enemy was defeated everywhere. West of Balakleya our Group attacked and advanced eastward and southward. The enemy, supported by tanks and fighter planes, attacked our positions east of Balakleya unsuccessfully.

Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks were repulsed on the sectors of the 2nd Panzer Army and the 4th Army. The fighting northwest of Rzhev was especially severe. Our Air Force participated effectively in the defense.



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Northern Army Group:

Enemy pressure near Staraya Russa is continuing. Enemy advances southwest of Kholm and north of Yamno were repulsed. Enemy attacks between Soltsy and Schluesselburg as well as south of Leningrad were also defeated. There was fighting with partisans behind the front.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Enemy situation unchanged. The German Africa Corps consolidated their positions in the area of Tmimi and Martuba.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

During a secret session in the House of Commons the total Allied shipping losses were given as 360,000 GRT monthly on the average, of which half were sunk by the Germans and half by the Japanese. In a public session the government stated that the total plane losses since the beginning of the war amount to 3,981 British, as compared to 6,440 German and 2,119 Italian, planes.

A well-informed source reports that a "depressed Maginot atmosphere" prevailed in the British officers' corps in Singapore. No one was inclined to continue resistance, which could have lasted only two to three months at the most. Aside from this, the example presented by Hong Kong had a very unfavorable effect.

Sir Stafford Cripps has lately come into the political spotlight. Cripps chose a good psychological moment for making his appearance, since the great disappointment caused by the break-down in East Asia and America has swollen the tide of public opinion against Churchill.

Eire:

According to a report from a diplomatic source, the U.S. has asked Eire to relinquish several bases for the use of North American forces. In his categorical refusal De Valera threatened that in the event of an invasion by any forces whatsoever Eire will enlist the aid of a third power.

Sweden:

The German Embassy reports that Sweden is attempting to reestablish closer relations with Finland.

Spain:

According to foreign reports, the Prime Minister of Portugal arrived in Spain for a conference with General Franco to be held in Seville within the next few days.

U.S.A.:

The State Department reports that the U.S. has sent a contingent of troops to Curacao and Aruba in order to support Dutch forces in the defense of these islands. The government of Venezuela and the Dutch government-in-exile have signed an agreement according to which Venezuela will participate in the defense of the Dutch possessions in a way similar to that stipulated in the agreement between the Brazilian and Dutch governments concerning the defense of Surinam.

Argentina:

It really seems to be true that the British government advised Buenos Aires against breaking off relations with the Axis powers.

According to a diplomatic source, the problem of convoys for inter-American shipping will be taken up in a conference on naval matters to be held in Washington in the middle of March. The Argentine government wishes to



avoid participating in a common convoy system, since such action might cause dangerous complications in Argentina's future foreign policy.

Brazil:

According to a supplementary report on the Rio Conference, all delegates had the impression that President Vargas was completely dominated by Foreign Minister Aranha, and that he can be considered merely a figure-head.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the berths for large ships in Norway. (See War Diary, 11 Feb., Situation Norway.) In a subsequent report on increasing naval anti-aircraft guns above the mobilization quota, it was stated that 25% of all the anti-aircraft guns of the Reich are naval guns, not counting the anti-aircraft guns on ship-board.

II. In the letter answering Commissioner Terboven (see War Diary, 11 Feb.) the Commander in Chief, Navy states that the Commissioner can no longer sustain the accusation that the confiscation of the whalers represents a violation of the agreement. The Fuehrer, contrary to the assertion of the Commissioner, assured the Commander in Chief, Navy that, now as in similar cases in the future, the captured vessels are to be confiscated via the prize court, and the prize court is only to change the reasons for the confiscation. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy declares that he agrees to consider the matter closed. In conclusion the Commander in Chief, Navy points out that the internal political repercussions in Norway caused by the reasons given for the decision could have been avoided if the responsible branch of the office of the Commissioner had given the Norwegian press a proper draft for their report on the Hamburg prize court proceedings. Copy of the letter as per l/Skl 3412/42 g.K. in War Diary Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the beginning of the Channel operation. As late as the evening of 11 Feb. the Air Force attempted to postpone the operation because of bad weather.

IV. In the middle of December the Naval Staff informed the Italian Admiralty via the German Admiral, Rome of its opinion on the execution and the urgency of minelaying in the Strait of Sicily. The answer to these suggestions did not arrive until now; it is full of misgivings which are absolutely incomprehensible to us. The Chief, Naval Staff directs the German Admiral, Rome to advise Admiral Riccardi that the Commander in Chief, Navy urgently wishes the mine field to be laid within the next two weeks.

V. In answer to the inquiry of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the Japanese Navy has been informed of the location of our mines in the Indian Ocean.

VI. For a report on transport submarines according to the opinion of the Submarine Division, Naval Staff, see War Diary, 11 Feb., Submarine Warfare.

Situation 12 Feb. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:South Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from a diplomatic source, 20,000 British light motorized troops landed in Freetown three or four weeks ago, and about 10,000 American troops arrived there about a week ago.

Indian Ocean:

Radio London reports that a considerable number of American ships are carrying war materiel to India, among other things planes, tanks, trucks, and chemicals.

2. Own Situation:

The auxiliary cruiser ship "28" is to depart for the Atlantic via the Channel and the Bay of Biscay at the beginning of March. The Naval Staff sends directives to Groups North and West and ship "28" concerning command regulations, unobserved departure, transfer to the western area, departure from the Bay of Biscay, and secrecy as per 1/Skl I k 324/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo is informed of the orders for the use of weapons by Japanese naval and air forces (see War Diary, 11 Feb., Situation East Asia) by letter 1111.

Radiogram 1428 contains a directive to blockade runner OSORNO concerning her rendezvous with a submarine from 14 Feb. 0800 to 18 Feb. 2400. For instructions to Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group West see War Diary, 11 Feb.

All ships in foreign waters were informed of the operations areas of Japanese submarines and of enemy reports by Radiograms 1837, 0349, 1527, and 0254.

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II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Aside from the attack on Brest (see War Diary, 11 Feb.) there were numerous enemy incursions between Ostend and Le Havre from 2000 to 0015 in the night of 11 Feb. No serious damage. Two hits were scored on the bridge of the steamer TURQUOISE in Le Havre. The ship is afloat. Three enemy planes were observed burning during the attack on Brest.

Channel Breakthrough:

Between 0119 and 0419 radio messages were intercepted giving continuous reports on the position of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla in the Dungeness-Beachy Head area, and the southern coast was alerted at the



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same time. Thus our diversionary maneuvers were successful.

0200 The task force passed Ouessant by dead reckoning.

0530 The 1st Mine Sweeper Flotilla sent out a mine warning in quadrant BF 3358 near point "Ysop" and was ordered by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West to sweep a minefree lane and to pilot the task force through.

from 0625 on Guernsey sent radar bearings of the position of the task force, which proved to be incorrect, however, since the vessels were actually sailing outside the range of Guernsey radar. Simultaneous bearings from Cap Levi pointed correctly to route "Rosa", however. Group West ordered the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to announce the passing of 1° 20' W by a short signal.

0840 At this time Commanding Admiral, Battleships reported the location at 1000 as already point "Qu"; thus the force is on schedule again. This was the first interruption of radio silence, which however seemed to have no bad consequences.

0845 Fighter escort joined the task force according to plan.

1130-1140 The force passed through the minefree lane led by the mine-sweeper flotillas as planned, after the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas had joined the group.

from 1200 on Increasing cloudiness, descending ceiling.

1250 Cape Gris Nez was passed. The planned jamming of enemy radar began at 1000 and appeared absolutely effective at first. We located our ships from the Channel coast radar station continually between 1000 and 1500, observing varying speeds of 24 and 27 knots.

1255 The enemy located our task force for the first time between points 15 and 14 on route "Rosa".

1330 We intercepted a British gunboat report about our forces. Thereupon the 3rd Air Force gave the order to take off.

1344 The 4th PT Boat Flotilla reported enemy PT boats off the port bow. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla had an encounter with enemy PT boats northwest and north of the task force. Destroyers IHN and SCHOEMANN participated.

1321 to 1345 Heavy shells fell continually on the port side between the escorts and the ships themselves, apparently from the British battery "Margret at Cliff". Battery "Siegfried" and battery "1725" retaliated with 80 rounds.

1344 Immediately after this dangerous area had been passed, the enemy plane attacks began. Eight planes, escorted by 18 to 20 Spitfires, made the first aerial torpedo attack. Three enemy planes were shot down by our fighters and anti-aircraft fire, and one by anti-aircraft alone. From this time until dark enemy planes attacked continually with only short pauses. Enemy radar now kept reporting our forces constantly.

1521 The border line between the areas of Groups West and North was

passed. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla reported that one PT boat was damaged. Radio monitoring reported her sinking. The flotilla also reported one plane shot down. The group with mine sweeper M "25" definitely shot down 3 enemy fighter planes; patrol boat "1507" also downed 3 enemy fighters; patrol boats "1811" and "1809" destroyed one fighter. The forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West lost 42 dead and 68 wounded through strafing and bombs.

For the map used by Naval Staff, Operations Division see War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring began intercepting reports of the German force in the Channel at 1245. A British PT boat commander reported at 1325 that 3 German battleships were 7 miles north of Calais. At 1333 British PT boats began to report contact. Starting at 1339 the Flag Officer, More sent out tactical signals probably to two groups. A British force reported being attacked by German planes 30 miles east of Galloper Rock at 1555. At 1643 the force came into contact with two battleships 5 miles distant, west of Hook of Holland. At 1810 we intercepted a report from a plane stating that it had sighted a battleship and two destroyers 12 miles west of Hook of Holland. Radio monitoring reported that motor torpedo boat "18" was sinking in the Hoofden area at 1420.

##### Own Situation:

Minesweeping of convoy routes proceeded in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North as planned, except that the 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla had to return to Cuxhaven because of bad weather.

#### Channel Breakthrough

1330 Group North took over the command.

The preparations in the area of Group North, as in the area of Group West, were executed according to plan except that because of bad weather the mine sweeper flotillas, some of the patrol boats, and the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla could not leave port to patrol the route.

1530 The SCHARNHORST struck a mine in quadrant 8755. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships reported that he transferred to destroyer Z "29" and later, after her engine broke down, to the SCHOEMANN. At first there was no exact picture of the damage inflicted by the mine. According to the observation reports of some of our fighters and of a mark-boat a considerable loss of speed was expected. Actually, however, the SCHARNHORST had already reported 27 knots top speed at 1745. From the report of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, giving the location at 1830 in the lower left corner of quadrant 8554, speed 27 knots, it was not clear whether he meant the SCHARNHORST, the task force, or destroyer Z "29". Therefore Group North informed the SCHARNHORST of the preparations that were made to meet her in case



she should put into Hook of Holland. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships aboard the SCHOEMANN, together with his operations officer and the commanding officer of the 3rd Fighter Command, followed the task force, which had meanwhile disappeared from sight. Torpedo boat "13", of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla accompanying the SCHARNHORST, had dropped out because of a bomb hit.

The SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, which continued together with the PRINZ EUGEN after the mine hit on the SCHARNHORST at a speed of 29 knots, were attacked by bomb and aerial torpedoes up until dark. These attacks were combatted by the entire anti-aircraft and by frequently changing course. The GNEISENAU was responsible for 3 of the planes which were observed to have been shot down.

1545

According to air reconnaissance 1 enemy cruiser and 5 destroyers were proceeding at 30 knots on an easterly course in quadrant AN 5715. At 1800 radio intelligence intercepted a report by this force stating that they expected to engage our main force at 1800. Actually the GNEISENAU sighted 1 enemy cruiser and 2 destroyers at 1643, and bombarded them with medium guns, heavy anti-aircraft guns, and 1 salvo from the heavy turret guns. Three hits of the medium guns and 2 fires were definitely observed on 1 destroyer. Because of better visibility, the enemy had opened fire shortly before, but scored no hits.

The PRINZ EUGEN, which had shot down 3 Swordfish planes during the attack by the torpedo planes, definitely downed one more plane and probably another during the continued attack. Several of the planes damaged by the PRINZ EUGEN were subsequently shot down by our fighters. During the battle with the cruisers and the destroyers, the PRINZ EUGEN sighted a submarine periscope less than 500 meters away, and evaded several torpedoes. In the process, the PRINZ EUGEN had a brush with a light cruiser and 3 destroyers on westerly course. According to observations by crew members, 2 enemy ships were set afire and suffered severe damage; a third ship sank. It was definitely established that at least 6 destroyer torpedoes were fired at the cruiser but missed. After this engagement the PRINZ EUGEN tried to join the GNEISENAU, which sent 3 torpedo boats to meet her. Actually the PRINZ EUGEN continued without any escort vessels, frequently even without fighter cover, while having to evade constant bomb and aerial torpedo attacks. She was, however, able to shoot down another bomber for certain. The cruiser took soundings constantly off the coast near Terschelling at very low speed, since she received no radio bearings, and could not see the light beacons due to bad visibility.

Destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN had turned to the northwest in quadrant 7995 at 1332 and participated in the PT boat engagement, pursuing the enemy PT boats as far as two miles off Goodwin Sands. From 1349 to 1355 the destroyer chased three newly-arriving PT boats in southerly direction, sinking one and damaging another.

From 1344 to 1348 the destroyer was exposed to fire from enemy coastal batteries.

1345

The destroyer opened fire on an enemy torpedo plane squadron of 8 to 9 biplanes approaching from the northwest, downed 2 planes and observed 2 others crash.

A single torpedo plane coming in at 1350 was fired on, although no hits were observed. From 1400 on the IHN and the SCHOEMANN followed our task force. Having continued to engage enemy planes, 2 of which she hit, the destroyer entered Hook of Holland at 1830 because of shortage of water, together with the JAGUAR and torpedo boat T "13", which had been slightly damaged by a bomb during an attack on the SCHARNHORST group (T "13" had definitely shot down 1 enemy plane and damaged 3 others). At nightfall enemy plane attacks let up, so that the ships were able to continue the voyage at high speed, each proceeding on her own.

- 1548 At mark boat position "Lila 1" patrol boat "1312" shot down an enemy plane, which crashed in the water beside her. Twelve men were missing when patrol boat "1302" went down.
- 2255 A mine hit the GNEISENAU in quadrant 8317, but the battleship was able to continue at a speed of 25 knots.
- 2235 The situation became more serious when the SCHARNHORST reported being hit by a second mine. Group North immediately ordered the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to send escort forces to the SCHARNHORST, which urgently requested tug assistance at 2359 by radio. As the weather grew constantly worse, the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla lost contact with the task force.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Defense Measures in Norway:

- a. Mine ship ULM laid barrages 2 and 3a according to plan.
- b. Since it is impossible to store mines for any length of time in the Norway area, it is necessary to have approval for an alternate plan, in case offensive mine operations are abandoned, so that the mines may be utilized to inflict damage upon the enemy and to protect the coast of Norway. The Commanding Admiral, Norway makes the following suggestions in this connection:
- (1) The present minefields off Harstad and the flanking minefields off the arctic coast should be reinforced.
  - (2) The inter-island coastal waters should receive further protection, with the exception of the Stadland and Hustadviken areas.
  - (3) The Westwall should be extended by declaring a wedge-shaped mined area and laying three minefields. For copy of the telegram by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, see 1/Skl 3465/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.
- c. For the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning the possibility for protecting the approaches to the Ofoten Fjord against submarines and surface forces, see 1/Skl 3443/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.
- d. Group North approves the declared area off Fro Havet (see



War Diary 6 Feb.) which the Commanding Admiral, Norway had requested.

e. The Naval Staff approved laying a flanking minefield off Stadland. It seems impracticable to leave a gap in the minefield to permit approaching Stadland from the west or northwest, since this would weaken the barrage at a decisive point.

The Naval Staff informs Group North with regard to operation "Sportpalast" that the Commander in Chief, Navy calls attention to the fact that the TIRPITZ should be held in immediate readiness, and should be used if necessary.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Group North reports that it and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea are keeping track of changes in the ice situation. Group North does not agree with the assumption of the Naval Staff that the ice situation at Aalborg has eased. The Group believes that under present conditions it is not to be expected that larger troop transports can be sent from Copenhagen or Aalborg to southern Norway in the near future. The Group therefore suggests that the forces to be sent as reinforcement to the Commanding Admiral, Norway at the end of operation "Cerberus" should be used to escort as many transports as possible through the North Sea and then through the coastal island waters to northern Norway. The Group suggests that the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch make available for this purpose as large a number of steamers as possible. (See Telegram 1130-3002.)

It is intended for the Northern Army Group to capture the islands Seiskaari, Peninsulaari, Lavansaari, Iso, Tytersaari, and Pien Tytersaari in February and March. Subsequently the Navy will take over the occupation and defense of the islands with Naval Artillery Battalion 531, naval batteries, and army coastal batteries. For the corresponding detailed directive to Group North and Naval Staff Quartermaster Division see l/Skl I Nord 345/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, a plane reported a probable hit on a submarine 180 miles west of Brest at 1020. Steamer JAMAICA PRODUCER reported a submarine approximately 200 miles west of the North Channel. In the evening Reykjavik informed a plane that the ALBATROSS is at a certain point west of Iceland. Radio intelligence located British ships shortly after midnight on 13 Feb. in the vicinity of the Azores.

According to an intelligence report from Spain, an agent claims, contrary to previous reports, that the damaged transport in Gibraltar is the LLANGIBBY CASTLE.

##### 2. Own Situation:

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is informed that according to Daventry the U.S. State Department has announced that U.S. troops have been transferred to Aruba and Curacao, and that an agreement has been concluded between Venezuela and the Dutch government concerning partici-

pation in the defense of the Dutch possessions (see Telegram 1710).  
For further reports on the situation see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the attack on Brest in the night of 11 Feb. 3 enemy planes were probably shot down, since they were seen afire. (See Situation West Area.)

#### Participation of the Air Force in the Break Through the Channel:

The 3rd Air Force participated in the defense of the fleet force from sunrise to sunset on 12 Feb. with 396 fighters and 50 bombers. Between 1330 and 1500 about 60 enemy planes, including 8 torpedo planes, were active in the Channel area, and between 1540 and 2020 63 more were active in the area between the Frisian Islands and the Dutch coast. The latter dropped some bombs at IJmuiden.

The fighters escorted our force constantly and successfully. Altogether the fighters shot down 19 enemy planes, among them 6 torpedo planes; they lost 2 planes themselves, according to reports received so far. 4 other enemy planes were shot down by coastal anti-aircraft at Dunkirk and Hook of Holland. According to British reports, the enemy lost 20 bombers and 16 fighters.

Our fighter planes fought under difficult weather conditions. Several of our planes therefore landed at alternate airfields, and have not yet reported their successes.

The bombers of the IX Corps accomplished the following:

One plane sent out deceptive radio messages.

15 planes staged mock attacks in the area northwest of Brest in order to tie down enemy fighters in the area of southwestern England.

10 planes attacked airfields and harbors. During these attacks a successful raid was staged on the Warmwell airfield, and direct hits were scored on 2 hangars and on barracks. The airfield at Exeter was also attacked, and hits were observed on hangars and barracks.

During an attack on the harbor installations of Torquay, hits were observed on storehouses adjoining the harbor. Exmouth was attacked as an alternate target, and hits were scored in the center of the city. Between 1640 and 1720 in the area northwest of Walcheren Island 24 planes attacked an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 4 destroyers which had been sent against our fleet force. The ceiling was very low, enemy fighters and long-range fighters were very active, and there was heavy anti-aircraft fire. Therefore no hits were observed, since our planes withdrew into the clouds immediately after dropping their bombs. By using all available forces, the Air Force successfully fulfilled its task of protecting the fleet.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 11 Feb. the harbor of Tobruk was successfully



raided. Attacks on the submarine pens in Valletta could not be carried out on 12 Feb. as planned because of bad weather. Airfields were attacked as alternate targets.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports were received about operations in support of the Army.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a special-purpose ship DENDAL supposedly carried 12 invasion boats on her deck. One of these boats, each of which can carry 30 men, had trial runs in the harbor on 10 Feb. The damaged troop transport which entered Gibraltar is supposedly the SYDNEY.

According to another intelligence report, the 3 transports which departed in the evening of 10 Feb. carried 5,000 men for Tobruk. No sighting reports were received from air reconnaissance in the entire Mediterranean area, except for 1 submarine reported sighted off Taranto. According to Italian reports from Egypt, a British force consisting of 2 cruisers and several destroyers has put into Alexandria at the demand of Admiral Cunningham. Several steamers with American war materiel for Russia are said to have been rerouted to the Red Sea, so that their cargo can be unloaded in Egypt.

2. Situation Italy:

During the night of 11 Feb., enemy planes attacked Tripoli. Tanker RONDINE sustained slight damages. The Italian navy reports that torpedo boat SAGITTARIO rammed an enemy submarine during the night of 7 Feb. The torpedo boat dropped anchor at Cephalonia, with considerable damage to her bow.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No supplies were shipped to North Africa. Traffic of single steamers on the western route was suspended on 7 Feb., since the Air Force was in need of a rest period, and the airfield had to be repaired; also due to the enemy situation (a break of the cruiser and destroyer through the Strait of Sicily). The 3rd transport group is scheduled to get under way during the next few days. Coastal traffic proceeded according to plan without incidents. A supply and transport station will be opened at Derna on 20 Feb.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A submarine was sighted west of Samos during the night of 11 Feb. Submarine chase was ordered. A large part of the war materiel has been salvaged from motor sailing vessel L "22" which ran aground near Mudros.

Black Sea:

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Enemy Situation:

A light cruiser was seen to enter Sevastopol at 0730. Air reconnaissance located several submarines south of Kerch Strait. Cruiser VOROSHILOV was located 60 miles south of Feodosiya on 11 Feb., evidently on a westerly course.

On the same day 2 submarines and several destroyers were at sea in the Crimea area.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

In some sectors of the southern front of the 17th Army heavy fighting is in progress. Several villages were taken south of Losovaya. Northwest of Balakleya the enemy staged unsuccessful attacks. At the northern wing of the 2nd Army an enemy attack in regiment strength was thrown back in a counterattack.

Central Army Group:

Our attack west of Byelev made slow progress because of mines and deep snow. West of Bolkhov Vesnini was taken in stubborn fighting. Several enemy attacks were repulsed west of Sukhinichi and west and north of Yukhnov. Fighting against partisans in the rear area continues. Also north and northwest of Rzhev enemy attacks were repulsed with bloody losses.

Northern Army Group:

Southwest of Lake Ilmen the enemy is exerting strong pressure on the eastern flank of our positions. An enemy attack from the north southwest of Staraya Russa was brought to a standstill. North of Lake Ilmen partisans were fought successfully. A strong enemy attack was repulsed between Soltsy and Schluesselburg.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

A forceful enemy attack in the fog was thrown back in the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish scouting forces reached the southern tip of Peninsaari Island on 20 Feb. The island appears to be unoccupied. Situation unchanged in other sectors.



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3. North Africa:  
Situation unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In the House of Lords Lord Beaverbrook declared with regard to his new task that there can be no question of a breakdown in British war production, since the production of war materiel has doubled in the past half year, and the production of tanks has even tripled as compared to January of last year. A shortage is evident only as the result of deliveries to Russia. The raw material situation, which was favorable heretofore, has changed particularly with regard to rubber and tin. Production of artificial rubber in the U.S. must be speeded up and tin must be used very sparingly. Also machine tools are very scarce.

The government has declared in the House of Commons that the Indian government has been asked to appoint delegates to the War Cabinet and to the Pacific War Council. The British government is striving to give India the same opportunity as the Dominions in directing war policy. The Indian delegates will rank equally with those from the Dominions. The Secretary of State for India will participate in the sessions of the Defense Council when Indian affairs are discussed. Finally, the Indian army will be represented on the General Staff, in the War Ministry, and in the Secretariat of the War Cabinet.

Portugal:

The Portuguese government has protested about flights of 2 Japanese planes over the Portuguese part of Timor. After being reminded that the territory in question is in the hands of the enemies of Japan, Portugal changed the protest to a friendly request. The Japanese navy disregarded a Portuguese request to designate a safe route for a Portuguese warship from Macao to Timor.

U.S.S.R.:

The German Official News Agency (DNB) reports from Ankara that the Russian union representatives sent a very unfavorable report to Moscow concerning their visit to England. They state that the capitalistic clique and the old union leaders are not capable of getting the British workers to make an all-out effort. Outwardly everybody hails the Soviets, but secretly would like to see them weakened. The British union leaders are petty bourgeois bigwigs, who are only trying to draw political advantages for themselves from the present predicament of their country. The important thing in Great Britain at the present time, however, is to whip up revolutionary enthusiasm in the broad masses, and to acquaint them with those methods which helped Soviet Russia to succeed. For this purpose agents must be made available so that under Soviet-Russian influence a group will be created in Great Britain, for whose success the deterioration of British democracy has already laid an adequate foundation.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt stated in a press report that the U.S.A. is in danger of being encircled since the Axis powers are about to include the entire world in their plans. These statements of the President are being interpreted to mean that it must be expected that German and Japanese forces will join by way of India or Soviet Russia. In view of this, the war policies



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of the Allies must aim at wearing down the offensive strength of the Axis powers by stubborn resistance and slow retreat, destroying all things which might be useful to the enemy and increasing Allied strength to the point where the Allies can take the offensive.

Argentina:

In the Chamber of Deputies a delegate of the radical opposition made a proposal to sever relations with the Axis powers.

Japan:

According to a Japanese report, a feeling prevails in Tokyo that Anglo-American propaganda is hinting at possible peace negotiations with Japan. The propaganda implies that Japan is weary of war and that the North Americans are increasingly dissatisfied with Roosevelt in view of the constant failures. Japan attributes no special importance to these feelers.

The Japanese press states the following:

"The Indian Ocean will now become the meeting place of the Axis powers. Since the situation in the Mediterranean will soon be solved in favor of the Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan will join hands in the Indian Ocean."

China:

Chiang Kai-shek is said to be deeply alarmed about the defeat of the Anglo-Americans and the lack of system in their operations in the Far East. In spite of this he still does not seem to believe that the time has arrived to begin negotiations with Japan.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division discusses the reports that have so far come in concerning the break through the Channel. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the repairs on the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU be pushed, so that the ships will again be seaworthy on 15 March at the latest. This work should take preference over everything else except submarine repairs.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff orders an investigation of the command organization in the area of Naval Group South. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter.

III. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that it is intended to begin operation "Sportpalast" according to plan. The forces are to depart between 14 and 16 Feb. The Commanding Admiral, Group North has gone to Wilhelmshaven. In connection with the mine hits on the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU, the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division again reports on the route taken in the break through the channel as discussed earlier. (See War Diary, 10 and 11 Feb.)

Since the Naval Staff recommended the plan for laying the anti-submarine barrage near Stadland as suggested by the Commanding Admiral, Norway, the Chief, Naval Staff gives his approval.

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IV. On the basis of the situation reports about Aruba and Curacao, the Chief, Naval Staff orders that submarines be directed to open hostilities in this operational area by firing on land installations whenever possible.

V. The Deputy to the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the troops and equipment held in readiness for operation "Seeloewe". Altogether 234 officers and 27,800 men are tied up by these plans. Of these, 72 officers and 18,100 men are already being used for other duties in the west area, so that if operation "Seeloewe" should be cancelled, 162 officers and 9,700 non-commissioned officers and men would become available. However, if the planned number of landing craft are commissioned, almost all of this personnel will be needed. Since these landing craft can be used in many ways in other theaters of war also, the personnel for training the crews will also still be needed. As regards equipment, cancellation of operation "Seeloewe" would make it possible to return approximately an additional 1,200 barges for commercial use. Of the 770 landing craft intended for operation "Seeloewe" 42 have already been commissioned and 300 others are under construction. The tugs which were collected have all been assigned to other tasks in the west area or have been put at the disposal of the Ministry of Transportation. Most of the fishing smacks have already been returned to non-military tasks. Furthermore 138 motor boats can be returned for other purposes. Gun carriers and auxiliary coastal sailing vessels are being used for harbor defense, training, or supplying the Channel islands.

Should operation "Seeloewe" be carried out, it would take a year to make available the necessary personnel and three months for the equipment.

For detailed survey see 1/Skl 3388/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, File "Haifisch".

The Chief, Naval Staff will suggest to the Fuehrer that the start of the operation be postponed 12 months instead of 8, so that personnel and equipment can be made available as indicated above.

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#### Special Items

I. The Commander in Chief, Navy had a conference with the Fuehrer in the afternoon and reported on the following: reinforcements in the north; naval measures in the Gulf of Finland; the problems in the Black Sea; the situation resulting in the west area because the focal points have been shifted to Norway and to the Mediterranean; the submarine situation; the problem of cargo space in the Mediterranean and the agreements with the Italians; the fact that the key position of Suez has assumed added importance due to the East Asiatic situation, and the effects of this; and the suspension of the plans for operation "Seeloewe". Copy of the report as per 1/Skl I b 383/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

II. It is impossible to transfer to the Black Sea as planned the eight motor mine sweepers which are now under construction in the French area, due to technical reasons and because of the time element. These eight vessels are to go to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West instead. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division orders that in their place 8 large German motor mine sweepers of the 3rd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla be transferred with officers and crews. This transfer should follow that of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla via the Elbe - super highway - Danube about March or April. They are to be based at Constanta and later at Sevastopol.

III. The Naval Staff issues a directive concerning the distribution of



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light forces and mine sweeper and escort forces, providing the following: whatever can possibly be made available should be sent to the Norwegian area; in the west area submarine operations from the ports in western France, operations of PT boats in the Channel, the most important military transports, ore imports from Spain, the departure and arrival of auxiliary cruisers, supply ships, and blockade runners are all to be assured; forces in the Baltic are to be adequate to recommence naval warfare in the spring (at present Sweden is not expected to enter the war); the Commanding Admirals, Defenses North and Baltic Sea are to keep at least as many forces as are needed for the most important convoy tasks in their areas; a PT boat flotilla and a motor mine sweeper flotilla are to be committed in the Black Sea in addition to the PT boat and motor mine sweeper flotillas transferred to the Mediterranean. See 1/Skl I op 343/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

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Situation 13 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

A compilation of enemy reports which were intercepted by radio monitoring and radio deciphering up to 8 Feb. 1942 will be found in radio intelligence report No. 6/42 of Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division (Radio Intelligence).

South Atlantic:

According to press reports the La Plata traffic has decreased 20% since last year.

Indian Ocean:

The French auxiliary cruiser BOUGAINVILLE and the submarine LE HEROS left Madagascar on 10 Feb. bound for Jibuti.

Pacific Ocean:

According to radio deciphering U.S. naval vessels were informed that two suspicious submarines were located in the Gulf of Panama and that no U.S. submarines are now stationed there.

2. Own Situation:

No reports came in from our auxiliary cruisers and ships in foreign waters. Enemy situation report sent out by Radiogram 1813.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Daventry reports that the German warships SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, and PRINZ EUGEN, escorted by strong air and naval forces, were attacked by British destroyers, torpedo boats, naval aircraft, and planes of the RAF near the Strait of Dover. The crews of the British bombers feel sure that during the many repeated attacks each of the enemy vessels was hit.

The coastal batteries of Dover also opened fire at long range. The British fighters shot down 15 enemy planes while the bombers themselves brought down at least 3 more. British losses amount to 20 bombers and 16 fighters.

Concerning the air and naval battle in the Strait of Calais, Reuter reports that this fight was the most important since Dunkirk and states: "The German warships which were protected by swarms of planes and surrounded by light naval vessels passed through the Strait of Calais unharmed except for some slight damage inflicted by bombs and torpedoes."

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

A minefield of shallow contact mines and apparently also British moored influence mines was located in quadrant BF 3358. Eight mines were swept and a 300 meter wide gap was opened. The 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla debarked 35 survivors of patrol boat "1302" in Ostend. Enemy air activity in the Dunkirk area in the afternoon.

Coastal Defense:

The Commanding General, 7th Army suggested to the Admiral, Western France that mines be laid in waters where landings are most likely, in order to reinforce our defenses. Group West rejects this proposal, explaining in detail the basic principles involved in this particular case. For copy see Marinegruppenkommando West 456/42 A 3 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI. The Naval Liaison Officers to the Armed Forces High Command and the Army High Command were informed.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Eleven planes flew over the Pellworm-Wilhelmshaven-Borkum area between 0207 and 0621 in the night of 12 Feb.

Own Situation:

During the night of 12 Feb. naval and Air Force anti-aircraft guns shot down one enemy plane each in Hook of Holland.

The ice situation improved further in the Elbe and Weser estuaries. The Elbe is free of ice as far as Cuxhaven.

Channel Breakthrough

After the SCHARNHORST had urgently called for tug assistance on 12 Feb. at 2359, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships fortunately was able to report that the SCHARNHORST was again on her way at 0004 on 13 Feb. She was actually able to make 14 knots from this time on, after lying still in quadrant 8312 for 1½ hours protected by the SCHOEMANN.



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The Commanding Admiral, Battleships aboard the SCHOEMANN, the SCHARNHORST, destroyer Z "29" which joined them later, and the remaining torpedo boats of the escort then headed for the Jade. By order of Group North some of the light forces first went to Heligoland. The SCHARNHORST arrived in Wilhelmshaven at 1230.

The GNEISENAU and the PRINZ EUGEN reached the Elbe without further unforeseen incidents. The two ships reached Elbe I at 0330 whereupon both proceeded to Brunsbuettel as directed by Group North. From there the GNEISENAU went on to Kiel.

When the ships entered the river estuaries, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships reported at 0824 that the transfer of the Brest Group to the Heligoland Bight had been completed.

The Commander in Chief, Navy then released the following statement to Commanding Admiral, Group West; Commanding Admiral, Group North; Fleet Commander; Commanding Admiral, Battleships; Commanding Admiral, Defenses West; Commanding Admiral, Defenses North; Commander, Torpedo Boats; and Commander, Destroyers:

"After careful preparations by the staffs and security forces the transfer of the Brest units to the Heligoland Bight was executed in a daring operation. I wish to express my delight and appreciation to the participating task force commanders, officers, and crews. I have asked the Commander in Chief, Air to convey my gratitude to the respective units of the Air Force."

Group North reports that light naval forces have been transferred from Heligoland because of the weather and improved ice conditions: destroyers to Wesermuende, torpedo boats to Cuxhaven.

There is as yet no information on the damage caused by the mine hits. Brief combat reports from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships and destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN have come in. Copies in War Diary File "Mandarine". At 2030 the Commanding Admiral, Battleships sent in the following figures as a partial report:

- a. One destroyer sunk, one on fire and abandoned, gun hits on several other vessels.
  - b. Fourteen planes definitely shot down by ship anti-aircraft guns.
  - c. Nine other planes badly damaged.
  - d. Torpedoes fired at enemy destroyers forced them to turn away.
  - e. An enemy PT boat flotilla was effectively fired upon.
- Copy of the telegram in War Diary File "Mandarine".

## 2. Norway:

For report by Admiral, Arctic Coast concerning flanking minefields II and III a (see War Diary 12 Feb.) see 1/Skl 3563/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway intends to issue the following incisive order in view of the unbearable convoy situation and congestion of supply traffic on the sea route Tromsoe-Kirkenes:

a. Transports between Narvik and Tromsøe including those carrying troops and men on leave are to proceed without escort.

b. Except for transports carrying troops and men on leave and other especially valuable cargo (such as batteries), all transports between Tromsøe and Banak are to proceed unescorted for the time being, so as to relieve the shipping situation in Tromsøe. For each such transport permission will have to be obtained from the Admiral, Arctic Coast in cooperation with the local Army command. Since we may assume that this sea route has been made safer by laying the flanking minefields and declaring danger zones, we must accept this risk involved in sending unescorted vessels.

c. Transports in the open sea east of the North Cape are to operate as heretofore. The escort vessels which will become free through the measures described in "b" are to be employed to increase convoy traffic in this region. The Naval Staff is informed by Radiogram 1000.

There can be no objection to this measure.

Group North reports that it is planned to use the TIRPITZ according to the directive of the Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 12 Feb.).

With regard to operation "Sportpalast", the Armed Forces High Command advocates using the ships and light forces to be transferred for carrying troops which have collected (men on leave), without equipment. In answer to an inquiry by the Naval Staff, the Commander, Destroyers reports that the IHN and destroyer Z "25" in Wesermünde can each carry 70 men. The ADMIRAL SCHEER can offer makeshift accommodations for 450 men.

Otherwise convoy and escort service in Norway proceeded according to plan and without unforeseen events.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Icebreaker CASTOR docked in Kiel and will probably be able to reach Copenhagen by 17 Feb. Other icebreakers operated as planned. The Naval Liaison Staff, Finland asked the Admiral, Baltic Countries whether and when it can be expected that the islands in the central Gulf of Finland will be captured. The Finns are considering occupying Hogland at the beginning of March. It would be well to synchronize the operations. The Admiral, Baltic Countries answered that the present Army situation does not permit us to determine the exact time when the Army operation to occupy the islands will take place. The Naval Staff thereupon directed Group North to inform the Admiral, Baltic Countries and the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland about the corresponding directive of Naval Staff, Operations Division, which was sent to Group North on 12 Feb. (see War Diary 12 Feb.).

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#### V. Merchant Shipping

In a British convoy merchantmen were observed that had used anti-torpedo nets during their voyage from the U.S. to Britain, supposedly with success.

In Japan the construction of merchant ships is under the Ministry of the



Navy. A detailed report on this subject as well as a survey of the ships in and the traffic to and from the port of Gibraltar in January 1942 and information on encroachment by British forces on French merchant shipping since October 1941 are, among other things, in Brief Report No. 5/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

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## VI. Submarine Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Several planes were ordered to attack a submarine whose periscope was sighted about 100 miles west-northwest of Vidal Bank. A British guardship reported two southeast-bound destroyers 70 miles southeast of Iceland. According to radio intercept service there are no heavy vessels with SC convoys, but there are battleships or cruisers with HX convoys. According to an attache report from Madrid, a commercial airplane flying from Seville to Las Palmas sighted a 3,000 GRT steamer of unidentified nationality south of Casablanca on 11 Feb. Her stern was sinking and she was trying to run around.

The radio intercept service learned that the steamer TAMAULIPAS received an order on 11 Feb. to continue her voyage to Key West, to obtain final instructions there, to sail through the Florida Strait at a distance of 9 miles from the navigational guide points, and to sail as close to shore as possible north of 29°N. Side lights may be extinguished when the ship is five miles from the harbor entrance and north of 29°N. Diamond Shoal and Winter Quarter Shoal are to be passed by daylight. For report on two suspicious submarines in the Gulf of Panama, see Enemy Situation, Pacific Ocean.

### 2. Own Situation:

A submarine reported a convoy of 5 vessels (1 steamer and 4 corvettes) on a 110° course south of Iceland. Submarine U "564" reported the sinking of the tanker VICTOLITE which had already been ascertained by radio monitoring. Further situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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## VII. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The Air Force reports that fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns shot down a total of 46 enemy planes on 12 Feb. during fighting in the Channel. It is not certain whether ship anti-aircraft is included here. We lost 6 planes, 2 because of collision in combat. Altogether 529 planes were in action.

Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa was attempted on 13 Feb. Results are of no value since they are incomplete. 25 enemy incursions are reported from northern France, 29 from western France.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports that British long-range fighters have markings very similar to those of the German

Ju 88's, and thus there is danger of mistaking them for one another. Submarine berths on Malta were attacked with 14 bomb mines type 1000. There was very well aimed heavy anti-aircraft fire from the entire port area. A fuel depot in Tobruk was set afire and a steamer was damaged. Ships in the sea off Tobruk were attacked between 1820 and 1830. One transport of 10,000 GRT probably sank after suffering five hits. One cruiser, one destroyer and one steamer were also hit.

### 3. Eastern Front:

On 11 Feb. many planes operated at all Army fronts, in spite of unfavorable weather conditions. The troops in the Staraya Russa area were supplied by air.

On 12 Feb. a merchant ship of 6,000 GRT was damaged near Kerch. The main point of attack was at the Central Army Group sector in the area north of Rzhev.

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## VIII. Mediterranean Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

In the morning 2 convoys with cruiser and destroyer escort were north of Sidi Barrani en route to Tobruk. A convoy coming from Tobruk was sighted 30 miles northwest of there in the afternoon. One of the westbound convoys reported in the morning an enemy air attack in the area NE of Tobruk; what was probably the eastbound convoy reported the same thing in the afternoon. Another force of 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers was attacked at 1450 north-northeast of Sidi Barrani by planes and, according to an Italian report, also by a submarine.

The Military Attache at Istanbul reports from a dependable source that the British Commanding General is expecting the arrival of two convoys with motorized forces in Alexandria before beginning the counteroffensive in North Africa.

### 2. Situation Italy:

An Italian report states that 5 Italian submarines are in the Atlantic and 22 in the Mediterranean either in waiting position or at sea.

### 3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No supply traffic either to or from North Africa.

### 4. Area Naval Group South:

#### Aegean Sea:

Naval Group South reports that, according to the Admiral, Aegean Sea, the Italian Naval High Command submitted a proposal for an east-west mine field in the center of the Aegean, which was allegedly decided upon in Garmisch. Since such a measure is contrary to present plans, the Group asks for further information, and will give an opinion as soon as it has knowledge of the new plan.



5. Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

IX. Situation East Asia

The Military Attache at Bangkok reports on 11 Feb. that Japanese planes attacked Batavia. According to the radio intercept service, a Japanese submarine attacked unsuccessfully the British steamer CLAN MURDOCH (5,950 GRT) southeast of Ceylon. There are no further reports.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

On the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group the Russians attacking east of Slavyansk were practically annihilated in a counterattack. Further successful attacks on the southern front. The Samara valley was mopped up. At the 6th Army sector there was heavy enemy pressure on the Balakleya front. Some enemy shock troops have penetrated into Alekseevskoe. A renewed enemy thrust north of Balakleya was repulsed in a counterattack with heavy enemy losses. In the morning of 13 Feb. the Red 21st Army began to attack with 5 or 6 divisions along a front 60 km. wide from Belgorod to the north. All attacks were repulsed with bloody losses. The enemy was thrown back in a counterattack. Heavy fighting is still going on at some places. It is expected that the attacks will be continued during the night.

Central Army Group:

Our attacks in the pocket west of Bolkhov and in the Vytebet valley gained ground towards the north, northwest and northeast. We reached the Systa valley south of Sukhinichi. The surrounded enemy units west of Yukhnov made futile attempts to break out. Attempts to break through the positions around Yukhnov from the west also failed. The railway line between Velikie Luki and Nevel was blown up by the enemy and is being repaired.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy attacks on Kholm. An enemy attack south of Staraya Russa was repulsed. North of Lake Ilmen enemy forces advanced to Samozhye. There is fighting going on near Krivino behind the front.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

Both sides carried out reconnaissance.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to unconfirmable press reports, French-Italian negotiations are said to have brought about a reconciliation. Italy supposedly renounced her claims to the Jibuti railway, Nice, and Corsica. These negotiations between the two "Latin sisters" are allegedly also to be extended to include Spain.

An evaluation of this report is impossible due to the lack of more exact knowledge of the nature of the press statements and the circumstances under which they were made.

General Nogues will go to Vichy in the near future for negotiations on the supply situation in Morocco, since the deliveries provided for in the U.S.A. - Weygand contract have come to an end.

Great Britain:

Some of the British newspapers launched outright attacks against Churchill, making him responsible for the late disasters. They demand that he reorganize the government.

Hore Belisha and two government liberals resigned from their party after having abstained from the last vote of confidence in the government. This gesture may also be interpreted as a sign of a gradually growing opposition to Churchill in the House of Commons.

The press and the radio give vivid expression to the disappointment and suppressed anger of the British people, caused by the humiliating failure of the Royal Navy and the RAF to stop the German ships from passing through the Channel. The British feel cut to the quick, and not only neutral but also noted British newspapers consider this German "Victory in the battle of the Channel" - the first since 1666 - of equal if not greater importance than the fall of Singapore. British propaganda promptly tried to emphasize this German success in order to avoid the impression, which would injure British prestige still more, that German forces operate in these English coastal waters with perfect impunity. It was inevitable, however, that this attempt would be a miserable failure considering the political effect of the breakthrough.

India:

Chiang Kai-shek continued his conferences with the Indian leaders.

Spain:

The Foreign Minister rejected the British protest against the bomb incident, supposedly instigated by the Germans, and the Anglophobe proclamations in Tangier. He declared that the Spanish conception of the matter, which was the only authoritative one, is based on the conviction that there was no German intervention. The Spanish government intends for its part to submit a protest in London, in view of the seriousness of the incident.

Sweden:

The speeches by Sir Stafford Cripps have caused considerable uneasiness



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in Sweden. Even Anglophile newspapers remark correctly that nothing could convince the Baltic Sea countries of British indifference more effectively than Cripps' propaganda.

Japan:

According to the German Ambassador, the Japanese mentioned a certain amount of Russian opposition to several questions (fishing agreements and treatment of Japanese firms in the northern part of Sakhalin Island) but express the hope that these can be easily adjusted. On the other hand the British declare that Japan will attack Russia as soon as weather conditions permit.

Portugal:

Carmona was reelected by an overwhelming majority in the presidential election on 8 Feb. Thus the British intrigues were unsuccessful which aimed at replacing him by Salazar, thus putting Salazar where he could have little influence, and making an Anglophile prime minister.

U.S.A.:

(Belated report)

The supreme commander of the Allied naval forces in the Far East, U.S. Admiral Hart, has been replaced by Admiral Helfrich of the Dutch East Indies.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Damage done to the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU.

According to a preliminary report of Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the SCHARNHORST suffered the following damage:

1. Engines: loud noises in the medium pressure port turbine. Damage to four boilers or their auxiliary equipment.
2. Electrical equipment: the thrust blocks of all turbo and Diesel electric motors were torn or twisted. It will be necessary to check the bedplates of all turbines and boilers and all safety valves.
3. Guns: all three turrets of heavy guns were damaged, the foundations apparently having shifted. B turret was most seriously damaged, and will have to be removed. Water got into A turret through the cable shaft. The turrets of the medium guns and the central pivot mounting were shifted in their pivots and foundations. Anti-aircraft guns were damaged in pivots, cradles, and mountings. All the heavy anti-aircraft guns must be taken off the ship for thorough checking. Almost all range-finding devices were severely damaged. The transformers were torn from their foundations.
4. Ship structure: about 15 fuel bunkers and 20 water compartments are leaking.

There is no report about the GNEISENAU so far. However, her damage is supposed to be less severe than that on the SCHARNHORST.

The Chief, Naval Staff repeats his order that an exceptional effort must

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be made to complete repairs as rapidly as possible. This wish of the Commander in Chief, Navy is to be sent in the form of a command to all stations concerned, especially to the shipyards. A delay as in former cases must not occur. A final decision will not be made until the middle of next week, since we cannot yet determine the extent of the damage and the time required for repairs. Besides, it is uncertain, due to danger from air raids, whether it is still advisable to transfer the SCHARNHORST to Kiel, where both ships could be repaired at the same time, as the Commanding Admiral, Battleships has suggested. However, in any case the SCHARNHORST is to dock immediately, as soon as the necessary unloading has been completed. The Chief, Naval Staff expects a report on the investigations on Tuesday.

II. Concerning the transfer of the cruisers SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN to Norway: The Commanding Admiral, Battleships was ordered to direct the transfer of the ships and also to take over the command of fleet forces now in Norway. During the transfer first the PRINZ EUGEN and then the TIRPITZ will be his flagship.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff reports that the Fuehrer granted the twelve month postponement of operation "Seelowe". The Armed Forces High Command must be informed of this.

In connection with a letter from the Fuehrer to the Duce the Navy is to send the Armed Forces High Command an account of what is necessary with regard to providing the transports and building naval barges in Italian shipyards so that these matters can be accelerated.

IV. Upon the inquiry of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Naval Staff Quarter-master Division replies that a heavy anti-aircraft detachment was withdrawn from Brest and put at the disposal of Group North.

V. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the Fuehrer's request concerning reconnaissance in the Norwegian coastal waters (see War Diary 5 Feb. 1942), and the opinion of the Naval Staff; for copy see report no. I a 357/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa. Copies of this are sent to Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, the Fleet, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for their information. The Naval Staff agrees with Group North concerning utilization of the Norwegian fishing flotillas. (See War Diary 10 Feb.) All available means should be exploited so as to achieve the greatest possible results. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is to report the possibilities and further plans after renewed investigations.

VI. Concerning an Axis operation against Suez, which has lately gained in significance, and Japanese control of the Indian Ocean: while the Fuehrer at first stressed the primary importance of the Russian problem by resuming the campaign in Russia, he in no way rejected the above lines of thought, when they were suggested by the Chief, Naval Staff. It is now necessary to explain the importance of these super-continental ideas to the Armed Forces High Command from the point of view of naval warfare.

VII. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the mine-laying which the DOGGERBANK is to carry out off Capetown about the middle of March, should the situation permit.

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Situation 14 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

A-10942



1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, U.S. officers state that the next arrival of U.S. troops in northern Ireland is expected about 15 to 20 Feb. Five transports, four destroyers and one cruiser went to Stranraer.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 0014 informs the REGENSBURG that she was sighted twice by our own planes and not by the enemy.

Ship "10" is informed of the new operations areas for submarines in the North and South Atlantic by Radiogram 2011.

All ships in foreign waters are informed of the successful Channel breakthrough of the Brest ships in Radiogram 1137 and 1214.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

The announcement of the British Admiralty and the Air Ministry concerning the engagements in the Channel on 12 Feb. confirms the losses of 20 bombers and 16 fighters, as already reported tentatively, mentions no other losses, and believes that at least one torpedo of the destroyers led by Captain Pizey aboard the CAMPBELL found its mark. The announcement concludes with the following words: "When the enemy ships, which had been separated, were last sighted, they were sailing in the direction of their ports in the Heligoland Bight. Further reports from our forces are expected."

A copy of the announcement is in War Diary, file "Mandarine".

Between 2120 and 2400 radio intelligence intercepted reports of radar findings from Dover to a PT boat flotilla leader, stating the location of a German force in the area north-northwest of Gravelines; at 2131 there followed an order for attack. PT boat "35" asked for tug assistance at 2330.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Group West is instructed to make the final report on the Channel breakthrough. All necessary data is to be provided Group West by Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the Commander, Destroyers, and the Commander, Torpedo Boats, so that the report can be made as soon as possible.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships presented a brief report to the Naval Staff, reserving the right to make additions or corrections after all reports concerning the operation have come in. All facts mentioned in this report have meanwhile been confirmed. Copies of the report were sent to the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, and to the Naval Liaison Officers at the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, at the Air Force Operations Staff, at the Army General Staff, and at Army Group D. Another copy under 1/Skl 3578/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, file "Mandarine".

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Further brief reports came in from the commander of the PRINZ EUGEN, who confirmed the excellent impression made by previous single reports concerning the ship's successful defense against enemy air and naval forces. Furthermore Group West, the commander of the GNEISENAU, and Group North have also submitted brief reports. Copies of all reports may be found in War Diary, file "Mandarine". Copies of the report of Group North were also sent to the Naval Liaison Officers of the various Armed Forces Staffs, etc.

Concerning damage on the SCHARNHORST, see Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

Channel Coast:

One of our mine detonating vessels was unsuccessfully attacked by British PT boats off Gravelines and reached port undamaged.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The Air Commander, North Sea reported that no visual reconnaissance was possible over Scapa, since very well-aimed heavy anti-aircraft fire at 9,000 meters forced the planes to turn back.

Own Situation:

Ice situation: shipping in the Elbe and Weser estuaries is only slightly handicapped. Patrol boat "1303" suffered slight damage through three bombs which failed to explode during air attacks in Rotterdam. Near the Jade buoy no. 8 an attacking enemy plane was shot down by anti-aircraft guns on the motor ship DUESSELDORF. Convoy and escort duty in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded as planned with no unforeseen incidents.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

An unconfirmed intelligence report states that the enemy is planning to attack the coastal area of Bergen. Norwegian fishing vessels are said to have received a British directive to assemble near Turøe (northwest of Bergen) in order to obtain instructions from British naval forces there.

According to air reconnaissance a submarine was stationed east of Nordkyn. British air activity over Lindesnes, Lister, Florø and Obrestad.

Own Situation:

Due to interruption of communication lines no reports came in from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and the Admiral, Arctic Coast.



Defense Measures in Norway:

a. In agreement with Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Norway, Group North will transfer ships "13" and "24" to the Commanding Admiral, Norway to be used for convoy duty in the Arctic region.

The RUGARD and patrol boat "1601", because of their limited range, are being assigned temporarily for fast transport service between Germany or Denmark and southern Norway. (See Telegram 2347.)

b. Group North informs the Naval Staff of its directive concerning the command authority of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. According to this, the fleet forces in Trondheim will be under the Commanding Admiral, Battleships until further notice as soon as he arrives in Norway. Requests for air support for naval warfare are made to the 5th Air Force via the Group; requests for local fighter escort for training in the fjord, etc., are made directly to the Fighter Command, Norway. The Fleet regulates command in all other matters.

The Air Force General Staff gave the Naval Staff its consent to permit the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to arrange for air support for his operations directly with the 5th Air Force, as long as his demands do not exceed the facilities of that unit. This applies especially in the case of enemy surprise operations which require quick action. Group North is informed of this.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Due to bad ice conditions the 4 transports from Stettin are not expected to arrive in Copenhagen before the evening of 15 Feb. Two of the transports, after taking on cargo, are to depart for Oslo on 17 Feb. with ice-breakers CASTOR and EISBAER.

The GNEISENAU made fast at the Holtenau locks at 2100 and intends to dock.

The Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff informs Liaison Staff, North that the Northern Army Group has been ordered to cooperate with Naval Group North in preparing to capture the islands in the Gulf of Finland, except for Hogland, which will be occupied by the Finns. The operation is to be executed before the thaws begin. The later defense of the islands will be taken over by the Navy. The Naval Staff is informed by Telegram 1900.

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V. Submarine Warfare
1. Enemy Situation:

A British plane reported attacking a southeast-bound submarine about 135 miles south of Rockall Bank.

According to Naval Attache in Lisbon, the Belgian steamer RENE PAUL will leave Porto for Gibraltar on 14 or 15 Feb. with 500 tons of tungsten aboard. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the Air Force are informed of this.

Radio intelligence intercepted a report from the U.S. radio station

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Annapolis stating that the steamer LADY NELSON (7,970 GRT) was torpedoed about 90 miles southwest of Cape Race. Louisburg relayed the SSS signal of steamer BEILA which was being pursued by a submarine about 420 miles southeast of Cape Race. A U.S. steamer in the latitude of Boston was directed to sail towards the Brenton Reef light ship in order to pick up a pilot.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache was ordered to send Lieutenant Walter Sitek, who was rescued from submarine U "581" on to Lorient, since there seems to be no danger that he will be interned. He left Ponta Delgada for Lisbon on 13 Feb. on the Portuguese destroyer LIMA. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is informed accordingly by Telegram 1719.

In the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines there is no longer any reason to assume that the usual amount of British north-south traffic will be directed through the West Atlantic, due to the entrance of the U.S. into the war and the present successful submarine concentration off the American East Coast. This belief is confirmed by the radio intercept service, according to which a large concentration of British north-south traffic was observed in Freetown. We intercepted a radio report of the Admiralty on 8 Feb. stating that it considers the submarine warning sent by a steamer in the Freetown area as absolutely unfounded. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore announces the following plans:

a. Submarines U "68" and U "505", which were to leave Lorient on 11 and 12 Feb. respectively, are to be stationed off Freetown or south-east of it.

b. Submarines U "154", U "155", U "158" and U "162" coming from the North Sea, and submarine U "503" coming from Kiel, are to be sent immediately to operate in the Florida Strait-Cape Hatteras area and north of it.

The Naval Staff agrees with these plans and sends the following account of its impression of the South Atlantic-British Isles enemy traffic on the basis of the information on enemy shipping obtained since the beginning of the year:

a. Enemy routing through the West Atlantic continues just as before the entry of the U.S. into the war. The only change that has been observed lately is that the enemy is trying to avoid the area west of the Small Antilles-Bermuda-Newfoundland line and to direct shipping between Trinidad and the northern route east of Bermuda.

b. In single instances ships coming from the South Atlantic were routed from Trinidad directly via the Azores, and fast ships from South Atlantic ports and the Indian area were sent via Freetown-Cape Verdes-Azores to Britain, and vice versa.

c. It will be impossible for the enemy to carry out a fundamental reshifting of his north-south traffic to the East Atlantic at short notice, in view of the numerous long-standing preparations with regard to loading and fuel supply (e.g., refuelling in the West Indies).

d. The increase of the Freetown traffic is probably due to more numerous transports from the British Isles to the Indian area rather than to more convoys heading for England.

Copy of the corresponding telegram to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines



as per 1/Skl I u 315/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

24 of the 26 planes which were sent out to mine the Thames in the night of 14 Feb. fulfilled their mission.

50 to 60 enemy planes penetrated into southwestern Germany in the evening.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Altogether 24 of our planes went into action against 2 enemy convoys about 180 miles north-northwest of Benghazi, where they were to meet. During the attack one steamer of 8,000 GRT was so severely damaged by a direct hit that she was scuttled by her own guns. 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers, and 3 steamers of 6 - 10,000 GRT were seriously damaged. One patrol boat was sunk while en route to her operations area.

The Italian Navy states that a convoy was attacked in the Tobruk area by Italian torpedo planes from the Aegean base. Two steamers were hit.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Improved weather conditions permitted stronger support of Army operations once more. Large transport units supplied our troops with reinforcements.

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## VII. Mediterranean Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Press reports from Africa state that ships of the British fleet, including an airplane carrier and 2 battleships, arrived in Gibraltar on 13 Feb. and left immediately in the direction of the Mediterranean after refuelling. This report has not been confirmed as yet. According to the radio intercept service, a British plane attacked 3 merchantmen and 1 destroyer with torpedoes south-southeast of Marsala (Sicily). Lively German air reconnaissance observed considerable enemy traffic in the central Mediterranean. A convoy of 5 freighters with 3 cruisers and 15 destroyers was observed at 0800 proceeding toward Malta 110 miles north-northeast of Derna. At about the same time another convoy of 4 freighters with 1 cruiser and 6 destroyers was seen about 210 miles southeast of Malta. The 2 convoys passed each other at about 1500. German planes successfully attacked the westbound convoy (see Air Situation). Other merchantmen were observed with escorts off the Cyrenaica coast, and some were attacked by our planes. One DIDO-class cruiser, one AURORA-class cruiser, one destroyer, 7 submarines, and 2 steamers were in Valletta in the morning. According to the radio intercept service, a British plane attacked a submarine southwest of Crete.

### 2. Situation Italy:

2 heavy and 2 light Italian cruisers with 8 destroyers departed

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for an attack against the reported British convoy and are to be at 35° 20' N, 16° E at 0800 on 15 Feb.

The distribution of the Italian fleet on 1 Feb. 1942 is in l/Skl 6098 g, War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

3. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla with 8 vessels has been sent out against the British convoy bound for Malta.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer ARGENTEA left Trapani for Tripoli in the evening of 13 Feb. The steamers ATLAS, ARIOSTO, and ANNA MARIA left Tripoli for Italy. The steamer ACHAIA arrived in Tripoli from Ras el Aali.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The three-fold mine net off Candia has been completed. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

The Naval Staff will put 1500 river mines, type B, at the disposal of Group South for executing their plans as reported, if the transport problem can be solved. 1,100 additional river mines, type C, which seem suitable for mining spots between Sevastopol and Lukulu from which the Russians can shell the land, are available.

Copy of the corresponding telegram to Group South as per l/Skl I E 2972/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

The Fuehrer decided not to interfere in Japanese plans for occupying Timor as long as the Australians are stationed there.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

According to statements from deserters, a large Russian attack is planned for 23 Feb. or the day before. The enemy seems to be redeploying his troops on the Slavyansk front. There is heavy enemy pressure on Doropolye. Enemy attacks supported by tanks north of Balakleya and north of Belgorod were repulsed.

A-10942



Central Army Group:

At the 2nd Panzer Army our forces west and northwest of Bolkhov advanced further to the northwest through heavily mined territory. We reached the highway in an attack south of Sukhinichi. The enemy is pressing with undiminished force from the south, southeast, and east on the positions near Yukhnov. Northwest of Rzhev heavy enemy pressure also continues. We repulsed enemy attacks on Velizh and south of it.

Northern Army Group:

South of Staraya Russa the enemy tried to break through to the west. Strong enemy attacks were repulsed south of Yamno. Partisan fighting behind the front continues. Preparations for attack were observed south of Leningrad.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The situation is unchanged.

3. North Africa:

After fairly weak resistance the enemy retreated before the units of the Armored Motorized Corps and the German Africa Corps which had advanced in order to mine Segnali and Temrad. Mines are to be laid in the areas around Segnali and Temrad on 15 Feb., and afterwards the forces will be withdrawn to their points of departure.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The French government informed the Italian Armistice Commission that the supply of Libya via Tunis has brought about U.S. diplomatic reactions. A report from a diplomatic source states that the French government therefore feels itself obliged to stop motor vehicle transports completely and the other transports temporarily.

Great Britain:

The perturbation of the British public caused by the danger to Singapore and the break through the Channel by the German ships continues undiminished. All newspapers emphasize that this breakthrough has made a great change in the North Atlantic situation in favor of the Germans. Instigated by these reports, a large voluntary drive was started for the construction of new warships. The German Embassy in Dublin is accused of having made possible the departure of the ships from Brest by transmitting weather reports. While Churchill is still spared adverse criticism to a great extent, many people definitely demand that he be relieved of his excess obligations, and especially that he give up the Ministry of Defense. The name of Cripps is again mentioned in this connection.

During a meeting of the British labor unions on 14 Feb. a resolution was made which strongly criticises the British government and demands that all private interests which hamper an increase in production be set aside. One of the union secretaries strongly attacked Churchill himself, and demanded that the British people free themselves of this man's magic power of speech. Beautiful speeches cannot win battles. The Indian Minister Amary attempted to defend Churchill.

Spain:

Political circles assume that the conferences in Seville deal not only with the Spanish-Portuguese relationship but also treat other problems. The principle of an "Iberian block" made up of Spain, Portugal, Argentina, and Chile, which could later be joined by the Vatican, Sweden, and Switzerland, is intended to unite all these states in working for peace and in advocating humane methods of fighting the war.

U.S.A.:

It seems that the problem of De Gaulle's occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon has caused a difference of opinion between Sumner Welles and Hull. The State Department has now officially stated that according to paragraph 6 of the Havana Convention, forcible conquest of areas in the Western Hemisphere cannot be tolerated. The American republics, which alone have the right to decide in this question, do not consider the present situation of St. Pierre and Miquelon dangerous enough to require intervention.

Sumner Welles reported on a comprehensive plan for opening up the Amazon area, where the problem of rubber production is of special importance.

Roosevelt's decision to make complete compensation to the French government for the loss of the NORMANDIE in the fire in New York harbor indi-



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cates that Washington has still not given up trying to win over Petain.

India:

Foreign reports state that Chiang Kai-shek's conferences with the Indian leaders were unsatisfactory. Ghandi is said to have avoided meeting him, and Nehru supposedly declared that the difficult Indian problems cannot be solved in a conference of a few days.

Japan:

The Japanese press states: "As long as Calcutta, Bombay, Ceylon, and Aden are not under Japanese control, the occupation of Singapore will mark only the beginning and not the end of the big operations."

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Special Items:

Experiences made not only in East Asia but also during the British foray on the Nord Fjord lead to the demand that coastal defenses be just as efficient toward the land as they are toward the sea. For a memorandum to this effect see War Diary, Part C; Vol. X.

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Situation 15 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

A Portuguese steamer reports that a convoy of 16 to 20 ships left Freetown on 11 Feb. on a westerly course. An unidentified ship reported being pursued by a suspicious vessel off the Ivory Coast. A submarine alarm was later issued for this area. Since none of our submarines have operated there for some time, British submarines are evidently patrolling the area, since submarine alarms occur frequently.

3 dispatch boats, 3 torpedo boats, and 1 U.S. auxiliary cruiser docked in Bathurst on 6 Feb.

Indian Ocean:

On 14 Feb. Admiral Simonstown announced the location of a drifting mine about 30 miles south of Port Elizabeth.

Pacific Ocean:

Radio intelligence intercepted instructions to a steamer which indicate that convoys are sailing in the Pacific. No further details could be ascertained as yet. The main port of departure for U.S. material sent to China is Newport News.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff took over the command of supply ship REGENSBURG at 2200 on 15 Feb. The ship is instructed to this effect and

sailing orders to proceed in the direction of point "Walnuss" are sent by Radiogram 1624. Enemy situation report by Radiograms 1705 and 2052.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

A bomb exploding in Brest wounded 5 soldiers and 5 civilians in the night of 14 Feb. Retaliatory measures are being taken.

#### Channel Coast:

Enemy PT boats attacked the 4th Mine Detonating Flotilla in the night of 14 Feb. Mine detonating vessel "21" scored several hits and reported the probable sinking of an enemy PT boat. Seven mines were swept on route "Rosa".

On 12 Feb. the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West shot down a total of 7 enemy planes definitely and 3 others probably - all without participation of the Air Force.

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed that the Naval Staff took over the command of the REGENSBURG.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service there was lively air activity over the entire North Sea area and the Norwegian coastal area. 2 planes report an unsuccessful bomb attack on 2 southbound merchant ships south of Aalesund. Radio intelligence intercepted continuous location reports of a German force near South Foreland or Dungeness. The flag ship of a PT boat group and 3 PT boats are out at sea.

Air reconnaissance sighted 1 battleship and 3 cruisers in Scapa Flow. One auxiliary cruiser, 2 tankers, and 6 mine sweepers were in the Firth of Forth. Mine sweeping was observed off the Firth of Forth.

Altogether 9 convoys were observed between Newcastle and the Thames between 0810 and 0930. Four, with 52 steamers, were on a northerly course, and five, with 46 steamers, headed south. A total of 17 escort vessels and destroyers accompanied the convoys. Five PT boats were sighted on a northerly course northeast of Flamborough Head.

#### Own Situation:

Convoy and escort service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded as planned and without unforeseen



incidents.

Group North reports that the fuel supplied the naval forces coming from the west has shown that the North Sea Station is most inadequately supplied by tankers. The ships were refuelled by large tankers from the shipyard at Kiel and by the supply ships at Wesermuende. Refuelling could not be carried out in the Heligoland roadway because of bad weather. This and other experiences have caused Group North to make an urgent request for the rapid transfer of small tankers from the west as required by the present shift in the focal point of operations. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Supply and Fuel Branch will take the necessary measures.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

No special reports were submitted.

Own Situation:

The mine ship ULM left Tromsø in order to transport mines from Germany. One of our planes bombed an enemy submarine northeast of Nordkyn but without success. The 11th Subchaser Flotilla arrived in Tromsø with 7 vessels. The steamer BIRK was sinking at 2154, having struck a mine; no further details are available as yet. Enemy planes raided Kirkenes in the morning of 14 Feb., and attacked a patrol boat northwest of Kristiansund North in the morning of 15 Feb. Enemy planes were sighted near Skudesnaes, Feistein, and Fedje in the morning.

Upon the inquiry of the Naval Staff concerning taking along to Norway soldiers on leave, the PRINZ EUGEN replies that 800 men could be taken aboard for a 36 hour voyage, or 650 if the voyage lasts longer. The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla reports that 10 men can sail on each of 5 vessels.

Group North suggests that, reserving final decision on the exact numbers, about 125 soldiers on leave be sent to Cuxhaven, and 250 to Wesermuende at once for embarkation on the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas. They must arrive before noon so as to make connections.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North were ordered to use all the available space on escort forces, other naval vessels, and escorted steamers to take along men on leave and small detachments to Norway.

The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas is ordered by the Naval Staff to dispatch the following personnel by noon of the date named:

On 15 Feb. 125 men to Cuxhaven

On 18 Feb. 250 men to Wesermuende

On 18 Feb. 1,100 men to Brunsbuettel.

Group North is informed accordingly.

Defense Measures in Norway:

(1) The Fuehrer orders Field Marshal List to investigate the military situation of Norway so as to see whether the defensive power of the

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Norwegian area, as far as it is commanded by Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway, and the cooperation of all three branches of the Armed Forces, guarantee that even large enemy landing operations can be dealt with.

(2.) All branches of the Armed Forces are to give Field Marshal List access to any information on any data necessary for his report. This applies also to civilian authorities in matters concerning the defense of Norway.

(3.) The Field Marshal will plan his inspection tour through Norway in Oslo in cooperation with Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway. Field Marshal List will most likely arrive in Oslo towards the end of this week. The Army High Command, Norway is to keep all pertinent maps and other material available at the 5th Air Force for the information of the Field Marshal. See Radiogram 1950.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is ordered to transfer the TSINGTAU and the 6th PT Boat Flotilla with 8 vessels to Norway as soon as possible. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is informed of this by Radiogram 1616 (copies to Group North, the Fleet, the Commander, Torpedo Boats), and is instructed that the 6th PT Boat Flotilla is intended for use in the Lofoten-Narvik area and that the Naval Staff considers Harstad as especially suitable as a berth.

Group North agrees to the anti-submarine barrages between Skudesnaes and Kristiansand South as planned by the Commanding Admiral, Norway (see War Diary 10 Feb.). The mines are to be set for 20 m. Reinforcement of the minefields of the Westwall and those west of Norway by Group North is to be carried out first, since these tasks are more urgent.

Of the 26 submarine reports which have come in, Group North considers all those unlikely which were made after the western minefields were laid. According to this the western minefields appear to have been surprisingly effective. Group North believes that the 20 m. depth setting is most suitable in view of the varying depth range of mine-sweeping apparatus and the lesser danger of their tearing loose in rough seas. The minefields will be laid by the Commanding Admiral, Norway. The Naval Staff is asked for consent and for release of mines. See Telegram 1934.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service the plane sent to pick up an SL convoy which was evidently approaching the British coast was unable to locate it. A U.S. tug reported a submarine 180 miles north-northeast of Cape Hatteras. Radio intelligence intercepted the subsequent SSS signal which was relayed by Annapolis.

An intelligence report states that a convoy of 42 steamers left U.S.



ports on 7 Feb. to transport war materials to Russia via Iran. Another convoy of 51 steamers, escorted by U.S. naval vessels, was assembled in the night of 7 Feb. north of Long Island in order to make for the British Isles.

2. Own Situation:

One of the several submarines out on search picked up 5 men of a missing FW 200 in the western part of the Bay of Biscay.

In the Mediterranean the convoy going from Malta to Alexandria which our planes had attacked on 14 Feb. was also located by our submarines. One of our submarines attacked the convoy unsuccessfully, while submarine U "81" fired a four fan on a cruiser and 3 destroyers; two of them were heard to hit the mark.

Submarine U "331" picked up 5 Italian fliers from a raft. Supplement to Submarine Situation is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

40 planes were sent to mine the Tyne off Newcastle in the night of 15 Feb.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Italian Air Force reports sinking a cruiser of 5,000 tons and a steamer of 10,000 GRT. Together with the appreciable number of ships sunk and damaged by our Air Force on 14 Feb., this would indicate that enemy shipping in the central and eastern Mediterranean must have been seriously impaired. Our Air Force supported the operations of the German PT boats and Italian forces on 15 Feb. by continual nuisance raids on Malta airports. 4 enemy planes were shot down during these operations and 7 more in Libya, all without loss to our Air Force. A Ju 88 raided a torpedo dump and an ammunition depot on Malta in a dive-bombing attack in the afternoon of 15 Feb. One bomb was observed to hit its target. Parts of shipwrecks and crates were sighted northeast of Derna. One of our planes shadowing a convoy north of Sollum, evidently the rest of the Malta-Alexandria convoy, was forced off. The large number of destroyers reported sailing with this convoy can be attributed to the fact that when the photographs were evaluated all escort vessels which were shorter than 90 m. were called patrol boats, and all those longer than 90 m. destroyers.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports have been submitted as yet.

VII. Mediterranean Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, 7 submarines, and 2 merchant ships in Malta; this was 1 cruiser and

2 destroyers more than on the previous day. No surface forces were sighted in the central Mediterranean. However German and Italian air reconnaissance repeatedly observed 2 large eastbound convoys between Tobruk and Alexandria. They were reported as being made up of 19 and 27 ships, including 2 or 3 cruisers, 19 or 20 destroyers, and 4 or 5 steamers. If the reports of the air forces are correct and do not actually concern only one and the same convoy, it could be that the convoy going from Alexandria to Malta turned back before reaching its destination. Another enemy force of 7 vessels was sailing on a south-southwesterly course about 50 miles north of Derna.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla proceeded according to plan. At 0123 the northernmost vessel sighted 4 westbound shadows for a minute. The flotilla's attempt to establish contact remained unsuccessful. Due to increasingly bad weather (west wind 7-8, corresponding sea conditions) the flotilla turned back in quadrant 3921 and arrived in Augusta at 1630. (See Telegram 1925.)

3. Situation Italy:

The Italian forces consisting of 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 7 destroyers, which were on a 110° course 75 miles from Valletta at 0800 and sailed south from there, also proceeded as planned. Nothing was sighted before nightfall. Since air reconnaissance had observed no enemy forces in the central Mediterranean all day and since, besides, 1 British cruiser and 2 destroyers had already returned to Malta in the morning, the planned action against the Malta convoy was not undertaken. The return voyage north was begun in the evening of 15 Feb. (See Telegram 2155.)

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

An enemy submarine sank the steamer ARIOSTO at 0230 in the latitude of Kurinat while the latter was on her way back to Italy from Tripoli.

Two magnetic mine sweepers were sent from Tripoli to Benghazi where a magnetic mine was detonated in the old harbor on 14 Feb.

The German Armistice Commission reports that the departure of the steamers PLUTO and RHEA from Marseille was stopped because of suspected treason. The ships are to sail for San Remo on 18 Feb., accompanied by an Italian escort from the border of French territorial waters.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Minesweeping was commenced northwest of Candia after several mines were observed in the area. The Italian Navy reports that a submarine was sighted between the islands Sikinos and Poligandros on 14 Feb. The convoy of the steamers SALZBURG and ARKADIA with three submarine chasers, en route from Salonika to Crete, will first make port in Candia because of submarine danger off Suda.

Auxiliary warship BARLETTA is to depart on 16 Feb. from Salonika with a torpedo boat for mine duty.

Black Sea:



Enemy Situation:

No reports have come in.

Own Situation:

Two landing craft arrived in Varna. The detonations in Varna Bay are probably due to the ice.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Fortress Singapore has capitulated. On the same day the Japanese began landing on Sumatra. Japanese parachute troops occupied the airport of Palembang. Press reports state that one cruiser of the ARETHUSA class was damaged during the evacuation of Singapore.

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IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Slight combat activity in the Crimea. 24 partisans were shot near Simferopol. At the 17th Army sector the enemy made a strong attack near Nirkovo and Yanina. Southwest of Yama we reestablished our positions by counterattacks. Our shock troops advanced northwards near Barvenkova in spite of very stubborn resistance. Our troops advancing in the Permovka valley, along with parts of the groups advancing in the Orel valley, reached the railroad southwest and west of Losovaya. At the 6th Army sector the southern wing of the Koch Group reached the highway northeast of Orel during a rapid advance across the Orel. Strong enemy attacks were warded off west of Balakleya.

Central Army Group:

At the sector of the 2nd Panzer Army the enemy succeeded in penetrating our positions south of Mtsensk. Northwest of Volkhov our shock troops took Mehesheva. Armored units advanced southwest of Vesnini. At the 4th Army sector the highway was subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire. The enemy pushed into our positions west of Yukhnov during a strong attack supported by tanks. Counterattacks are under way. We surrounded an enemy unit southwest of Vyazma. In several attacks along the front of the 4th Army the enemy succeeded in making only one penetration east of Rzhev, which was cleared up again in a counterattack.

Northern Army Group:

The enemy's attacks on Kholm were repulsed. Southeast of Lake Ilmen the enemy tried to engage our advanced units from both sides by heavy pressure, but suffered heavy losses by our counterattacks. New reinforcements from the west are fighting the enemy who is blocking the highway south of Staraya Russa.

2. Norwegian and Finnish Front:

No reports as yet.

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3. North Africa:

The areas near Segnali and Temrad were mined as planned.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Churchill spoke on the radio on 15 Feb. In order to make the present difficulties appear less serious he pointed to the incomparably greater crises which Britain faced in August 1941 and above all in August 1940 after the fall of France. Since then the U.S. have come to stand at Britain's side, and the Russian armies, far from being conquered are about to drive the intruders out of their country, thus destroying the legend of Hitler's invincibility. Britain by herself could never have defended the Far East against Japan. Greatest caution was always used so as not to provoke Japan, and even the most insolent Japanese affronts were put up with before the U.S. entered the war. No one in London ever thought it possible that Japan would dare to wage war against both Britain and the U.S.A. at the same time. While the Japanese may triumph at the moment, history will some day show that the Japanese attack was criminal folly. Britain's defeat in the Far East is only temporary. With Chinese help Britain can hope to hold the East Asiatic position. Churchill always prophesied that this would be a hard struggle with great set-backs, but that the ultimate Anglo-American victory could be forfeited only by the fatal crime of weakening in resolution and unity. Parliament must support the government to the utmost with hopeful and useful criticisms, but must not rob it of the power to resist, which is so essential for overcoming difficult times and cruel disappointments. From each defeat the vital energy must be drawn which will lead to victory.

Churchill's statements were 'strikingly ineffective compared to his previous speeches.

China:

According to a diplomatic report, Chiang Kai-shek had intended to speak to British authorities about military cooperation during his trip to India. Above all he wanted to safeguard the vitally important connections to Burma. It is said that Chungking circles have long been dissatisfied with the scanty Allied help. Another purpose of the trip is said to have been to establish an Asiatic front made up of China, India, and Burma in opposition to the Pan-Asiatic plans of Japan. The British would like to use the Chinese statesman in this connection so as to overcome the internal difficulties in India. British conservative circles consider this manner of conciliation not very beneficial to British prestige. Chinese officials declared that they wished to maintain proper neighborly relations with Indo-China.

Egypt:

The Finnish consul general in Alexandria reported that 90% of the Egyptians are anti-British and that all of Egypt is looking forward to Rommel's arrival.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Damage to the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU.

According to the report of the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division

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the mine hit caused comparatively slight damage on the GNEISENAU. However, unfortunately the ship ran into a wreck while entering Brunsbuettel and damaged her bottom. This repair will be the decisive factor in determining the time required. According to present reports the entire repair will probably take three weeks, during which the damage caused by the bomb hit while in Brest can also be completely eliminated. Consequently there can be no question of transferring the GNEISENAU back to Wilhelmshaven in exchange for the SCHARNHORST.

Preparations with regard to the SCHARNHORST have progressed to such a degree that she will be able to dock on 17 Feb. As far as can be determined at the moment, the date for the completion of repairs will depend on the time required to repair the guns, which is now estimated at two and a half months. The Chief, Naval Staff again emphasizes the urgent necessity for completing repairs as soon as possible. When he is at the Fuehrer's headquarters during the next few days, the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is to make a report concerning the condition of the ships, as requested by the Fuehrer.

The Chief, Naval Staff asks the Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch to report at once concerning the wreck at Brunsbuettel.

II. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports on the experience made with radio and radar during the Channel operation. It seems that the enemy was unable to break our code, which had not been improved in time for the operation. Cooperation between the radio intelligence of the Navy and of the Air Force was good. For the first time the Air Force utilized the same wave lengths as the Navy as requested. This aided cooperation greatly.

III. The Naval Staff Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports on the French protest submitted to the German Armistice Commission against the anchoring of supposedly damaged German ships off Tunis.

IV. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports on the tasks of the intelligence service for the current year.

V. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the preparations for operation "Sportpalast". Three vessels of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are being transferred to Trondheim on 16 Feb. with 125 soldiers on leave aboard. This provides the escorts needed by the TIRPITZ.

A report was made concerning the distribution of the light naval forces and escort vessels as per 1/Skl I op 343/42 Gkdos. Chfs. (see War Diary 13 Feb.)

The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the directive of the Armed Forces High Command about means for deceiving the enemy as to the Army's operational plans during the next few months.

Concerning operations of submarines off Aruba and Curacao, the Chief, Naval Staff wants a definite order that the submarines commence hostilities in this area by firing on the oil refineries and tank installations on shore. In this connection the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports that the Naval Staff has already suggested this to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the plan of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for sending two submarines to the west coast of Africa. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees



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with the opinion which the Naval Staff expressed to Commanding Admiral, Submarines. (See War Diary 15 Feb.) Even if the belief of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that the southern traffic to Britain is no longer using the roundabout way to the west is not substantiated by the information at the disposal of the Naval Staff, it would still be justifiable to transfer two submarines to the area off Freetown. We may expect a sufficient number of targets there for this small number of submarines, and the appearance of our boats in that part of the Atlantic can only be helpful in disrupting the enemy's escort service.

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Special Items:

The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered on 9 Feb. that the decision of the Reich Military Tribunal (Reichskriegsgericht) should close the matter of the torpedo failures. In order that all information of military or technical value be utilized, the material gathered for the proceedings should be carefully examined, and abstracts thereof should be made available to the agencies concerned. The special staff will be dissolved. Its files will be deposited with the Naval Ordnance Division, Torpedo Branch.

The opinion which the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has expressed in his reports, namely that torpedo and warhead pistol failures were particularly frequent during the Norwegian operation and had a decisive effect on successes, is not entirely correct, for there was actually no unusual number of failures during the Norwegian operation as compared to submarine warfare previous to that time. Rather the results achieved during that period were influenced most by the number of misses, which amounted to 41.8%. These misses were caused by the difficult conditions confronting the submarines during these operations.

This statement was included in the War Diary of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning the Norway operation by the Naval Staff's war diary section.

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Situation 16 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The southern channel of the Mississippi was closed.

South Atlantic:

A Spanish steamer sighted 2 patrolling U.S. planes near St. Paul's Rock on 23 Jan. On 28 Jan. the steamer encountered a ship that was not blacked out west of St. Helena; on 29 Jan. a freighter northeast of the Trinidad islands; on 31 Jan. a freighter off Rio; on 2 Feb. a freighter northeast of Porto Alegre; and on 4 Feb. an unarmed tanker northeast of the La Plata estuary.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" is informed about this year's whaling and the move-

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ments of the REGENSBURG by Radiogram 0231. Directive to OSORNO concerning star recognition signals in Radiogram 1934. Ship "10" is sent information on the steamers SOUTHERN QUEEN and SOUTHERN PRINCE by Radiogram 1956.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

An official British report states that 200 to 300 British bombers and more than 300 fighters were sent out against the German naval forces in the Channel on 12 Feb. It had been expected that these German ships would appear in the Channel, and thus plans were made beforehand. All PT boats which were available in the Dover area participated in the attack on the German warships. The destroyer WORCESTER fired her torpedoes at a German battleship from a distance of 2,000 m. Although the British destroyer was hit and set on fire while turning away, she nevertheless returned to her base.

According to the explanations of competent British authorities, the battle in the Channel proved that the Air Force alone cannot keep enemy naval forces from landing on the British coast.

The British Admiralty announced the loss of the old destroyer CULVER (?).

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

During an enemy air attack on Brest the shoe repair shop of the local naval station was destroyed. There was some loss of personnel and aside from that serious damage to buildings in the town. No bombs were dropped during the enemy air attack on Lorient on the evening of 15 Feb. Fifteen explosive bombs were dropped on St. Nazaire. No damage of military importance is reported.

#### Channel Coast:

The numerous ground mines detected of late on routes "Rosa" and "Lila" indicate that the enemy has discovered our routing. On 16 Feb. we swept 26 mines and detonated 18 on these routes.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Little air activity during the day. There was considerable air activity in the evening near Terschelling and in the area of the east Frisian Islands up to Heligoland and Sylt.

#### Own Situation:

The KONDOR got clear after running aground at Oldeoog Plaat, and made port in Wilhelmshaven. Convoy and escort service in the area



of Commanding Admiral, Defenses North proceeded as planned and without unforeseen incidents. According to the report of Group North, not only 7 salvage tugs owned by the Navy from the Baltic, North Sea, and Dutch areas went into action during the transfer of the Brest ships, but also all other tugs still available in the North Sea area. Of this total of 24 tugs only 4 are still ready for operations. Most of them will have to be returned to commercial use after being repaired. The others will not suffice to maintain systematic salvage work and escort service. Since the focal point of operations has been shifted to the north and east, Group North requests that at least 12 salvage or sea-going tugs be assigned to the area of Group North from the western area. (See Radiogram 1952.)

The Armed Forces communique gave special emphasis to the role played by the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West, with particular mention of the chief of staff to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. As a result the Commanding Admiral Defenses, North states justifiably that this commendation constitutes, certainly unintentionally, a rebuff to his forces, particularly since they were assigned to the area in which most of the air and destroyer attacks took place, lost patrol boat "1302", suffered hits on patrol boat "1303", lost the commander of patrol boat "2009", and definitely shot down two planes. In spite of their small number, his minesweepers cleared the way, sweeping 31 ground mines which were ready to explode, and escorted the Brest ships into the river estuaries. At times extremely bad weather and severe ice conditions made their duties especially difficult to execute. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships also believes that the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North merit equal mention with those of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West in the Armed Forces communique. (See Telegram 1915.) The executive office of the Commander in Chief, Navy is to take the necessary steps. The Naval Staff fully agrees with the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

## 2. Norway:

### Enemy Situation:

No special reports.

### Own Situation:

Strong wind during a snow storm in Kirkenes drove several steamers from their berths on 15 Feb. This caused the Norwegian steamer BIRK (3,664 GRT) in the Boek Fjord to sink after drifting into the minefield which we laid on 11 Feb. (See War Diary 15 Feb.) The Norwegian steamer ARNA was able to clear the minefield under her own power in the last minute.

Therefore the sinking seems to have been a mere accident, and there is nothing wrong with the minefield as such.

### Defense Measures in Norway:

The Naval Staff is very much in favor of laying as many deep minefields as possible in the spots where enemy submarines may be expected to become particularly active on the southwest coast of Norway, since our mobile anti-submarine defenses are weak. The Naval Staff asks Group North, which up to now reacted negatively to a similar suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Norway to reexamine the matter, taking into account the considerations submitted by the Naval Staff. For copy of the corresponding telegram with a detailed account of the situation by the Naval Staff see 1/Skl I E 3242/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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Concerning the transfer of men on leave to Norway in connection with operation "Sportpalast" the Naval Staff informs Group North and the Fleet that the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas has been directed to have 1,250 men in Erunsbuettel, 160 in Wesermuende and 20 in Cuxhaven ready for embarkation by noon of 18 Feb. The Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas is informed of the degree of secrecy necessary.

Group North issues orders accordingly and distributes the men aboard the ships as follows:

800 men on PRINZ EUGEN  
450 men on ADMIRAL SCHEER  
70 men each on RICHARD BEITZEN and destroyer Z "25"  
10 men each on SEEADLER, KONDOR, ILTIS, and FALKE.

The men are not to embark until just before departure of the ships.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Icebreakers CASTOR and EISBAER arrived in Copenhagen with four transports and the mineships SKAGERRAK and UNKAS. Icebreaker NORDLICHT got stuck in the ice off Memel with the hospital ship PITEA and the steamers JADE and WESER.

Group North asks that mine detonating vessel "6" and the C groups of the 36th and 32nd Minesweeper Flotillas be transferred to its area in time for the spring operations in the Baltic Sea. (See Telegram 2231.)

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

A British plane bombed the Spanish steamer MONTE ABRIL about 300 miles northwest of Cape Finisterre. The radio intercept service assumes that the plane mistook the ship for a German merchant raider. A submarine attacked the tanker CPALIA (6,195 GRT) 480 miles northeast of Cape Charles on the American East Coast. On 16 Feb. radio station Curacao reported submarines on the south coast of Curacao and Aruba between 0730 and 1700. The U.S. radio announced that a submarine sank several tankers near Aruba and bombarded the hydrogenation plant.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "156" reported sinking 2 tankers near Aruba and firing 2 misses at a tanker at the pier. In defense the enemy used only searchlights, a plane, and a patrol vessel. A torpedo exploding in the tube wounded two men whom the submarine would like to set ashore in Martinique. Negotiations on this matter with the Foreign Office disclosed that the French government has no objections to the plan, but advises that the vessel should enter port without further ado, signaling her intention of debarking sick persons, since it is not certain whether the port authorities in Martinique can be advised in time.



VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Twenty-one of our planes mined the Humber estuary during the night according to plan. For enemy air activity in the Heligoland Bight as far as Apenrade, Flensburg, Jever, and Terschelling between 2100 and 2300 see Situation North Sea. Several bombs were dropped but caused no damage. Aerial mines were probably dropped. One plane was shot down near Terschelling. Fourteen enemy incursions were made over France and 5 over the Brussels area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The nuisance raids against the airports on Malta were continued. There was only limited air action due to weather conditions. Five bomb mines, type 1000 were dropped into the harbor basin during the attack on Tobruk.

3. Eastern Front:

At the Northern Army sector strong dive bomber and fighter units attacked troop assembly areas and villages where troops were quartered south of Staraya Russa on 15 Feb. The enemy suffered many casualties and heavy losses of rolling stock. Some of our large transport planes dropped ammunition and supplies.

4. Special Items:

a. The Air Force Operations Staff pointed out that the experiences of the Channel operation show that when many code words are used, frequent inquiries and repetitions become necessary, thus jeopardizing secrecy; thus the fewest possible code words should be used.

b. The Naval Liaison Officer to the Commander in Chief, Air advised the Chief, Air Force General Staff again of the importance of attacking ships in the Black Sea, especially warships. While agreeing with the above opinion, the Chief, Air Force General Staff referred to the Fuehrer directive, according to which the Air Force is to give direct aid to the Army. Therefore enemy supply ships while loaded or unloading are the main targets. It goes without saying that all opportunities to attack Russian naval vessels will be exploited. On 13 Feb. the Chief, Air Force General Staff again advised the 4th Air Force to attack ships. However the available air forces are very weak and aside from that the first mud period has begun in the Crimea and will last about four weeks, so that the airports have become very soft.

c. On 16 Feb. the 4th Air Force received a Fuehrer directive advising that, in view of the approaching season of mud and bad weather, it is especially important to guard the coastal area between Sevastopol and the Kerch Strait. As far as weather conditions will permit, all enemy landing attempts must be crushed. For this purpose it is essential to discover the approaching ships in time so as to destroy them before they begin to unload. The necessary forces, (dive bombers, bombers, and torpedo planes, as well as the necessary fighter escort) will have to be available for this task at all times.

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VII. Mediterranean Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance made no particular observations. Radio decoding intercepted a British air reconnaissance report about an Italian task force of 2 cruisers and 5 destroyers 170 miles east of Malta on a northerly course, and another report of a British aerial torpedo attack with supposedly 2 hits.

2. Own Situation:

During the night of 15 Feb. a German submarine scored 2 hits on a task force of 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers off Alexandria.

3. Situation Italy:

An enemy submarine seriously damaged the destroyer CARABINIERE off the Messina Strait. The ship is being towed in.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine was pursued north of Rethymno.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance of 15 Feb. stated that Kerch Strait is free of ice as far as the line Kamish Burun-Tuzla Spit. The ice north of this line was broken.

Own Situation:

During the conferences of the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command with the Honved Ministry and the General Staff in Hungary it was decided among other things that the Hungarian Danube naval forces are to continue to operate on the Danube as heretofore. At the proper time an investigation is to be made as to whether these forces can be employed for escort duty in the Black Sea. In agreement with Naval Group South the Naval Staff points out to the Armed Forces High Command that in view of the small size and the structure of these ships, they cannot be used as escorts in the Black Sea. However it would be possible and very desirable to employ the Hungarian forces, as in 1918, for patrol and guard duty in the lower courses of the Ukrainian rivers and in the Sea of Asov. The ships can be transferred there via the Black Sea only one at a time from port to port, and only in good weather. Since extensive technical preparations would be necessary for this transfer, the Armed Forces High Command is asked whether the Naval Staff could not establish contact with the Hungarian Navy now, so as to find out whether any vessels can be withdrawn from the Danube, and if so which ones. Attention is called to the fact that the Rumanians, whose harbors would have to be used a large part of the way, might cause difficulties.

6. Situation France:

In the middle of December 1941 the French Government submitted to the Italian Armistice Commission its wishes concerning the protection



of French merchant shipping off the Tunisian coast and concerning reprisals against British commercial shipping off the Algerian coast. In contrast to the Italian opinion, the Naval Staff informed the German Naval Command, Italy of its belief that the French must have freedom of action in their territorial waters. This includes submarine chase which was prohibited them expressly only outside their territorial waters, at the time when they were given permission to send naval forces to North Africa. German submarines have orders not to approach the French coast closer than 20 miles.

The German Naval Command, Italy, however, believes that it must side with the Italians, who oppose accomodating the French in any way. It points out that the solution of the sovereignty problem requested by France and approved by Germany would facilitate British operations, especially supply shipments for the purpose of reinforcing the British positions in the central and eastern Mediterranean, while the Axis would have less chance to interfere with British shipping than up to now. (See Telegram 0930.)

The Naval Staff reiterates the reasons for its opinion. There is no legal justification for changing the freedom of movement of French forces and prohibiting submarine chase within French territorial waters. The Naval Staff believes it impossible that France will turn against the Axis in the near future. On the contrary, Axis insterests and French wishes tend towards gradual participation by France in the fight against Britain. Should France take over the control of French territorial waters, we would be spared tasks which the French are capable of doing and can take over according to international law. In order to avoid further disadvantages by uncontrolled passing of British ships, it is planned to ask France to lay a French minefield near Cape Bon with a minefree lane, which is to be guarded by France. The Naval Staff orders the German Naval Command, Italy to procure Italian agreement immediately so that the matter can be pursued further by the Foreign Office and the Armed Forces High Command.

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## VIII. Situation East Asia

### 1. Enemy Situation:

An Attache report states that Indian reinforcements from Calcutta arrived in Rangoon in January. Australian reinforcements are said to have arrived in the Dutch East Indies.

According to press reports the U.S. squadron which attacked the Gilbert and Marshall Islands has returned to Honolulu. Furthermore, U.S. troops are said to have landed on Java. A further press report states that a considerable part of the garrison of Singapore was evacuated to Sumatra. Reuter reports that an Australian warship took aboard more than 500 soldiers from a transport which was hit by a Japanese bomb just outside of Singapore.

### 2. Situation Japan:

Large Japanese units landed near Macassar. During the air attack on the evacuation convoy from Singapore, which consisted of 25 vessels, 10 ships were hit, of which 2 caught fire. On the island of Singapore, the British are making their last stand in the area of the water reservoirs. 100 Japanese planes attacked Palembang. Parachute troops landed.

The German and Italian naval attaches were given additional information concerning the naval battle in Malayan waters. The PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE had an escort of 3 destroyers, which stood 2 miles off the point evidently as anti-submarine protection. During the Japanese attack they took up positions abeam the task force for anti-aircraft defense. Aerial torpedoes were dropped from a height of 20 to 100 m. at a distance of 3,000 to 4,000 m. The PRINCE OF WALES sustained 2 direct bomb hits and 1 at the ship's side, about 5 torpedo hits starboard, and 2 port. The REPULSE was hit by 1 bomb and 4 torpedoes starboard and 7 port. 50% of the aerial torpedoes and 4% of the bombs scored hits. Japanese losses were slight since their bombers diverted the anti-aircraft fire. Since the attacking planes were so numerous, there was no systematic defense. The greater the height from which the planes dropped their torpedoes, the more their wings were riddled by anti-aircraft fire. The planes which dropped their torpedoes from less than 30 m. sustained no damage. During the battle near Hawaii 1 ship of the CALIFORNIA class and 1 of the OKLAHOMA class were sunk by bombs alone. The Naval Staff passes this information on to the Armed Forces High Command; the Army High Command; the Commander in Chief, Air; the Fleet; the Commanding Admiral, Battleships; the Commander, Destroyers; and the Commander, Torpedo Boats.

According to a report of the Military Attache, Tokyo the impression prevails that the Japanese Army is preparing a surprise attack on the Soviet Far Eastern front in the early summer. About 20 divisions are in Manchukuo and Korea at the moment, and more are expected.

## IX. Army Situation

### 1. Russian Front:

#### Southern Army Group:

At the 17th Army sector all enemy attacks near Yama were repulsed. The enemy was thrown back to the east northwest of Losovaya. Heavy enemy attacks were repulsed on the southern wing of the 6th Army.

#### Central Army Group:

The enemy temporarily occupied the western bank of the Oka River east of Bolkhov at the sector of the 2nd Panzer Army, but was dislodged by a counterattack. West of Bolkhov our troops gained territory to the North. Heavy fighting is in progress around the highway and positions near Yukhnov at the 4th Army sector. Enemy attacks near Medyn and northwest of Rzhev collapsed. Demidov fell into enemy hands. Newly brought-up troops made a concentric attack on enemy forces which had penetrated Velizh. Enemy forces near Velikie Luki were reinforced.

#### Northern Army Group:

Heavy enemy pressure south of Staraya Russa. Otherwise the situation is unchanged.

### 2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No change in the situation.

### 3. North Africa:

Slight scouting activity on both sides. The combat force



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of the German Africa Corps and Armored Corps was withdrawn as planned after having mined the area around Segnali and Temrad.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

After the first reports of depression in Australia due to the fall of Singapore, the hope is expressed that in spite of the capitulation, which means for Australia what Dunkirk meant for Great Britain, the situation can still be kept under control. Doubtless, however, the political anxiety is constantly becoming more serious. Many demand that the last two grave defeats be discussed in Parliament. The opposition to Churchill is now considerably more severe since party differences have recently increased. In the conferences concerning the Ministry of Production the extreme mistrust of the Labor Party has already become apparent, since the party is afraid that Churchill is placing the government more and more into conservative hands. It is certain that changes in the cabinet will be demanded in the session of the House of Commons which is scheduled to take place in the next few days, during which Churchill is expected to give a comprehensive summary of recent events.

According to a reliable report the British Ambassador in Lisbon who recently returned from London is said to be very dejected because of the general feeling in Britain. Leading circles are said to recognize fully the gravity of the foreign and domestic political situation, and it is known that Churchill is not strong enough to cope with the situation. However it is considered too dangerous to change leaders at this time. The strict conservatives are against continuing the war, which on the other hand is advocated particularly by Eden. The anti-American attitude is growing and there will probably be no change in the situation in view of the lack of success of American warfare. Rather, informed circles fear a disastrous development in the war situation, and a dangerous worsening of the food situation; the general public, however, is still much too unconcerned and too little inclined to make any sacrifices. Diplomatic circles report that the foreign troops which are stationed in Scotland are in general on good terms with the native population, but the tactless and arrogant conduct of U.S. soldiers in Northern Ireland has already led to friction.

Since these statements originate in British sources, we may safely say without overestimating the importance of these symptoms that the pressure of the war is gradually beginning to have a visible effect on our main enemy. Naturally in view of British perseverance and their realization that everything is at stake in this war, we should not indulge in exaggerated hopes, but nevertheless it can be seen that the effects of our warfare are slowly beginning to become apparent. Every new blow to the vulnerable points of the enemy's position contributes to the eventual destruction of his power of resistance and, above all, his will to fight. The defeat in Libya, the fall of Singapore, and the humiliation of the Channel breakthrough have lately made their contribution in this direction. If along with the constant pressure of our war on British merchant shipping the British come to realize that Russia is done for, if we could overcome the oil bottleneck, and if the Empire communications to India through the Mediterranean could be eliminated and a German-Italian-Japanese line of communications could be established instead, this would suffice for us at least to come very close to our final goal.

Canada:

The government's intention to introduce universal conscription caused a



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large demonstration by French Canadians in Montreal on 14 Feb. Strong protest was expressed against the constantly growing U.S. influence on Canadian policies.

South Africa:

The people's fear that the Japanese might seize Madagascar induced General Smuts to declare that he does not wish to give any spontaneous assurance that the Union of South Africa will not participate in an occupation of this island.

Finland:

According to the report of the German Ambassador, the enemy's "peace offensive" against Finland has greatly abated. Also within the country the resolute stand of the government has for the moment put an end to discussions of the possibilities for peace and ultimate war aims, which originated in social democrat circles.

Hungary:

Regent Admiral Horthy has asked the government to have Parliament choose his deputy according to the new law.

Turkey:

Here also Cripps' statements made an extremely unfavorable impression in leading circles. There is considerable disappointment even in the British colony in Ankara. Among other things the press points out that Cripps' efforts indicate that no actual understanding about post-war conditions in Europe has as yet been reached between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians.

The order to leave the country, which was actually issued to British citizens by British authorities in Turkey, was obeyed only by those who had no important work to do. It maybe assumed that **this order**, which was made public, was issued in order to worry Turkey about a possible German occupation, and to justify a British demand that Germans be expelled from the country.

U.S.A.:

Welles' declaration that according to advisers in French North Africa there are no indications that American shipments sent there benefitted German forces in Libya is in line with the U.S. attitude toward France.

On 15 Feb. the New York Stock Exchange hit the lowest point since the beginning of the year.

Chile:

The Supreme Defense Council has ordered the strategically important coastal points fortified immediately in order to safeguard raw material exports. Furthermore a mobile coastal defense group will be established and the Navy will be enlarged from the reserves.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Concerning the plans which the Commander in Chief, Navy announced

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some time ago for replacing the personnel in Norway after this winter, if possible, the Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration reports that all necessary preparations have been made. The personnel of the coastal artillery is to be exchanged for forces from home and the western area battery by battery, while the personnel on ships will be exchanged one by one. Actually a considerable exchange has already been made in this manner. The great difficulties in transportation of course complicated matters.

## II. Repairs on the GNEISENAU and the SCHARNHORST

a. GNEISENAU: According to a report from the shipyard at Kiel, structural repairs can be completed by 6 Mar., and the ship can be ready to leave on 10 Mar. Should the mast be shifted, as was requested by the Fleet Command, five days more would be needed. Since there is no actual need to improve radio facilities, the main reason for such a measure, this request is rejected by the Chief, Naval Staff.

b. SCHARNHORST: According to the report of the Chief, Naval Construction Division, the length of time needed to repair the SCHARNHORST will be determined by the damage to the foundation of the turbo electric motors and not by the damage to the guns and turrets. Since some of the parts must be newly cast, the time for repairs is estimated at two and a half to three months.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships suggested that the ship be transferred to Kiel at the earliest opportunity, since it was observed at Brest that if all the objects to be protected are in one port, defenses can be concentrated there, such as anti-aircraft, fighters, and night fighters. Aside from this and the fact that Kiel is safer from attack due to its location, there are advantages pertaining to training which must be considered. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships considers it justified to transfer the ship immediately if adequate precautions are taken.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves if the transfer does not involve any grave danger (draught in the canal; possibility of striking another mine). However, first of all it must be ascertained whether the structural repairs could not perhaps be made in Wilhelmshaven in a short time, so that the ship will not need to go into dock in Kiel at first. The matter is being investigated.

III. A report is made on the statement by the German General, Rome to the Armed Forces High Command calling attention to the endangered position of General Cavallero; his replacement would not be favorable to German interests. For copy sent by the Armed Forces High Command for the information of the Commander in Chief, Navy see 1/Skl 378/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

IV. According to a report of the Naval Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command is about to put into effect a directive which subordinates the Naval Shore Command, Kirkenes to the Commanding General, Army, Lapland. The Chief, Naval Staff will protest to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command by telephone immediately, in order to prevent the release of this directive.

V. A report is made by the Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division about the possibility of declaring a blockade along the American coast, which is at present being discussed with the Foreign Office. The Naval Staff believes that, for the protection of neutral shipping to South America (Swedish, Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese,



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Argentinean, and Chilean), it would be well to shift the southern boundary of the blockade area to the latitude of Cape Hatteras.

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Special Items

Conference between the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Ambassador Ritter (Foreign Office)

Ambassador Ritter showed full understanding for the importance attributed by the Naval Staff to the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal and reported by the Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer. From this point of view it is undesirable to postpone further discussions of this problem between Admiral Nomura and General Jodl until spring, particularly since the Japanese have repeatedly and clearly emphasized that their further operations westward will have to depend on our actions in the same area. Therefore it is absolutely necessary to come to an early understanding with Japan. It will be the task of the Armed Forces Intelligence Division to convince the Armed Forces Operations Staff of this necessity as soon as possible.

The conference then touched on American aspirations with regard to Africa. Both Ambassador Ritter and the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff are skeptical about them. Concerning France, Ambassador Ritter did not believe that the Fuehrer would want to resume negotiations before spring. All in all the Foreign Office views the possibility of aligning the Arabs with the Axis as rather remote. Seizure of Suez would undoubtedly be a decisive step in this direction and should help to clarify Ibn Saud's noncommittal attitude. Time will tell whether Stalin will capitulate if developments make his position untenable. The Foreign Office seems to think that he will fight to the end. Finally, the Ambassador agreed with the opinion expressed by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concerning withholding Seehaus information, and promised to inform the Foreign Minister to that effect. Ambassador Ritter approves of declaring a blockade area the southern boundary of which lies in the latitude of the Florida Strait. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

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Situation 17 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

On the basis of information on the enemy situation released by the Italian High Command in North Africa on 31 Jan. and 1 Feb., the Naval Attache, Rome reports that in Egypt the construction of a road or a railway between the port of Kosseir on the Red Sea and the town of Keneh in the Nile valley has been begun. This link would permit American materiel to be unloaded in the port of Kosseir without any danger from the air. Construction of this line is said to have become necessary because Suez, Ismailia and Port Said are within the reach of the Axis air forces. There are no further reports of special importance.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 0927 informs ship "10" that the DOGGERBANK is to lay

75 standard mines, type C off Capetown during the new moon period in March and contains instructions that the DOGGERBANK should withdraw after completing her assignment. At the same time permission is given to carry out operation "Kairo" during the same new moon period, in case the aforementioned task is considered impossible for reasons which cannot be judged by the Naval Staff. A description of the GLENSHIL is sent to Etappe Japan in letter 1615.

Enemy situation report by Radiograms 0424 and 0630.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Own Situation:

In the evening of 16 Feb. there was an enemy air attack on the 4th Minesweeper Flotilla on route "Rosa" between points 28a and 29. Two vessels suffered light damage, and there were a few casualties. Minesweeper "4006" was damaged by land-based artillery fire in the area of St. Malo. Investigations are under way.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Lively air activity by the 18th Group between 54° and 62° N. According to radio intelligence an auxiliary ship carrying Dutch refugees plans to enter Yarmouth. The destroyer VIMIERA, which was reported lost by the Admiralty on 19 Jan. sank in the Thames estuary. A buoy marking the wreck was mentioned on 23 Jan. Air reconnaissance observed lively convoy activity along the east and southeast coasts.

### 2. Own Situation:

Convoy and patrol service proceeded according to plan. During 3 air attacks the eastbound convoy shot down one of the attackers in quadrant AN 8315.

Group North asks that the Naval Staff decide whether it would be possible not to take along the soldiers on leave on the big ships if shuttle traffic is instituted by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. See Telegram 1621.

The Naval Staff believes that transportation of soldiers in connection with operation "Sportpalast" is a special measure and therefore has nothing to do with this permanent shuttle traffic.

As to the lack of tankers in the North Sea, Group North reports that the tankers held in readiness in the Heligoland roadstead for the torpedo boats returning from the Channel operation could not be used, since



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refuelling at sea was impossible due to the inadequate equipment of the torpedo boats and the bad weather conditions; thus the latter part of the operation was jeopardized. (See Radiogram 1759.)

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will look into the matter further.

The Commanding Admiral, Group North expressly states that the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North which participated in the preparation and execution of the Channel breakthrough exerted themselves to the limit with respect to materiel and personnel. Group North fully appreciates and praises their achievements. If any units aside from those of the main task force received any mention whatsoever in the Armed Forces High Command communique, equal recognition for the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North is justified. (See Radiogram 1625.)

The efforts made for this purpose by the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy unfortunately remained unsuccessful, since the Armed Forces High Command maintain that no such additions to the Armed Forces High Command communique are possible.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is informed that the Fuehrer consented to launch operation "Seeloewe" 12 instead of 8 months from now, since it is impossible to execute the operation earlier. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is asked to inform all naval stations which are concerned in the preparations for "Seeloewe" of this decision. The Naval Staff Operations Division is to inform Groups West and North, Admiral France, Naval Station, North Sea, and the Admiral Amphibious Forces.

Corresponding directive 1/Skl I op 395/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Section "Haifisch".

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

No reports from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean because of communication trouble.

The steamer RADBOD ran aground and sprang a leak in the Busse Sound. Measures for salvaging were started in Kirkenes. A Norwegian motor boat sank near Bud, supposedly due to a mine that got caught in the net. Torpedo boats T "4", "6" and "12" passed Lervik en route north on 17 Feb.

During an enemy air attack against the steamer LUBA near Kristiansand South, the attacking plane collided with the funnel of the steamer, crashed on the ice, and burned up.

According to a report of the Air Force, one of our patrol boats was sunk northwest of Stavanger in an enemy air attack. No report from a naval station on this matter has as yet been received.

The Naval Staff adopted the following attitude toward the statement of the Quartermaster Division of the Commander in Chief, Air, concerning the importance of shipments to northern Norway:

"The Naval Staff is well aware of the severe transportation difficulties in northern Norway. So far nothing could be done about the scarcity of escort vessels. However, it is planned to transfer a considerable number of escort vessels to the Commanding Admiral, Norway at the end of February or beginning of March. Aside from that, the Armed Forces High Command has made additional fuel available for convoys to northern Norway as requested by the Naval Staff. Thus it will be possible to return to operations the escort vessels which were laid up due to lack of fuel. Moreover, the inter-island route has been protected to a certain extent by laying minefields and declaring mined areas, so that a large part of the traffic can now proceed without escorts." (See Radiogram 1929.)

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Icebreakers CASTOR and EISBAER are en route to Oslo from Copenhagen with two transports. The transports are carrying 1,890 men. Otherwise nothing to report.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports 24 planes in the 15th Group and 33 in the 19th. One of the planes of the 15th Group was ordered to look for a submarine sighted at 62° 37' N, latitude not understood, and another reported attacking a submarine 9 miles northwest of Butt of Lewis, effect not observed. Of the 19th Group one plane was located 70 to 370 miles west northwest of La Coruna and two planes 60 to 75 miles northwest of Brest.

Off the American East Coast the Finnish steamer MODESTA, about 315 miles northeast of St. Juan, reported sighting a submarine, and the U.S. steamer MONTOSO on the east coast of Florida reported being pursued by a suspicious vessel.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "108", which is operating along the American coast, reported having sunk 4 freighters with a total of 22,000 GRT. According to observations of the submarine, all traffic except that in the immediate vicinity of the coast has been stopped. The area southeast of Cape Hatteras offers better opportunities for attacks, particularly during the night in shallow water. Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Concerning the Naval Staff's suggestion for bombarding oil installations on Aruba and Curacao with incendiary shells (see War Diary 11 Feb.) the Commanding Admiral, Submarines stated on 14 Feb. that he considers ships to be the primary targets of submarines also in this area, but that the submarine commanders have oral instructions to fire at land targets when no ships are encountered or when it is not too dangerous to do so after attacking ships. In order to clarify the situation the Commanding Admiral, Submarines will repeat these instructions to the submarines by radio.

In accordance with the directive of the Chief, Naval Staff (see War



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Diary, 16 Feb.) the Commanding Admiral, Submarines received the following instructions on 17 Feb.: "The Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the submarines begin operations near Aruba and Curacao by bombarding tank installations, unless local conditions do not permit the use of guns."

For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl I u 375/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary Part C, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

On 16 Feb. three hits were scored on a steamer of 6,000 GRT in the port of Tobruk, and two on an enemy submarine off Suda Bay. The nuisance raids against Malta were continued. An undamaged Wellington plane was forced to land in southern Italy.

### 3. Eastern Front:

The Air Force lent strong support to Army operations and was especially effective at the Southern Army Group near Belgorod and the Central Army Group in the areas of Rzhev and Kholm as well as near Staraya Russa.

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## VII. Mediterranean Warfare

### 1. Enemy Situation:

There are more steamers and planes in Gibraltar than heretofore. 38 freighters, 11 tankers and 84 planes were observed. An Italian agent reported that on 16 Feb. a cruiser, 2 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats and 3 steamers passed Cape Serrat on an easterly course in 2 groups at 4 hour intervals. The forces in the port of Valletta are practically unchanged. One of the three light cruisers was in dock as she has been for some time. Since recent reports concerned movements of one small cruiser at the most, it may be assumed that only one of these three ships is ready for operations. No enemy vessels were sighted in the coastal waters of Marmarica and Cyrenaica. According to an Italian report 150 tanks and 100 guns with ammunition were unloaded from U.S. steamers in Suez and Port Said during the first third of the month of February.

Daventry reports on the evening of 17 Feb. that two Italian cruisers and one destroyer were attacked and hit by torpedo planes.

### 2. Situation Italy:

An enemy air attack on Tripoli during the night of 16 Feb. caused no military damage. The Italian naval forces arrived in Taranto and Messina in the evening of 16 Feb. after an unsuccessful operation against the enemy convoy. No reports about attacks or damage by enemy

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torpedo planes have been received. The damaged destroyer CARABINIERE was towed into Messina. Submarine U "331" reported observing a torpedo hit by an Italian plane on a British cruiser, presumably the CAIRO, in the eastern Mediterranean at a distance of 20 miles. The successful Italian Air Force officer was picked up by the submarine after losing his plane.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The steamer ARKADIA was repeatedly but unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine during the morning and afternoon of 16 Feb. An enemy submarine was sighted off the western tip of Crete on 17 Feb.

Auxiliary warship BARLETTA is west of Euboea, en route south from Salonika, to lay mines near Milos.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed very lively traffic of Russian naval forces and submarines, which was confirmed by radio intelligence.

Own Situation:

The steamer RUDNITCHAR was severely damaged by a block of ice while approaching the Bosphorus. An attempt is being made to salvage her.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

With the occupation of Palembang the Japanese have gained control of the most important oil area of Sumatra, with a yearly output of 2,700,000 tons of oil. Thaton was captured in Burma. The Japanese occupied several important islands of the Anambas group. According to the report of the Japanese Navy the following were sunk between 10 and 14 Feb.: one enemy auxiliary cruiser, one submarine, two small vessels, one minelayer, and eight transport vessels. Damaged: one British and one Dutch cruiser, one British destroyer, one torpedo boat, and ten transport vessels.

As a result of Japanese action one minelayer and one transport ran aground. These successes were evidently scored against the evacuation fleet of Singapore.

According to the report of the Naval Attache, Tokyo the Japanese Admiralty reported on 17 Feb. that the entire 2nd Japanese Fleet is at the moment concentrating on the ships evacuating Singapore. The planned



landing on Bali will be executed on 18 Feb., and that on Java at the end of this week.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The fact that enemy units and planes in the Crimea are being reinforced substantiates the statements of prisoners who told of an attack planned for 23 Feb. Evidently due to the large losses of the last few days, the enemy discontinued attacks against the Von Kleist Group. At the southwest wing of the 6th Army our forces gained territory very slowly. Enemy forces which had broken through northwest of Balakleya were annihilated. A strong attack near Prokhorovka was thrown back in a counterattack.

Central Army Group:

Heavy enemy attacks which were supported by tanks and planes broke through our lines east of Bolkhov. Our tanks are counterattacking. Enemy attacks on the 4th Army sector were repulsed. South of Vyazma considerable enemy forces were surrounded and annihilated. Northwest of Rzhev six enemy tanks penetrated our lines. We destroyed five of them. The enemy was again thrown out of Demidov. The town of Velizh was recaptured in an attack from the west and the south, and our troops which had been surrounded there were liberated.

Northern Army Group:

The newly arrived reinforcements near Staraya Russa succeeded in throwing the enemy back eastwards across the highway to the town. Enemy attacks which were made northeast of the town were stopped by our tanks and dive bombers.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Reinforcement of the strong points and minelaying continued according to plans. It is planned to hold Cyrenaica with part of the forces in the near future, and to rest and relieve the bulk of the troops.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to the report of the German Embassy in Paris, Admiral Darlan was enthusiastic about the Channel breakthrough of the Brest units. In a congratulatory telegram to the Commander in Chief, Navy, Darlan attributed more importance to this feat, the like of which has not been achieved since the time of French naval warfare in former days, than to the fall of Singapore.

Great Britain:

As was to be expected, Churchill attempted in the Lower House to show the favorable side of the Channel breakthrough for Great Britain, in order to overcome the bad impression which this incident had left with the entire country. According to Churchill, a total of 3299 planes attacked the Brest ships during the last ten months; they dropped 4,000 tons of bombs, and 43 of the planes were lost. However an investigation must be made to find out why the operation was not discovered at once at daybreak, and whether cooperation between Admiralty and Air Force commands was as close as it should have been. All in all he agreed with the belief of the Admiralty that the disappearance of the German ships from Brest was to be welcomed. In spite of the annoyance caused by this incident in itself, it is a fact that the situation in the Atlantic has been improved thereby.

He considered a discussion concerning Singapore premature. Should Parliament insist on it, he would call for a vote. He took the same stand concerning appointing a defense minister. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that rumors are circulating in London that Churchill wants to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections.

According to the statements of the Portuguese Ambassador who recently returned from London, the British people are surprisingly indifferent and apathetic in the face of the seriousness of the situation. Neither the workers nor the middle class are at all inclined to make any sacrifices. Their passion for pleasure is great, morals have reached a low point. Everyone is criticising the government. The officers complain about the serious lack of discipline and there is dissatisfaction in the Navy. All in all the atmosphere resembles that in France before May 1940. Only the leading classes are really ready to make sacrifices and are patriotic, although at the same time they are very pessimistic.

Spain:

According to a report of the German Embassy, Franco and Salazar were well satisfied with their meeting in Seville. Salazar is said to have expressed his belief in European solidarity, however at the same time pointing to the vulnerability of the Portuguese insular and colonial possessions.

U.S.A.:

Further credit of \$1,000,000,000 is to be extended to Soviet Russia under the lend lease law. A fund of \$32,000,000,000 will be set up for the construction and armament of merchant ships and for the production of war materials for the Allies. The total armament expenses for the



fiscal years of 1941-1943 will amount to \$142,000,000,000. The U.S. press is again strenuously objecting to the increasing influence of Soviet Russia in the U.S. While the Communist Party has officially only 100,000 members, millions of Americans are innocent members of organizations which closely cooperate with the communists. The alliance with Soviet Russia offers the communist agents an excellent opportunity to establish themselves everywhere, well disguised. It is absolutely necessary that communism be looked upon as a totalitarian system, which is incompatible with democracy.

There is a rumor in diplomatic circles that Secretary of State Hull will not return to his office after his vacation, since he is being accused of diplomatic ineptitude which is said to have caused the war with Japan. Reproaches of this kind have in part also been made against Roosevelt. Attention was aroused by Willkie's attacks against various members of the government, especially against Knox who is continually interfering in the affairs of the State Department. There is no mutual trust between the divisions of the Armed Forces.

#### Japan:

According to the report of the Embassy, a newly formed council for the development of greater East Asia, composed of 37 leading officers, statesmen and industrialists under the chairmanship and immediate direction of the Prime Minister, will begin work on the development of the new greater Japanese sphere of influence. All conquered areas will at first remain under military administration, assisted by a number of capable advisers from various fields. The Filipinos, if they show loyal cooperation, will be granted an independence similar to that of Manchukuo; the native princes will remain in power in the Malay states as well as in British and Dutch Borneo, although naturally under strict Japanese control. European languages are to make way for Japanese, but the native tongues will be preserved. Culturally it is aimed to create a greater East Asian community, in contrast to the suppression and exploitation of the imperialistic systems of the white race; particular emphasis is put on the common ties between Japan and these areas through the Buddhist religion. Only specially selected Japanese will be sent into the new areas for demographic reasons, determined by the needs of Japan and Manchukuo. A free exchange of capital or an uncontrolled economic system are out of the question. The newly established South Sea Development Bank is to handle the necessary investments. The ultimate economic goal is to create a greater East Asian antarchy dominated by Japan, which is geared primarily to Japanese industry. A merchant fleet of no less than 15,000,000 tons is considered necessary to solve the vitally important shipping problem. The government consciously avoids exactly defining the limits of this new sphere of influence. However many public statements have been made which indicate that Australia, New Zealand, Madagascar, and the Russian Far Eastern coastal provinces are included.

#### China:

In Chungking it is expected that the trip of Chiang Kai-shek to India will induce the British to make more concessions in India. The main goal is said to be to form a new common front against Japan, which includes Soviet Russia.

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#### Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the Japanese be asked for



information on their experiences with British mines off Singapore.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that the structural damage on the SCHARNHORST is comparatively slight, but that the renewal of the turbo foundations, which will determine the date of completion, will take ten weeks; he suggests that, since the investigation has shown that this is possible, the ship be transferred to Kiel immediately. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees. Corresponding directive is issued by the Quartermaster Division to Group North, the Fleet, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the SCHARNHORST and the naval shipyards in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel.

III. The Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that according to the statement of the German Armistice Commission the battleship DUNKERQUE left Oran for Toulon escorted by three flotilla leaders and two torpedo boats.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff urges that PT boat action in the Mediterranean be intensified. In this connection the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the suggestion which the Naval Staff has already sent to the German Naval Command, Italy, namely that the PT boats be sent out from Derna against the enemy traffic along the Cyrenaica coast for the present. He states that the German Admiral, Rome (see War Diary 8 Feb.) opposes this suggestion. However the Naval Staff does not wish to let matters rest as they are. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees and authorizes the Naval Staff to send the suggestion to the German Naval Command, Italy in the form of an order from the Chief, Naval Staff. Thus the following order is released:

1. The Commander in Chief, Navy considers PT boat surprise attacks along the North African coast to be highly important. Contrary to the opinion of the German Naval Command, Italy the Naval Staff believes that the present situation offers good opportunities for PT boat operation in North Africa, in the form of short surprise raids on the Tobruk traffic. The Naval Staff believes that no naval base with repair facilities, torpedo storage, electric shore installations, etc., is needed for this purpose. Derna or possibly some sheltered bay could serve as a temporary jumping off place. In view of the importance of the operation the additional wear and tear must be tolerated. Intensive attacks on enemy supply traffic are particularly important in view of the present weakness of the enemy and the need to exploit our successes in North Africa.

2. Considering the fact that few PT boat attacks are being made against Malta, particularly because of the well-known mine danger, the possibilities for using PT boats along the North African coast temporarily in surprise raids from temporary bases should therefore be reexamined. Even if only four boats are put into action, there are good chances for success. If necessary, the Malta mining operations could be carried out with the rest of the vessels. (See Telegram 1616.)

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#### Special Items:

I. Concerning the Channel breakthrough of the Brest group, Group West in its brief report expresses regret for not having been able to provide a sweeper escort to precede the task force. Actually it is impossible with available equipment for an escort to keep ahead of a force at a speed of 27 knots. The Naval Staff Operations Division asks the Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch for information



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on the development of the bow protection gear and the protecting paravane sweep for high continuous speed, work on which was started during the fall of 1939. See 1/Skl I E 3807/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

II. On 18 Feb. in the presence of the military and naval attaches Japanese Vice Admiral Nomura in person transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Navy a message of the Japanese Admiralty to the German Armed Forces. The message states that in connection with the conquest of Dutch Timor the Japanese operational area may be extended to Portuguese Timor for reasons of self defense. The Portuguese government will be notified immediately prior to the occupation. For security reasons the Italian government will not be informed. The same report is to be delivered simultaneously by the Japanese Ambassador to the Reich Foreign Minister. The Armed Forces Intelligence Division has informed the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, the Deputy Chief, Armed Forces Operations Staff, the Air Force Operations Staff, and Chief, Army General Staff.

III. Concerning the organizational problems which have arisen because of the withdrawal of forces from the Commander, Naval Air, the Commander in Chief, Navy wrote a personal letter to the Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Air asking him to retain the staff of the Commander, Naval Air in its entirety, independent of the question of the future of naval air forces, which the Fuehrer will decide later. He suggested either that a new post be created for the Commander, Naval Air under the 3rd Air Force and he be made responsible for all bombing and reconnaissance missions over the eastern part and east coast of the British Isles and the North Sea south of the line Hanstholm-Newcastle and northeast of the line Dover-Calais; or that the staff of the Commander, Naval Air be put under the 5th Air Force and that he be designated as the new Air Commander, North (West) with responsibility for escort of the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea and reconnaissance west of the Skagerrak approaches, in addition to all tasks so far carried out by the Air Commander, North (West) with the planes of the 5th Air Force. The experience which the Commander, Naval Air has gained in his cooperation with the naval commands and naval forces as well as his familiarity with the use of aerial torpedoes, which is also extremely valuable for this area, will contribute in solving the increasingly difficult problems which are bound to arise for both branches of the Armed Forces in this sea area.

For copy of letter see 1/Skl 3447/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

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Situation 18 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

A convoy of 3 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 mail steamer, 1 hospital ship with 3 torpedo boats and 3 avisos was in the approaches to Bathurst on 11 Feb. According to an Italian report, large British and U.S. ships were located within the range of the Freetown radio.

Indian Ocean:

The French auxiliary cruiser BOUGAINVILLE and the submarine LE HEROS arrived in Jibuti on 16 Feb.

Pacific Ocean:

According to an Italian source, the KING GEORGE V arrived in Melbourne severely damaged and is said to have proceeded to a North American shipyard after preliminary repairs.

The intercept service last located the ship in northern Scotland on 15 Dec. Therefore the above report needs to be investigated.

2. Own Situation:

According to Reuter, the British Admiralty immediately recognized as false the SOS signals on the evening of 31 Jan., which originated from a ship supposed to be the British BRITTANY, since that steamer was not at the reported point, 450 miles north of the Azores, at the time in question, and since the name SPREEWALD was mentioned immediately following it. The Admiralty infers from this that the SPREEWALD was sunk by an Italian or a German submarine.

Sailing orders were sent to DOGGERBANK by Radiogram 1327. Radiogram 1846 sent sailing orders to OSORNO and informed her that she would be met by 3 minesweepers and planes on 18 Feb. at a point not beyond 17° W. Enemy situation report by Radiogram 1902.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence a British submarine planned to carry out maneuvers in the Plymouth area at noon. A British vessel reported minelaying by a plane 10 miles east-southeast of St. Albans Head.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Enemy planes sank the Italian fishing steamer BELENA and 2 French fishing steamers in quadrant BF 9374 on 16 Feb.

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed of the orders sent to OSORNO by Telegram 1825.

Channel Coast:

Enemy air activity during the day between Ostend and Calais.

Disposition of Forces: With regard to the request of Group North (see War Diary 16 Feb.) concerning the allocation of ships, Group West reports that the C Group of the 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla was transferred to Group North on 1 Nov. 1941 with the 1st Coast Patrol Force; that the C Group of the 36th Minesweeper Flotilla is to go to the Black Sea according to orders of the Naval High Command; and that



according to the orders of the Naval High Command concerning the distribution of mine detonating vessels, mine detonating vessel "6" cannot be released. In view of the lack of escort vessels and the uncertain mine situation on route "Rosa", the transfer of the OSTMARK can be effected only in several stages. On 13 Feb. the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla was released from the shipyard, as well as the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla; they are at the disposal of Group North. (See Telegram 1110.)

In accordance with the directive which was meanwhile released by the Naval Staff (see Telegram 2020), the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is ordered to transfer the 4th Minesweeper Flotilla to Heligoland as soon as possible to be at the disposal of Group North.

### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

A reliable agent is said to have been informed on 13 Feb. by the Adjutant of the British Vice Admiral King, who arrived in Lisbon by plane from Cromarty, that the Admiralty has ordered the heavy warships of the North Atlantic convoys withdrawn immediately to the Scottish bases. Two ships are expected to arrive on 20 Feb. at the latest, presumably in Moray Firth. It is not known whether this measure is meant to concentrate the forces in the northern North Sea or is merely in line with planned overhaul and repairs. It is certain, however, that the order resulted from the withdrawal of the German battleships to the North Sea bases and that the Admiralty does not fear action by heavy German forces on the North Atlantic routes in the near future. There are said to be no plans to substitute U.S. vessels for the heavy ships withdrawn from the North Atlantic. Only the convoys going from the U.S. to Ulster with troops or war materiel are to be protected by a large U.S. warship.

According to the radio intercept service, 4 departing convoys with about 34 steamers and three arriving convoys with 28 steamers were sighted between the Humber and the Thames between 0900 and 1100. They were escorted by about 16 destroyers and 8 escort vessels.

##### Own Situation:

In a belated report on the results of 12 Feb., the Commanding Admiral, Battleships stated that the forces of the 1st Coast Patrol Force shot down a third British plane.

According to a report from Naval Station, North Sea it was confirmed that as of 13 Feb. 300 enemy planes were shot down by the various naval artillery, river, and harbor patrol flotilla commands in the area. During enemy air activity over the German Bight between 2020 and 2230, an enemy plane was shot down at Schiermonnikoog. An undetonated electro mine was salvaged from the plane, which should give us valuable information.

It is suspected that aerial mines were dropped between Borkum, Heligoland and Wangeroog.

Group North reports the following survey of light forces: All boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are ready for operations; 3 of them are blocked in by ice in the Trondheim Fjord and 2 in Cuxhaven. Four boats



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of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are ready for operations; 3 of them are blocked in by the ice in Cuxhaven, and one in Flensburg. A fifth boat, T "13", was hit by a bomb in Rotterdam and is out of commission. Three boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are ready for operations; 2 of them are blocked in by the ice in Cuxhaven, and the third is en route to Heligoland. The KONDOR is out of commission due to running aground. The JAGUAR was damaged by planes and is also out of commission.

In the evening of 19 Feb. 5 destroyers will be ready in Heligoland, and 3 other destroyers will be ready at the end of February or the beginning of March.

For statement of Naval Staff Operations Division in reply to Group North's request for providing 4,200 standard mines, type C and 3,500 explosive floats in order to reinforce the Westwall, as well as the corresponding telegram to Group North see 1/Skl I E 3695/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

The Naval Staff Operations Division does not share the misgivings expressed by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Coastal Defense Branch concerning danger to the troop transports to northern Norway and danger to security because of troop concentrations in the ports of embarkation on the North Sea, especially in Hamburg. When sufficient escort forces are available, as will be the case when the minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas are transferred, the supply transports can be carried out from the naval standpoint as soon as the technical requirements have been met. Should troop transports be involved, they should be routed to Kristiansand South whenever possible. An accumulation of transport vessels in the North Sea ports can be prevented, since the minesweeper and motor minesweeper flotillas will not all be transferred at the same time anyway. The above concerns the general question of utilizing the naval forces being transferred to Norway for carrying troops and supplies. There is also the special case of transferring soldiers on leave to Norway in connection with operation "Sportpalast". Here the matter of security should be given especially careful consideration. However, the Naval Staff believes that in view of the importance which the Armed Forces High Command places on the transportation of these soldiers to Norway, the permission which was granted once should not be revoked. Group North and the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas have repeatedly been asked by phone to make the necessary preparations, being particularly careful to keep the matter secret.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The German Legation at Helsinki reports that on 12 Feb. Prime Minister Ryti stated concerning the rumors about British-American landing maneuvers in the northern area that such an operation does not seem very sensible in view of the large amount of shipping space it requires, which is urgently needed in other places. He believes that this is probably only a big bluff which is meant to make an impression on Finland and Sweden and keep Russia in a good humor. Britain did the same thing once before during the winter of 1939-1940 when she promised Finland extensive aid, which upon close scrutiny proved to be absolutely inadequate. In spite of this, it is not completely out of the question that such an attempt might be made. The last American memorandum to Finland of 4 Feb. also indicates that this might be the case, since it would hardly be understandable otherwise why America attaches so much importance for Finnish-American relations to the presence of



German soldiers in Finland. In any case, Finland would of course fight against America, should that country join Russia.

Own Situation:

No report from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean because of interference with communications. Submarine U "436" arrived in Kirkenes. Submarine U "435" was west of Stadland in the evening. The BRUMMER reports sinking an enemy submarine after an unsuccessful ramming attempt, while en route to Tromsø at 2340. Position and details are missing.

The transport and convoy traffic in northern Norway proceeded according to plan. The steamer congestion in Tromsø has been relieved considerably. Between 1 and 17 Feb. 23 ships with Armed Forces materiel and 3 ships with troops on leave were escorted north from that port. 8 more steamers are to follow within the next few days. The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla with torpedo boats "4", "5", and "12" left Bergen for Trondheim. The Air Force report that enemy planes sank a patrol boat south of Skudesnaes has been confirmed by the Navy. The crew was rescued uninjured. Enemy air forces in the afternoon, evening, and night of the 17th was extremely active along the Norwegian west and south coasts.

The Reich Commissioner, Norway asked the Commanding Admiral, Norway to extend to 60° N the 30 mile fishing zone between 64° and 68° N. The Commanding Admiral, Norway urgently supports the request, since fishing along the coast is handicapped and sometimes impossible because of the minefields, so that by the end of the season considerable difficulties must be expected in the delivery of fish to deep freezing plants in Norway, as well as in the food supply for the Armed Forces and the population, and the export of fresh fish to Germany will have to be stopped entirely. See Telegram 2030 for corresponding request to Group North, with copy to Naval Staff.

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IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Patrol boats "1003", "1007", and "1011" are employed in the shuttle traffic for soldiers on leave between Hirtshals and Kristiansand South. Otherwise nothing to report.

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V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

20 planes of the 15th and 26 planes of the 19th Group were observed over the northeast Atlantic. A convoy was sighted 45 miles north-northwest of Lewis. Several planes were sent out in search for another convoy at about 54° N 16° W, presumably heading for the British Isles. In the Iceland area a plane reported attacking a south-bound submarine with depth bombs. The boat is said to be damaged. At 46° 10' N, 18° 46' W a Catalina plane unsuccessfully bombed a submarine. Another plane was sent out after her.

In the Caribbean the U.S. steamer MOKIHANA (7,460 GRT) was torpedoed presumably in the Trinidad area and sent SOS signals.

The commander in charge of defenses in the Antilles area reports that a



torpedo dud of German origin was observed in Aruba. According to the statement of the Standard Oil Company, the refinery was not damaged during the bombardment of Aruba. Immediately after the beginning of the attack, U.S. planes went up and started submarine chasing at dawn.

## 2. Own Situation:

A submarine west of Iceland reported heavy air patrol. The boat was bombed from the air on 17 and 18 Feb. The beacons are lighted. There are no patrols outside the minefield. While there is no steamer traffic, many fishing vessels can be observed by day and night. None of these were attacked because of the weather. U "502" sank 2 tankers of 3,300 GRT in the Caribbean Sea on 16 Feb., and damaged one tanker of 1,500 GRT by two torpedoes in the engine room, probably sinking her. Aruba was completely blacked out on 17 Feb. Another submarine reported heavy traffic in center and upper right of quadrant ED, most of it originating in Trinidad.

Telegram 1616 informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines of the press reports concerning the effects of submarine warfare in the West Indies; competent persons in that area state that off the coast of Venezuela 7 tankers were sunk by a submarine, of which one was the large tanker ARKANSAS; according to foreign press reports, 14 tankers which had already left Macareo returned, and the oil shipments from Venezuela were stopped for the time being.

It is pointed out in Telegram 1700 to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that his designation of the northwest border of route "Anton" (as per operations order No. 50, Annex 1, Correction of 15 Feb.) does not correspond to that announced by the Naval Staff on 11 Feb.

The report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines in answer to the inquiry of the Naval Staff as to how to establish direct connection with Japan by submarine (see War Diary 11 Feb.) states that a X B submarine could make the voyage without refuelling, a IX C submarine with the aid of an escort vessel for refuelling at 20° S, or a IX C submarine without escort vessel but refuelling once in the South Atlantic from the DOGGER-BANK. The UA submarine cannot be used for this operation because of the bad condition of her engines and lack of extra parts. For copy of corresponding telegrams see I/Skl I u 351/42 and I u 400/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Night attacks on ships were unsuccessful. For enemy penetrations into the German Bight see Situation North Sea.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

On 17 Feb. between 0300 and 0430 ten enemy planes attacked the staff headquarters of the German Africa Corps and scored several direct hits. Seven men were killed.

For results of photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria see Enemy Situation, Mediterranean Warfare.



3. Eastern Front:

Support of ground operations. Successful fighter activity and bombing of airports.

VII. Mediterranean Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Algeciras a convoy is expected to leave Gibraltar probably at the end of the week. Eleven ships are already in the bay and eleven others left in ballast in order to load.

German air reconnaissance observed only slight traffic along the Cyrenaica coast. Photographic reconnaissance at 1339 showed the following ships in Alexandria: one battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, one battleship of the ROYAL SOVEREIGN class in floating dock, 2 cruisers of the AURORA and C class, 2 other light cruisers, the French vessels, 11 destroyers, of which one had no stern and one other was in dock, 8 submarines, 4 patrol and repair ships, 14 escort vessels and gunboats, 4 magnetic mine sweeping barges, 2 hospital ships, 36 steamers (about 175,000 GRT), 10 tankers (about 63,000 GRT), of which one (7,000 GRT) appeared to have run aground. About 2 km. west of the port entrance 2 steamers are grounded, one of which (4,000 GRT) has no stern, and the other (7,500 GRT) is broken in half. There were about 30 planes at the airport. According to the Italian radio intercept service, the British CANON convoy was attacked by planes off Marsa Matruh. An Italian report states that 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers coming from Aden and bound for Alexandria, were sighted entering Port Sudan.

2. Own Situation:

The 8 vessels of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are to be ready for operations on 5 Mar.

3. Situation Italy:

According to the report of the director of the German anti-submarine training school, Italy, the torpedo boat CIRCE while en route from Naples to Messina sank an enemy submarine and captured the crew on 13 Feb. after German hydrophones had located the submarine during the preceding night.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer TEMBIEN anchored near Jerba for the night while en route to Tripoli, after being sighted twice by enemy planes. Four naval barges left Palermo for Tripoli via Trapani. Naval barge "170" arrived in Benghazi on 17 Feb. to be used as lighter there.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

The minelaying operation of the auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA was postponed because of bad weather.

For the request of Naval Group South to the Naval Staff Quartermaster

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Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch concerning permission to set up a submarine chasing and escort flotilla for the Aegean Sea see 1/Ski 3939/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Naval Group South asks the German Naval Command, Italy to obtain the consent of the Italian Naval High Command that the Italian Chief of Staff be officially subordinated in every respect to the Admiral, Aegean Sea, and informs this office that it will be necessary in the near future also to regulate the operational command in the Aegean Sea. For copy of corresponding telegram see 1/Ski 3927/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

No special reports.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Judging from intercepted radio messages, the supply situation in Sevastopol seems to be very strained.

On the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group the enemy was thrown back in a counterattack west of Yama. East and west of Barvenkova there was bitter fighting. Some of our advances were successful. Our attack at the southwestern wing of the 6th Army proceeded slowly. The enemy who attacked in battalion and regiment strength near Melikhova several times was repulsed in a counterattack. The forces of the 2nd Army succeeded in taking several villages in the Sozna valley. The railway line between Lgov and Bryansk is being threatened by reinforced partisan groups.

Central Army Group:

In the partisan area northwest of Bryansk Russian military doctors conscripted men under protection of the regular Army. All enemy attacks at the 4th Army fronts were stopped. In Velish the enemy was forced back into the northern part of town.

Northern Army Group:

There is heavy enemy pressure on the eastern border of Kholm. South of the town our tank units pushed forward into the Kunya valley and captured several villages. The situation in the area near Staraya Russa is strained.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Successful raids were made into the area behind the enemy



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front, along the Karelian northeastern front. At the Army High Command, Lapland, deserters predict an enemy attack for 23 Feb. Judging from the enemy situation, a large-scale attack is not expected.

3. North Africa:

Enemy reconnaissance activity was increased at the front of the German Africa Corps and the Motorized Corps. Enemy positions have not been shifted.

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Items of Political Importance

Netherlands:

The position of Mussert and the Dutch National Socialist Party as the only recognized political movement has found little approval among the population; however, it is said to have greatly increased Mussert's demands on the German government. Mussert is said to be far from contemplating a union with the Reich and is striving for a separate, politically independent Holland which, however, is to be set up along National Socialist lines. The followers of Mussert are said to be strengthened in these demands by the fact that Quisling has been commissioned to govern in Norway.

Belgium:

The situation is unequivocally determined by the catastrophic food situation. The population as a whole hardly reacts any longer to political questions and has sunk into a state of apathetic waiting.

France:

The discussion about a possible conversion in the status of French prisoners of war to that of forced laborers has not yet culminated in an agreement. It was pointed out by the French that if Germany does not recognize in some form the French desire for collaboration, the people will no longer believe in it, but will assume the attitude of a conquered people marked by passive resistance and sabotage.

Great Britain:

Lord of the Admiralty Alexander declared the British war effort at sea has been badly hampered by the loss of France. From 1 Nov. 1941 to 21 Jan. 1942, 148,000 GRT of enemy warships and merchantmen were sunk between Italy and Libya. The German attack on Russia has caused large forces to be diverted for transports and convoys to that theater. The blow to Pearl Harbor has for the present completely changed the situation in the Pacific. However, the combined strength of the two greatest sea powers will prove to be an impenetrable wall.

Eden declared in the Lower House that it is not intended to recognize a "free German movement". On the other hand, Churchill stated on a different occasion that the British people will never cease to support Austria in her efforts to free herself from the "Prussian yoke".

United States:

The French Ambassador in Washington denied the assertion that hidden German submarine bases on Martinique have any connection with the recent attack on Aruba.

India:

A lengthy conversation between Chiang Kai-shek and Gandhi has now taken place after all.



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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief of the Naval Communications Division reports on the following: the successful jamming of enemy signals during the Channel operation; the request of Group West to practice jamming of communication signals in conjunction with the Air Force; new methods of using identification signals in radar communications and of shortening the transmitting time of short code signals (Zuemageraet).

II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports on damage to the SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU. According to the final estimate, the time required for repairs to the SCHARNHORST, including structural ones, is decided by the time required to install foundations for the turbines; this was also considered the determining factor before the final estimate.

III. Group West and the Commander, Torpedo Boats having expressed approval, the Naval Staff recommends that two mine fields be laid as requested by Group North on 17 Feb. in order to combat surface forces in the Hoofden east of the British closed area, which according to latest findings is no longer respected by British forces. The purpose is to protect our traffic lanes along the Dutch coast. The Chief, Naval Staff gives his consent. It is intended that the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North lay the barrage with 210 standard mines, Type C, using the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla, which is to be released by Group West.

IV. Operation "Sportpalast". On 18 Feb. the Commanding Admiral, Battleships called attention to the fact that the order of Group North regarding attacks by the heavy forces against enemy traffic from Murmansk to Archangel presupposes the existence of a powerful group ready for action. He stated that the Fuehrer made the same observation on 12 Jan.; furthermore he said that at present only the transfer of the PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER is possible with a few destroyers, and even this transfer is very much endangered by the greatly accelerated preparations, the extended stay in Brunsbuettel, and the assembling in Brunsbuettel of 1,450 men on leave. He stated that, in addition, the embarkation of such a large number of soldiers on leave and also the impossibility that the two units operate together because of their unequal speed make the undertaking hazardous. He proposes, because of these facts and considering the completion dates of the GNEISENAU and the HIPPER, that we postpone operation "Sportpalast". Rather we should do the following: complete training on the PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER; prepare for the transfer of the GNEISENAU and the HIPPER by 10 Mar. at the latest; repair and train the destroyer and torpedo boat groups by the same date; and start operation "Sportpalast" during the new moon period in March with the GNEISENAU, the PRINZ EUGEN, the HIPPER, and the SCHEER, together with all destroyers and torpedo boats. This would have the advantage that the preparations could be carried out at leisure with greater secrecy, and further that the increased preparedness of the enemy due to the Channel break-through would be on the decline. A powerful group, after inclusion of the TIRPITZ, would guarantee that the required tasks would be safely carried through, while at the same time the light forces would be used only once. The disadvantage of postponing reinforcement of the Trondheim position, which is inadequate in any case, by two and a half or three weeks would be more than compensated by these advantages.

Group North reports in this connection that operation "Sportpalast" will be started just as soon as sufficient escort vessels are available and weather conditions are favorable. The cue can be expected any time after 19 Feb. The decision to start the operation is mainly dependent on the possibility of quickly reinforcing our position in Norway, utilizing the present concentration of planes. The other points mentioned



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by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships were already considered by the Group prior to the decision. The fact that soldiers on leave are included, although considered an additional hazard, is not regarded as decisive, particularly since it seems fairly certain that the undertaking will be kept secret because of the constantly changing time factor.

According to the opinion of the Fleet it is certainly more difficult to keep operation "Sportpalast" secret than was the case in former operations, and therefore the weather situation is more important. However, the enemy situation in the northern area after the break through the Channel will hardly be more favorable for the transfer in March, since it can be expected that the enemy will strengthen his forces there, especially submarines, mines, and planes. Furthermore, it is more difficult to camouflage the departure of four vessels and the days will be longer. Completion of the training period for the ships in home waters as desired by the Fleet Commander cannot be accomplished until April at the earliest due to ice conditions, except for the SCHEER, since the possibilities for training in March are small. The tactical difficulties in commanding the group, as pointed out by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships would not in any way be eliminated by including the SCHEER, even if the operation is postponed until March; on the contrary, they would be increased by using four ships that have hardly been tested instead of only two. This fact will in part cancel out the advantage of the greater fighting potential. It is no doubt disadvantageous from the point of view of security and in case there should be fighting to take along soldiers on leave. Since the decisive factor in deciding the time of the transfer must be the appraisal of the entire strategic situation, it is necessary in the opinion of the Fleet Commander to execute the operation as soon as possible. The Fleet Commander therefore suggests that operation "Sportpalast" be carried out according to plan if it is operationally necessary and if weather conditions are entirely favorable; however, the Fleet Commander suggests that if at all possible soldiers on leave not be included either now or in the future. He recommends urgently that constant mine-sweeping operations and submarine chase at the entrances to Trondheim and Bergen be started at once.

The Naval Staff cannot concur with the request of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. On the other hand, the viewpoints expressed by Group North and the Fleet Command are completely in line with its own opinion. The danger that the operation might be exposed if soldiers on leave are included must not be over-estimated, particularly since the men will not even assemble in Brunsbuettel; they are not to arrive there until shortly before the departure of the ships. The decision must be based on the strategic necessity of the operation. Therefore, according to the opinion of the Naval Staff, the operation must be executed as planned. Since, having the same opinion, Group North has already arranged everything necessary, no interference by the Naval Staff is considered necessary.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees completely with this opinion.

Five destroyers and one torpedo boat are ready for action at Heligoland on the evening of 19 Feb.

V. The Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed Admiral Bartoldi of the extent of the mine damage to the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU and it is expected that the Japanese will likewise learn of it by way of Rome. Therefore the Japanese liaison officer is to be informed during the course of a general report about the intended concentration of our forces in Norway that the transfer of the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU will have to be postponed for some time due to necessary short-term repairs.

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VI. In a short memorandum the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command suggests that due to the strained situation in the Staraya Russa area the 7th Mountain Division originally intended to be used in Finland be made available to the Northern Army Group for use in that critical territory.

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Situation 19 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The United States is planning combined airplane-blimp-patrol boat operations for coast guard purposes. The central station at Arlington, Virginia has jurisdiction over all stations from Maine to Florida.

South Atlantic:

An agent reports that from 20 to 26 Jan. the U.S. transport SPICA, tanker RAPIDAN, coast guard cruiser DUANE, a minesweeper meant for the Dutch East Indies, two destroyers, one of them the DAVIS, and a cruiser were at Simonstown. Ship traffic was very lively. Troop transports only put into Port Elizabeth and East London, at which times the ports are closed to other traffic and strictly guarded.

Indian Ocean:

On 19 Feb. a British steamer 90 miles southeast of Trincomali gave an SSS warning signal.

Pacific Ocean:

According to reports from Santiago, two U.S. destroyers entered Valparaiso. An American convoy is expected to arrive in Chile.

2. Own Situation:

The supply ship GERMANIA lying at Santa Cruz receives sailing orders via the Naval Attache, Madrid to proceed to western France. For copy of the order see 1/Skl I k 415/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Etappe Japan is informed that the REGENSBURG left western France on 12 Feb. Information is sent now that the ship has passed through the principal danger zone. Further information is sent regarding plans for the REGENSBURG to supply ship "10" which is now operating in the South Atlantic. Later the REGENSBURG is to supply ship "28" due to leave her home base shortly, after which the REGENSBURG will proceed to Japan. Since operations by auxiliary cruisers are planned for the South African area, the Naval Attache is ordered to arrange with the Japanese Navy that 70° E and 10° S is not crossed to the west without prior notification. For copy of the corresponding letter see 1616.

Loss of the SPREEWALD is partly due to the fact that she failed to observe the schedule she had reported. Etappe Japan is being advised to this effect and being instructed that the ships must endeavor to pass the reference points on the days they announce in advance and which are confirmed by the Naval Staff. Premature passing of reference points, especially points in the North Atlantic, must be avoided in any event. The Naval Staff will allow for delays which may be unavoidable. For copy of respective telegram, see Radiogram 1617.

Information on the enemy situation was sent by Radiogram 1956.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, German PT boats were reported beginning at 2300 in the waters off Lowestoft and off Cromer.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

The Spanish Navy was ordered to shoot at British planes flying over Ferrol with land and sea based anti-aircraft.

#### Channel Coast:

Mines were laid by the 2nd, 4th, and 6th PT Boat Flotillas in the area from Dover to Dungeness and on the convoy route in the Smiths Knoll-Ordfordness area. Due to unfavorable weather conditions, the 4th PT Boat Flotilla did not put out to sea. The 6th PT Boat Flotilla executed its mission according to plan without being detected. However while proceeding along the western border of the declared area, it was continuously spotted and shot at with star shells; thus it was unable to approach the convoy again. This was the first time that mines equipped with time-setting devices were used in the Dover-Dungeness area.

According to reports received from the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, the gun shields on the 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns and the bridge protection on the motor minesweepers stood up excellently under enemy attacks during the Channel breakthrough on 12 Feb. Therefore, the Group urgently requests that manufacture of these gun shields be undertaken at home.

Necessary steps are being taken by the Naval Ordnance Division.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, 2 enemy destroyers were sighted 145 miles northeast of the Faroe Islands. According to the radio intercept service, a southbound German convoy was repeatedly reported by British planes west of Sylt in the afternoon. German air reconnaissance located lively convoy traffic along the British east coast.

According to the radio intercept service of the Air Force, a convoy consisting of 48 steamers is scheduled to leave Reykjavik on 19 Feb.: 19 of the ships are destined for Inverness, 4 for Peter Head, 7 for Aberdeen, 8 for Edinburgh, 5 for Hull, and 5 are under special orders. In addition, 3 more ships are reported on 19 Feb. leaving for Inverness.

On 15 Feb. at 2115 the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla sighted 2 vessels in quadrant AN 8752 (north of Ostend); the vessels were equipped with red lights and did not reply to recognition signals but put out their lights. Since these vessels, apparently destroyers, did not attack,



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it is possible that they were laying mines.

Own Situation:

Destroyers IHN, SCHOEMANN, JACOBI, Z "25", and BEITZEN are assembling in Heligoland. The 1st Coast Patrol Force reported that a fourth plane had been shot down on 12 Feb.

According to a report from Group North, transfer of the cruiser KOELN to Wilhelmshaven and subsequently that of the SCHARNHORST to Kiel have been postponed until the tugs and icebreakers will no longer be needed for the preparation of operation "Sportpalast" (see Telegram 1624).

Group North reports that it is planned to lay 10 additional barrages in the Westwall minefield. For copy of the report see 1/Skl 4008/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch requests Group North to make available the SCHLESIIEN to escort troop transports through the ice from Stettin to Hamburg; the Shipping and Transport Branch requests Group North to keep it informed about convoy possibilities through the North Sea and any possibilities for transporting men on leave on naval vessels. For the time being, the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas intends to dispatch troop transports only to Kristiansand South or Oslo.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

An agent who has contact with enemy agents reports that the British are planning landings for the end of February. A number of Norwegians have orders to eliminate a certain officer. Norwegian agents left for England several days ago.

It is noteworthy that the time given coincides with that of the Russian attacks announced for 23 Feb. Furthermore, the fact that the debate in the House of Commons in London was postponed is believed to be connected with these enemy plans.

Own Situation:

Minesweeper M "1503" from the BRUMMER convoy was responsible for sinking the Russian submarine on 18 Feb. at 2340 near Honningsvaag by ramming. The commander of the submarine, which was presumably Shch "403", is aboard the BRUMMER. Subchaser "1214" tried to ram an enemy submarine on 19 Feb. in quadrant AC 8429 because the depth charge equipment was out of order, but was unsuccessful.

Supplies to the north are moving on schedule without any special incidents.

The Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command does not object to extending the fishing area as requested by the Commanding Admiral, Norway. The Food Minister supports this request also for the reason that the fish this year are farther off the coast than usual.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway will be advised at once that approval has been granted (copy is sent to Group North) in order not to delay settlement of this important food question.

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Group North differs, since the requested extension of the fishing area would interfere with the movements of German naval forces, and wishes to be informed how many fishing vessels might be in the area at any one time, and whether they have orders to dim or extinguish their lights at night. Group North emphasizes the danger that these vessels might help the enemy, and might use secret transmitters.

#### Defense Measures in Norway.

Patrol boat SALIER laid the mine blockade near Lang Sound on 18 Feb. according to plan. On the same day M "1" laid mines for the protection of Bergen in coastal island waters west of Hjelte Fjord: in Raugno Sound, Ulve Sound, and O Sound (diagonal approaches to Hjelte Fjord).

According to a report from the Commander, Torpedo Boats, the 6th PT Boat Flotilla intends to start north from Heligoland with all vessels and the TSINGTAU on 25 Feb. at the latest.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The transport group made up of CASTOR, EISBAER, HANS RICKMERS, and LEVANTE have arrived at Oslo.

For copy of the request by Group North for 1,417 mines for the mine operations in the Baltic Sea approaches and the decision of the Naval Staff see 1/Skl I E 3780/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

The radio intercept service reported lively reconnaissance activity and several submarine sighting reports in the rendezvous area. Some of the signals, however, seemed to be practice signals. The following ships were reported torpedoed off the U.S. East Coast: Steamer EMPIRE SEAL (7,954 GRT) near Cape Sable; steamer ELIZABETH MASSEY (4,323 GRT) southeast of Cape Canaveral (Florida); steamer SCOTTISH STAR (7,224 GRT) about 540 miles north-northeast of Cayenne.

Tankers VACUUM and EAGLE reported being followed by suspicious vessels. The steamer OKLAHOMA reported being missed by a submarine torpedo. According to a radio report from New York it is feared that 10 tankers were lost near Aruba, of which 7 were sunk or damaged and 3 are missing. The following were named as sunk: PEDERNALES (3,945 GRT), ORANJESTAD (2,396 GRT), SAN NICOLAS (2,391 GRT), TIA JUANA (2,395 GRT), and MONAGAS (2,650 GRT). RAFAELITA reportedly was towed to Curacao and ARKANSAS was beached near Aruba. The press furthermore reports that the Brazilian steamer BARQUE (5,152 GRT) was sunk. According to deciphered radio messages, U.S. ships enter or leave Caribbean ports only during the day, and they sail with their lights completely blacked out.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "136" operating northwest of Scotland sank an



unescorted steamer of 8,000 GRT on 17 Feb.

Submarine U "108", which had already sunk 4 steamers totaling 22,000 GRT, further reports sinking the steamer SOMME (5,265 GRT). Although the last torpedo missed, nevertheless two loud detonations were heard after 8 minutes.

Submarine U "161" entered the Gulf of Paria and torpedoed one tanker and one steamer in the roadstead of Port of Spain. Under the protection of the coast, heavy east-west traffic was observed in that area with active plane cover. Light beacons are dimmed.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines was informed by Radiogram 1717 regarding submarine successes in the West Indies and by Radiogram 1716 regarding the sinking of the Brazilian steamer BARQUE. According to Associated Press reports official Brazilian circles regard the situation as serious; however it is not expected to lead to war. Nevertheless, reprisal measures against Axis firms in Brazil are anticipated.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines was informed that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN has left Las Palmas and is instructed to inform submarines located west of Africa accordingly. For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl Ik 411/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Our night plane attacks on ships were without results. During the night of 19 Feb. enemy planes penetrated into western Germany, Holland, Belgium, northern France, western France, and the area Stavanger-Aalesund.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance activity. For results see Enemy Situation, Warfare in the Mediterranean.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Our planes continued to be very active, especially along the central and southern sectors of the front, with remarkably favorable results. Reconnaissance activity in the Black Sea.

The Naval Staff is informed about the directive of the Air Force Operations Staff concerning antiaircraft defenses in Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Lorient, and St. Nazaire. For copy see 1/Skl 4006/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

German air reconnaissance located 3 small steamers with 3 escort vessels off Tobruk, 1 tanker and 1 steamer on east course off

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Sidi Barrani, and 3 large steamers and 3 small naval vessels on south-east course off Ras Azzaz.

On the evening of 18 Feb. the Italian Navy sighted a submarine near Cape Bon. According to Italian reports to the Air Force, 2 damaged cruisers are in Marsa Matruh and 2 tugs have left Alexandria to tow them into port. The Italian radio intercept service reports a message to Marsa Matruh from a British escort vessel that the PROFIT convoy was sighted north of Sollum by planes.

2. Situation Italy:

On 18 Feb. 19 Italian submarines were in the Mediterranean.

According to reports from the Italian Armistice Commission, Algiers local French authorities claim the right to search Axis vessels arriving in Tunisian ports. The Italian Navy requests the opinion of the Naval Staff. Further details in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

According to a report by the naval representative at the Armistice Commission, France, the German and the Italian Armistice Commissions have agreed on possible secret German participation in the supply shipments to Tunis. The agreement was submitted to the Armed Forces High Command for approval.

Further details in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

No special incidents.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0250 two Russian vessels bombarded the Saki airfield near Eupatoria with 30 to 40 rounds of medium caliber.

It is planned to lay mines in order to protect the coast.

In the morning, air reconnaissance located 1 battleship and 2 cruisers at Novorissisk and 2 cruisers and 2 submarines at Tuapse. At Sevastopol, 4 warships were observed departing and one PT boat and one tug arriving.

Own Situation:

No special incidents.

5. Situation Turkey:

According to reports by the consulate, 4 warships sailing under the British flag and destined for Turkey are expected at Iskanderun, 2 of them presumably destroyers.

In addition to the destroyers it is planned to give submarines to Turkey.

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VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to reports from the Military Attache at Bangkok, the U.S. Admiral Hart was killed on 4 Feb. aboard the HOUSTON off Java. British and American reinforcements have arrived in Batavia. During the landing at Palembang, Dutch and U.S. planes damaged 2 Japanese cruisers and 5 transports.

2. Situation Japan:

The Military Attache at Bangkok reports that between 21 Jan. and 15 Feb. the Japanese Navy sank 5 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 16 submarines, and 42 transports. The Japanese Air Force downed 277 planes. Altogether, 33 enemy submarines have been sunk up to now.

In Burma, Japanese troops crossed the Biling River. According to press reports, fighting is in progress around Sittang. Air attacks were directed primarily against the Japanese rear communications.

In Singapore, 7,000 British, 13 Australians, and 30,000 Indians were captured. Public utilities of the city are once more functioning. The islands to the south have been occupied.

A new Japanese Army based on Borneo is preparing to attack southern Sumatra, Java, and the other islands of the archipelago. The troops which landed at Palembang started from Pontianak. The landings at Medan originated from Padan and were made without the assistance of parachute forces because the transport carrying the parachute forces was sunk in the Gulf of Siam by enemy submarine.

The press reports heavy Japanese air attacks on Port Darwin. Fighting has again started on Luzon. The Riouw Islands have been occupied by the Japanese.

The occupation of Sumatra and surrounding islands will give Japan access to the largest share of the rubber and tin production in the southeastern Asiatic sphere which amounts to almost 80 percent of the world production of rubber and 70 percent of the world production of tin. The bauxite mined in the Riouw Islands provides amply for Japan's aluminum production, thus filling a vital gap in her raw material supply. The oil fields of Sumatra and Borneo will give Japan 8,000,000 tons of oil yearly and guarantee the war needs of the country even if only part of the oil can be extracted for the time being.

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IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Enemy attacks along the Bakhmut continued with new reinforcements and our advance was stopped south of Barvenkova. However, near Losovaya the enemy was repulsed and some ground was gained. Tenacious fighting rages at the southwest wing of the 6th Army.

Central Army Group:

Various sectors of the front were attacked by the enemy but

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without much success.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy fighting around Kholm and Staraya Russa. Near Yanno the enemy was repulsed. Between Soltsy and Schluesselburg counterattacks are in progress against enemy forces which had penetrated our lines.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No special reports.

3. North Africa:

Situation unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

On 19 Feb. the trial against Daladier, Blum, Gamelin, and others started in Riom. Gamelin stated that he intends to remain absolutely silent during the entire trial.

Great Britain:

Before the start of the debate in the House of Commons Churchill decided to yield to pressure and form a new war cabinet. He himself will continue to head the Defense Ministry; however, Sir Stafford Cripps will be Lord Chancellor and Leader of the House of Commons, while Beaverbrook has been eliminated.

According to reports from Sweden the question is supposed to have arisen in England whether the crisis is not so serious that it calls for a solution beyond precedent, meaning a conservative coup d'etat or one coming from the left, in which case Cripps would take over. Although so far Churchill has postponed a decision, he has lost considerably in prestige. The debate will be a very stormy one for him.

During the debate in the House of Commons, the War Minister attempted in a lengthy explanation to blame supply difficulties for the failures in Libya.

Great Britain - United States:

According to Italian deciphering of a report of 28 Jan. from the Turkish Ambassador in Washington to Ankara, General Leeskia, the American Military Attache who accompanied Churchill to the United States and has now been appointed the head of the intelligence service, made statements according to which the Allied General Staffs evaluate the situation as follows:

1. The Russian need for tanks and ammunition is very great. Everything possible must be done to satisfy this need. The Russian front must hold at least through 1942. Anglo-American troops cannot be sent abroad until the summer of 1943; at that time they will invade Germany from the east.

2. Axis forces may attack Malta and the Axis may reinforce their positions in North Africa; however they will not march through Turkey for an attack on the Near East, due to the high state of preparedness of the Turkish Army.

3. In the spring, Germany will start a large-scale offensive against Russia. The Allies, meanwhile, will build up huge stock-piles of war materiel in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq; they will probably also send troops in order to assist Turkey should this become necessary and to protect Africa.

4. Turkey demands mainly planes which, however, along with tanks are particularly scarce and are vitally needed by Russia and Great Britain. Also the South American countries and the Far East and China demand planes, so that Turkey's demands cannot be met.

According to a deciphered report by the Portuguese Ambassador in Ankara

to Lisbon, the British Ambassador in Ankara seems optimistic about a final Allied victory because of the decisive importance which the Russian Army, the productive capacity of U.S. industry, and the Anglo-American Fleet will have during the coming year. In his opinion, the German Army will not be able to annihilate the Russian Army; therefore the Eastern Front will be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war. After the fall of Germany, Japan can easily be beaten. Bolshevism will be changed under Anglo-American influence. There is no need to fear that it will spread over Europe. Russia will be rewarded after the war to be sure; however, she will not be permitted free play as Axis propaganda claims. Russian expansion in Europe has never yet been possible in the course of history. To organize the European economy after the war it will be necessary to create a large bloc of many countries.

Spain:

Among other pertinent problems that of closer economic cooperation between France, Spain, and Portugal was discussed during the conference at Seville.

The German Embassy reports that relations between the Spanish and the Portuguese Armies are not completely satisfactory. Spanish officer circles are playing with the thought of occupying Portugal one of these days. Sentiment in the Portuguese Army is not uniformly for Salazar.

Sweden:

According to the opinion of Swedish military authorities a British expeditionary force landing in northern Norway would be unable to penetrate into Swedish territory because of the strong Swedish resistance it would encounter in Norrland. Moreover, the Swedish Government is willing to reinforce the fortifications along the Norwegian border if desired by Germany.

U.S.S.R.:

According to diplomatic reports from Manchukuo the sufferings of the population are increasing constantly. Moscow is anxious to avoid a conflict with Japan; for that reason Russia has refused the British requests for British occupation of Russian points of strategic importance.

Hungary:

Stephan, son of Admiral Horthy, chosen deputy regent, has been considered friendly toward Great Britain up to now and was regarded in the past as belonging to the anti-German factions in Hungary.

U.S.A.:

War Minister Stimson declared that the scattering of the defense forces desired by certain circles is the surest way to lose the war. On the contrary, the Allied forces must be consolidated for offensive action and the war must be carried into enemy territory as quickly as possible.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the Italian opinion that the Italian submarines and subchasers should be transferred to the Black Sea together with their Italian crews. The



Chief, Naval Staff decides that there is nothing else to do at the moment but to accept the offer with thanks. Of course, these Italian forces must be completely under the command of the Admiral, Black Sea.

II. The Chief, Naval Ship Construction Division reports on the mine damage to the SCHARNHORST. The ship withstood the first hit relatively well, which apparently occurred directly under the ship's bottom and spent its entire force in that area. Because of an unusually high degree of elasticity, the vessel escaped structural damage. Fortunately the buckling and the strains caused by the explosion disappeared after a few days so that the turrets which had stuck at first, could be freely moved once more. Thus the original estimate of the damage to the guns was fortunately greatly exaggerated. The fracture of the turbine foundations was caused by the second mine hit. All means are being made available to the Kiel shipyard for completing repairs within the stipulated period of ten weeks. The consequences to other shipyards because of the drain on their manpower for this purpose cannot yet be estimated.

III. With reference to the Air Force report on the great effectiveness of the British anti-aircraft artillery at Scapa Flow at a height of 9,000 meters, the Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports as follows: At the expense of exactness in hitting the target, we can also attain a range of 9,000 meters and more at any time for calibers of 8.8 cm. on up by setting the time of ignition beyond 30 seconds, our maximum up to now.

IV. The Chief, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division reports on the progress of the work to clear up the wreckage near Brunsbuettel, which has been going on for some time. As the wreck is well marked and is also not directly in the way, and also because its removal, due to the ore cargo, will take a long time, it had not seemed inadvisable to postpone the work until the ice period is past. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the wreck be removed as soon as possible.

V. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the present state of the war in foreign waters. Ship "10" must have reached the Antarctic by now. No reports have been received from her up to now. Ship "28" is in Cuxhaven ready to sail. The DOGGERBANK is in the South Atlantic in the waiting area. Ship "23" will be ready for departure in April. Of the blockade-runners, supply ship REGENSBURG has passed through the Natal Strait and has been ordered to supply ship "10" in the South Atlantic about the middle of March. Tanker CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will leave Las Palmas during the next few days and will be stationed in the South Atlantic to supply ship "28". The Italian steamer PIETRO ORSEOLO is expected to arrive in southern France in the near future. According to dead reckoning, the RIO GRANDE is believed to be at 40° S, 138° W; the FUSIJAMA at 10° S, 163° W; and the MUESTERLAND at 14° N, 160° E; the MUESTERLAND left Kobe on 18 Feb.

For the next shipping period beginning in fall 1942, 10 motor ships with a total loading capacity of 68,000 tons are to be available to Etappe Japan.

VI. The use of Italian submarines for transport purposes in the Mediterranean is unsatisfactory at present. Of the 5 large vessels originally used, 2 have been lost and another is being used for other purposes. Thus only 2 vessels remain which can transport any sizeable loads. All the small submarines have been withdrawn from transport duty. Captain von Puttkamer has been requested to notify the Fuehrer accordingly. This might be a further point for the Naval High Command to include in the draft of the letter which the Fuehrer plans to send the Duce.



Special Items:

I. Subject: Mine hits on the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU. The Naval Staff Operations Division has examined the questions of whether the mine situation was sufficiently considered in plotting the route, and whether other measures for protecting the ships against mines were provided to a sufficient degree. For copy of the results of these findings and requests to the Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch for further technical investigations see 1/Skl IE 3960/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

II. The following commands were informed of the Fuehrer's decision to extend the period of preparation for operation "Seelowe" from 8 or 10 months, as originally planned, to 12 months: Groups West and North; the Commanding Admiral, Norway; the Admiral, France; the Fleet Commander; the Commanding Admiral, Battleships; the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff; and the General Staff, Army (copy sent to Army Group D). For copy see 1/Skl I opa 407/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary files "Haifisch".

III. For the second wartime report regarding the medical service of the Navy, completed on 31 Aug. 1941, see 1/Skl 3897/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 20 Feb. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:

Enemy reports obtained through radio deciphering and intercept service up to 18 Feb. are compiled in radio intelligence report (B-Bericht) no. 7/42 released by the Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division.

North Atlantic:

An agent reported that north of Long Island a convoy of 42 freighters departed the night of 6 Feb. The convoy is carrying war materiel to Russia by way of Iran and is protected by an American warship. The British Navy has developed a new type of anti-aircraft vessel for convoy duty. She is equipped with light 2 and 3.7 cm. anti-aircraft guns only. However, in addition, the vessel carries 3 to 4 catapult fighter planes. By spring, 12 of these vessels are to be ready; they are former merchantmen currently being converted in U.S. shipyards.

South Atlantic:

The Pan American Airways Company in collaboration with the De Gaulle administration had planned to establish regular passenger and freight service between Damascus and New York via Brazzaville, Natal, and Miami at the beginning of this year.

According to Italian reports, convoy CS 15 was at 16° S, 30° W (north-east of St. Helena) on course 145° on 3 Feb.

On 15 and 16 Feb. a Portuguese fisher sighted numerous De Gaullist troop transports; the vessels were anchored north of the Congo estuary



and were protected by light vessels and 4 destroyers.

Indian Ocean:

On 20 Feb. a British steamer sent an SSS signal that she had been torpedoed 240 miles west of Cape Comorin (Ceylon).

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" was advised by Radiogram 1259 of instructions to the DOGGERBANK to proceed to the waiting area and to carry out the special operation during the new moon period of March; at the same time, she was informed of the German submarine operations off Curacao and Aruba. The DOGGERBANK was informed by Radiogram 1334 of the ships at Simonstown between 20 and 26 Jan. Group West informed the OSORNO by Radiogram 2004 that the submarine which had been sent to meet her failed to contact her by 18 Feb., and has been released; the OSORNO is to proceed alone.

The Naval Attache at Madrid is instructed to issue the code word for the departure of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN (see message 1921).

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is being advised that the Naval Staff intends to go through with operation "Suedsee". However, due to unexpected ice conditions at the present time, the icebreakers and vessels probably cannot be made ready in time to carry out the operation during 1942. The Naval Staff assumes that the Japanese are no longer interested. Since the project was planned because of Japanese requests, the Attache has been asked to ascertain definitely whether or not the Japanese are still interested.

The matter under discussion is the use of the northeast passage for commercial traffic with Japan as suggested by the Japanese. The Naval Staff concluded the preliminary investigation, and sent the results to the Japanese in Oct. 1941; so far, however, no reply has been received. However, since the time has come to begin actual preparations if the voyage is to be made during the summer months, the Naval Attache has been asked to reopen the question.

For details about the project (code word "Suedsee"), see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

Information on the enemy situation was sent by Radiogram 2033.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

No special incidents.

Channel Coast:

During operations of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla in the night of 19 Feb. PT boat "39" was rammed by PT boat "53" when the flotilla was reassembling after an engagement with enemy destroyers. She entered Ijmuiden badly damaged. PT boat "53" must be considered lost. For brief report by the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 1445. Mining operation in the area of Dover-Dungeness was carried out according to plan in the evening of 20 Feb. by the 4th PT Boat Flotilla. For brief report by the 6th PT Boat Flotilla on mining operations in the night of 19 Feb. see Telegram 0735 (see War Diary 19 Feb.).

Because of the withdrawal of forces from the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West and the importance of keeping the routes on the Atlantic coast open, Group West fully supports the request by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West for planes to assist in mine-sweeping operations. Group West asks the Naval Staff to request the planes from the Commander in Chief, Air.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Active air reconnaissance along the Norwegian coast, Skagerrak, Denmark, and central North Sea.

Own Situation:

Steamer AMERIKA was damaged by a mine in quadrant 8312. An attempt is being made to tow her to Den Helder.

The 13th and 18th Mine Sweeper Flotillas, mine detonating vessels "15" and "17", and patrol boats "807" and "809" will be used for operation "Sportpalast".

Operation "Sportpalast".a. Points for and against immediate execution.

Because of the directive by the Naval Staff (see War Diary 30 Jan.) the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, on 2 Feb., suggested postponing the Channel break-through in case ice conditions in the river estuaries in the German Bight should prevent the vessels from entering; he further voiced objections to transferring the forces involved to Norway immediately following the breakthrough in view of insufficient training of the crews, the GNEISENAU's need for repairs, shortage of fuel and ammunition, and the fact that the transfer of the fighter cover would consume a good deal of time.

Group North more correctly, had understood the Naval Staff directive to mean that, while lengthy pauses should be avoided, sufficient time should be permitted for replenishing supplies of all kinds and for delays due to the weather.

The Fleet Commander considered it necessary for the ships and destroyers to spend several days in port before the necessary transfer to the northern area. He demanded that before the transfer could be effected



the reconnaissance and fighter planes in that area would have to be reinforced. Moreover, the Fleet Commander pointed out that if the GNEISENAU were transferred without being repaired she would not be completely ready for action for some time to come.

To the objection of Commanding Admiral, Battleships concerning inadequate training of the crews, the Naval Staff replied that it would be an absolute waste of time to leave ships in a training area rendered useless by ice conditions. Therefore, all ships ready for departure must be transferred to the northern area. The transfer is to be considered a new operation, and Group North is to take all necessary precautions concerning weather, anti-aircraft defenses, etc., when making preparations.

Furthermore, the transfer of the light naval forces must be arranged so as to serve at the same time as protection for the cruiser SCHEER, which is to be transferred to Norway in the near future. For copy of instructions by the Naval Staff see I a 251/42 Gkdos. Chfs., in War Diary, Files "Sportpalast".

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships voiced further misgivings about the operation on 4 Feb. He pointed out that the greater part of the personal belongings of the crews of the Brest forces was stored ashore; also not all the necessary equipment for the ships was aboard, and it was not practical to bring aboard the rest of this for security reasons connected with operation "Cerberus". Therefore he suggested that the ships should wait 2 weeks in ports in Germany prior to the transfer to the north, so that this equipment could catch up with the ships.

The Fleet Commander correctly termed these objections unjustifiable.

b. Preparation of air reconnaissance.

On 6 Feb. the Naval Staff, in accordance with the request by Group North, asked the Air Force Operations Staff (with copy to Group North) to take the following measures to support the transfer of the Brest ships to Norway: to provide the necessary fighter and long-range fighter protection in the areas of northern Jutland and western Norway; to have in readiness suitable bomber and reconnaissance forces in the Norwegian area; as far as possible to reinforce the fighter protection of the bases at Trondheim and Narvik. The Naval Staff requests further that the reconnaissance forces in the Norwegian area, including the polar coast, be made adequate to permit, if possible, daily effective reconnaissance of the coastal waters over a wide area. These reconnaissance forces are a vital prerequisite for operations by the Brest ships after their transfer.

On 9 Feb. the Naval Staff was able to inform Group North that according to a communication received from the Air Force Operations Staff Group North could contact the Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Group Command, Central Area as well as the Chief of Staff of the 5th Air Force in order to arrange the necessary details.

The Air Force Operations Staff made all possible preparations to meet the requests of the Naval Staff. Two additional fighter and three additional long-range fighter groups were transferred temporarily to Norway to support operation "Sportpalast". On 17 Feb. the Air Force Operations Staff informed the Naval Staff that the Fuehrer ordered that the 3rd Air Force, the Air Force Group Command, Central Area, and the 5th Air Force participate in the operation. The Air Force Operations Staff added that Group 506 would be transferred north in the very near future.



However, the Air Force General Staff refuses to transfer Groups 106 and 506 earlier than intended from Aalborg to the Norwegian area for bombing missions, giving up the planned reconnaissance as requested by Group North. Both groups combined have only sixteen planes available, and in any case sufficiently strong forces must be kept ready for action in the area of northern Jutland.

c. Operations order.

The operations order given on 7 Feb. by Group North specifies as follows: The battleships SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU and the cruisers SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN are to be transferred to Norway in order to carry out both offensive and defensive operations in the northern area. An attempt will be made to have the ships leave under weather conditions which will make it probable that their departure by day across the North Sea will not be detected by the enemy.

The destroyers and torpedo boats of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Torpedo Boat Flotillas which are ready for action will serve as protection.

The Commanding Admiral, Group North, will direct the operation from the command post in Kiel. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships will have tactical command aboard the SCHARNHORST. Defense forces in the southern part of the North Sea will be under the command of the Chief of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla aboard the SEEADLER, in the northern part of the North Sea under the Commanding Admiral, Destroyers.

The destroyers and the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas under the Commanding Admiral, Destroyers are to proceed to Stavanger at the earliest possible date. The 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla is to continue from there to Bergen immediately. The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla is to proceed from Stavanger to Griphoelen through coastal island waters.

All vessels and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla as well as any destroyers and torpedo boats which have become available in the meantime will depart on receipt of code word "Sportpalast" in such a manner that on the following morning (x plus 1 day) at 0600 the force is at point H (quadrant 9557, extreme lower left). The ships will approach point H and continue north under minesweeper escort according to the orders of the Commanding Admiral, Group North. From quadrant AN 9546 they are to proceed without mine-detonating escort along route "Blau" as far as quadrant AN 3875; from there they will continue to Griphoelen approximately by way of quadrants AN 3465, 3188, 3899, 8424, and 8228. On x plus 1 day they should have reached 58° N by twilight. Shortly before that time the light forces will approach Stavanger to relieve the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which is to proceed to Bergen. After the vessels arrive at Griphoelen, two battleships together with the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla and the destroyers of the 5th and 6th Destroyer Flotillas will proceed directly to Trondheim. Two vessels (cruisers) and the destroyers of the 8th Destroyer and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotillas are to continue by way of coastal island waters to Narvik. In case only one battleship participates, the PRINZ EUGEN is to go with the others to Trondheim; in case only two ships participate, both as well as the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to proceed to Trondheim.

The force is to report at once any aircraft passing overhead if it is suspected that they were spotted.

The operation is to be broken off at the discretion of the Naval Staff if the situation makes this necessary, or if local weather conditions and those at the British Isles make it likely that there will be strong enemy air activity. Group North can order the operation broken off if



enemy reconnaissance planes are seen to have observed the force or if inferior enemy forces are encountered. Otherwise the Commanding Admiral, Battleships is to act on his own judgement if he meets enemy forces, in accordance with this operations order.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North are to have subchasers and pilots ready at the gaps in the mine fields so that the ships can put into Kristiansand South if necessary.

The operation is to be continued in foggy weather.

The operations order further provides instructions with regard to air reconnaissance, close escort, fighter protection, and communications; it also contains data on the enemy situation, mine situation, fuel oil supplies, and tug assistance.

The Naval Staff has no comments on the operations order. For remarks by the Commander in Chief, Navy with regard to getting the TIRPITZ ready for operations see War Diary 12 and 13 Feb.

d. Additional preparations.

On the basis of a communication from the Air Force Operations Staff, Group North was advised on 12 Feb. to communicate directly with Colonel Galland concerning the fighter protection.

After completion of the Channel breakthrough, the Naval Staff answered the inquiry of Group North on 13 Feb. as follows: "Execute operation "Sportpalast" as planned with all available forces".

On 14 Feb. Group North reported that the operation would probably be carried out between 16 and 18 Feb., and that the Commanding Admiral, Battleships would command the force in spite of the fact that the SCHARNHORST would not be included. As tentative date for the departure of the advance guard of destroyers and torpedo boats the night of 16 Feb. was given; the date of departure for the ships was given as the evening of 17 or 18 Feb.

Changing the operations order, Group North further ordered that on 15 Feb. the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla and one vessel from the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to go to Bergen. After refuelling there they are to proceed to Trondheim to be at the disposal of the Commanding Admiral, Norway in order to patrol the harbor entrance at Griphoelen with protecting paravane sweeps and to protect the TIRPITZ. Beginning 18 Feb., all available destroyers, the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla are to be ready for operation "Sportpalast". The destroyers are to proceed all the way to the port of destination; the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla is to be released to Stavanger and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla to Bergen. The port of destination for the ships and destroyers is Trondheim.

e. For further scruples of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships and the opinions of Group North, the Fleet, and the Naval Staff see War Diary 18 Feb.

f. Start of the operation:

On 17 Feb. Group North reported that the start is still uncertain since all the torpedo boats at Cuxhaven are icebound; the Group reported at 1300 on 20 Feb., however, that the word to start might be expected at 1730.

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At that time the following defensive forces were available: the 5th destroyer Flotilla with five destroyers and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla with three vessels. Group North ordered the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to release all torpedo boats, depending on their fuel supplies, at the latest in the area Stavanger-Bergen.

The code word was given at 1743.

Group North ordered the TIRPITZ and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla to be ready for action within the hour beginning on 21 Feb. at 2000, and beginning on 22 Feb. at 0400 to be ready for immediate action.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo transmitted a Japanese report from Madrid that the United States intends to supply war materiel on a large scale to Archangel as soon as ice conditions permit. The purpose of the landing on northern Ireland is to divert German attention from the transports.

Own Situation:

Due to interruption of communications no news has been received from Admirals, Arctic Ocean and Arctic Coast.

On 19 Feb. submarine U 586 arrived at Trondheim. During the afternoon enemy planes were reported over Trondheim. Transport and escort service according to plan.

Defense Measures in Norway.

a. Since only two submarines are available at present for operation in the Arctic Ocean, the Commanding Admiral, Norway suggests adding a third boat, preferably submarine U "454" because of her experience in the Arctic Ocean, otherwise submarine U "403". At the same time, the Commanding Admiral, Norway points out that according to instructions by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines the submarines at Trondheim and Bergen are intended to be more or less stationary; however, for defense purposes at least one vessel from each base should be in position at sea and an additional vessel in the harbor. For the report to this effect to Group North (copies to the Naval Staff and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines), see Telegram 1930.

b. The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports to Group North, with copy to the Naval Staff, on the measures taken in 1½ years of hard work, using all possible means, for the protection of Ofoten Fjord and Narvik. Narvik at this time can be regarded as relatively the best fortified harbor in northern Norway. See Telegram 1920 for details on coastal and torpedo batteries, anti-aircraft protection, protection of the berths in Bogen Bay by anti-aircraft, double net barrage and protective nets at the berths, coastal listening equipment, and deep-lying submarine barrage.

c. For survey of repair ships, base ships, and shipyard installations in Norway as of the beginning of Feb. 1942 see 1/Skl 4113/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

d. The mining operation reported by the Commanding Admiral, Norway (see War Diary 12 Feb.) is approved by the Naval Staff, with the

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changes suggested by Group North. In accordance therewith the plan to extend the Westwall north of Stadland is abandoned. Group North will require all mines which the Commanding Admiral, Norway can spare in order to reinforce the Westwall, the northern fields of which are to be laid by Group North from Norway.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway repeats his request to Group North for a mine transport vessel to be used as storage ship for the mines to be delivered.

e. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is instructed to make available for transfer to the Norwegian area an additional 42 to 45 naval ferry barges for the Commanding Admiral, Norway, in addition to the 20 naval ferry barges already previously requested; they are to be sent there as soon as possible in arrangement with Group North. About 30 of these vessels are to be used as transports and 12 to 15 for mine-laying. These include the 6 to 8 ferry barges requested by Group North for mine-laying purposes (see communication 1818 dated 19 Feb.).

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The Finnish icebreaker SISU has left Hangoe with 2 German and 4 Finnish steamers in the attempt to bring the German ships to Swinemuende and the Finnish ships to Koenigsberg. Icebreakers CASTOR and EISBAER have left Oslo with 2 ships for Copenhagen.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

In addition to the usual air reconnaissance, the radio intercept service located a ship in the rendezvous area approximately 150 miles southwest of Rockall Bank. The radio intercept service further observed messages from Annapolis warning against dangerous mine fields at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and underwater obstacles at the entrance to St. Pierre (Newfoundland). Concerning the West Indies, the U.S. radio reported a new attack by a German submarine on petroleum installations at Aruba on the evening of 20 Feb. The high command at Trinidad reported 2 explosions, probably caused by a submarine, which damaged two tankers in the harbor of Port of Spain during the night of 18 Feb. According to a report from the Brazilian Government, the Brazilian steamer OLINDA (4,000 GRT) was sunk along the Atlantic coast.

The British Admiralty announced the loss of the destroyer GURKHA. The Vichy telegraphic service (Ofi) reports the loss of the Canadian corvette SPIKENARD due to enemy action.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "656" detailed to bring in the blockade runner OSORNO, did not meet her. The reason is not yet known. The submarine is in quadrant CB. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines suspects that the point of intersection of the south-north and east-west traffic lanes is in quadrant CB 61.

On 15 Feb. submarine U "566" torpedoed a steamer of 9,000 GRT from a

convoy southeast of Halifax. The vessel probably sank.

Italian submarines are also operating in the West Indies. At present 2 are east and a third north of the Lesser Antilles.

For supplementary report on the situation see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports on the findings of the commission from the Inspectorate of Torpedoes investigating the numerous unexplained misses during January 1942. The commission blames them on the fact that the depth gear pocket of the G7e torpedoes is not watertight; thus excess pressure is created which leads to the torpedoes being aimed too low. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines requests immediate introduction of a depth gear pocket which is reliably watertight.

The Torpedo Branch of the Naval Ordnance Division will take the necessary steps.

Since transferring to the Mediterranean, the German submarines have scored the following successes there:

Sunk:

- 1 battleship BARHAM (25 Nov.)
- 1 aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL (13 Nov.)
- 2 cruisers (14 Dec. and 18 Dec.), one probably the GALATEA
- 3 destroyers (27 Nov., 24 Dec. PARRAMATTA, 12 Jan.)
- 1 gunboat GNAT (19 Oct.)
- 3 escort vessels (11 Dec. and 29 Jan.)
- 6 steamers totalling 19,000 GRT (17 Oct., 4 Dec., 24 Dec., and 28 Dec.)
- 1 tanker AVANESOW of 7,000 GRT (19 Dec.)
- 3 transport vessels, probably 1 steamer and 1 escort vessel (14 Feb.)

Probably sunk:

- 2 destroyers (12 Jan. and 3 Feb.)
- 1 torpedo boat (18 Oct.)
- 1 tanker of 8,000 GRT (13 Dec.)

Hits:

- 1 battleship MALAYA (13 Nov.)
- 1 transport of 8,000 GRT (21 Dec.)
- 1 steamer of unknown tonnage (24 Dec.)
- 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers (16 Feb.)

Probable hits:

- naval force (30 Jan.)
- destroyer or steamer (4 Dec., 6 Dec.)
- 1 steamer, 4 destroyers (24 Dec.)
- several destroyers, 3 hits (3 Feb.)
- convoy (16 Jan., 4 Feb.)

This list of losses is enlarged still further by the successes scored by the Air Force and by mine warfare. It makes it clear that the British no longer have naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, but rather the Axis now predominates at sea as well as in the air.



VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No special incidents.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance attacks were resumed against Malta in spite of poor weather conditions.

3. Eastern Front:

The Air Force supported the Army by fighter and transport operations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

One French convoy going east and another going west passed through the Strait of Gibraltar. According to an intelligence report, a convoy is expected to leave Gibraltar in the near future. On 20 Feb. air reconnaissance was without result. According to the German radio intercept service, the situation in the western Mediterranean was rather unusual on 19 Feb. Radio messages for the 1st British Submarine Flotilla were sent from Malta to Gibraltar. It is suspected that these were in connection with the transfer of the DUNKERQUE to Toulon. Judging from French radio communications of 20 Feb., a British reconnaissance plane was seen over Oran. An Italian report from an allegedly reliable source states that 1 airplane carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers, 10 PT boats, 2 motor minesweepers, and three steamers carrying war materiel arrived at Alexandria on 12 Feb. This report was not confirmed by photographic reconnaissance of 18 Feb. According to another Italian report, 2 steamers of 10,000 GRT and 3 steamers of 3,000 GRT loaded war supplies for Turkey at Port Said on 24 Jan. under conditions of particular secrecy.

2. Situation Italy:

No special incidents.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer ERITREA was badly damaged by a magnetic mine on 18 Feb. while putting into Benghazi.

4. Area Naval Group South:

No situation reports due to disturbance in communications.

The Army Group has requested the Army High Command for early assignment of a mature naval officer as liaison officer for the 1st Panzer Army in order to prepare for the coming operations.

The Naval Staff informs the Officer Personnel Division that it is absolutely necessary to assign such an officer soon, due to the need for close cooperation between the Navy and the 1st Panzer Army.

5. Situation France:

The Naval Staff gives an opinion on the problem of use of radio by French merchant vessels. For discussion of the matter see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

2. Situation Japan:

The Thailand General Staff told the Military Attache in Bangkok that the radio and press news reports of an advance by Chinese troops across the Thailand border are incorrect.

In Singapore, release of the Indian prisoners was started. According to a report by the Naval Attache at Tokyo, the oil refineries at Palembang are partially intact. The press reports on Japanese landings on Timor and Bali have not been confirmed so far; however they are most probably correct. These reports reveal more and more the Japanese intention to attack Java.

The Naval Attache at Tokyo further reports:

During all conversations with staff officers of the Naval High Command, the great strategic importance of Madagascar for naval warfare was repeatedly emphasized, and the need to obtain bases there from the Vichy government. Together with the planned operations from Singapore and later Ceylon, operations from Madagascar would make it possible practically to paralyze enemy communications to the northern part of the Indian Ocean.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Strong enemy attacks are still in progress against the northern front of the Von Kleist Army Group from Yama to Losovaya. There is strong enemy pressure on the southern wing of the 6th Army. The 2nd Army was able to cross the line reached during a thrust west of Livny.

Central Army Group:

Southwest of Vyazma the partisans were reinforced by 3,000 men who landed at night. The pocket west of Rzhev has been mopped up. Except for a few remnants, the enemy was destroyed. This concluded the first part of the winter battle at Rzhev, which has cost the enemy nearly 27,000 dead and almost 5,000 prisoners. 6 rifle divisions can be considered destroyed, 4 beaten, and 9 rifle divisions and 5 tank brigades battered.



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All enemy attacks in the above sectors of the Army Group were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy fighting continues at Kholm and Staraya Russa. Between Soltsy and Schluesselburg enemy attacks were thrown back.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No change in the situation.

3. North Africa:

No special fighting.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The reorganization of the war cabinet, and especially the appointment of Cripps, are considered in Great Britain as well as in the United States and the neutral countries as vital factors for future political developments. Some circles welcome the fact that Cripps, the friend of the Soviet, is being placed in this prominent position, others deplore it, depending on their political orientation. In Great Britain, it is not believed that Churchill actually intends to grant Soviet Russia a free hand politically; certainly not to the extent that the statements by Cripps would have one believe. Moreover, the war cabinet is still considered too large; it should be narrowed down to about four or five really outstanding personalities. It is further thought that the Prime Minister still carries too great a burden. Conservative British newspapers are unanimous in the opinion that a negotiated peace with Germany is no longer feasible, since the Empire itself has been threatened. If Great Britain loses this war she will lose everything, since she would be unable to survive a third world war of such a scope. In the face of a European federation of 375 million people, Great Britain would be completely without influence, and would not even be able to govern her own fate. Therefore, Great Britain must conquer Germany once and for all. She cannot afford to forego this last opportunity to do so.

India:

According to authoritative military circles, reports about deterioration in the fighting strength of the Indian troops in North Africa are not borne out by facts. Moreover, the Indian troops are still completely loyal to their officers. It would be wrong to consider them as politically unreliable. The United Press reports that Gandhi declared his talks with Chiang Kai-shek have not increased his hope for early Indian independence.

Ireland:

De Valera's position must be regarded as considerably strengthened by the resignation of Dillon, fanatic enemy of the Germans and leader of the opposition.

United States:

According to diplomatic reports, the fall of Singapore has alarmed the U.S. press seriously. This news is being used as a means to arouse the public to even greater efforts so that the war will not be lost. Actually, serious apprehension exists in official circles with regard to the further developments in the Pacific.

Japan:

In connection with Japanese landings on Portuguese Timor, the Japanese government points out that British and Dutch troops occupied the island on 17 Dec. 1941, thus forcing Japan to drive them out. As soon as conditions permit, the Japanese are prepared to withdraw their own troops and recognize fully Portugal's sovereignty. As might have been expected, the British version of this incident is just the opposite. They interpret the occupation of the territory by their own troops as a protec-



tive measure against expected Japanese attacks. Their version is supported by the Dutch government, which claims that an agreement was about to be concluded with Portugal for replacing the occupation troops by Portuguese troops which were already under way.

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Special Items:

I. The information requested by the Japanese Navy concerning the Ceylon landings was sent to the Naval Attache, Tokyo and Admiral Nomura. See 1/Skl I opa 431/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

II. The Foreign Office transmits the text of a telegram which the Duce had Graf Ciano give to the German Embassy in Rome. The telegram, which the Duce considered particularly interesting and revealing, was evidently sent by the U.S. Embassy in Kuybishev to the War Department in Washington on 7 Jan. According to this message, Soviet Russia considers American aid up to now disgraceful and a complete failure. The Russians feel cheated with regard to details which have led to difficulties in the shipment of supplies, particularly airplanes. They assume that U.S. efforts to aid Russia are being influenced by differences of opinion between the two governments which have arisen in the past or are expected to arise in the future. The writer seems to think that the Soviets will be unable to withstand continued German attacks this summer unless German war production is stopped and Allied supply shipments are considerably increased. He believes that Soviet Russia is aware of this situation and therefore is trying to end the war by summer. If the Russians are unable to do this and there is a shortage of supplies, they may have to capitulate.

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Situation 21 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

On 20 Feb. a light cruiser and 2 American transports carrying Canadian troops left Ponta Delgada heading south.

South Atlantic:

On 19 Feb. the BIRMINGHAM arrived in Montevideo.

Pacific Ocean:

The submarine base at Kodiak (Alaska) is evidently being enlarged, since it is planned to construct storage sheds for submarine torpedoes.

2. Own Situation:

The Italian blockade runner ORSEOLO has been met by our forces at the Spanish-French border. The German portion of the cargo includes 600 tons of rape seed oil, 40 tons of shoes, 2,000 tons of rubber, and 3,800 tons of whale oil. The Italian share of the cargo amounts to approximately 2,500 tons.

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The REGENSBURG, the RIO GRANDE, and the MUENSTERLAND have been advised by Radiogram 1814 of the new regulations governing the exchange of recognition signals with the Japanese.

Radiogram 1646 informs the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN to head west from the point of departure up to 30° W, and then to proceed in accordance with sailing orders.

Information on the enemy situation is sent by Radiogram 1713.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division was instructed by letter 1515 to arrange for the supply of the DOGGERBANK and the supply ship REGENSBURG. Both vessels are now in foreign waters.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

No reports of special interest.

### 2. Own Situation:

#### Atlantic Coast:

The OSCORNO was advised by radiogram 1359 that air reconnaissance did not locate her on 19 and 20 Feb., and that a northbound and a south bound convoy can be expected on the convoy route along her approach route during the 4 days beginning on 21 Feb. The ORSEOLO was met at 1000 at the Spanish-French border.

#### Channel Coast:

In a brief report, the 4th PT Boat Flotilla reports execution of her mining operation according to plan the night of 20 Feb. without special incident. The 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla had a short engagement with enemy PT boats in the neighborhood of Boulogne while en route west. On 20 Feb., mine detonating vessel "171" was sunk by a mine. The entire crew was saved. Enemy planes attacked motor mine sweepers "33" and "163", mine layer OSTMARK, and patrol vessel "1514" causing light damage and some casualties.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

#### Enemy Situation:

Little air reconnaissance before noon, increasing at noon, in the area of the Norwegian west coast and over the German Bight. Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa Flow revealed the following ships on 20 Feb.: One battleship of the George V class, the RENOWN, presumably one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, presumably one gunboat, 9 destroyers, escort vessel WOOLWICH, and 13 merchant vessels.

#### Own Situation:

The attempt to bring steamer AMERIKA into port has failed.



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The crew was saved. Mine detonating vessels "15", "17", and "161" and the 13th and 18th Minesweeper Flotillas are providing protection for operation "Sportpalast" as planned.

According to instructions by the Fuehrer, protection is to center on the area of northern Norway. This is to be considered in all measures, including the operation of all available mine sweepers. For that reason, a definite decision about the request by Group North for reinforcement of the Westwall minefield can be made only after the reasons for the request have been submitted. For communication to this effect to Group North see Telegram 1717.

Group North informed the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch that it is hoped to utilize the next east-west convoy of the SCHLESSEN for transferring troops from Stettin to Kiel and Hamburg. Because of past experience, the Group asks that no men on leave be carried aboard large vessels during transfers to the north, since this would necessitate assembling the men well in advance close to the ports of embarkation because departure could be announced only on very short notice. The presence of large numbers of troops in the vicinity of the ports would jeopardize the secrecy of the operation. Since the minesweeper flotillas to be transferred north are to be used for mining operations they also cannot carry men on leave.

Concerning the transport of men on leave on ships involved in operation "Sportpalast", the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas was notified at 1300 on 20 Feb. by telephone that it would be permissible to send the men to Brunsbuettel. However, because the message was held up at the Supply and Transportation Office, the troops were not sent in time, and of the expected 1250 men only 350 could be taken aboard, and 900 remained behind.

#### Operation "Sportpalast".

Until 1340 the operation proceeded according to plan.

At 1350 Group North reported they were spotted by British planes. Therefore the Commanding Admiral, Battleships was ordered to break off the operation and put into the Elbe River since his force had been detected by the enemy.

At 1400 the task forces turned back.

The Naval Staff regrets the fact that the operation cannot be continued, especially since the chances for a renewed attempt are rapidly decreasing. The enemy is now on the alert and will try everything in his power to locate and destroy the vessels. Our air protection is very strong at the present time, consisting of 6 long-range fighter groups. Therefore we do not have to fear enemy planes during the day. Enemy action by surface vessels is not regarded as a serious threat. However, Group North obviously anticipates some danger the next day when the ships are in the area of Stadland. Since the PRINZ EUGEN has not had any battle training, and engagements should be avoided, another attempt would be too dangerous. The Naval Staff cannot disregard these misgivings of the Group; it agrees to the order cancelling the operation. During the next few hours the situation was discussed from all possible angles, since the Naval Staff and Group North did not as yet wish to give up the operation entirely.

Meanwhile the Air Force requested an early decision in order to be able to withdraw the long-range fighter groups which are needed for night fighting in Germany.

Thereupon, the following topics were discussed by telephone by the Naval Staff Operations Division and Group North:

- (1.) The urgency of reinforcing the Norwegian area at an early date.
- (2.) The necessity of an early transfer of at least the destroyer forces in case the heavy ships should be unable to proceed to Norway.
- (3.) Insistence of the Naval Staff on transfer of the ships, in other words a renewed attempt in the next few days.
- (4.) The possibility of proceeding at night through the North Sea and of putting into a Norwegian fjord.

At 1747 the Commanding Admiral, Group North telephoned his decision to continue the operation. The task force is to resume the voyage at dark and to proceed to Norway with the destroyers; however, the torpedo boats are to be released. The Naval Staff is obtaining the approval of the Chief, Naval Staff. Orders by Group North are as follows: at dawn on 22 Feb. the ships are to put into Skudesnaes Fjord. They will proceed to Hjelte Fjord along the coastal island route. There the destroyers will refuel and the force will proceed after dark on 22 Feb. At Hellesoe they will leave the islands and continue to Griphoelen.

At 2133 the Group reported briefly on the situation and the progress of the operation so far. According to this report at 1337 the task force headed south in approximately quadrant AN 6335 where at 1810 a fighter downed a Lockheed plane. One Lockheed made a torpedo attack on the SCHEER.

At dark the force headed north again approximately in quadrant AN 9546. By midnight no special incidents had occurred.

## 2. Norway:

### Enemy Situation:

At 1607, the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast informed the Air Commander, North Sea that 4 large vessels, one of them with 2 masts and 1 funnel, had been sighted 20 miles west of Maaloe. Since these could hardly be German ships, 8 Ju 88's took off from Sole to investigate. 7 of the planes sighted nothing. The eighth sighted 3 steamers in the approaches to the Nord Fjord, and attacked one, the Finnish steamer RITHA INNTIV, without success. At the approach of the plane the vessels headed west at high speed.

These reports do not give a clear picture of the situation at this time.

### Own Situation:

On 20 and 21 Feb, ship traffic proceeded without any special incident. However, 4 steamers were again delayed at Tromsoe and 7 at Kirkenes because of lack of escort forces.

On 20 Feb., bad weather caused the 8th PT Boat Flotilla to break off its operation.

Enemy planes were active on 19 Feb. over Kirkenes, on 20 Feb. over Petsamo and along the west coast, and on 21 Feb. near Stavanger and near Lister. On 21 Feb. one plane was sighted near Holmengraa, one west



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of Maaloe, and one in the Trondheim area. A convoy was attacked in the Nord Fjord, but without success.

Submarine U "591" arrived in Bergen on 20 Feb. Submarines U "134" and U "585" arrived in Kirkenes on 21 Feb. On 22 Feb. submarine U "434" is expected in Trondheim, and submarine U "377" in Narvik.

On 21 Feb. minesweeper ULM left Kristiansand South, heading south.

Beginning 21 Feb. at 0900, 2 vessels went on submarine patrol in Kors Fjord and 2 in Skudesnaes Fjord.

The Naval Staff submits to Group North opinions regarding the use of mines for the purpose of disrupting British supply traffic to northern Russia (key word "Nordroute"). Copies are also sent to the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean for their consideration. See telegram 1/Skl I E 3980/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

Discussions between Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway regarding the dispatch of the ULM were relayed to the Naval Staff by Telegram 1250.

With regard to the transfer of PT boats to the northern area, the Naval Staff also attaches great importance to leaving the 2nd and 4th PT boat Flotillas, which are accustomed to the Channel in that area. For that reason, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is being instructed to postpone reinforcement of the PT boats in the Arctic Ocean until the 5th PT Boat Flotilla is available. Therefore the 8th PT Boat Flotilla will be transferred to Norway when it becomes available, and the 8th PT Boat Flotilla will be withdrawn and disbanded.

In case it is necessary to reinforce the PT boats in Norway earlier, certain preparations can be dispensed with (adjustment of hours of operation, previous overhaul of the vessels, etc.). The only problem is how to make available a PT boat tender, without which an additional PT boat flotilla cannot be transferred to the north on short notice. As far as the Naval Staff Operations Division knows, at the present time no PT boat tender is available for this purpose. If this problem can be solved only by withdrawing the TANGA, the Operations Division requests that the proper arrangements be made. (If necessary, a command post ashore equipped with the necessary communications facilities would suffice for Admiral, Arctic Ocean.)

#### Defense Measures in Norway.

In answer to an inquiry of 6 Feb. by the Naval Staff, on 18 Feb. Group North presented a survey of the defenses of the Norwegian coast. For copy of the report together with a map of the defense positions see 1/Skl 4221/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

While being escorted through the ice by the CASTOR and the EISBAER, while en route from Oslo to Copenhagen, transports LEVANTE and HANS RICKMERS collided.

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V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, an unknown steamer and the British tanker EULIMA (6,207 GRT) were torpedoed about 320 miles south of Cape Hatteras. The American tanker SWIFTSURE sent an SSS signal north of Chesapeake Bay. The Standard Oil Company has instructed their tankers to proceed to Bermuda first to unload part of their cargo, and from there to proceed to New York. A steamer, presumably the CIRCE SHELL, was torpedoed northwest of Trinidad. On 21 Feb., at 0700 a submarine warning was issued for the area of Fort de France (Martinique).

2. Own Situation:

For reports on successes along the American coast as well as about successful attacks on a convoy in the Mediterranean east of Sidi Barrani see supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Up to 21 Feb. our submarines had sunk 80 vessels totalling 532,900 GRT along the American East Coast.

Of the above tonnage the Naval Staff Intelligence Division was able to confirm the sinking of 77 vessels totalling 515,522 GRT, identifying 60 of them by name, totalling 400,522 GRT. These figures include 31 tankers totalling 240,775 GRT.

Of the 77 vessels, 36 were sunk in the Atlantic, 33 along the coast, and 8 in the Caribbean Sea.

Special reports have been released almost daily on these submarine sinkings, and the interest of the general public in submarine warfare has suddenly been revived. Together with the impressive reports on the Channel breakthrough of 13 Feb. these increasing submarine successes have done a great deal toward lifting the morale of the people, particularly in view of the depressing situation on the Eastern Front.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

One armed reconnaissance plane scored two direct hits on large factory installations in New Hunctanton (sic, Tr.N.).

During the night of 21 Feb., enemy planes penetrated into the areas of Meppen, Erfurt, Nuernberg, Augsburg, Reutlingen, and Metz; also into Belgium, Holland, and Norway.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

With improving weather, attacks were increased against airfields on Malta.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports of special interest.

4. Special Items:

In answer to a request by the Naval Staff, the Commander in



Chief, Air Force advises that the available fighter strength of the 5th Air Force is being reinforced by an additional group. This group will be used exclusively for the protection of the naval base at Trondheim. (See Telegram 2150.)

## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

No changes of any importance.

### 2. Situation Italy:

It is planned to employ battleship DUILIO, 3 cruisers, and destroyers for the protection of the 3rd transport group. Upon request, the German Naval Command, Italy supplied details on the sinking of a British submarine by torpedo boat CIRCE on 13 Feb. The British submarine was sunk in the same spot as the steamer LUCARIA. Thus, the German search receiver on the CIRCE has scored its second success within a very short time. (See War Diary 2 Feb.)

### 3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

On the evening of 20 Feb., the 3rd transport group started out. It consisted of steamer UNIONE with 2 torpedo boats from Naples to Messina, tanker GIORDANI and steamer LERICI with 4 destroyers and 1 torpedo boat from Taranto to Corfu, steamer MONVISO with 1 destroyer and 1 torpedo boat from Brindisi to Corfu. The group will continue to Tripoli on the evening of 21 Feb., together with steamers MONGENIVRO and RAVELLO.

It is planned to execute the operation of the 3rd transport group as follows:

(1) The above 6 vessels with destroyers and torpedo boats will depart in 3 groups on 21 Feb., leaving Messina at 1230 and Corfu at 1800. At the same time, the cruisers (GORIZIA, TRENTO, BANDE NERE with 3 destroyers will leave Messina. All groups will meet with the DUILIO group 200 miles east of Malta on the morning of 22 Feb. There the DUILIO group will await further developments in the enemy situation. If the operation proceeds according to plan, the DUILIO group is to start back for Taranto the morning of 23 Feb. The convoy and the cruisers, on the other hand, are to be 30 miles north of Cape Misurata on the morning of 23 Feb., where they will be met by 2 torpedo boats from Tripoli. Arrival at Tripoli is planned for 23 Feb. at 1600. At the same time, motor ship ALLEGRE and steamer WACHTFELS, each escorted by 1 destroyer and 1 torpedo boat, are to leave Naples and Palermo respectively, each group proceeding independently to Tripoli by the route west of Malta.

The combined German and Italian Air Forces will provide air protection for the vessels. Reconnaissance will be carried out over the entire Mediterranean, and enemy forces in Malta will be tied down by continuous attacks on the air fields.

In addition, beginning on 21 Feb. at 1600 the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla will be ready for action on two hours' notice, depending on the enemy situation and on weather conditions.

### 4. Area Naval Group South:

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Aegean Sea:

Due to lack of shipping space and escort vessels on the route from Trieste to Patras, supply shipments for the three branches of the armed forces, particularly for the German submarines in the Aegean Sea, are absolutely insufficient. One of the suggestions made to improve this situation, namely to transfer seven of the naval transports now on duty between Trieste and Piraeus, must absolutely be refused by the Operations Division, since lately enemy submarines have been sighted repeatedly in the Adriatic Sea, and losses have occurred. However, in accordance with the suggestion of the German Naval Command, Italy, the attention of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch is called to the necessity of shortening the route from Italy to Patras and to the possibility of shipping supplies from Brindisi.

It is, unfortunately, not possible to use the same solution for facilitating commercial traffic. The port facilities at Brindisi are not sufficient to handle more, and there are other difficulties as well the necessity for carrying return cargoes from the Dalmatian ports, especially bauxite from Dubrovnik.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located the following forces in Black Sea ports on 19 Feb.: 1 battleship, 6 cruisers (1 being fitted), 18 destroyers (3 being fitted), 8 torpedo boats, 30 submarines, 15 PT boats, 67 steamers of about 116,000 GRT, 5 tankers of about 36,000 GRT.

Own Situation:

Steamer RUTNITSCHA, damaged by ice while arriving in the Bosphorus on 17 Feb., is a total loss.

5. Situation Turkey:

According to press reports from Istanbul, a new destroyer ZAFER, built in England, arrived in Alexandretta under British flag. The flag was changed in Mersina.

6. Situation France:

Battleship DUNKERQUE and escort vessels arrived in Toulon the evening of 20 Feb.

The Commander in Chief, Navy, through the Commanding Admiral, France, conveyed his joy and satisfaction to Admiral Darlan at the successful completion of the transfer. (See Telegram 1616.)

(In the same manner Admiral Darlan had relayed to the Commander in Chief, Navy his admiration of the successful Channel breakthrough of the Brest forces.)

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VIII. Situation East Asia

The following is from the report of the Japanese Admiralty on the sea battle off Java on 4 Feb.: Reconnaissance planes sighted the cruisers HOUSTON and MARBLEHEAD, 2 cruisers of the JAVA class and 2 of the TROMP



class, and 5 destroyers. Following the Japanese reconnaissance planes, 36 bombers went into action and then a second wave of 24 planes. The enemy forces were augmented by the cruiser DE RUYTHER and 3 destroyers. During the 2 attacks the HOUSTON received 2 direct 250 kilogram hits, as well as four 250 kilogram bombs next to the ship, which was severely damaged and set afire. Although the ship was not actually seen to sink, she probably did so, since only a very large oil spot was visible an hour later. One cruiser of the JAVA class sank immediately after being hit by two 250 kilogram bombs. Another cruiser received 2 direct hits of 250 and 60 kilogram bombs, but did not sink. A gun turret of a cruiser of the TROMP class was hit by a 250 kilogram bomb, but the vessel was not sunk. Two bombs of 250 kilograms each caused heavy damage to the DE RUYTHER. She probably sank, although this was not observed. The bombers took off from Kendari. The weather was favorable. Bombs were dropped from 2,000 to 3,000 meters. No low-level attacks were made. One plane was lost.

## IX. Army Situation

### 1. Russian Front:

#### Southern Army Group:

On 19 Feb., the port commander at Genichesk reported sighting a large group of enemy troops on Arabatskaya Strelka marching to the northwest. The Von Kleist Army Group was unable to prevent enemy penetration in the Yama area. Strong enemy attacks, supported by tanks, further penetrated the lines between Slavyansk and Losovaya. Enemy attacks at the sectors of the 6th and 2nd Armies were without success.

#### Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks in the area of this army group were repulsed. The remainder of the enemy forces, about 500 men under the leadership of a division commander, from the pocket west of Rzhev were either captured or annihilated.

#### Northern Army Group:

Strong fighting, with varying success, continues near Kholm, Staraya Russa, and Soltsy.

### 2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No reports were received so far.

### 3. North Africa:

Air reconnaissance reports that the 4th Indian Division has advanced to the Ain el Gazala position. Enemy scouting activity is normal in front of the German Africa Corps and the Motorized Corps.

Tanks ready for action: German: 25 type III (Sic, Tr.N.), 98 type III, 16 type IV and four command cars; Italian: 62.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Additional changes have occurred in the British cabinet. Lord Beaverbrook has resigned as Minister of Production. The new members are evenly divided into Rightists and Leftists.

India:

In a message to the people of India, Chiang Kai-Shek appealed for cooperation in the common struggle for liberty. It would increase Great Britain's prestige to grant India full political sovereignty as soon as possible. In a speech in Calcutta, Nehru declared that he believes the British cabinet is not yet ready to meet Indian demands. Therefore, no compromise can be reached at the present time between the National Congress and the Government of Great Britain.

Vatican:

According to a diplomatic report, Japanese efforts for closer understanding with the Vatican are continuing successfully. A special mission composed of Japanese diplomats currently in Europe will go to Rome in the near future. This mission will discuss Roman-Catholic interests in Greater East Asian territories under Japanese control (Philippine Islands).

Portugal:

After hearing a declaration by Salazar, the National Assembly unanimously accepted a resolution strongly protesting against the Japanese invasion of Timor in the name of the Portuguese nation.

According to the German Embassy Salazar stated that he doubts a British victory; in his opinion, the war will end in a compromise peace.

Chile:

According to diplomatic reports, the new President, Rios, declared himself unequivocally in favor of maintaining neutrality.

Japan:

The press is demanding that representation in the Japanese Diet of Greater Asia convening subsequent to the elections on 30 Apr. should be made to conform to present-day needs and eliminate the influence of the old parties.

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Special Items:

I. Japanese Interpretation of the Strategic Situation. In the following, the Naval Attache sums up statements by Japanese officers on the Admiralty Staff; it should be noted that these statements are unofficial:



Despite the great successes, the Japanese Navy is realistic enough to regard these victories merely as initial steps on the road to final victory. At the present time the outcome of the war is uncertain, with perhaps a slight advantage on the side of the Axis. The tremendous war production of the U.S. will not make itself felt until next year at the earliest. The Axis Powers must take advantage of this delay. If they succeed this year in joining hands across the Indian Ocean, the war will have been decided in their favor. Every effort must be bent, therefore, to reach this goal. This calls for all-out attacks simultaneously by Germany and Italy from the north, and by Japan from the south. The earlier this is begun, the better. The enemy must not be given even a moment's respite.

Negotiations to this end among the Axis Powers should start at the earliest possible date. The Japanese Navy fully realizes the tremendous difficulties involved in operations against Suez and Iraq from the north, especially since both operations require elimination of the British Mediterranean Fleet. However, the Japanese believe they can promise effective collaboration by naval operations from the south.

II. The Mines Branch, Naval Ordnance Division submits the findings by the Degaussing Group stating that destroyer HEINEMANN was degaussed much less effectively than the other ships of her class, since her degaussing loop in the bow had not been rebuilt. Neither the Degaussing Group nor the Mines Branch, Naval Ordnance Division know the reasons why this had not been done as ordered.

It is believed that the destroyer would not have been sunk by ground mines had she been refitted properly.

III. The Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered immediate construction of several of the new type submarines (Krupp-Walther). A small number is to be completed by 1 Jan. 1944 (20).

At the same time, the Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered to concentrate on the development of the turbine-driven Ingoline torpedo. Its speed and performance is superior to that of other torpedoes because of the new and improved type of propulsion. Quite aside from this, however, work is to be continued on closed-cycle engines and electric drive as means of torpedo propulsion.

IV. The captured British document "Signal Manual" (Conduct of the Fleet) contains all regulations pertaining to the conduct of the British Fleet and its escort; regulations governing smaller-type vessels and the air forces; instructions for enemy contact reports and reconnaissance. The "Signal Manual" is said to contain all methods of procedure tested and in actual practice. Methods that have not been tested are described in "The Fleet Tactical Instructions" which have already appeared in translation as M Dv No. 943.

The "Signal Manual" is being made available to all official stations for tactical training of naval officers and officer candidates.

For information as to the contents, and instructions by the Commander in Chief, Navy see 1/Sk1 6597/42 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

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Situation 22 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:North Atlantic:

The British steamer EMBASSAGE sent a distress signal reporting an attack by an enemy surface raider in 40° 35' N, 38° 17' W. Her bow was set afire by gunfire. An operational radiogram from Gibraltar to the Admiralty and the home fleet, intercepted 2 hours later at 1641, may possibly be linked with this report. It was subsequently rebroadcast to all vessels in the Mediterranean.

The location specified is on route "Anton" which suggests the possibility that the vessel might be the blockade-runner OSORNO. However, the EMBASSAGE is so different from the OSORNO that she cannot possibly serve as camouflage for the latter. Another possibility might be that the EMBASSAGE was shelled by one of our submarines returning from the zone of operations.

According to press reports, 2 British battleships, launched in 1939 and 1940, are out on trial runs.

South Atlantic:

On 21 Feb., the American cruiser MEMPHIS was located in the vicinity of Martinique. According to agent reports, American vessels pass 400 miles from the northeast coast of Brazil. The beacons in Santos are reported extinguished.

The Japanese Naval Attache at Madrid reports that an American heavy cruiser has arrived in Freetown. 2 additional ones have passed through the Panama Canal into the Pacific Ocean.

2. Own Situation:

The Italian blockade-runner PIETRO ORSEOLO has entered the Gironde. No reports have been received from our vessels in foreign waters.

Report on enemy situation by Radiogram 1211.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Air reconnaissance was unsuccessful in locating motor ship OSORNO.

Channel Coast:

The brief report by the 4th PT Boat Flotilla on mine operations during the night of 21 Feb. contains nothing of special importance. See Telegram 0345.



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OSTMARK has left the area of the Group Command for transfer east.

Battery "Grosser Kurfuerst" shelled an enemy convoy near Dover, from 2044 to 2245, by 2 partial salvos; the effect was not observed.

At 1800, enemy planes approached the coast near Gravelines and Dunkirk for reconnaissance.

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### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance was active in the Skagerrak area and southern Norway. Moreover radio monitoring intercepted an SOS by French steamer ENSEIGNE MARIE ST. GERMAIN (3,139 GRT) east-northeast of Great Yarmouth; the steamer requested towing assistance. At 1135 air reconnaissance reported 1 light cruiser and 1 destroyer 20 miles east of Montrose, first on course 90°, later on course 360°, under full steam; furthermore, in the same area, another destroyer proceeding at full speed on course 40°.

##### Own Situation:

Motor ship ULM and hospital ship METEOR were escorted south from Kristansand South. OSTMARK and 5 vessels of the 4th Mine Sweeper Flotilla arrived at Hook of Holland from Boulogne; the 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla was transferred to Wesermuende.

Between 2348 and 0310 during the night of 21 Feb. enemy planes passing overhead were fired upon throughout the area from Antwerp to Emden. Convoys proceeded on schedule without special incidents.

#### 2. Norway:

##### Enemy Situation:

In the evening of 21 Feb. increased air reconnaissance was carried out between Stavanger and Maaloe. On 22 Feb., several planes entered the area of Stavanger, attacking Sole and Lister. Lively air reconnaissance activity in the area between Stavanger and Kors Fjord, from 0745 to 1045.

At about 1830, radio monitoring intercepted reports concerning 2 battleships proceeding northeast and 3 destroyers in Skudesnaes Fjord. At 1910, the same report was repeated to 4 planes. 3 additional planes received coded operational orders. Additional British reconnaissance was observed during the night.

At 2139, Scapa Flow radioed the "ou" signal (operation urgent) to the Scapa forces, 2115 time of origin. At 2145, Cleethorpes radioed the "ou" signal to all ships in the home district, with 2112 the time of origin; the message was rebroadcast at 2201 by Scapa Flow to all Scapa forces.

##### Own Situation:

The convoy bottleneck has been cleared up again for the

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time being, since the 11th Subchaser Flotilla has already been assigned and the 12th Subchaser Flotilla is only now being withdrawn.

According to reports by Admiral, West Coast the eighth Ju "88", on 21 Feb. (see War Diary 21 Feb.), spotted and attacked our own convoy in the Nord Fjord instead of the suspicious forces which had been reported in that area by Maeloe. Fortunately, the plane missed and no damage was done.

For unknown reasons, the interior of the soldier's rest home at Bodoe was destroyed by fire on 21 Feb.

#### Operation "Sportpalast":

Everything proceeded according to plan on 22 Feb. Group North employed the following submarines to protect the flank of the force: Submarine U "377", en route to Narvik, in quadrant AF 5870; submarine U "454", currently in Trondheim, in quadrant AF 8150. 2 enemy reconnaissance planes were downed during the morning in the Stavanger area. 17 patrol vessels were assigned to protect the approach to Trondheim. TIRPITZ and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla stand ready in the eastern part of the Trondheim Leden to meet the force.

After refueling, the force of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships left Hjelte Fjord at 2030 and continued en route to Griphoelen.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Enemy planes were sighted in the Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein area, but dropped no bombs. Mine laying is not suspected. The alert was sounded in Kiel from 2204 to 2245. No planes were downed.

Nothing to report on the naval situation.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reported only slight reconnaissance activity by the 15th and 19th Groups.

According to Italian reports, motor transports QUEEN EMMA and PRINCESS BEATRICE reached Ponta Delgada on 20 Feb. during their trip from Capetown to Southampton.

Reports were intercepted that 3 steamers were torpedoed off the North American and Florida coasts. Among these were the American passenger steamers ROBERT E. LEE, which suffered a damaged rudder, and WALTER JENNINGS, which exploded. Steamer CIRCE SHELL, torpedoed 21 Feb. in West Indian waters, was given up as lost. The American steamer LOWASANDER reported sighting a suspicious craft northeast of Cuba (presumably an Italian submarine). According to press reports, German submarines have sunk 14 Allied merchant vessels in the Caribbean Sea up to now. On 21 Feb. Reuter reported the sinking of tanker

A-10922



KONGSGAARD near Curacao and of tanker PAN MASSACHUSETTS (8,202 GRT) off the Canadian coast. Reuter further reports that the De Gaulle corvette ALICE was sunk during convoy duty in the Atlantic; 34 members of the crew were lost. The Admiralty reports that the BARHAM sank 5 minutes after she was hit by 4 torpedoes; 868 of her crew were lost, including 56 officers and the captain. Vice Admiral Pridham-Wippel, 2nd Admiral of the Mediterranean Fleet, was saved.

Submarine U "331" only fired 1 spread of 3!

2. Own Situation:

In quadrant BD 1428, 600 miles northwest of Newfoundland, submarine U "155" made contact with a convoy going southwest, and sank 1 tanker of 9,000 GRT and 1 steamer of 6,000 GRT. About 500 miles northeast from there, U "154" located a convoy proceeding in easterly direction and consisting of 6 steamers and 2 destroyers.

Submarine U "455", 1 of the submarines operating east of Iceland outside of the Seydis Fjord, failed to reply when asked to report her position.

Submarine U "128" reported successes off the Florida coast. Supplemental report on the situation as per War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Air operations for "Sportpalast" proceeded according to plan.

For report on enemy air activity during the night of 22 Feb. see Situation Baltic Sea. In the morning of 22 Feb. 4 enemy planes flew into the Lister area and 4 into the Stavanger-Sole area between 0730 and 0850. Our fighters downed 2 planes. At 0817, 3 enemy planes appeared from the northwest, in the latitude of Utsire. There they bombed the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships without success and drew strong anti-aircraft fire from coastal batteries and ships. Between 2100 and 2300, another 4 enemy planes appeared in the Bergen-Herdla area.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Throughout the day the protection of the 3rd Transport Squadron was the objective of all operations of the air forces under the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South. This included preventing enemy planes based on Malta from operating. Details in daily situation report.

During an attack on a convoy north of Sidi Barrani, the II Group, First Tactical Experimental Wing (II. L. G. 1) scored an especially gratifying success. 2 steamers of 8,000 and 6,000 GRT were sunk, and the third and last was heavily damaged and listing when last seen.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports have been received as yet about operations on 21 and 22 Feb.

Reports intercepted by Air Force radio monitoring concerning supply difficulties on many sectors of the Red Army front are to be found in the daily situation report.

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

A convoy consisting of 27 steamers left Gibraltar during the afternoon in a westerly direction, escorted by 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, 5 corvettes, and 3 gunboats.

The suitability of submarines for escort duty must be considered problematic, especially within the range of planes.

Photographic reconnaissance of Valletta showed an increase of 2 submarines.

British air reconnaissance from Malta spotted the section of the convoy which had left Messina for the first time at 0130; it was identified as 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, and 1 steamer. The planes maintained contact until 0355. Presumably the first report about sighting the force was made by a British submarine at 1854 on 21 Feb. On that date, radio intelligence intercepted an urgent message from a submarine, with 1854 as time of origin, which was directed to 14 different centers. The position of the submarine was computed to be in the vicinity of Cephalonia.

At 0525, another group of reconnaissance planes spotted the Messina convoy. They defined DUILIO as a ship of the LITTORIO class, and the 3 cruisers as 2 ships of the TRENTO class and 1 of the CONDOTTIERI class. The planes which maintained the contact repeatedly reported they were driven off by air protection. They further reported encountering difficulties because of successful radio interference by the German Air Force.

On 22 Feb., German planes located a convoy in the Eastern Mediterranean, consisting of 3 steamers and 3 destroyers. The convoy was successfully attacked. (See Aerial Warfare.)

At 1020, German air reconnaissance sighted 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers, 33 miles east of Bardia on westerly course; 10 miles further east 1 destroyer and 1 unidentified vessel were sighted lying at anchor.

Thus, there is no evidence of any kind of naval operation directed against the 3rd Transport Squadron.

### 2. Situation Italy:

Escort operations for the 3rd Transport Squadron proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

12 Italian submarines were in the Mediterranean in waiting position or at sea.

Regarding the possibility of augmenting the transports by using sub-



marines, the German Naval Command, Italy relays the following report by the Italian Navy:

At the present time, submarines CAGNI and MILLO are being used for supply operations. Submarines SCIESA and TOTI are being converted into transport submarines. Information as to cargo capacity and the date these submarines will become available is forthcoming.

It is not intended to withdraw submarines from the Atlantic for the following reasons:

1. Experiences by German submarines confirm that the Strait of Gibraltar is being guarded closely and the possibility of losses during passage has increased.
2. Italian submarine yards are taxed to capacity. Therefore, a number of the submarines returned from the Atlantic would have to lie idle.
3. The contribution of the submarines from the Atlantic to supply operations would be limited at best.
4. Prospects for submarine warfare in the Atlantic are increasing after U.S. entry into the war.

In the opinion of the Naval Staff, however, the above-cited views are not compatible with the actual needs of the situation, particularly those arising from further developments in North Africa. Therefore, suggestions as to steps deemed necessary will be submitted to the Chief, Naval Staff.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

A convoy of 6 vessels and the 2 separate vessels are en route to Tripoli in accordance with plans.

4 naval barges have left Pantellaria and 4 more Trapani, heading south.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA has started mine operations near Milos and Suda.

She is being escorted throughout the operation by 4 torpedo boats, while 3 PT boats will accompany her as far as Milos.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to interrogations of 2 female spies on 21 Feb., attacks and landings in the Crimea are planned; moreover, Odessa is to be bombed on 23 Feb. Group South was informed accordingly.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

Official Allied quarters published the results of the Bali battle on 20 Feb., during which their air and sea forces battled Japanese warships and transports. Allied losses are reported slight.

The press reports that evacuation of British and Dutch troops from Sumatra has started. Despite obstinate resistance, the Japanese are continuing to land on Bali.

2. Situation Japan:

The Naval Attache, Tokyo reported occupation of the island of Bangka as part of the operations against Palembang.

The press reports that the Japanese forces on Sumatra have reached the Sunda Strait on their advance south. Further successes are also reported from Burma.

Heavy air attacks were made on Port Darwin.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

The enemy offensive in the region Yama-Losovaya is continuing. Our position projecting along both sides of the Bakhmut, near Yama, was recaptured. The enemy was able to penetrate deeply only south of Losovaya. Several enemy attacks were repelled by the 6th Army east of Kharkov. The 2nd Army, likewise, repelled attacks in their sector south of Livny.

Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks were repelled, some of them at heavy cost to the enemy.

Northern Army Group:

Fighting continues around Kholm, Staraya Russa, between Soltsa and Schluesselburg and west of Yamno. All our lines held.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

The enemy situation is unchanged. The report received 21 Feb. that a brigade had advanced 50 kilometers east of Bab es Serir was not confirmed by air reconnaissance.

The transfer of Italian Army artillery forward into the area 35 kilo-



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meters west of Derna has begun.

Italian command posts in Cyrenaica have begun to disarm the Arabs.

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Items of Political Importance

Brazil:

Through Portugal, the government protested to Berlin about the torpedoing of the two Brazilian vessels. The Cabinet in Rio will decide whether the German ships (WINDHUK) now in Brazilian ports are to be confiscated rather than purchased as was originally planned. The Cabinet will further decide whether Brazilian ships should be armed and sail in convoys.

Japan:

Political circles expect a long war. Moreover, in evaluating their opponents, they credit Great Britain with greater toughness than the United States. The final outcome of the war will be decided in the European-African sphere rather than in the Pacific. As concerns direct communication between Japan and the other Axis powers, it is assumed that the trans-Siberian route will be blocked longer than the sea route via the Indian Ocean. Therefore it is desirable that Germany open up the approaches to the Persian Gulf as soon as possible. With the same objective in mind, the Japanese plan to occupy Ceylon.

With regard to the United States, Japan hopes that the blockade on both shores will be successful; that there will be internal social tension and strikes; that the Panama Canal will be destroyed; that the Japanese operation against the Aleutians will be successful in order to eliminate once and for all American air operations against Japan. However, Tokyo plans to delay any move against Russia as long as possible. Sooner or later, the Russian coastal provinces will fall to Japan anyway. The influence of the extreme nationalist movement, headed by Nakano, continues to grow, especially among the Japanese youth. It is quite possible that this movement will develop into a party represented in the new Parliament. In any event, a reorganization of the government is necessary, since the present government is not capable of coping with the economic difficulties which are to be expected in the case of a long war. The old upper class must be completely eliminated.

China:

According to reliable reports, Chiang Kai-shek's absence on the occasion of his visit to India has been used with his knowledge to explore the possibilities of a peace settlement with Japan. However, it turned out that the Japanese demands were unacceptable.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reported on his stay at Fuehrer Headquarters. Among other things, he submitted to the Fuehrer the question of the gun barrels on the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU and data on the manpower of the Navy. The Armed Forces High Command has admitted that the measure placing the Naval Shore Commander, Kirkenes in certain matters under the Commanding General, Lapland Theater is an exceptional measure in view of the particularly dangerous situation. The Armed Forces High Command will issue a directive to this effect.

For record of the conference of the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division see Skl Qu A 556/42 Gkdos. Chfs in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.



II. The Chief of the Underwater Obstacles Branch submitted plans for a net barrage at Trondheim. Should current trials at Narvik prove satisfactory up to a depth of 500 meters, it is planned to install an indicator net to a depth of 700 meters at the entrance to Trondheim. In the meantime, the defenses of the inner fjord are to be reinforced by floating net barrages to a depth of 180 meters. The Chief of the Naval Staff concurs.

III. The Italian reply to the memorandum by the Naval Staff regarding the closing of the Strait of Sicily, as well as instructions by the Naval Staff to the German Admiral, Rome, are in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII. The Chief of the Naval Staff concurs with the instructions.

IV. The Japanese Navy wishes to purchase the steamer SCHARNHORST in order to convert her into a carrier. The Naval Staff believes that this negotiation would require permission by the Fuehrer. However, the Naval Staff suggests that the Japanese be permitted to inspect the vessel to determine whether she could be converted. It is thought unlikely that she could be used as an aircraft carrier in view of her low speed. The Chief of the Naval Staff agrees.

V. The Naval Staff deems it necessary to call to the attention of Naval Group South the possibility that they might have to participate in actual combat. At the present time, their forces are concentrating almost exclusively on preparations for the transport operations expected in the near future. The Chief of the Naval Staff has authorized the dispatch of a telegram to that effect. For copy see 1/Skl I m 275/42 Gkdos. Chfs, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

VI. The Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division reports that Group North has protested against the fact that, whereas the Commanding Admiral, Norway was notified directly, it received only a copy of the Naval Staff's decision with regard to extending the fishing area off the Norwegian coast to 60 miles, as requested by the Commanding Admiral, Norway; Group North states that it should have received direct notification and the Commanding Admiral, Norway the copy, so that the Group's operational objections could have been expressed. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division justifies the procedure by reason of the urgency of the matter. According to the Food Ministry, each lost day of the Lofoten fishing season, which is short in any event, means a loss of several thousand tons of fish. Moreover, the operational objections mentioned by the Group cannot be considered as very serious, since with their uncertain navigation the fishermen never remained within the 30 mile area anyway. If there are compelling reasons to permit this fishing, which is undesirable in any case from a strategic standpoint, such objections must be overlooked.

The Chief of the Naval Staff agrees with the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division; however, he desires that the proper channels be observed. The Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division will inform Group North accordingly. To Group North's claim that an irresponsible person had taken care of the matter at the Operations Division, the Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division had already emphatically stated by telephone to the Group that this was not the case, but that the matter was treated in the regular way.

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Special Items:

Upon the request of the Army General Staff, Intelligence Division, West,

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the Naval Staff Operations Division has expressed an opinion on the possibility of enemy landings in western Europe. After evaluating the facts on the side of the possible aggressors, Great Britain and the U.S., and the conditions which must be observed for a landing in western France or on the Iberian peninsula, the Naval Staff comes to the following conclusions:

1. For a limited period, Great Britain and the United States could provide 1,500,000 GRT for a landing operation.
2. They command sufficient naval forces to protect the transports and to overpower the coastal defenses.
3. The western and southern coasts of the Iberian peninsula are particularly suitable for landings.
4. Except for the area around Cadiz, coastal fortifications are negligible. Moreover, a flank attack from Gibraltar would eliminate Cadiz also.
5. We have no assurance that we could recognize such an operation by the enemy in time.
6. The only means of attack available to the German Navy are submarines.

The Naval Staff is of the opinion that, due to insufficient shipping facilities, the Anglo-American powers will avoid landing operations which would extend over a period of months, thus giving Germany time to build up a front. In such a case the enemy would have to fight for months more at the expense of the forces in North Africa, India, and the Pacific, which are already taxed to the limit, in order to avoid another defeat which would weaken Britain's morale and weld Europe into an entity. Great Britain and the United States can hope to have additional shipping space by the end of this year; however, they are also afraid that by that time they will be too late, because of probable developments on the Russian Front which are favorable to Germany.

The overall situation is constantly changing due to the submarine successes on the U.S. East Coast and the effects of the blows dealt by the Japanese naval forces which are having repercussions all around the globe. Therefore, the Naval Staff will observe British communications closely for any clues as to landings in western Europe. It is impossible to predict accurately whether and beginning at what time real danger exists.

A plan which was worked out in connection with operation "Isabella" and which describes a transport operation involving 2 waves of 8 divisions each sailing from the North Channel to ports in southern Spain is appended to the statement; it would still be useful now.

For copy of the above see 1/Skl I opa 3473/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIB.

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Situation 23 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:



South Atlantic:

The Brazilian government has ordered all Brazilian merchant ships to be painted gray for protection.

A Spanish steamer reports that on 13 Jan. she sighted a plane, a cruiser and a convoy between Dakar and San Vicente. She was stopped by a British patrol vessel off Freetown.

The French reported that on 15 Feb. several small convoys were sailing off the Ivory Coast; they were escorted by patrol boats or torpedo boats.

To judge from a radio message intercepted on 22 Feb. which the British floating whale factory SOUTHERN EMPRESS sent in a special whaler's code to the Unilever Whaling Company in London, this ship must be in the whaling area.

Pacific Ocean:

According to an Italian report, vessels sailing from western Australia to the Atlantic ports of the United States proceed via Capetown.

2. Own Situation:

The Italian blockade runner PIETRO ORSEOLO reported a smooth voyage at an average speed of 14 knots. During her entire voyage the vessel sighted nothing but three columns of smoke south of the Tuamotu Islands on 14 Jan. She passed west of the Society Islands instead of between the islands as ordered.

The DOGGERBANK was advised by Radiogram 1602 that on 3 Feb. convoy SW 15 was located at 16° S, 30° W on a 140° course with a speed of 12.5 knots.

The Attache at Tokyo has been requested to report immediately whether the OSORNO uses any other distress signals besides the LGBS signal, and what condition her engines were in when she left. The Naval Staff suspects that the distress signal from the steamer EMBASSAGE (see War Diary 22 Feb.) might have come from the OSORNO in case she was delayed by engine trouble. (See Telegram 1329.)

Vessel "10" was informed by Radiogram 1853 of the radio message of the SOUTHERN EMPRESS (see Enemy Situation).

All vessels in foreign waters were advised of the PIETRO ORSEOLO's arrival in Bordeaux on 22 Feb. and of the enemy situation by Radiograms 2001 and 2247.

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II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

To judge from radar location of a British convoy on the evening of 22 Feb., the route from the mouth of the Thames River to the west which was used up until now has been shifted farther south, evidently due to our mine operations.

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2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Lack of sufficient forces under the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is requiring Group West to curtail many of the tasks executed in its area in the past, and to concentrate on those which it is sure of being able to carry out. For that reason, the incoming and outgoing submarines must be limited to two routes ("Tannennadel" and "Uhunest"), and they will head for their bases from the point of intersection with route "Rosa". This regulation goes into effect beginning 26 Feb. at 0000, according to the directive by Group West. (See Telegram 2220.)

Channel Coast:

Intended mine operations could not be carried out by the PT boats because of bad weather.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The cruiser KOELN has been transferred from the Elbe to the Jade protected by minesweeper escort. Three vessels of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and minesweeper "38" are en route from Heligoland to Rotterdam. The Dutch fishing steamer "Ym 118" is overdue; it is improbable that she has tried to escape.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Planes were active. Of the 23 planes located, 19 flew into the Trondheim area. At 0702 radio intelligence intercepted a message from what was evidently a British submarine, not a plane, about sighting 1 pocket battleship of the DEUTSCHLAND class, 1 cruiser, and 3 destroyers west of Kristiansund North on a 70° course. The message was relayed to the Scapa forces by blind transmission. At 0910 radio intelligence intercepted the code signal "Falcon" from the Scapa area, and at 0950 an order to a British plane to continue reconnaissance up to the entrance to the Trondheim Fjord. At 1256 a submarine was sighted 8 miles north of the Kongs Fjord battery (north of Stavanger).

Own Situation:

On 21 Feb. a cutter carrying 22 passengers bound for the British Isles was captured and brought into Aalesund.

For the report by the Admiral, Arctic Coast about the mine barrages at Langsund see 1/Skl 4374/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIIa.

Operation "Sportpalast"

On 22 Feb. Group North advised the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to use his own judgment as to whether to continue with the operation, since the weather forecast for 23 Feb. predicted very low visibility. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships continued the voyage on 22 Feb. at 2030 as reported. On 23 Feb. at about 0700 the force was



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apparently sighted and reported by an enemy submarine (see Enemy Situation). At 0725 PRINZ EUGEN reported being hit by a mine in quadrant AF 8341.

At 1045 Group North reported that it suspected the ship was hit by aerial torpedo or by a submarine torpedo rather than by a mine as reported by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, considering the intercepted enemy messages (see Enemy Situation).

This was the opinion of the Naval Staff in view of the enemy situation.

Because the Commanding Admiral, Battleships suspected a mine hit he went farther out to sea; at 0900 the force was in quadrant AF 8263. During the night the BEITZEN, the IHN, and the JACOBI of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla lost contact with the rest of the force and put in at Bergen.

This measure must be clarified.

Group North ordered the 5th and the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotillas to go to the assistance of the PRINZ EUGEN. The Admiral, North Norwegian Coast was ordered to dispatch patrol boats and minesweepers to the quadrant from which the accident was reported. The TIRPITZ was ordered to enter port. At 0914 the SCHEER was in quadrant AF 8351. The PRINZ EUGEN passed Termingen at 1300, and at 2357 she anchored in the Lo Fjord. Her rudder was out of order and a 10 meter long portion of her stern had been blown off; however, her engines remained intact. The SCHEER had already put into Trondheim at 1245. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla arrived in Aalesund at 2000.

At 1617 Group North reported "Operation Sportpalast completed". At 1648 the Group conveyed thanks to the participating air forces, with special appreciation for the support given during operations "Sportpalast" and "Cerberus".

At 2135 the Commanding Admiral, Battleships sent the preliminary report of the damage to the PRINZ EUGEN:

- (1) Compartment I at scantling 6.5 is snapped off. Rudder jams at port 10. Rudder room is flooded. Steering engine in order.
- (2) Propellers are in order. Center and starboard shaft tunnels can be pumped out.
- (3) Both radar apparatuses and the UU device aft are out of order.
- (4) Losses among the crew: 1 seriously and 12 slightly wounded; so far 2 are missing.

Losses of men on leave: 5 dead, 1 seriously and 12 slightly wounded.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

No special incidents.

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V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

The radio intercept service reports that convoy SC (presumably no. 70) left Sydney (Canada) on 16 Feb., and is expected to reach the rendezvous area on 28 Feb., probably at quadrant AL 68/39, AL 26, or AD 81.

At 1120 a plane reported sighting the convoy at 57° 70' N, 20° 11' W.

According to an agent report from Marseille, a British convoy, including 1 transport of 15,000 GRT, is to leave Gibraltar for the east between 25 and 28 Feb.

Radio intelligence intercepted reports from the British steamer EMPIRE UNION and the Latvian steamer EVERAGRA stating that they were being chased by submarines off the American East Coast near Cape Sable and Cape Hatteras.

The U.S. steamer LIHUE (7,001 GRT) was torpedoed about 240 miles west of Martinique. The U.S. steamer WEST CEDA (5,658 GRT) was torpedoed southeast of Trinidad. Annapolis has informed all ships about a steamer which was abandoned on her beam ends at the southeast coast of Florida at about 27° 04' N, 80° 01' W.

2. Own Situation:

Our submarines are keeping contact with the enemy convoys northeast of Newfoundland and west of the Porcupine Bank. Reports of successes have not been received up to now.

From the east coast of Florida, submarine U "504" (Lt. Commander Poske) reports sinking a tanker (6,000 GRT), the U.S. steamer GULF PRIDE (12,510 GRT), and a four-masted freighter of the CAMBRIDGE type (about 10,800 GRT). The boat reports heavy traffic during the day only on the 20 mile line, with only a few vessels along the coast at night. The opportunities for attack are good, but the area is heavily patrolled. Destroyers drove off the boat temporarily, using hydrophones and depth charges. Supplementary report on the situation is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is informed that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will depart the evening of 23 Feb.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No reports of special interest have been received.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

5 enemy planes were downed over Malta by planes escorting the 3rd transport group.

Nuisance attacks on Malta were continued.

The Commander in Chief of the Air Force has ordered the 4th Air Force to attack from a base at Saki in the order of their importance Novorossisk, Sevastopol, Batum, and other places where there are large ship concentrations.



3. Eastern Front:

No reports of special interest have been received.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, the battleship MALAYA, the aircraft carrier EAGLE, 1 cruiser of the DIDO class, and 5 destroyers have arrived at Gibraltar from the west. According to an Italian report, the MALAYA supposedly came from Freetown. The EAGLE was spotted in the Indian Ocean some time ago.

The report about the aircraft carrier must be verified. If the EAGLE is in Gibraltar, then 2 aircraft carriers are now there.

An intelligence report from Spain states that the convoy which left Gibraltar on 22 Feb. heading west includes the DAMDALE, a special vessel for landing craft.

An Italian report states that planes from Malta maintained contact all during the day with the Italian naval forces returning to their operational ports. In the supply traffic in the area Alexandria-Marmarica-Cyrenaica, our air reconnaissance located 8 merchant vessels of medium and small size, 5 destroyers, and 3 patrol vessels. 6 destroyers were sighted toward noon lying in Tobruk harbor, protected by fighters.

2. Situation Italy:

At 0800 the escort forces (Group DUILIO) were 195 miles south of Augusta on their return voyage. The Italians report that one of their torpedo boats from the escort of the 3rd transport group, equipped with a German search receiver, sank a British submarine off Tripoli.

This would mean the third success of the German search receivers.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

During the evening the 3rd transport group with 6 steamers arrived in Tripoli after an uneventful voyage. The German portion of the cargo included 122 men, 337 vehicles, 15 motorcycles, 4,337 tons of Armed Forces goods, and 765 bags of Armed Forces mail.

Of the vessels proceeding alone west of Malta to Tripoli the steamer WARTENFELS also arrived in Tripoli during the afternoon. The steamer ALEGRI put into Palermo in the morning because of bad weather. The steamer BEPPE is returning from Tripoli to Naples. The steamers VETTOR PISANI, ARGENTEA, and BENGASI are to leave Tripoli the evening of 23 Feb. for Italy.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

On 22 Feb. the Net Laying Group, South started operations in the Gulf of Suda. Auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA has completed the mining

operations at Milos and in the Gulf of Suda.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio silence since morning seems to indicate that operations are about to start. According to a report from an unconfirmed source, the Russians intend to attack at the southern flank, with the cooperation of their Black Sea fleet.

Own Situation:

No special incidents.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

No reports of special interest have been received.

2. Situation Japan:

According to reports received from the Attaches at Bangkok and Tokyo, the situation is as follows:

(1) Burma: The British have mined the entrance to Rangoon harbor. Following the distribution by the Japanese of propaganda leaflets dropped by planes, numerous Indian deserters have gone over to the Japanese side. On 21 Feb., advance units reached the Sittang River. Japanese planes attacked Mandalay.

(2) Singapore: The total Japanese losses in the fight for the island amounted to 3,000. Additional losses of approximately 3,000 were suffered in the fight for Malaya. The other islands south of Singapore were taken without encountering resistance.

(3) Dutch East Indies: A strong Japanese expeditionary force landed on Bali, near Singaradja. On Java, the Japanese destroyed numerous planes on many air fields.

2 destroyers and 2 freighters were sunk in the Gaspar Strait during a Japanese air attack. During mopping-up operations in the Malacca Strait, the Japanese navy sank a British submarine chaser, a motor minesweeper, an armed merchant vessel. In addition, 4 freighters were captured.

Between Bali and Lombok, 2 Japanese destroyers and several torpedo boats had an engagement with a light enemy cruiser and 3 destroyers. 2 of the enemy destroyers were sunk; the third destroyer and the cruiser were damaged. One of the Japanese destroyers suffered slight damage.

(4) Australia: Intense air attacks did severe damage at Port Darwin. On 19 Feb. 1 special-purpose ship of 6,000 tons, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, and 9 transports were sunk; a second destroyer was damaged. All 26 of the enemy planes on the airfield were destroyed. Another attack was made on 20 Feb. 72 naval bombers participated in the first attack, 21 in the second.



IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

The enemy again unsuccessfully attacked positions west of Losovaya, to which our forces had recently withdrawn. Enemy attacks were likewise repelled in the Bereka valley and southwest of Livny.

Central Army Group:

After heavy fighting, our troops captured Chernishino, south of Sukhinichi. Enemy attacks were repelled along the highway in the area of the 4th Army as well as near Yukhnov and west of Vyazma. However, the expected major attack along the rest of the Eastern Front failed to materialize on 23 Feb.

Northern Army Group:

The situation remains unchanged in the areas of Kholm and Staraya Russa. In the sector southwest of Staraya Russa our reserves were brought up. Strong enemy artillery fire was directed against the enemy front.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation remains unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Enemy reconnaissance, partly supported by tanks and artillery, was directed against the German Africa Corps and the Motorized Corps. Enemy forces which had penetrated into a German strong point south of Tmimi retreated to the southeast before a German counterattack.

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Items of Political Importance:

France:

During the discussions with the U.S. the French government intends to maintain that the supplies shipped to Libya were principally food, not war material. Their objective is to avoid endangering French property in America if at all possible. Although Darlan believes that the U.S. is bluffing, the Foreign Office is inclined to regard the situation more seriously. It fears that the Allies might take steps against Martinique, partly as a result of the presence of German submarines in the Caribbean Sea, and particularly that they might act against Madagascar.

French-Japanese talks regarding the use of French ships in Indo-China are about to be concluded, since the Japanese have stated that they would not use the ships as war transports.

Great Britain:

The fact that Cripps has stated that he will enter the war cabinet only if the India problem is solved at once in an acceptable way gives evidence of the crisis prevailing in Great Britain.

By giving a very dark picture of the British domestic situation, a reputable North American periodical is trying to increase U.S. aid to Britain to the utmost. In so doing it states several remarkable and indisputable facts: Recent developments tend to make Britain more and more democratic, since the 50% income tax, the rationing of food and clothing, and the danger of bombs which threaten all alike are doing away with differences which permitted the upper class to exist. Although the British people are still brave, united and determined, they have become very tired. The question is already being raised whether if they lose the war they will not become the most hated nation on earth. They are beginning to realize that the power of National Socialism is such that it forces those who fear it and try to fight it to imitate it. Inadequate help from the United States means the end of Great Britain.

India and China:

In a message to the Indian people on 21 Feb. Chiang Kai-shek stated that China and India are in full agreement with the Atlantic Charter and that they must participate in the fight until final victory. Chiang Kai-shek sincerely hopes and trusts that the British will grant the Indian people full political sovereignty as soon as possible without waiting for special demands from India. This would not merely be the most intelligent political move, but is also the most honorable.

The fact that the leader of nationalist China can meddle in such a way in the most intimate affairs of the Empire illustrates strikingly the decline in British prestige regardless of whether he did so with or without the consent of the British.

Sweden:

According to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm, military circles consider that an Anglo-American large-scale attack on northern Norway is hardly feasible any more. Only two more months are left until it will



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remain light both day and night; moreover, the necessary shipping space is no longer available.

Russia:

In a pompous speech commemorating the twenty fourth anniversary of the Red Army, Stalin emphasized the alliance between the Red Army, Great Britain, and other countries. In mentioning Germany, he distinguished sharply between the Hitler clique and the German people; the German people will always continue to exist. He went on to say that the soldiers of the Red Army feel no class hatred for the German people. German prisoners of war, whether officers or enlisted men, are not killed but their lives are spared.

Iran:

All British efforts to define the British and the Russian spheres of interest have failed. Moscow makes no secret of her intention to subjugate the entire country to her influence.

United States:

In his speech on 23 Feb., which is not yet available in full, Roosevelt fights an attitude which evidently exists among the population and which is worthy of note. A large number of the American people seem to feel that all U.S. resources should be concentrated. In other words Roosevelt is trying to combat a reawakened isolationism of a military nature. It was not difficult for the speaker to muster arguments which arise out of the close interrelation of the various theaters of this world-wide war.

The American press criticized sharply the disastrous developments in Singapore. Churchill is blamed for concentrating all forces in Europe and fighting Germany at the expense of the Far East.

Brazil:

According to a diplomatic source, the cabinet is considering a declaration of war against the Axis powers.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division discussed the brief report by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships regarding the transfer of the PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER to Trondheim. In the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the enemy was fully aware of the operation, because of the over-all situation and because numerous bits of information had leaked out, so that he was able to prepare effective countermeasures. For copy of the report see I/Sk1 I a 444/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, files "Sportpalast".

The Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Staff disagree with the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. A statement of their opinion is being drawn up. The Chief of the Naval Staff requests the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to observe the proper channels via Fleet and Group Command.

II. The statement of 23 Feb. by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships concerning the damage on the PRINZ EUGEN has been sent to the Fuehrer

Headquarters for the attention of the Fuehrer and to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

The investigation must be concluded before any decisions about repairs can be made. If at all possible, the Chief of the Naval Staff prefers that the repairs be made in Trondheim, in order to save time and another transfer of the vessel. If the lack of dock space should be an obstacle, the repair work might be facilitated by using caissons.

III. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on data for landings on Ceylon, which were submitted to the Japanese navy as they had requested. (See War Diary 21 Feb.)

IV. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on unified quadrant charts for the Navy and the Air Force. Prior to the war an effort was made to reach an agreement between the two branches of the armed forces, but it was unsuccessful. Therefore Air Force quadrants were superimposed on naval quadrant charts, and these have been used for about a year. However, so far only a limited number of Navy posts have been equipped with them up to now. Now the Naval Staff Hydrographic and Meteorological Division has ordered the maps printed in sufficient quantities to satisfy all needs.

V. Transport of Supplies to North Africa by Italian Submarines.

At the Fuehrer's request the Naval Staff had ordered the German Naval Command, Italy to determine how many submarines would have to be withdrawn from the Atlantic for this purpose, and the amount of supplies that could be shipped by employing additional Italian submarines. The German Naval Command, Italy submitted its report on 22 Feb. (see War Diary 23 Feb.). On 7 Feb., the German Naval Command, Italy had already submitted its opinion on the project as a whole, pointing out that the supplies which can be carried by submarines make up only a small percentage of the total amount needed. However, under certain circumstances such supplies can be of decisive importance. They suggested that the large torpedo and minelaying submarines be withdrawn from the Atlantic for transport purposes, and that medium-sized submarines also be used, the exact number still to be determined. The Naval Staff points out that the February new moon period, which would have been suitable for Italian submarines from the Atlantic, has already passed. In any event, this matter must be handled very diplomatically as the Italians will probably consider it a point of honor, which is quite understandable.

The Adjutant to the Fuehrer as well as the Navy Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command have been advised of the situation. They were also informed that the Chief, Naval Staff considers it important to convert additional large Italian submarines to transport vessels, since they may be needed later for urgent transport operations, depending on the situation and the progress of our offensive, neither of which can be predicted. This conversion program must be started, even though at present transport submarines are not urgently needed. A memorandum to this effect will be prepared for the Fuehrer's letter to the Duce.

VI. The Chief of the Naval Staff Communications Division reports on the range of British radar (theoretically up to 100 miles, but actually only up to 40 miles); on the effectiveness of German radar on ship-board in locating planes (7,000 m., and at high altitudes up to 34,000 m.); on the practice of the other two branches of the Armed Forces of relieving manpower shortages in the communications industry by detailing large numbers of enlisted men from their communications divisions to that industry, supposedly so that they can "familiarize themselves with new equipment".



VII. The Chief of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the change in jurisdiction of the Commanding Admiral, France and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. Upon suggestion by Naval Group West, this change was approved by the Naval High Command. (See War Diary 3 Feb.) The Chief of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division also reported on the establishment of a company of light engineers as part of the Brandenburg Training Regiment, to be commanded by a naval officer. Men from this company are to be assigned to auxiliary cruisers, for special tasks.

VIII. The Naval Construction Division reports on the progress of negotiations with the Italians about the construction of war transports and landing craft in Italian shipyards. The Chief of the Naval Staff agrees that in return half of the transports should be left with the Italians with the stipulation that for the duration of the war they are to be used exclusively for common war tasks. Furthermore, 20 landing craft may be offered the Italians with the same provision, if this is necessary in order to reach a satisfactory agreement.

IX. The Chief, Naval Staff approves the commendation proposed by the Operations Division for the Commander, Destroyers and the Commander of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla for initiative and exemplary behavior when the destroyer HEINEMANN was sunk by a mine. See l/Skl I a 7391/42 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

X. The Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section of the Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the suggestion made by Group North about the renewal of the "Westwall" mine barrages. In principle, the Operations Division approves the plan of the Group, but points out that the mine operations in the area of northern Norway must be completed first.

The Chief of the Naval Staff emphasizes the importance of the protection given by the "Westwall" minefields to damaged vessels that must be returned home for repairs, as in the case of the PRINZ EUGEN. At the same time, however, the Chief of Naval Staff wishes to avoid creating the impression that Commanding Admiral, Group North is being dictated to. The Naval Staff will bear this in mind when replying to Group North. For a copy of the reply see l/Skl I E 4471/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI. (See War Diary 18 Feb.)

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### Special Items

#### I. Change in Armament

The Naval Construction Division reports on measures taken to simplify naval ship construction as ordered by the Commander in Chief, Navy on the basis of the Fuehrer directive of 3 Dec. 1941 which was issued for the purpose of simplifying and increasing the capacity of the ship-building industry. See l/Skl 4569/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

II. The Commander in Chief, Navy has established the following ranks for naval commanders ashore, to become effective at once:

- a. The Commanding Admirals of Groups North and West will have a rank equivalent to that of a commander in chief of an army group.
- b. The Commanding Admiral of Group South, the Commanding Admirals

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North, East, Norway, and France will have ranks equivalent to a commander in chief of an army.

c. The admirals of the coasts from western France to the arctic coast, the Admirals Black Sea and Aegean Sea, and the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy will have the rank of the commanding general of an army corps.

d. The coastal defense commanders will have the rank of a divisional commander, and the naval shore commanders the rank of an independent brigade commander.

e. The sector commanders will have the rank of a regimental commander.

The organization and jurisdiction within the Navy is not affected by this order.

III. A survey has been made of enemy ship losses caused by German mines during January 1942 as verified by the Naval Staff, divided as follows:

- a. Effect on enemy shipping.
- b. Enemy countermeasures and minesweeping activities.
- c. Tactical evaluation.

See l/Skl I E 4228/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

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Situation 24 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

U.S. cruiser OMAHA, which together with 3 destroyers was escorting a convoy at the beginning of the month, was originally supposed to proceed to Monrovia, but was rerouted to Bathurst and Freetown. Destroyer BURGA arrived at Bathurst on 13 Feb. On 14 Feb. a British destroyer left Bathurst. On 16 Feb. 3 large steamers, 4 torpedo boats, and 1 patrol boat arrived, 1 freighter, 1 sloop, and 2 subchasers departed, and on 17 Feb. 2 torpedo boats and 1 mail steamer departed.

Pacific Ocean:

One U.S. battleship is said to be on convoy duty in the South Pacific.

Indian Ocean:

Very heavy shipping traffic is reported from South African harbors, consisting mainly of eastbound transport vessels. Simonstown reports the arrival of U.S. submarine ARGONAUT on 28 Jan., and the new British cruiser GAMBIA on 31 Jan., both headed for the Far East. U.S. ships are taking on ore and wool for the U.S. in South Africa. Approximately 20 steamers refuelled in Durban between 27 and 31 Jan.



2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Madrid is sent the following orders:

a. He is to report the day's run and the speed of the GERMANIA, if possible prior to her departure.

b. In order to avoid jeopardizing the secrecy of the operation, he should not mention the port and date of departure in a telegram as he did in Telegram 299 Gkdos.

c. For his information: When the code word is issued the ship can depart at any time up to the time mentioned in the order, depending on local conditions. In this manner the Naval Staff takes into consideration the enemy situation and the local conditions.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo is informed about experiences of the ORSEOLO: The voyage went smoothly at 14 knots continuous speed. The ship and her engines are in the best of condition. Nothing was sighted except columns of smoke south of the Tuamotu Islands.

Ship "10" is informed about the plan of the Naval Staff to have her meet the REGENSBURG in the "Komponisten" area after the whaling operation, and she is ordered to bring the whaling operation to a close at her own discretion. After the supply operation it is planned to put the REGENSBURG at the disposal of ship "10" in the Indian Ocean. (See Telegram 2259.)

Information on the enemy situation is sent via Radiogram 2008.

In considering auxiliary cruiser warfare, Captain Rogge, the captain of ship "16", states that large areas of the oceans, particularly those into which enemy shipping has withdrawn, can no longer be considered as operations areas for valuable auxiliary cruisers. Enemy defenses and increasing difficulties in auxiliary cruiser warfare in the course of the war have resulted in a stalemate, so that although we have achieved numerous successes, they are no longer worthwhile considering the risk involved. The stalemate cannot be broken in our favor unless radically different measures are adopted. In conclusion Captain Rogge enumerates possible ways in which warfare in foreign waters can be improved.

For a copy of this valuable memorandum, which contains useful suggestions based on the writer's practical experience, see 1/Skl 4656/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

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 II. Situation West Area
1. Enemy Situation:

The Naval Attache, Madrid reported that British planes flew over Cape Finisterre on the morning of 23 Feb.

The French steamer ENSEIGNE ST. GERMAIN (see War Diary 23 Feb.) probably ran on one of the mines laid by the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla off Great Yarmouth.

According to radio intelligence, the Murmansk convoy PQ 12 left the

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North Minch on 24 Feb., heading for Iceland.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is planning to station patrol boats along route "Rosa" so that submarines can approach their bases at full speed. Because of danger from enemy planes it is suggested that submarines proceed along route "Rosa" only at night.

The Naval Staff is informed to this effect via Telegram 1030.

Channel Coast:

Nothing special to report.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic. Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was increased air activity over the German Bight during the evening and the night. Mines were probably dropped. According to the radio intercept service, there was lively minesweeping activity in the Harwich area on 22 Feb. Minesweeper EARL KITCHENER was probably damaged. Air reconnaissance located 5 convoys off the east coast between Firth of Forth and Lowestoft.

Own Situation:

The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Hook of Holland for the north. The SEEADLER, the ILTIS, the FALKE, and the M "38" transferred from Heligoland to Hook of Holland. The SCHARNHORST was escorted by minesweepers from the Jade to the Elbe. Two 250 kg. bombs and one YC 800-1,000 kg. bomb were salvaged from an enemy plane shot down near Sylt. At Borkum another plane was seen shot down at sea. Aerial mines are suspected in the shipping routes of the German Bight.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

See Situation West Area for departure of the PQ convoy from the North Minch.

At 0758 submarine U. "377" reported 1 British battleship, 1 light cruiser, and 2 destroyers on westerly course at moderate speed in quadrant AF 5790 (about 170 miles west of the Trondheim Fjord). Contact was lost at 0905. (Marginal note: This enemy force was sent out in connection with operation "Sportpalast". It had no effect on the operation, and it is probably a correct assumption that the enemy did not receive information in time, although it was difficult to keep the operation entirely secret.)

According to statements of the captured Russian captain of submarine Shch "4", the northeast passage is being used to send submarines to



Vladivostok. At the present time 16 submarines are supposedly ready for operations in the Arctic Ocean, among them several small 200 ton submarines of the MOLODKA type.

Own Situation:

Air reconnaissance requested at 0830 to operate against a reported enemy force did not take off until 1137; the planes did not sight anything, but dropped bombs on the Swedish steamer STEGEHOLM near Stadland, not recognizing her nationality in time. At 1645 the state of immediate readiness ordered by Group North for the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships was cancelled. The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla swept the departure route from Trondheim via Griphoelen with paravanes, and made a check sweep outside the fjord. See Telegram 1635.

The 5th Destroyer Flotilla has anchored in Trondheim.

The BRUMMER laid flanking minefield 3B on 23 Feb. according to plan. For the mine report of the Admiral, Arctic Coast, see 1/Skl 4492/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports about the order to close the gap in the Stadland barrage by means of minefield VIII; the barrage will be announced on 1 Mar. whether it has been laid or not. See 1/Skl 4491/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Submarine U "456" has left for the operations area northeast of Kola Bay; U "436" will probably depart on 17 Feb. They will take up positions close to the coast, since the Commanding Admiral, Norway believes that a considerable number of submarines would have to be available to operate effectively against convoys in the Bear Island area. (See Telegram 1200.)

Group North is planning to utilize the PRINZ EUGEN in Trondheim as additional anti-aircraft protection. For this purpose she may receive additional light anti-aircraft guns. (See Telegram 2251.)

Grip Fjord and Ytre Fjord have been closed because of mine danger, and a new shipping route has been designated through the Trondheim Leden.

Convoy and transport operations proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

The Commander, Destroyers reported that the destroyers BEITZEN, IHN, and JACOBI lost contact with the force of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships in the night of 22 Feb. during a snow flurry. Although they used radar and visibility improved, they were unable to reestablish contact. When Group North sent out the report on the enemy situation which had been deciphered belatedly, the destroyers assumed that the task force had turned back, and therefore they put into Bergen.

Because of this very unfortunate misunderstanding the task force was escorted by only 2 destroyers instead of 5 on the morning of 23 Feb., a fact which was no doubt most helpful to the enemy submarine.

According to the Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, construction of the bombproof submarine pens in Trondheim ordered by the Fuehrer has not even been begun, since it has not yet been possible to transfer the diving bell vessel because of the tug shortage.

The Naval Staff is arranging to have a tug furnished as soon as possible.

The Food Ministry reports that the herring catch in Norway is particularly good this year. On 20 Feb. a record catch of approximately 25,000 tons was made. It is expected that a catch of 450,000 tons of Stor and Vaar herring will be made this season.

These figures indicate the great importance of the Norwegian fishing industry. Most of the fish are being used for the German food and fat supply.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to Finnish air reconnaissance, there is one Russian fighter plane on the airfield of Lavansaari. On the south and southwest beaches of the island there is a chain of guard shelters at a distance of 1 kilometer from one another. There is an anti-aircraft battery on the southeast coast of Suur Lake. There is hourly sleigh traffic between Hogland and Lavansaari during the night.

##### 2. Own Situation:

The Finnish icebreaker SISU had to return to Utoe with steamers in tow because of the ice situation.

Patrol boats "1003", "1007", and "1011" have left Hirtshals for tests of the Torpedo Experimental Station.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

U.S. merchant ships were given sailing instructions for the Caribbean Sea. (They are to follow zigzag courses, are to approach Aruba and Curacao during the day, and to proceed to Trinidad close to the shore on the east side of the Lesser Antilles.)

##### 2. Own Situation:

8 submarines established contact during the day with the convoy proceeding in southwesterly direction northeast of Newfoundland, and some of them were able to maintain contact for some time. 4 submarines have reported sinking 5 tankers and 3 steamers totalling 54,000 GRT. One tanker of 10,000 GRT should evidently be discounted, since she was attacked and hit by 3 submarines in succession.

It is particularly noteworthy that 2 of the tankers in the convoy were equipped with anti-torpedo nets, and that there was a submarine trap which evidently worked together with two escort vessels. Contact was also maintained with the convoy which is now in the western approaches of the North Channel. Attacks, however, have remained unsuccessful so far.

North of the Cape Verdes submarine U "505", en route south, met a



convoy of several fast steamers proceeding at 15 knots and escorted by planes. She was unable to establish contact.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

For copies of the telegrams of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Group North, relating to the supplementary situation report of 23 Feb., as well as for the Naval Staff directive about submarine operations in the north area, see 1/Skl I u 417/42 Gkdos. Chefs., 1/Skl I u 426/42 Gkdos. Chefs., and 1/Skl I u 427/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

In accordance with the opinion of the Naval Staff Operations Division (see War Diary 29 Jan.), the Naval Staff Submarine Division has asked the Naval Construction Division to reexamine and if possible advance the delivery dates of XB submarines, since due to the expansion of the whole naval theater these vessels are very important.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the morning British fighter planes flew over the Channel coast, causing some damage to traffic installations and causing a number of casualties in a marching infantry column by strafing.

For operations against the enemy force sighted by submarine U "377" off the Norwegian coast, see Enemy Situation, Norway.

2 steamers of 2,500 GRT each were severely damaged in a convoy off Flamborough Head. 12 enemy planes flew over the German Bight during the night of 24 Feb. No damage has been reported. 7 planes were reported over Norway, 3 over Holland, and 21 over Belgium and northern France. A total of 2 planes was shot down and one plane was seen to crash.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

On 22 Feb. 30 Italian fighter planes made a low-level attack on the Akroma airfield; results were observed. Aside from German air forces of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, 68 fighters, 17 reconnaissance planes, and 41 escort planes of the Italian Air Force went into action on 23 Feb. According to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, enemy attacks on German airfields in Cyrenaica have increased. In the afternoon, 3 Ju 88's attacked the Valletta submarine base with 3 SC 1000 bombs. 2 detonations were observed on the target; the third probably hit the Governor's palace.

### 3. Eastern Front:

The Air Force Operations Staff reports that a heavy cruiser entering Sevastopol was damaged by two bomb hits.

The Air Force was very active along the entire Eastern Front in support of Army operations except in the far north.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

Troop transport LLANGIBBY CASTLE left dock in Gibraltar. No enemy sighting reports were received in the central Mediterranean. In the eastern Mediterranean German air reconnaissance located 2 small convoys off the North African coast. Radio traffic between submarines and the commander of the 1st Submarine Flotilla as well as between Alexandria and Malta, with the Fleet Commander, North Atlantic participating, was very lively and urgent, so that it can be assumed that a supply operation has been planned or launched from Gibraltar.

Further evaluation of the photographs taken of Alexandria harbor on 18 Feb. shows that the QUEEN ELIZABETH, which was lying at anchor in the photographs taken on 7 Feb., was lying at the quarantine station on 18 Feb., the bow in water 8 to 9 meters deep, the stern in water 10 to 11 meters deep. Considering the draught of the ship, it must be assumed that she is grounded. No damage is visible. It seems, however, that the aft turret, which was still visible on 7 Feb., has disappeared. Oil traces in the vicinity of the ship may have originated from a tanker which is evidently beached about 200 meters from the QUEEN ELIZABETH.

The ROYAL SOVEREIGN-class battleship in the floating dock appears to have a damaged bow. No damage is visible on deck. The floating dock is surrounded by a net barrage at a distance of 50 meters.

2. Situation Italy:

The DUILIO group reentered Messina early on 24 Feb., the cruiser group in the afternoon. During the night of 22 Feb. and on the evening of 23 Feb. enemy planes attacked Benghazi and Tripoli without damage to military installations.

A belated report has been received that the tanker LUCANIA (8,106 GRT), which was supposed to remove Italian citizens from Ethiopia, was sunk by a British submarine on 13 Feb. in 39° 20' N, 17° 20' E, contrary to the agreement concluded with the British government. At this place an Italian torpedo boat, the CIRCE, for the first time sank an enemy submarine while using a German search receiver.

As ordered by the Chief, Naval Staff, the commander of the German Naval Command, Italy has been informed that the memorandum of the Italian Naval High Command about the German Naval Staff's proposal of 31 Oct. 1941 for mine operations in the Mediterranean is unsatisfactory; this memorandum was transmitted on 2 Feb. without comment by the German Naval Command, Italy. The Commander in Chief, Navy assumes that the opinions expressed in that memorandum have been superseded by the conference in Garmisch, so that the measures recommended in the proposal of the German Naval Staff will be carried out with dispatch.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamers BENGASI, PISANI, and ARGENTEA are on the return voyage from Tripoli to Naples; steamers BEPPO and DELIA are returning to Palermo. Tanker RONDINE arrived in Palermo. 8 naval barges are waiting in Pantelleria for better weather in order to proceed.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Departure of the SIENA transport group has been postponed



because of the weather. Otherwise the situation is unchanged.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a heavy cruiser entered Sevastopol in the morning. In addition there were 1 destroyer and 18 merchant ships in the harbor. 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, 18 steamers, and 2 tankers were located in Novorossisk, and 1 submarine on westerly course was sighted 90 miles south of Sevastopol.

Own Situation:

The port commander of Ak Mechet has taken over his post. The railroad bridge at Tighina has been opened to traffic.

The Naval Staff Operations Division agrees with the proposal of the Shipping and Transport Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division that a supply and transport office should be set up for the Black Sea, and requests the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to do whatever is necessary to establish this office at an early date. The Naval Staff Operations Division intends to request that Captain von Baumbach be sent at the appropriate time to assist the officer in charge of the supply and transport office for a limited period, because of his excellent knowledge of local conditions and his command of the Russian language.

5. Situation France:

The Military Attache, Rome reported to the Army High Command on 2 Feb. about the statements of General Cavallero concerning the Tunis problem. According to Cavallero it must be realized that an offensive on the Suez Canal can be launched and maintained only if the supply route via Tunis is safely in Axis hands. The Duce is said to have made the following statement in this matter:

At first certain political concessions must be made in order to bring France into the new European order. Only after it is sure that France will go along with the Axis is it safe to permit her to reinforce her troops in North Africa to any extent. The supply base Tunis must be occupied by German and Italian troops. The Italians do not hesitate to guarantee to the French that this will not change in any way the political structure of the country for the time being, and that the occupation will not prejudice the permanent status of Tunis. The Duce is convinced that a decision about the future of Tunis will not be made until the end of the war, and he has full confidence in the Fuehrer's promise that he will fully back Italy's demands on France when peace is concluded. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

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VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing special to report.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Fighting is continuing in the sector of the Von Kleist Group. Communication with German forces south of Losovaya in the Samara valley was reestablished. Enemy attacks were also repulsed in the sectors of the 6th and 2nd Armies.

Central Army Group:

At the 2nd Panzer Army all attacks were repulsed, partly by means of counterattacks. At the 4th Army 4 enemy tanks have blocked the highway. Enemy attacks south and north of Yuhnov were repulsed. Guerrilla warfare is going on around Vyazma. Northwest of Rzhev several enemy attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, and several villages were taken in a counterattack.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy fighting prevailed in the areas of Kholm and Staraya Russa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Enemy assault troops were repulsed on the Karelian Isthmus and at the Svir front. An enemy company which had crossed the Onozero Lake on the ice was captured.

3. North Africa:

Situation unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

On 24 Feb. Churchill delivered a speech in the House of Commons defending the war policy of the Government. He repeated the assertion that the more pressing need for defending territories closer home has not permitted adequate protection of the Far East. Also this time, the only trumps that he could mention were America's entry into the war and Russia's stamina. Churchill stated that due to the lack of air supremacy the loss of Singapore, which is not a fortress but a naval base, was inevitable. Britain's greatest concern of the moment is the defense of the Indian Ocean and the protection of the oil fields in the Near East. He declared that this war must and can be won as was World War I, during which Germany's victorious banners were likewise flying over all of Europe. The reorganization of the Cabinet, too, recalls the ordeals of World War I, but at the same time brings to mind the surprising turn of events in 1918.

During the debate, the Prime Minister was asked questions pertaining to the following subjects: cooperation between the branches of the Armed Forces; the Channel breakthrough of the German battleships; full details about the failure of air raids on Germany which were termed useless and wasteful, and were said to be consuming men and equipment urgently needed for naval and land operations.

Political Review No. 47, Paragraph 1a, contains a report about the organization of British propaganda broadcasting, which is under the direction of the Foreign Office. This report mentions the interesting fact that the English-speaking commentator of the German radio, "Lord Hawhaw", is quite popular with listeners in England.

India:

The leader of the Congress Party, Nehru, expects no change in policy as a result of the reorganization of the new British Cabinet, which he believes unwilling to accede to Indian demands.

Turkey:

On 24 Feb. a bomb exploded in Ankara in an attempt on the life of the German Ambassador, Von Papen.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt announced that a pact has been concluded between the U.S. and Great Britain, defining the terms of the Lend Lease Law. The final agreement will be made at a later date.

Argentina:

Vice President Castillo explicitly notified the departing German Ambassador that so long as he remains in office there will be no change in Argentine policy.

Japan:

The press emphasizes that Churchill's greatest error lies in overestimating the military strength of the U.S. A dyed-in-the-wool materialist,

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he judges the strength of naval forces only by their tonnage. Churchill, and with him Britain, are at present completely dominated by Roosevelt. So long as this state of affairs is tolerated by the British people it will be impossible to halt the collapse of the Empire.

A report from the German Embassy states that German authorities are particularly careful to emphasize the interdependence of German and Japanese victories; the more so because in the first flush of victory the Japanese are inclined to evaluate their own accomplishments out of all proportion to those of their German allies.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. In order to complete transport operations by 31 Mar. as scheduled, the Fuehrer has given permission to route shipments for Norway via the North Sea so far as necessary.

Group North is being informed of the above and is directed to see that 2 convoys of 4 transports each leave Hamburg every week. One of these convoys is to unload in Kristiansand South, the other in Oslo.

The Shipping and Transport Branch of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will furnish 4 steamers from the west area and 4 from Gdynia.

The transports from Gdynia will be transferred with the assistance of the SCHLESSEN before the hospital ship STUTTGART and the cruiser LEIPZIG are transferred.

The Chief, Naval Staff agreed to the above procedure after receiving a report from the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division.

II. In view of the fact that our submarines have observed enemy tankers using anti-torpedo nets (see War Diary 24 Feb.), the Chief, Naval Staff directs the Naval Ordnance Division, Torpedo Branch to report on the present stage of development of anti-torpedo net devices.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division asks for a decision concerning the renewed request from Group North to equip motor mine sweepers with torpedo tubes.

The Chief, Naval Staff decides that there are no reasons which would justify or demand a change in the Naval Staff's attitude concerning this problem.

IV. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division delivers a final report on the question of Italian transport submarines (see War Diary 24 Feb.).

V. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about Group North's critique of the brief battle report which the Commanding Admiral, Battleships filed on operation "Sportpalast".

For copy see 1/Skl 451/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the opinion of the Group. For copy of the corresponding notice from the Naval Staff to Group North, with copy to the Fleet Command and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, see 1/Skl 451/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.



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VI. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about the directive from the Armed Forces High Command to the Army Command, Lapland concerning operations for the summer of 1942. The defense of the Finnish area, particularly around Petsamo, remains the primary task. This area can be successfully defended only after the occupation of the Rybachi Peninsula. Not until then can Petsamo be used as a base for light naval forces. Because of the well-known difficulties connected with a frontal attack, the Peninsula will have to be seized by means of an amphibious operation. The Army Command, Lapland is to submit the plan of attack to the Armed Forces High Command. This plan is to be drawn up in close cooperation with the 5th Air Force and the Navy, which has been requested to assign for this purpose an experienced naval officer to the Army Command, Lapland or the Mountain Corps, Norway.

An attack on Loukhi is planned in case the above operation proves impossible. It is to be investigated whether Loukhi or Byelomorsk can serve as a base for launching an operation against Kem so as to disrupt the sea supply lines of the Russian group around Ukhta.

The attack against Murmansk as well as an attack by the Central Army Group against Kandalaksha are not feasible for the time being.

The Naval Staff Operations Division has completed a survey about the Navy's ability to support and facilitate the Army's land attack by a simultaneous attack from the sea. It arrives at the conclusion that the Navy can effectively support an attack on the Rybachi Peninsula by landing Army troops at several suitable points of the Sredni and Rybachi peninsulas.

Aside from favorable weather and wind conditions, the feasibility of the operation depends on whether the necessary men and equipment can be assembled in the Petsamo area in time.

The survey has been forwarded to the Armed Forces High Command, with copies to Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway. For copy see 1/Skl I op 428/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway are being notified at the same time that the Armed Forces High Command will presumably issue orders in the near future to the Army Command, Lapland to begin preparations for such an operation.

The Naval Staff is keeping the 20 naval barges previously mentioned by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division (see War Diary 17 Feb.) in reserve for a possible landing on the Rybachi Peninsula. In the meantime they may be used for transports in the Kirkenes-Petsamo area.

The Naval Staff Operations Division is also studying the possibility of laying mines in the waters around the Rybachi Peninsula. In this connection it must be kept in mind that the mine fields are intended to protect the landing, but should not obstruct it.

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#### Special Items

During conversations with the Chief of the Special Staff for Economic Warfare of the Armed Forces High Command and the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Tripartite Pact on 10 Feb. Admiral Nomura presented his personal estimate of the situation and of the possibilities

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for strategic cooperation between Japan and the other Axis powers. He is of the opinion that, aside from transporting troops and materiel to the British Isles and Soviet Russia, the Anglo-Americans will endeavor to use ships and planes for reinforcing their positions in the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, as well as in Iran and Iraq, in order to concentrate all their available land, sea, and air forces at the fronts in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of dealing a decisive blow to Italy, thereby splitting up the Axis, maintaining their control over Turkey, and at the same time improving their positions in Iran and Iraq so as to eliminate the threat to India. Therefore the Allies must consider all Axis operations against Russia as secondary, but all operations against positions and resources of the British Empire as of primary importance. Should a German advance to the southeast and south in the direction of the Caucasus and North Africa fail, Japanese efforts in that direction would be wasted and would lose their significance.

Nomura states that strategic cooperation can be achieved only along these lines.

The minutes of the above conference have been forwarded to the Armed Forces High Command, with copies to the Foreign Minister and the chiefs of the various branches of the Armed Forces. See l/Skl 3976/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

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Situation 25 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The U.S. cruisers CONCORD and LOUISVILLE, the destroyers MONAGHAN and SOMERS, as well as 2 other destroyers, have been located in North Ireland.

South Atlantic:

On 1 Feb. a very heavily escorted British convoy of 20 troop transports arrived in Freetown.

The auxiliary cruiser ASTURIAS arrived in Montevideo on 23 Feb.

Indian Ocean:

Large troop transports from the British Isles were expected to arrive in South African ports by the middle of Feb. The U.S. cruiser QUINCY was in Durban on 31 Jan. The U.S. destroyer MOFFET and 2 other destroyers called at Port Elizabeth and Simonstown. These vessels are patrolling the route to Trinidad. The British steamer JANETTE SKINNER, which sailed from Lourenco Marques on 23 Feb., had to return to port because the crew hired to replace the original Chinese crew, which had been arrested for mutiny, proved unable to handle the ship.

2. Neutrals:

For data about Fernando Po and Tangier, as well for information about the number of men in the Portuguese Navy see News Analysis No. 10,



Naval Staff, Foreign Navies Branch.

3. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has replied to the inquiry concerning the OSORNO. According to this information the ship which sailed on 23 Dec. may have been at approximately 30° W, 44° N on 22 Feb. This means a considerable deviation from the reckoned position and makes it appear even less likely that the distress signal from the EMBASSAGE was actually sent by the OSORNO. The OSORNO is not expected to reach the Bay of Biscay before 27 Feb. For further contents of the message from the Naval Attache see Telegram 1902.

A report from the Naval Attache in Madrid states that the departure of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN was delayed until the night of 23 Feb. because the captain was hesitant to sail earlier because of the strong winds. (See Telegram 2100.)

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that Japanese data about British mine fields in the Singapore area cannot be expected before a month from now. The Japanese Navy has made available a brief report about mine fields off Hongkong, containing data about the control loop gear for detecting submarines as well as about British mines. The report will be forwarded via the PORTLAND which sails on 26 Feb. (See Telegram 1343.)

The REGENSBURG received sailing instructions via Radiogram 1803. The instructions provide that the REGENSBURG is to meet and supply ship "10" at the new points "Hans", "Paul", "Karl", and "Max". Radiogram 1701 advised ship "10" accordingly.

The date on which the DOGGERBANK is to sail, as well as the time at which she will execute her assignment, is being left to the discretion of the ship's captain. The Naval Staff expects the vessel to leave her waiting area by 10 Mar. at the latest. Paragraphs D 4 and 5 of the operations order are pointed out as being particularly important in executing the operation. Corresponding directive via Radiogram 0933.

Report about the enemy situation via Radiograms 0641 and 0847.

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II. Situation West Area

Nothing to report.

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III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted an order to 2 British planes to investigate an object afire at sea northeast of Cromer. According to air reconnaissance there was one convoy off the Firth of Forth and another at the mouth of the Tyne. During the night of 25 Feb. there was lively enemy air activity over North Germany, with Kiel the main point of attack. Other enemy planes flew over Holland.

Own Situation:

Minesweeper and icebreaker escort for the SCHARNHORST from the Jade to the Elbe has been carried out. The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has been assigned to the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla en route to Norway to take part in minelaying operation "Hannover". 4th Minesweeper Flotilla, together with the OSTMARK will lay minefield 16.

On the evening of 24 Feb. an enemy plane crashed as a result of hitting the mast of the Swedish steamer MARIANNE after flying over her four times. During the night of 24 Feb. three enemy planes were shot down, most likely by the Heligoland and Wangeroog batteries. A fourth and a fifth plane were probably shot down at Ameland.

Group North has ordered the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North to lay minefields 4A and 4B. (See Telegram 1734.)

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported that a battleship and two cruisers with steam up were sighted at 1000 at Polyarnoye.

The presence of a battleship so close to German airfields is possible, but highly improbable. Possibly there is some confusion with a cruiser and two destroyers.

Own Situation:

Submarine and surface escort for the food transport from Porsanger Fjord to Lakse Fjord proceeded according to plan. It is suspected that the enemy planes which were observed in the Stadland area dropped mines.

The transfer of the 17th Patrol Boat Flotilla to the Commanding Admiral, Norway, which Group North had intended to carry out in the near future, has been cancelled for urgent repairs. Until it has been decided which shipyards are to undertake the repairs the flotilla will be assigned to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North for the troop transports in the North Sea. As compensation the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North will transfer the 14th Minesweeper Flotilla to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses West. The 5th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is en route to Norway. After finishing minelaying operations the 5th and 4th PT Boat Flotillas will likewise be at the disposal of the Commanding Admiral, Norway. Four of the minesweepers are to be transferred to Trondheim to be at the disposal of the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast for escort and submarine chase with the Fleet. The Naval Staff has been informed about Group North's directive to the Commanding Admiral, Norway. (See Telegram 1754.)

Following the inquiry from the Naval Staff Operations Division, the Commanding Admiral, Norway submitted a list of vessels that were laid up in his area through shortage of oil supplies. 27 valuable vessels were involved, and this largely explains the recent lack of escort forces. According to the Commanding Admiral, Norway, all of these vessels have been put back into service as a result of an increase in the allocation of fuel oil.

The special regulations concerning communication between the Air Force and the Navy for the purpose of transmitting reconnaissance reports and maintaining contact during fighter operations in connection with operation "Sportpalast" proved of value. Hence Group North suggests to the



5th Air Force that in the future arrangements similar to those for operation "Sportpalast" should be adhered to, thus making sure that naval commands receive prompt and full reports about Air Force reconnaissance in the area of the 5th Air Force. (See Telegram 2151.)

It will be of interest to see after some time has elapsed to what extent this attempt to improve communications between these two branches of the Armed Forces has succeeded.

In accordance with the conference with the Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 23 Feb.) Group North was informed that the Chief, Naval Staff upholds his decision to grant the Commanding Admiral, Norway's request for extending the fishing areas. The disadvantages that would arise from reducing the Norwegian catch would have a very bad effect on the German food situation, which is already strained; by comparison the Naval Staff believes that the disadvantages for naval warfare if the fishing areas are expanded are not so serious, particularly since these drawbacks would become evident only if naval operations were conducted during the fishing season in the fishing areas. Moreover Group North is being informed that it was necessary to make an immediate decision on the request of the Commanding Admiral, Norway in order to utilize every single day for fishing in the extended area. Group North is also being informed that an oversight was responsible for the fact that the Naval Staff Operations Division sent the telegram of 19 Feb. directly to the Commanding Admiral, Norway, with only a copy to Group North.

On the basis of this decision, Group North reports that it withdraws its objections to extending the fishing areas. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is instructed by the Group to issue an emphatic warning to the fishing vessels not to cross the 60 mile limit.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

The Admiral, Baltic Countries reports lively enemy air activity in the coastal area; several bombs were dropped.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Ship "7" and ship "47" are en route from Kristiansand South to Horten with 12 steamers. Patrol vessels "1003", "1007" and "1011" have again entered Hirtshals after completion of Torpedo Experimental Station trials.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

One British ship was observed west of the entrance to the North Channel and another northwest of Iceland. Four British destroyers refuelled on 22 and 23 Feb. at Ponta Delgada.

U.S. tanker FLORIDA is badly damaged and U.S. steamer RARITAN has run aground; both are in need of assistance.

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South of Porto Rico the British steamer LA CARRIERE (5,586 GRT) was torpedoed and sank. A U.S. radio station reported that two submarines were sighted 200 miles east of Karata (Nicaragua).

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "94" reports sinking the EMPIRE HAIL (7,005 GRT) another steamer from the southwestbound convoy. Submarines have been instructed to break off operations against this convoy at nightfall and to proceed as ordered to the assigned attack areas. Submarine U "752" scored two hits on the steamer PULK in the second convoy.

Submarine U "161", operating in the Caribbean, reported sinking a tanker of 5,000 GRT and the U.S. steamer LIHU (7,001 GRT) off Trinidad. The submarine assumes that the LIHU was a decoy, since the ship avoided 3 torpedoes, apparently by means of a listening device. Submarine U "129" reported sinking 3 steamers totalling 18,400 GRT.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "652" sighted a convoy consisting of 2 steamers with 2 escort vessels northwest of Sollum Bay, but was chased off.

Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

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VI. Air Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the night of 25 Feb. between 2218 and 0440 enemy planes flew over the area of Denmark, Fehmarn, Wilhelmshaven, and Norden. One incursion was made via Sylt, Flensburg, Koeslin, Bromberg, Gnesen, Wollin, and Ruegen, and back. Five localities report damage. The heaviest attacks were on Kiel. More detailed reports are still lacking. Enemy planes also flew over Norway, Holland, Belgium, and northern France.

2. Mediterranean Area:

Complete photographic reconnaissance has shown that enemy air forces have been transferred from the Alexandria area to the front. There was a total of 90 planes at the airfields on Malta, in contrast to approximately 200 in December 1941. Bad weather and air field conditions interfered with operations of the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, South.

3. Eastern Front:

35 planes attacked the harbor and city of Sevastopol on the evening of 23 Feb. with visible effect. The reported attack on a heavy cruiser in Yuzhnaya Bay took place on 24 Feb. at 1050. Eight Ju 88's scored one hit with an SC 1000 bomb and another with an SC 500 bomb. There were several near misses. Air reconnaissance showed that the heavy cruiser was still in Yuzhnaya Bay on 25 Feb.

There was not much air activity on the Army fronts on account of bad weather.



VII. Mediterranean Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Situation Italy:

On 24 Feb. submarine chase was carried out south of Marettimo after a submarine had been sighted. Nothing is known about the results. The enemy again made air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi. A plane crashed in flames in the vicinity of Benghazi.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 3rd transport group carried the following German cargo to Tripoli: 198 men, 484 vehicles, 16 motorcycles, 10,575 tons of supplies for the Armed Forces, 1,093 bags of mail.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Escorted transports with Italian troops and artillery entered Candia on the evening of 24 Feb. The SIENA transport group left Piraeus for Suda on 25 Feb.

Black Sea:

According to an unconfirmed report a Turkish auxiliary sailing vessel that put out from Burgas was sunk by a Russian submarine in the approaches to the Bosphorus. No further reports have been received.

5. Situation France:

The Naval Intelligence Division report on the organization, disposition and state of readiness of the French fleet is included in report no. 10 of the News Analysis, Foreign Navies.

6. Situation Turkey:

In reply to an inquiry by Group South, the Naval Staff states that there are no operational intentions or plans should Turkey turn against Germany or should there be a British attack on Turkey. The Naval Staff considers both these contingencies impossible at present.

VIII. Situation in East Asia

According to the report of the Military Attache, Bangkok of 24 Feb., the Japanese are expected to renew their offensive in Burma on the Sittang River, on 25 Feb. The enemy air force consists mainly of American volunteer pilots. In Sumatra the Japanese advanced southwest from Palembang for about 180 kilometers along the railroad line. The southern part of Bali is in Japanese hands. The landing at Koepang was prepared by naval paratroopers. Fighting is still in progress there.

On the basis of reports by the German Military Attache, Bangkok, the Special Staff for Mercantile and Economic Warfare has compiled a short survey of Japanese landing tactics. For copy see 1/Sk1 4613/42 Gkdos. in War

Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

No important change in the situation. Minor attacks up to battalion strength were repulsed. Our advance south of Losovaya was successful.

Central Army Group:

The highway between Demenskoye and Yuzhnov was cleared by counterattack. The enemy unsuccessfully attacked our advance units south of Sukhinichi. There were no important actions on the eastern front of the Army Group. South of Byeloi the enemy was driven from the highway.

Northern Army Group:

Our reinforcements are advancing slowly in the direction of Kholm. Southeast of Staraya Russa we are advancing toward the north-east. Enemy attacks south and north of Staraya Russa were repulsed. The enemy is attempting to advance in the rear area toward Lyubovo. Our security forces are en route to Lyubovo.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No change in the situation.

3. North Africa:

The 4th Indian Division in the Gazala position was relieved and transferred to the area south of Sidi Oma. Normal patrol activity on both sides.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

During the debate in the House of Commons on 25 Feb., in which some quite contradictory opinions were expressed, Hore Belisha was well received when he came out for a new deal for India and criticized the prevailing method of waging air warfare on enemy territory. The Conservatives emphasized that the only things which could bring about a British defeat are inability to regain mastery of the seas within a definite period or annihilation of the Russian army. The Laborites pointed out the Soviet method of control over industry and demanded nationalization of all important industries. One Laborite emphasized that the majority of the Asiatics refuse to tolerate British administration any longer. Malaya will never return to the British fold. Cripps, as government spokesman, closed the debate, saying that he is an intermediary between Parliament and the War Cabinet and will try at all times to bring about a compromise between both points of view. He described the present state of the war as gloomy, but stated that the people can and will carry the heavy burden. Nobody will be permitted to shirk his patriotic duties. The government will soon come to a decision about the Indian question and colonial matters will be examined; the air raids on Germany were started when Britain was not so hard pressed. Now, however, the situation is quite different. The government will also decide this question in the near future.

London political circles connect Churchill's declaration about the serious shipping losses with the submarine attacks on the American coast, where the coastal islands are most likely being used as bases. The Anglo-American powers can be expected to take determined countermeasures.

According to a report of the Transocean News Agency, Halifax and Welles have agreed to demand a binding statement from the Vichy government concerning the stand to be taken by the French fleet and colonies, especially Madagascar, with regard to German naval warfare. A clear explanation will be demanded for the transfer of the DUNKERQUE to Toulon.

Stalin's declarations that the Red Army does not intend to destroy the German people have aroused great surprise in the British public. The Daily Herald, which hitherto shouted loudest for retribution, hurries now in a most servile manner to say that in Great Britain as well the people are not altogether convinced of the need to destroy Germany.

Spain:

In a newspaper article a close friend of Franco, General Kindelan, terms German cooperation with Japan betrayal of the white race. Likewise the alliance of the Anglo-American powers with China and Russia is unnatural. The Spanish Foreign Office does not approve of the article.

The Portuguese press displays similar trends.

Rumania:

According to a report from the Bucharest Legation, Antonescu expressed disapproval of the German minority's support of the anti-church movement.

U.S.A.:

Secretary Knox told the officers of the Navy that the day is not far off when the U.S. fleet will no longer be numerically inferior: Since 7 December 1941 the Americans have learned to be realistic and not to put on false airs.

Chile:

As the result of U.S. pressure, a Chilean armed forces mission will go to the States, but it has strict instructions from the government. A number of coastal batteries and about 80 instructors are en route to Chile from the U.S.A.

Dutch East Indies:

According to British reports, the Dutch East Indies government has decided to grant autonomy to the country.

Japan:

The government is engaged in framing a reply to Portugal regarding Timor. A friendly settlement of differences is anticipated. If necessary it is intended to call upon the Axis powers to arbitrate.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports that the listening equipment for Trondheim will be sent from Nordenham on 28 Feb.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that the Italian navy has requested a list of new German naval vessels and naval losses. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to providing this list, excluding submarine losses.

It is reported that the Armed Forces High Command directive concerning subordination of the Naval Shore Command, Kirkenes under the Army Command, Lapland as an exceptional measure was issued in accordance with the agreement reached at Fushrer Headquarters between the Armed Forces High Command and the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division (see War Diary 20 Feb.).

III. The Chief, Naval Staff approves the final report and orders of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division regarding the utilization of the small cruisers and old battleships. (The NUERNBERG and the KOELN will be used in operations of the nucleus fleet; the LEIPZIG and the EMDEN will continue to be used as training ships; the SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and the SCHLESIEEN are to be used as training ships.)

For copy of the Quartermaster Division order see 1/Skl 4708/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 601 left for Odessa on 25 Feb. The motorized detachment will follow by mid-March.

In connection with the question of using naval forces, the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division points to the difficulties caused by the lack of officers. The Officer Personnel Division is unable to satisfy even the simplest demands without considerable shifting of personnel



and without drawing heavily on junior officers. At present Captain Rollmann has been ordered by the Commander in Chief, Navy to investigate the personnel situation of all naval offices on the spot; the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division believes that it would be desirable if a list could be furnished on this occasion showing the assignments of the 1,700 naval officers.

IV. In accordance with the directive of the Chief, Naval Staff, Group North has been requested to look into the following matters and offer suggestions (the Commanding Admiral, Norway has been informed):

a. The defense of the approaches to Trondheim via Frohavet, Ramsøe Fjord, and Griphoelen by deep barrages.

b. The closing of the gaps in the minefield in Trondheim Leden by means of reliable deep barrages.

V. According to a report from the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the increased movements of warships have given rise to a situation whereby the allocation of fuel oil, 50,000 tons per month, is no longer sufficient. Our reserves have been reduced to 150,000 tons through deliveries to Italy and since we ourselves have had to draw upon them. The Chief, Naval Staff will refer to the importance of the oil situation at every conference with the Fuehrer.

VI. The Naval Staff Operations Division considers it desirable to commit further fleet forces in the Norwegian theater and suggests:

a. Transfer of the SCHEER as soon as possible to Narvik.

b. Transfer to Norway of the GNEISENAU and the HIPPER during the March new moon period.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

For the directive on this matter to Group North see 1/Skl I op 461/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

In this connection the question was discussed as to who is to command the fleet forces in Norway, the Fleet Commander or the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. The Chief, Naval Staff agreed with the proposal made by the Naval Staff that the Naval Staff should decide this matter later, depending on the situation and the number of ships involved. In any case the Fleet Staff is not to transfer to Norway; it must remain in home waters on the HELA, so as to avoid interrupting current operations.

VII. On 15 Jan. Group North reported on its plans in view of the existing enemy situation in the eastern Baltic. While the enemy will probably remain on the defensive, Group North takes account of the possibility that he might go over to the offensive if a change in command should be made.

Since we will still have only a few forces available, we must resort in general to mine warfare, which will be supplemented by light naval forces.

The Chief, Naval Staff assented to the planned mine barrages (see War Diary 26 Jan.

Following the conference with the Chief, Naval Staff on the measures planned and the requests of the Group, the detailed opinion of the Naval



Staff is recorded in 1/Skl I op 416/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

VIII. The Chief, Naval Staff reported on the personnel difficulties at the German Naval Command, Italy due to the fact that Captain Kreisch as Commander, Submarines, Italy refuses to take orders from the Chief of Staff of the German Naval Command, Italy. The Chief, Naval Staff decides that the Commander, Submarines, Italy is to be independent, that is, that he is to accept orders only from the Commanding Admiral of the German Naval Command, Italy.

IX. The Chief of the Torpedo Inspectorate reports on the findings of the investigation of the unexplained torpedo failures that have occurred to an increasing extent in submarine warfare since the beginning of January. In the opinion of the Torpedo Inspectorate these and the earlier torpedo failures were most probably caused by leakage in the depth gear pocket in torpedo type G 7e. Orders have been given to eliminate this fault as far as possible by better servicing; however this cannot remove constructional weaknesses. Therefore the Torpedo Inspectorate has decided to order 500 of the new depth gear (with "D" priority) designed by Baurat Meycke which has proved its efficiency in about 120 trials at the Torpedo Experimental Station. It is in a more advanced stage of development than other similar devices. In this gear the connecting rods are replaced by membranes guaranteeing a perfectly watertight transmission of impulse. It is expected that torpedoes equipped with this gear will be ready by the end of the year. The Chief, Naval Staff is pleased that the solution of the inexplicable torpedo failures is now so far advanced and agrees to the suggestion made by the Torpedo Inspectorate, which is also endorsed by the Torpedo Branch of the Ordnance Division.

The Chief, Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division then reported on the problem of combatting anti-torpedo nets and, in agreement with the Chief of the Torpedo Inspectorate and Professor Cornelius, came to the conclusion that this question cannot be solved by using a pistol with a cutting or explosive action, but rather by further development of the remote firing pistol.

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### Special Items

I. The Armed Forces High Command, War Economy and Armaments Branch report on the war economy for January 1942 observes that most of the work at this time was concerned with measures to carry out the Fuehrer Directive of 10 Jan. All sources of manpower were mobilized to increase Army armament as required, while at the same time maintaining Air Force and submarine armament as before. It is difficult to accomplish because numerous skilled workers have been drafted, and raw materials required cannot be provided. In addition special difficulties arose in January through the lack of coal, power, and fuel. The War Economy and Armaments Branch believes that once the system of so-called armament soldiers is put into effect, it will not be altogether impossible to fill the need for skilled workers. In addition it is anticipated that about one million Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers can be used. It is further hoped to increase the manpower supply by recruiting additional foreign workers, if necessary by force in the occupied areas; by using more women; by curtailing consumer industries; and by a vast coordination program in industry carried out by the Reich Industrial Commission (Reichsgruppe Industrie). For uniform handling of all these measures Ministerialdirektor Mansfeld has been made Reich Commissioner for the



Labor Supply.

The transport situation has been aggravated to an unexpected degree through the severe cold. Even in the armament industry plants had to be shut down. Traffic has been at a standstill on the inland waterways since 15 Jan.

The raw material situation has also been adversely influenced by the transport difficulties; especially the coal supply situation has become acute. 39 armament factories had to be shut down completely and 5 partially because of the coal shortage. Difficulties in power supply have caused decrease in production in the aluminum industry also. The first plant that produced synthetic toluol in Germany had to be shut down. For a while restriction of toluol consumption will be unavoidable. Rumanian oil deliveries fell short of the anticipated quantities on account of the transport difficulties and unfavorable weather.

II. A survey of shipping operations in all areas carried on by the Navy from 14 Jun 1939 to 31 Dec. 1941, has been drawn up by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division Shipping and Transport Branch. See 1/Skl 7227/42 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. For the order of the Naval High Command to arm fishing cutters in Norway with 3.7 cm. Army anti-tank guns, see 1/Skl 4634/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

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Situation 26 Feb.I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Group West informs the OSORNO by Radiogram 1705 that her position was not computed correctly so far because the wrong date of departure was given. Today she is assumed to be in an area approximately 300° and 150 miles from point "Bruno"; air reconnaissance and protective measures will be continued.

Radiogram 1054 contains instructions to the REGENSBURG about the position of reference points.

Radiogram 1738 informs all ships in foreign waters that the PIETRO ORSEOLO has arrived, and that the sum total of submarine successes off the U.S. East Coast and in the Caribbean Sea amount to 580,000 GRT.

Information on the enemy situation is sent by Radiograms 0640 and 1543.

For supplement to operations orders for ship "28" concerning the political attitude of South America see 1/Skl I k 454/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, stated on 13 Feb. that the happenings in the Channel and off Singapore when the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE were sunk, have brought home the paramount importance of a naval air arm for naval warfare. According to air reconnaissance, there was an outbound convoy of 7 steamers and an inbound convoy of 8 steamers in the North Channel. A convoy of 10 tankers and one steamer was sighted in Belfast Lough on a 330° course, with a cruiser and two patrol vessels, and some distance to the north an inbound convoy of 10 steamers and a destroyer.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

See 1/Skl I Nord 458/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIB for directives of the Naval Staff to the Naval Attache, Madrid that the ELSA ESSBERGER is not to leave Ferrol before 7 Mar.; to the Chief, Naval Communications Division to inform Group West on the methods of communicating with the Naval Attache, Madrid and with the ELSA ESSBERGER; and to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to reinforce the anti-aircraft armament of the ELSA ESSBERGER as suggested by Group West by an anti-aircraft detachment.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

Special Item:

Group West has made available a survey covering vessels under the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, which at the end of February had been out of commission for some time. These include 16 mine detonating vessels, the 12th Minesweeper Flotilla, the 36th Minesweeper Flotilla, the 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla in their entirety, as well as 3 motor minesweepers, 14 minesweepers, and 5 patrol vessels from other flotillas. (See Telegram 2000.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

At 0735 British forces at Scapa received the code word "Archer". At 1748 a British reconnaissance plane reported 7 northbound merchant vessels and 1 escort vessel 54 miles west-southwest of Blaavanto Huk (obviously one of our northbound convoys en route from Heligoland to Kristiansand). Lively minesweeping activity off the southeast coast.

2. Own Situation:

At 0230 an enemy plane was seen to crash in flames in the Sylt sector. 3 enemy planes made an unsuccessful low-level attack on northbound convoy 816 in quadrant AN 9328 at 1755. Mine detonating vessels "145" and "147" were attacked by 2 enemy planes in quadrant AN 8576. Mine detonating vessel "145" was damaged. The operation was discontinued.



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In the morning Group North issued the code word "Hannover" for the first mine operation of the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla to reinforce the "Westwall" barrages.

The Fuehrer wishes to have a report by the end of the week on planned troop transports via the North Sea covering the following points:

- a. Over-all planning and scope
- b. Type and number of troops
- c. Size and speed of the steamers
- d. Tactical handling of the convoy

The Fuehrer suggests that the first operation be carried out on a particularly large scale, since it is expected to succeed; later the enemy will probably take countermeasures.

Telegram 1525 contains the directive of the Naval Staff to Group North, with the addition that the size of the first transport group depends on the available tonnage; that information on points a to c will be provided by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division together with the General Staff; and that the Group is to report by 27 Feb. its plans for point d.

Group North emphatically requests once more the transfer from the west of 12 tugboats, to be employed with German crews, since the Commanding Admiral, France has declared, in agreement with Group West, that only 5 tugboats can be turned over immediately and a sixth only after a three month's shipyard period. (See Telegram 2035.)

An investigation will be made by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

## 2. Norway:

### Enemy Situation:

Lively radio traffic in the Murmansk area on 25 Feb. Air reconnaissance on 26 Feb. to check the results of air and photo reconnaissance of 25 Feb. found no battleship in the entire Murmansk Bay. The 3 cruisers reported on 25 Feb. turned out to be steamers. In the Kola Bay a group of 22 steamers and 1 tanker, and a group of 3 steamers and 1 destroyer were sighted. It is possible that the reconnaissance plane mistook this destroyer for a battleship on 25 Feb. Daventry reports that a British submarine torpedoed the PRINZ EUGEN off the Norwegian coast.

### Own Situation:

Convoy and supply traffic according to plan. On 25 Feb. at 2330, shipping was permitted in the Ytre Fjord and Griphoelen; likewise at Laeroelsosen, after a check by mine detonating vessel. In the afternoon and evening of 25 Feb. lively enemy air activity over the west and south coast; numerous bombs were dropped, some of them time bombs which exploded in the air.

In order to gain a good picture of the British shipping to Russia, and, if opportunity arises, to operate against it, Group North requests the 5th Air Force to reconnoiter this area systematically, if possible daily, and to find out the route and speed of the convoys around Jan Mayen. The main area to be reconnoitered is between the island and

about 100 miles southeast thereof. The Naval Staff will support this request with the Commander in Chief, Air.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

The Reuter agency reports officially that the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU suffered heavy damage and are in dock at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, respectively.

##### 2. Own Situation:

The air attack on Kiel on the night of 25 Feb. caused heavy damage to buildings of the shipyard and of the Deutsche Werke. The fire at the coal depot of the naval shipyard was extinguished. The naval barracks ship MONTE SARMIENTO was burned out amidships through a direct hit, but the fire was brought under control. Severe loss of life may be expected. Additional damage in the buildings of the Torpedo Inspectorate, the paymaster's office, and in the vicinity of the Bluecher Harbor. Many doors and windows were damaged. Slight damage at the Moenkeberg oil depot and the explosives experimental plant of the Naval Chemical and Physical Experimental Station. 20 planes took part in the attack from 0227 to 0417. For additional details see Telegrams 0723, 0753, 1130 and 1830. By evening 5 dead and 21 wounded had been reported on the MONTE SARMIENTO.

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#### V. Submarine Warfare

##### 1. Enemy Situation:

An American patrol plane attacked a submarine southwest of Martinique.

The U.S. Secretary of the Navy announced that in January and February 56 attacks were made on enemy submarines in the Atlantic. 3 were sunk and 4 damaged. According to reports in the press the Norwegian steamer BLINK (2,701 GRT) and the U.S. tanker CITIES SERVICE EMPIRE (8,103 GRT) were sunk by submarines off the Atlantic coast of America. A submarine sank the Belgian steamer GANDIA (9,626 GRT) en route from Liverpool to St John's. The U.S. steamer COFRESI, which allegedly was torpedoed on the night of 23 Feb. off the southern coast of Cuba, is lying undamaged in a U.S. port.

##### 2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "502" sank the steamers GRETAFIELD (10,000 GRT) and THALIA (8,329 GRT) in the Caribbean, and achieved a hit with her last torpedo upon an empty tanker of 6,000 GRT. The submarine reports lively traffic of unconvoyed ships in the Windward Passage and at Aruba in quadrant EC 67.

In the Mediterranean west of Sollum Bay submarine U "652" established contact with a westbound convoy. No additional details have come in as yet.



Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

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## VI. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For reconnaissance results in the North Channel see Situation West Area. In the night 33 of our planes dropped mines in the Humber. From 2120 on enemy planes flew over Denmark, Schleswig Holstein, Bremen, and Borkum. The attack concentrated on Kiel. Damage has not yet been reported. 6 incursions were made over western France.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance attacks upon Malta were continued. During the attack on the torpedo depot of Calafranca the results could not be observed because of the glare of searchlights.

### 3. Eastern Front:

On all Army fronts attacks on enemy columns, areas of concentration, and rolling stock, with good effect. For results of reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean see Enemy Situation Norway.

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## VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, the carrier ARGUS, a cruiser of the DIDO class, and 3 destroyers left Gibraltar on a westerly course.

According to an unconfirmed Italian report the infantry garrison of the island of Gozzo off Malta has been withdrawn on account of difficulties in supply. Otherwise nothing to report.

### 2. Italian Situation:

During the night of 25 Feb., enemy air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi. No military damage.

### 3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa

Steamers returned from Tripoli to Italian harbors according to plan without any unusual incidents. 4 landing craft sailed from Lampedusa for Tripoli on the evening of 25 Feb.

### 4. Area Naval Group South:

#### Aegean Sea:

A Greek steamer of 464 GRT with a cargo of fuel blew up north of Chalkis. Cause of explosion is unknown.

#### Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Southwest of Yalta a surfaced submarine was forced to submerge by fire from German anti-tank guns on shore.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The railroad between Bangkok and Singapore is again functioning on an emergency basis. The occupation of Bali is proceeding successfully. There is as yet no Japanese confirmation of the press reports that a U.S. carrier, supposedly the YORKTOWN, has been damaged.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

On the Sevastopol and Feodosiya fronts enemy attacks were repulsed. These attacks were in company and battalion strength and were supported by artillery and planes. It is supposed that they were undertaken to win favorable jumping off points for a large-scale attack. According to reports of the Rumanian intelligence service, the Russians have unloaded great quantities of war material on the Kerch peninsula, mainly heavy tanks and artillery.

The enemy continued his attacks on the left wing of Von Kleist Army Group supported by numerous heavy tanks. The fighting is continuing.

Central Army Group:

After strong artillery preparation the enemy succeeded in breaking through our lines east of Volkhov with a few tanks. Counter-attacks are in progress. Enemy attacks west of Medyn and upon the defensive front were repulsed. A Russian cavalry group is being surrounded in the area southwest of Vyazma. Enemy attacks were repulsed along the Moscow-Vyazma highway. A few Russian tanks succeeded in breaking through northwest of Rzhev. Enemy attacks were repulsed south of the railroad from Rzhev to Velikie Luki. There is heavy enemy pressure on the supply line south of Byelev.

Northern Army Group:

Heavy fighting continues southwest of Kholm. Enemy pressure on the advance units of the II Army Corps southeast of Staraya Russa continues. An enemy attack was repelled south of this town. Enemy operations are still in progress to block the supply line near Lyuban.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation generally unchanged.



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3. North Africa:

Routine reconnaissance activity on both sides.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to Reuter the relations between Washington and Vichy are extremely strained. Welles has stated that for the present he will not give any explanations about the "ambiguous situation" in these relations.

Great Britain:

The First Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander, stated in the House of Commons on 26 Feb. when referring to the naval budget that the task of the British Fleet has been enormously expanded since the loss of the French Navy. While Axis shipping plies mainly in waters safe from air attacks, the Battle of the Atlantic has turned into a battle of the seven seas. Despite this, 22 German auxiliary cruisers and supply vessels were sunk in 1940, together with 2,500,000 GRT of Axis merchant shipping. The Axis has lost almost double the number of merchant vessels in its transports to North Africa as Britain has in transports to the Middle East. Corvettes have proved their value in action. British shipbuilding has risen nearly 100% since the outbreak of the war. Following the grave losses up to April 1941, a change took place after the Greek campaign which can be explained by the improved convoy system, greater experience of the crews, and American assistance. As a result, imports to England have risen steadily. Losses in convoyed ships have been kept just under 1/2%. Since the start of the war, British submarines have sunk or damaged 326 enemy ships, among them 64 war vessels. Besides this the air force sank 45 warships and 345,000 GRT of merchant vessels of the enemy. The British Navy has grown to be three to four times as large as in peacetime. So many wished to enlist in the Navy that thousands had to be rejected. The NELSON was damaged twice, the RESOLUTION, MALAYA, ILLUSTRIOUS and FORMIDABLE each once, and all have been repaired.

During the debate the Admiralty was very strongly criticized as times. The Prime Minister's explanation of the German vessels' break through the Channel was given a poor reception. Apparently the defensive power of British ships is less than that of German ships, as demonstrated by the BISMARCK in particular. A Conservative Admiral ascribed the failure in the Channel to the lack of unified command of the RAF. It was stated that the crews assigned had had only limited experience in the use of aerial torpedoes. Another Conservative member said it had been a grave mistake to sign the naval treaty with Germany, on account of which the building of battleships had to be abandoned. Admiral Keyes sharply criticized the poor performance of the shipyards. A representative of the Admiralty admitted that loss of production was quite serious in the shipbuilding industry during the past year. However, the production shows a satisfactory increase now, so that ships in need of repair do not have to wait for room in the shipyards.

India:

The leader of the untouchables, Ambazar, declared that the hegemony of the Hindus is a grave threat to the fifty million oppressed people. He demanded from the British Government a proclamation, according to which India is to achieve Dominion status within three years after the end of the war, on the condition that the various elements in India agree, within one year after the cessation of hostilities, to end the caste system. In case such an agreement cannot be achieved, the question should be submitted to an international court of justice, whose decision



should be incorporated in the constitution of the future Indian dominion.

Egypt:

According to a report of the Transocean News Agency, the former government parties have decided not to take part in the coming elections, as the Wafd Government controls the entire administration and thus free elections are impossible. Other reports have it that the present Government is unwilling to release food supplies for the British troops, before the vital needs of the civilian population are satisfied. It is said that determined British measures have been taken in reply.

Spain:

The Foreign Ministry issued a sharp denial of rumors circulating in countries of the Western Hemisphere, according to which German submarines have supply bases in the Canary Islands.

The Spanish press states that public opinion in Portugal is far less excited by the Japanese occupation of Timor, than by the previous occupation through the Dutch and Australians. It may be expected that the Japanese will evacuate Timor, as soon as the arrival of Portuguese troops assures the neutrality of the island. This friendly attitude toward Portugal is attributed to the recent conferences between Salazar and Franco.

Portugal:

The Japanese Government has suggested in Lisbon that the transport SAO BELO and dispatch boat ZARCO should remain east of the 90° longitude up to 10 Mar.

The Japanese Government will afterwards set the route to Timor and the points of debarkation there. The Portuguese troops are to have full freedom of action on Timor, with the exception of a few strategically important points, which the Japanese will keep for the time being. The civil administration is to remain entirely in Portuguese hands.

U.S.S.R.:

Litvinov stated in a speech in New York that Hitler's forces can be destroyed only through a simultaneous offensive at two or more widely separated points. Allied victory or defeat depends on the outcome of the German offensive in Russia during the coming Spring.

Africa:

It is reported from various sources that the Allies are busily organizing West and Central Africa. A network of strategic highways is being built in great haste to connect French Equatorial Africa with the Sudan and Kenya. A number of up-to-date air fields are being constructed.

U.S.A.:

Secretary of War Stimson emphasized that it is quite difficult to send reinforcements to the South Pacific on account of the vast distances. General Wavell has shown himself absolutely equal to his task.

East Asia:

In view of the contest now going on in East Asia, it is of interest to note that out of the estimated two billion inhabitants of the globe ap-

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proximately one billion belong to the yellow race, 680 million to the white, 140 million to the black, 28 million to the brown, and 18 million to the red race. Of the 170 million half-breeds approximately 123 million are Asiatics.

Japan:

According to reports from the Foreign Ministry, the negotiations with Portugal regarding Timor were satisfactory.

Hungary:

On the occasion of the election of the regent's deputy a split occurred in the Arrow Cross party. One faction has joined the government party.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. In connection with the damage to the PRINZ EUGEN, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships reports that the rudder blade and mainpiece were completely torn off and the steering gear was heavily damaged, and that it will be impossible to undertake the repair work in Trondheim. Furthermore, the tanks for drinking and washing water in compartment 12 have sprung leaks, likewise three oil bunkers in compartments 1 and 12. It is probable that 6 additional bunkers of compartments 3 and 4 have also sprung leaks.

The losses have risen to a total of 9 dead, including the 2 previously reported as missing.

According to the estimates of the Trondheim shipyard, provisional repairs, consisting in removing the broken part, making the stern watertight, and installing a temporary rudder, can be completed within eight weeks. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships considers that the quickest way to repair the ship would be to start building a new stern in a German shipyard at once and to attach it after the ship has been transferred home.

For copy of the report to the Naval Staff, to the Naval Construction Division, to Group North and to the Fleet see 1/Skl 4769/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa, File "Sportpalast".

II. According to reports of Naval Station, Baltic Sea and of the GNEISENAU, the ship suffered two bomb hits on the stern during the air attack on Kiel, in the night of 26 Feb. at 2350. Turret A burned out. The magazines of turret B are flooded. The fire in the forward part of the ship has not been put out yet. For a preliminary report on the attack and the damage by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Fleet to the Fleet Commander at the Naval High Command, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III, file "Bomb Hit on the GNEISENAU". So far it seems that 90 men were killed. As an emergency measure the SCHARNHORST was transferred at once to a less conspicuous berth, and the camouflage of the ship was improved. It is considered essential to increase the anti-aircraft defenses of Kiel and to provide smoke screen equipment for the main area at least. Since the Foerde is frozen over, the dock and the ships are easily recognizable. The Commanding Admiral, East suggests that the SCHARNHORST be transferred to the east. The Fleet Command, however, proposes that the SCHARNHORST be left in Kiel for speedy repairs, while the GNEISENAU should be transferred east as soon as she is ready to sail.



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The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the question of smoke protection for Kiel be reinvestigated, and the necessary steps taken.

No other reports were made or decisions taken.

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Special Items

Cable projectors: Following the request made in the summer by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North for cable rocket defenses against low-level plane attacks, the Naval Ordnance Division has developed usable equipment after the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North had himself made unsatisfactory experiments. The DSR 4000 was released for production at the beginning of February after several delays; the DSR 1000 (numbers indicate range in meters) has only provisionally been released. In addition to the cable projectors, other weapons against low-level attacks are being developed, among others projectors for throwing wire spools.

The Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the Air Force should be consulted in further developments, since it is likewise developing cable projectors and similar equipment.

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Situation 27 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

For a compilation of reports on the enemy situation on the basis of radio decoding and radio monitoring up to 22 Feb., see radio intelligence report no. 8/42, published by the Naval Staff Communications Division, Radio Intelligence Branch.

Indian Ocean:

Convoy WS 15 from the British Isles left Durban on 17 Feb. and arrived in the Mombasa area on 23 Feb. Convoy SW 16 left Greenock on 16 Feb. A British vessel left Bombay for Mombasa on 9 Feb., and arrived on 19 Feb. Another ship, together with a large passenger steamer, left Colombo on 8 Feb. and arrived in Durban on 18 Feb.

A British tanker sent an SSS signal on 26 Feb. west of Colombo. An agent reported that the EDINBURGH was in Madras on 12 Feb. One anti-aircraft cruiser was located in Colombo and one in Calcutta on 15 Feb.

The French aviso BOUGAINVILLE and submarine LE GLORIEUX left Jibuti for Diego Suarez on 21 Feb.

2. Own Situation:

For changes in reference points for the sailing orders of the TANNENFELS and the operations orders of ship "28", see 1/Skl. Ik 465 and 466/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Radiogram 1207 warns the OSORNO of a three-masted auxiliary sailing vessel which is evidently a plane or submarine trap.

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In reply to his inquiry, the Naval Attache, Madrid is informed that the GERMANIA is to leave on 3 Mar. at the latest. (See communication 1616.)

Radiogram 2014 informs ship "10" that recognition-signal cartridge no. 7 will be used after 1 Mar.

Radiogram 2302 contains corrections for the first ten groups in the code signal manual of 1941, page 20.

Radiogram 1605 contains the enemy situation report.

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## II. Situation West Area

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

### 2. Own Situation:

Group West reports that 41.7% of all security forces in the Belgian-French area are not ready for operations (see War Diary 26 Feb.), so that it is hardly possible to carry out urgent naval tasks. It is essential that the situation be improved, particularly by increasing the capacity of the shipyards in the French area, and by bringing up the necessary equipment. (See Telegram 1630 to the Naval Staff and the Admiral, France, with copy to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.)

### Channel Coast:

Between 0720 and 0728 battery "Grosser Kurfuerst" fired 4 partial salvos at enemy ships off Dover; no effect was observed.

In the evening the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla laid mines southeast of Orfordness, and the 4th PT Boat Flotilla on the convoy route south of Dungeness.

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## III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

### 1. North Sea:

Mine detonating vessel "145" was towed into Hook of Holland. An enemy reconnaissance plane flew over Leuwarden, Groeningen, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven as far as Kiel and back via Brunsbuettel, Cuxhaven, and the East and West Frisian Islands. German fighters were unsuccessful.

Group North reports with reference to the Naval Staff directive concerning the use of escort forces to carry troops through the North Sea (see War Diary, 26 Feb.) as follows:

a. Assembly of a large convoy is conspicuous and might provoke a large-scale enemy attack. A series of convoys of usual size would be more advantageous, particularly since anti-aircraft protection is never entirely adequate.

b. The convoys must have continuous fighter cover on the



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coastal routes. The necessary forces should be requested from the air force commander.

c. If the ice situation does not change, torpedo boats will not be available as escorts, except for the KONDOR and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla if they can be spared from ship "28".

d. It is planned to carry the troops in convoys made up of 2 or three, or if necessary 4, steamers, escorted by forces of the 17th Patrol Boat Flotilla, one minesweeper flotilla, and forces of the Commanding Admiral, North.

e. This task can be carried out only at the expense of our Norway and west convoys, since it is an extra operation and no reserves are available for it.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to the London radio, the PRINZ EUGEN was torpedoed by the British submarine TRITON. The submarine believes that another hit was scored on an escorting destroyer. (The explosion heard from the PRINZ EUGEN was therefore evidently caused by torpedo failure.) Air reconnaissance sighted 4 small naval vessels in Polyarnoye and south of there 1 unidentified large vessel. One destroyer and 8 steamers were sighted north of Murmansk.

Own Situation:

At 1412 harbor defense boat CHERUSKER sank in Porsanger Fjord near Svaerholtklubben following an explosion. 19 men are missing. It was evidently a submarine attack.

On 26 and 27 Feb. enemy planes attacked Petsamo and Kirkenes, Stavanger and Lister, as well as a convoy near Egersund. All attacks were unsuccessful.

Supply and convoy operations according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reported that the 4th Minesweeper Flotilla was detailed to the Admiral, Arctic Coast after its arrival. (See Telegram 2010.)

Short reports from submarines U "584", "456", and "585" on operations off the Murman coast and south of Bear Island state that bad weather prevails, and that no enemy forces were sighted.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships reports as follows concerning the plan of Group North to increase the anti-aircraft defenses of the PRINZ EUGEN:

a. As far as can be estimated at present, at least 3 or 4 weeks will be needed to put the ship in operating condition for the transfer.

b. During this time it would be best to keep the ship in a protected berth in the Lo Fjord.

c. Therefore it is hardly possible to use the PRINZ EUGEN as additional anti-aircraft protection for Trondheim. She is lying in the Lo Fjord well-protected from the air, and her own weapons are

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adequate. It is unnecessary to equip her with additional light anti-aircraft guns, which it would be difficult to set up.

The War Diary of 15 Feb. of the Commanding Admiral, Norway indicates that the ship congestion in Norwegian ports, particularly in Tromsøe (see War Diary, 9 Feb.), is caused mainly by the absolutely inadequate unloading capacity of the harbors. It would take 4 to 5 months to unload just the ships sent to northern Norway.

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

See Telegram 0007 for a preliminary report on the damage caused by enemy planes in Kiel and Schleswig Holstein during the night of 25 Feb. The number of men lost on the MONTE ARMIENTO is as yet unknown. Approximately 500 men were aboard. Supposedly no alarm was sounded. The matter is under investigation.

At 1200 the GNEISENAU sent the following report about the bomb hit:

26 Feb. Sustained a bomb hit at turret A at 2315. It is assumed that the turret crew and damage control group 5 were killed. Camouflage material and turret A caught fire. Shortly thereafter a tongue of flame burst out of turret A, evidently caused by exploding ammunition. The fire spread to turret B.

At 2340 the ship was hit forward a second time. The deck at compartment 21 was split open. Large fire forward, on the battery deck and the lower deck. Impossible to approach the fire due to great amount of destruction, immense heat, and smoke. Magazines of turret B are flooded. Approximately 100 dead, including the chief engineer, 4 midshipmen, 1 petty officer. 20 were wounded. At present the ship is filled with about 3,000 tons of water due to leakage and attempts to put out the fires.

At 1900 the GNEISENAU reported as follows: Fires forward have been extinguished for the most part. The holds must be kept under observation. Most of the living quarters forward are destroyed.

Turret A is still inaccessible. Damage to turret B probably moderate. Extent of damage below water due to bomb hit on the deck not yet established.

Transports with icebreaker escort proceeding according to plan.

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries is planning to have Group Cellarius seize 60 to 100 Estonian fishing boats and to use them in the Estonian area as a harbor patrol flotilla and for special tasks in the spring. He requests approval of this plan. (See Telegram 1740.)

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#### V. Merchant Shipping

See short report no. 6/42 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch for information about the sale of 7 Finnish steamers to Sweden, decline of Irish foreign trade, increase of Canadian foreign trade, and another increase in British maritime insurance rates in the Indian and Pacific areas.

A-10942



VI. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

The Seydis Fjord radio mentioned convoy QP 7 on 23 Feb. No details were intercepted.

U.S. war and merchant ships were informed about submarine activities south of Long Island, off the New Jersey coast, and southeast of the Florida coast. Merchant vessels were instructed to put into port before dark, and to sail by day.

One steamer sank on 26 Feb. approximately 50 miles off Cape Fear.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from the American coast and the West Indies.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "652" reports the unexplained failure of 2 fans fired at an escort ship and at several overlapping ships from a distance of 1,000 meters.

Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Shortly after 27 planes had mined the Humber, 1 burning steamer was sighted in the mined area.

51 enemy planes attacked targets in Germany during the night of 27 Feb., and dropped bombs on the east coast of Zealand, Laland, Hamburg, Oldenburg, and Groeningen. No particular damage. The outskirts of Kiel were attacked. A few enemy planes flew over Belgium, northern France, Holland, and Norway. Altogether 3 planes were shot down.

Mediterranean Theater:

Submarine pens and the harbor of Valletta, one surfaced submarine outside the harbor, as well as enemy airfields in Cyrenaica, were successfully attacked.

Eastern Front:

Air operations at the Army fronts were hampered by bad weather. Some very heavy bombs were dropped on the city and harbor of Kerch.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

At 0250 the MALAYA, the EAGLE, and 2 destroyers left Gibraltar in an easterly direction. The ARGUS group, which left for the west on

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26 Feb., passed Ceuta in an easterly direction at 0230.

It may be assumed that the two groups are jointly ferrying planes to Malta and the eastern Mediterranean.

The German News Agency (DNB) reports from Algeciras that a convoy with troops and war materiel coming from the Atlantic departed for the Mediterranean after a short stop in Gibraltar.

A German submarine sighted a convoy of 2 steamers 28 miles off Ras Azzaz on westerly course; two hours later the same convoy was sighted by air reconnaissance entering Tobruk.

Radio intelligence intercepted a report of a British vessel which sighted submarines 60 miles northwest of Port Said and 19 miles northeast of Marsa Matruh.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla transferred to Pantellaria.

3. Situation Italy:

During an enemy air attack on Tripoli in the night of 26 Feb. the MONGINEVRO was damaged by bomb hits. One lighter loaded with ammunition exploded and 2 others were sunk.

Between 0005 and 0145 on 27 Feb. enemy planes attacked Benghazi apparently without causing military damage.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The harbor of Derna has been opened to shipping. The shipping and transport office at Ras el Aali has been dissolved. 4 naval barges arrived in Tripoli.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 26 Feb. subchasers prevented a submarine attack on the SIENA transport group.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

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IX. East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Daventry, in the afternoon of 27 Feb. an Allied squadron in the Java Sea attacked a strong Japanese fleet which was covering a convoy coming from the north. During the engagement, which lasted until nightfall, both sides suffered losses, the extent of which is not yet known.

The Japanese convoy withdrew to the north during the battle.



2. Situation Japan:

17 Japanese long-distance bombers without fighter cover attacked a U.S. naval force consisting of 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, and several destroyers northeast of New Guinea.

The aircraft carrier and 1 cruiser were severely damaged. 13 Japanese planes were lost.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

In the early morning hours the enemy launched a large-scale attack in the Crimea, concentrating on the Feodosiya front, where he achieved some initial success. The fighting is still going on.

The enemy succeeded in breaking through our lines south of Yama at the Von Kleist Army Group. Other attacks were unsuccessful.

Central Army Group:

The 2nd Panzer Army and the 4th Army repulsed all attacks.

Northern Army Group:

The supply route to Kholm was mopped up. Enemy pressure in the Staraya Russa area is increasing. Enemy attacks were repulsed at the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Holland:

In a public meeting Mussert said that the day on which all of the Dutch East Indies is in the hands of the Japanese will be the blackest day in the last 150 years of Dutch history. Since the days of Admiral de Ruyther Holland has had no real independence but has practically been dependent on Great Britain. Holland will lose her so-called independence, but will keep her language, customs, and other cultural traits.

Great Britain:

In an official declaration, the Labor Party laid down principles for the conduct of the war and the post-war period. It refuses to consider negotiations with Hitler or his allies. The Labor Party is not demanding any special privileges, but considers itself a member of the British community. After the war India must be granted complete independence.

In a radio talk Cripps addressed the workers of Europe, urging them to sabotage Hitler's war effort.

Halifax declared that the defense of the British Isles is one of the most important tasks of the war; in addition, Great Britain has many other positions to defend in the world, which explains why 70% of Allied losses are British.

In view of the growing emergency, the British press is advocating re-organization of the Indian setup, calling attention to military considerations in connection with fighting which will probably take place in India.

Vatican:

The Italians have established that the Vatican will receive a special Japanese commission. This might afford a possibility to combat Catholic circles in Chungking.

U.S.S.R.:

The British are said to be dissatisfied with relations with Russia, since their hopes for a change in Soviet political, social, economic, as well as religious thinking have proved futile. On the contrary, Soviet attempts to interfere in British domestic affairs have made themselves felt.

U.S.A.:

Welles made an official statement that the U.S. government was assured once more by Vichy on 24 Feb. that the French government will not abandon the stand taken in June 1940. According to Reuter the negotiations are concerned with the defense of Madagascar and the strategically important French possessions in West Africa. Also Roosevelt's personal message of 10 Feb. to Petain concerning shipments to Libya is said to have been answered by the French chief of state in a similar diplomatic vein. Vichy promised not to permit further shipment of motor vehicles to Libya.

According to the Associated Press, several influential senators demanded



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that the State Department insist that London should agree at once to grant India independence after the war.

Willkie has demanded that the Allies should go over to the offensive, since the war cannot be won on the defensive.

Argentina:

Under U.S. pressure the government has given up representing Italian interests in El Salvador and Mexico.

Japan:

The High Command in Manila has appointed 11 Filipinos as governors of provinces.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff

The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports about the damage on the GNEISENAU as established so far. Fire destroyed the entire forward part of the vessel above the armored deck as far as turret B, so that this whole section will have to be rebuilt. Turret A and probably also turret B will have to be removed. Structural repairs alone will require approximately one year. The ship is able to proceed under her own power, unless further damage is discovered. It is estimated that approximately 1,000 men will be needed to complete the repairs. The repairs could be made in Gdynia. Part of the material needed can be salvaged from the ship.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff declares that if repairs take so long it will hardly be possible to keep the ship in active service. Further investigation by the Naval Construction Division will show whether the repairs will be made at once with all available means, or whether they will be done bit by bit between other work. This will depend particularly on available manpower.

The time needed for the repair of the PRINZ EUGEN depends on whether the large casting of the rudder frame will have to be made anew. If so, this alone will take 9 months. The Germania shipyard will be ordered at once to build a new stern. Likewise preparations are now getting under way to make the ship ready for the transfer (caulking and an emergency rudder). It will take 6 weeks to make the ship ready to sail at 18 knots.

The Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy will inform the Chief, Naval Staff about the matters discussed.

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Special Items

I. For the opinion of the Naval Staff on the question of Japanese bases on Madagascar and on Franco-German relations see 1/Skl I c 4703/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVI. Copies were sent to the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff and the Foreign Office (Ambassador Ritter), as well as to the Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command and the Chief of the Military Commission of the Tripartite Powers.

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II. In reply to the request of the Armed Forces High Command for information regarding troop transports through the North Sea, communication 1/Skl I Nord 477/42 Gkdos. Chefs. is sent to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command for the Naval Liaison Officer, to the Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer, and to Group North, and is also given to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIIa.

III. Group North has ordered submarine U "116" to lay two trial barrages of rack mines between 57° 28.5' N, 8° 35' E and 57° 30' N, 8° 35' E (barrage A); and between 57° 40' N, 8° 20' E and 57° 41.5' N, 8° 20' E.

These are the trial barrages of live rack mines which were ordered to be laid by a submarine in the Skagerrak at the request of the Mining and Barrage Inspectorate with the consent of the Naval Staff, as arranged between Group North and the Inspectorate.

IV. The German Embassy, Madrid reports that Spanish political circles definitely expect an Anglo-American operation in Africa, and believe that a landing may be made in French Morocco at any time. This would create a very serious situation for Spain, and Suner believes that it might involve Spain in the war. The German Ambassador does not believe that Spain would be able to resist for any length of time without outside help in case of an attack on Morocco or on the Iberian peninsula itself. He believes, however, that our enemies would like Spain to remain neutral at the present time, and would try, in the event of an African operation, to keep Spain out of the war by making guarantees of a political and economic nature. The ambassador asks instructions from the Foreign Office in case Spain should ask for advice at the decisive moment.

The Naval Staff is of the opinion that an enemy operation in French Morocco is unlikely. However, landings in the vicinity of Dakar, at Bathurst, Freetown, and in Portuguese Guinea are more probable. In any case it is undesirable for Spain to reach a compromise with the Allies.

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Situation 28 Feb. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The British steamer GLENBEG reported being pursued by a suspicious vessel at 46° 23' N, 34° 47' W. The pursuing vessel later turned off to the northeast. (This was probably a meeting between two unescorted British vessels.) The location given is just outside route "Anton".

The Admiralty announced that the former U.S. destroyer BELMONT was sunk.

South Atlantic:

According to an Italian report, approximately 100 merchant vessels, mostly French and Greek, were in Freetown between 12 and 17 Feb. One British cruiser and 4 destroyers were likewise located in the harbor. Transport vessel SYRTIA left Freetown for the north in a convoy.



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Pacific Ocean:

According to the radio intercept service, on 26 Feb. a vessel was mentioned on the Australia-Colombo route which was in the U.S. shipyard at Bremerton in December 1941. This was probably the WARSPITE.

The Japanese assume U.S. naval forces to be disposed as follows: about 13 submarines in East Asia; 1 aircraft carrier, about 3 heavy cruisers, and 8 destroyers in Australia and New Zealand; 2 or 3 heavy cruisers, about 27 destroyers, and 14 submarines in Hawaii; 1 aircraft carrier and 8 submarines on the West Coast.

On 18 Feb. the U.S. destroyers EMMONS and HAMBLETON entered Valparaiso.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1703 informs the REGENSBURG about changes in reference points on route "Beta".

Radiogram 1416 informs the OSORNO about plane recognition signals in effect after 1 Mar.

Radiogram 1734 informs all vessels in foreign waters about the enemy situation and about changes in the Naval Staff Operations Division, Merchant Ships Branch.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, a British motor gunboat reported to Portsmouth at 0915 that she had completed an operation, that 6 men were killed and 3 prisoners were left behind. Additional vessels were located at sea.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

For telegram sent to Group West concerning delay in unloading the ELSA ESSBERGER because of bad weather and concerning communications with Madrid and Ferrol see 1/Skl I Nord 474/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIB.

Channel Coast:

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla, in 3 groups, laid mines on convoy routes in the night of 27 Feb. as planned. For brief report see Telegram 1310.

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla, in 2 groups of 4 boats each, laid mines in quadrant AN 7967 as planned in the night of 27 Feb. For brief report see Telegram 0520. On 28 Feb. 6 vessels of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla transferred from Boulogne to Ostend.

Between 0120 and 0131 about 100 enemy paratroopers jumped from 6 to 10 planes onto the "Storch" landing field at Juemel near Cape d'Antifer; they attacked "Wuerzburg" apparatus W 110 of the Air Force at 0144,

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partially destroyed it, and took the rest with them. They machine-gunned the Navy's "Freya" apparatus, but did not damage it. Enemy losses: 1 killed, 4 prisoners. German losses: Army - 1 killed, 1 wounded, 3 missing; Air Force - 1 killed, 2 wounded, 1 missing.

At 0350 4 motor gunboats were sighted, which evidently took aboard the paratroopers off Bruneval. (See Enemy Situation.) According to later reports the enemy group consisted of 3 officers and 70 men. The purpose of the operation was evidently to eliminate the "Wuerzburg" apparatus so as to weaken our air defenses. The Navy was not involved. Responsibility for our defense lay with the Army. The Navy sounded the alarm without delay. It took only 8 minutes for the first report to reach the competent naval shore commander. A brief report by Group West was sent to the Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer and the Naval Liaison Officers at the Armed Forces High Command and the Army High Command. For copy see 1/Skl 4890/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

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### III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

#### 1. North Sea:

##### Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

##### Own Situation:

5 vessels of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla transferred from Ostend to Heligoland. Cable steamer NORDERNEY (with the listening apparatus for Trondheim aboard) left Wesermuende for Heligoland on the first leg of the voyage. During air attacks in the night of 27 Feb. enemy planes dropped bombs on the fortified area of Wilhelmshaven, Norderney, Borkum, Wesermuende, and Cuxhaven without causing any damage; a few houses were damaged in Brunsbuettel.

Group North reports that only one of the loaded tankers expected from the West Area arrived in Germany so far. Group North urgently requests safe and speedy transfer of these tankers because of the fuel and tanker shortage. (See Telegram 1604.)

The following information is sent to the Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff concerning the state of the defenses of the Frisian Islands in the event of an enemy attack (this information was supplied by Naval Station, North Sea):

a. Since the first surprise raid on Norway, defenses against similar raids from sea or air have been prepared in the coastal areas of Naval Station, North Sea. Exposed batteries have as far as possible been surrounded with barbed wire at the most dangerous spots. The battery crews have been reinforced by infantrymen with artillery training.

b. During practice the lack of antitank equipment (antitank guns and rifles) made itself felt, as well as the lack of light mortars which are essential for high-angle firing in the dunes. Additional equipment of this type is urgently requested.

c. The Frisian Islands off the German coast are being defended by naval forces. At the request of Naval Station, North Sea,



the West Frisian Islands from Ameland to Texel have been reinforced by one infantry battalion from the Army. Close cooperation of this battalion with the naval antiaircraft and barrage batteries in the area has been assured. Because of difficult landing conditions at Schiermonnikoog and Rottum, these islands are defended only by naval antiaircraft units.

d. Today's raid on Cape d'Antifer, like all similar occurrences in the past, caused warnings to be issued to all subordinate commands. (See Telegram 2019.)

See Telegram 1935 for the report of Naval Station, North Sea.

Because of the weather it is impossible to carry out mine operation "Hannover" (barrage 19 A). Since the forces for that operation are available, Group North is planning to use them elsewhere. Group North therefore issues the order not to lay barrage 19 A for the time being, but instead to lay barrage VIII in the Skagerrak between 57° 26.5' N, 08° 26' E and 57° 37' N, 08° 13' E. The operation is to be carried out as soon as the weather is favorable.

## 2. Norway:

### Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located 20 to 25 steamers, some of them large, in Murmansk. 2 were sighted leaving the bay. 8 steamers, singly or in pairs, were between the Rybachi Peninsula and Cape Teriberski in the afternoon. No ships were at Iokanga or Teriberski at that time.

### Own Situation:

The reported explosion on a harbor patrol boat on 27 Feb. took place on the VANDALE and not the CHERUSKER. 5 men of the anti-aircraft personnel have been added to the list of losses.

Submarine U "454" arrived in Trondheim, U "455" in Bergen.

Blizzards are interfering to some extent with shipping. The north convoys did not leave Kristiansand South because of ice.

Group North agrees with the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships concerning repairs on the PRINZ EUGEN; the Group believes that the transfer can be made only when it is possible to proceed through the Baltic Sea entrances.

Torpedo boat T "4" reports leaving Trondheim as ordered by the Naval Construction Division, Engine Maintenance Branch. Her turbines are to be repaired in a German shipyard.

In this connection Group North reports that the ship received orders on 24 Feb. to remain in Trondheim until relieved. The Naval Construction Division, Engine Maintenance Branch issued its order without informing the Group or the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. The Commanding Admiral, Group North has ordered torpedo boat T "4" to turn back. (See Telegram 1521.)

Commander Busch has been chosen to make preparations for the operation against the Rybachi Peninsula. The Naval Staff will put him at the disposal of Army Command, Lapland and the Mountain Corps, Norway, to work out the plan of attack and later to carry out the landing operation.

This information is sent to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations



Staff by Telegram 1/Skl I op 476/42 Gkdos. Chfs. For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA, file "Operation Rybachi Peninsula".

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#### IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

An enemy air attack in the night of 27 Feb. was not carried out in full. The Coastal Defense Commander, West sent a report on the engagement by Telegram 0551.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea requests that night fighters be made available at once for the area south of Anholt for defense against enemy mine-laying planes, since it is impossible to sweep ground mines because of the present ice situation. (See Telegram 1010.)

For orders of the Air Force Operations Staff concerning reinforcement of the air defenses of Kiel (Air Force Smoke Screen Detachment 1, Motorized) see 1/Skl 4862/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

The Kiel Shipyard reports unofficially that structural repairs on the SCHARNHORST would take about 13 weeks. (See Telegram 0930.)

The GNEISENAU reports that the fire on 27 Feb. was entirely put out by 2300. Total losses: 1 officer (Chief Engineer), 4 midshipmen, 12 petty officers, 94 men, 8 of them cadets. Altogether 111 men were killed or missing, and 3 were severely wounded.

For a brief report from the GNEISENAU see 1/Skl 4874/42 Gkdos. in War Diary file "Bomb Hit on the GNEISENAU".

See 1/Skl 4885/42 Gkdos. in War Diary file "Bomb Hit on the GNEISENAU" for the suggestions of Group North that the repairs on the battleships not requiring dock space should be done outside of Kiel; that the transfer of the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU to Gdynia should be investigated in view of the ice situation and the danger of aerial mines. The question of whether the Wilhelmshaven dock should be transferred to the east contrary to the previous decision is also discussed.

The Army High Command has asked the Navy for strong icebreakers, since ice pressure and floods will greatly endanger the Riga airfield and railroad bridge when warmer weather sets in, thus jeopardizing supply shipments to the Northern Army Group. Steps taken by the Army engineers to make it possible for the ice to move out to sea by breaking a channel in the river are inadequate.

At the present time even icebreakers cannot get through Riga Bay. The Navy has already requested heavy icebreakers from Sweden and Finland. The Armed Forces High Command will have to decide at the proper time whether the Copenhagen-Oslo transports can be delayed for the benefit of the Riga operation, so that the German icebreaker CASTOR can be used. A corresponding request has been sent to the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, with copies to the Army High Command and Group North. See Telegram 1920.

Group North supports the request of the Admiral, Baltic Countries that the Cellarius group be reinforced by means of Estonian fishing boats. (See Telegram 2103.)

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V. Merchant Shipping

The Naval Intelligence Division has investigated the length of time ships require to sail to the British Isles on the most important shipping routes during the years 1940 and 1941. 82 days are required from the North American East Coast to the British Isles and back, including lay days; thus 4.3 round trips can be made in a year. 2.4 round trips a year can be made from the North American West Coast to the British Isles, 4.9 from Spain and Portugal, 2.3 from East Africa, 2.4 from India, and 1.9 from East Asia. A detailed report, as well as reports about shipping in the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf are contained in report no. 6/42 of the foreign merchant shipping series put out by the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Italian report, a British convoy is expected to arrive at Lisbon on 10 Mar. A submarine sighted the tanker SAN AMBROSIO off the Florida coast. The Panamanian tanker SYLVAN ARROW reports a suspicious vessel with a lighter north of Trinidad.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "96" reports that she sank the steamer TORUNGEN (1,948 GRT) off the American East Coast, and that the tanker KARS (8,888 GRT) was gutted by fire after being attacked. The submarine reports increased air and patrol activity along the coast. Submarine U "432" reports sinking an ore steamer of 10,000 GRT off Cape Hatteras. She reports heavy north-south traffic also during the night. Submarine U "578" reports sinking a 10,000 GRT tanker near Delaware Bay, and sinking a warship with 4 funnels by means of a two fan. Submarine U "156" reports sinking the British steamer LA CARRIERE (5,586 GRT) in the Caribbean Sea, and probably sinking a steamer of 2,500 GRT and a tanker of 4,500 GRT by gunfire. For supplementary report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Staff informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that tanker GERMANIA is to leave Santa Cruz for western France between 1 and 3 Mar., and gives details about her characteristics, camouflage, maximum speed, and course.

On 25 Feb. the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reported the planned re-disposition of submarines in the northern area. The Naval Staff expressed agreement with these plans, and stated that in special emergency cases or when enemy forces are reported, thus necessitating immediate action by the submarines stationed at Trondheim and Bergen, Group North will have immediate command over these submarines, informing the Commanding Admiral, Submarines at the time.

On 27 Feb. Group North asked the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to change the sailing orders of several of the assigned submarines. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines complied with this request the same day.

For copies of the respective telegrams see 1/Sk1 467/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

The transfer of the Finnish submarine SAUKKO to the Black Sea is now

out of the question. Instead, 6 small Italian submarines with Italian crews are to be transferred to the Black Sea. In addition the Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered 3 German submarines of type IIB to be transferred. It will take 26 weeks to complete the transfer. The Naval Staff Submarine Division informed Group South and the Naval Attache, Rome to this effect on 28 Feb., with a copy to the Admiral, Black Sea.

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## VII. Aerial Warfare

### 1. British Isles and Vicinity:

At about 1700 numerous enemy fighter planes flew over the Ostend area. 99 German fighters went into action. 4 Spitfires were shot down for certain, and 2 more probably.

23 planes dropped mines in the Humber according to plan.

### 2. Mediterranean Theater:

For report of air reconnaissance see Enemy Situation, Mediterranean.

### 3. Eastern Front:

Armed reconnaissance planes attacked the city and harbor of Murmansk without observing damage. One steamer of 8,000 to 10,000 GRT was damaged at Murmansk. No reports have been received from the Eastern Front.

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## VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

### 1. Enemy Situation:

Task force H, with the MALAYA, the ARGUS, the EAGLE, one DIDO-class cruiser, and 8 destroyers entered Gibraltar from the east at 2145. The radio intercept service discovered numerous ferrying flights to Gibraltar from the west on 27 and 28 Feb. This probably confirms the assumption concerning the assignment of task force H. An agent reports that steamer SUBIESKI may be expected to leave Gibraltar soon with about 400 evacuees, among them 200 arsenal workers that have been relieved.

German air reconnaissance in the central and eastern Mediterranean located only 2 eastbound destroyers northwest of Marsa Matruh.

According to Italian agent reports from Egypt, 3 light cruisers arrived in Alexandria from the Red Sea.

Photo reconnaissance showed the following ships in Alexandria at 1350: 2 battleships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, one of them still in dock, the other probably grounded at the stern; 4 cruisers of the DIDO and D classes, 9 destroyers, 15 gun and patrol boats, 6 submarines, 4 escort and repair ships, 4 magnetic mine sweepers, 40 steamers, 7 tankers, 6 passenger vessels, and 2 hospital ships. In addition 4 new harbor barges were located, and strong traces of oil were seen in the harbor.



2. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Tripoli and Benghazi during the night of 27 Feb. 3 planes are assumed to have dropped mines in the approaches to the harbor of Benghazi.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer TEMBIEN left Tripoli for the return voyage to Italy on the afternoon of 27 Feb. 4 naval barges were unable to continue from Pantellaria to Tripoli because of the weather.

4. Area Naval Group South:

No special incidents.

According to a memorandum of Group South concerning naval tasks in the Black Sea, the main task for summer 1942 will be to ship supplies by sea to Russia, keeping pace with the progress of the land operations; any additional available forces should support Army operations directly, for example assist in crossing the Kerch Strait. In addition, raids are planned, which would indirectly aid radio intelligence and protect the supply routes and directly protect the flank of the Army toward the sea.

For copy of the memorandum see 1/Skl 442/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IX. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. War Department estimates that Army Air Force attacks on enemy ships have had the following results: 1 battleship probably sunk and 1 damaged; 1 cruiser probably sunk and 13 damaged; 2 destroyers probably sunk and 2 damaged; 3 tankers probably sunk; 11 transport vessels probably sunk and 14 damaged; 1 submarine probably sunk; and 1 aircraft carrier damaged.

In London it is assumed that the following Japanese ships have been sunk or damaged by the U.S. and Dutch Navies: 1 battleship lost and 3 damaged; 7 cruisers lost, 8 severely and 11 slightly damaged; 11 torpedo boat destroyers sunk, 4 severely and 6 slightly damaged; 1 aircraft carrier severely and 1 slightly damaged. The U.S., Dutch, and British Navies supposedly sank 9 submarines and damaged 2; sank 79 transport and merchant ships, and damaged 15 severely.

In publishing these figures Reuter did not give any further particulars.

2. Situation Japan:

According to Domei, a naval battle took place on 24 Feb. near Wake Island. The U.S. force consisted of 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers. Of these 1 cruiser was hit by fortress artillery and burst into flames; the other cruiser and 1 destroyer were damaged by bombs, and 5 planes were shot down. Only 1 Japanese patrol vessel was lost. The defense installations on Wake were slightly damaged.

On 27 Feb. the Japanese fleet encountered the combined Allied fleet in the Java Sea, and sank 1 cruiser and 6 destroyers in a "great naval battle". When the report was issued the battle was still in progress. This engagement seems to be the beginning of the Japanese landing operation on Java. Radio intelligence intercepted a message to Soerabaya stating that 30 transport vessels with landing craft were sighted on the northern coast of central Java.

## X. Army Situation

### 1. Russian Front:

#### Southern Army Group:

Enemy attacks in the Crimea, particularly at the Feodosiya front, were much weaker, evidently as the result of the heavy losses of the previous day. Muddy roads brought our counterattack on Tulumchek to a halt.

The enemy is launching a large-scale attack against the northern front of the Von Kleist Army Group. One breakthrough has been sealed off. Attacks were repulsed at Babenkovo and Losovaya. Lively combat activity southwest of Livny at the 2nd Army front.

#### Central Army Group:

All enemy attacks were repulsed at the 2nd Panzer Army and the 4th Army, some under heavy losses. The enemy was successful only in an attack on Byeloi, which resulted in occupation of the northern outskirts of the city. Northwest of Velizh the enemy is digging in. In the rear area in the vicinity of Drupchevak 32 mayors and 100 members of the police force were murdered by partisans.

#### Northern Army Group:

An enemy night attack on Kholm was repulsed. North of Staraya Russa there is heavy enemy artillery fire. In the rear areas of the Volkhov front there was partisan fighting.

### 2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

At the Svir front an enemy patrol broke through our lines at Myatusovo. 200 Russians crossed Lake Omega on the ice and entered Shoksha, destroying several houses and a lighthouse.

### 3. North Africa:

No particular change in the situation.

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GLOSSARY

Barbarossa

Cover name for the invasion of the U.S.S.R. begun in 1941.

Cerberus

Code name for the operation involving the transfer of the SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, and PRINZ EUGEN through the Channel in February 1942.

An exceptionally large number of code or cover names was used in this operation, a fact which seems to have led to some confusion and jeopardized the secrecy of the undertaking. Thus the over-all operation was referred to not only as "Cerberus", but also as "Mandarine", "Torero", "Ganges", "Korsika" and "Labyrinth".

The operation of the 3rd Air Force in connection with the breakthrough was known as "Donnerkeil", and various phases thereof as "Papagei", "Gewitter", "Hagel", "Blitz", "Offenes Visier", and "Fruehlingsanfang". The adviser to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, Col. Ibel, stationed on the SCHARNHORST, was known as "Jafue Citrone"; an officer in similar capacity on the GNEISENAU as "Georg", and on the PRINZ EUGEN as "Peter".

Donnerkeil

See Cerberus.

EMC mine

Standard mine, type C; a contact mine against surface vessels.

Etappe

Secret German naval organization for providing German naval units with information and supplies from foreign bases. Etappe Japan was of great importance for German blockade-running activities.

Fab XI

A combination magnetic and acoustic firing device for mines.

Felix

Cover name for a proposed operation involving the conquest of Gibraltar and the establishment of German naval bases on the Canary Islands and at selected points along the Spanish coast.

Freya apparatus

Anti-aircraft radar equipment.

Haifisch

Cover name for an operation in conjunction with "Seeloewe", the planned invasion of England. This cover name was later used as camouflage for "Barbarossa", the campaign against Russia.

Hannover

Cover name for a mining operation to reinforce the so-called West-wall barrages (barrage 19A).

Hoofden

A body of water in the southwestern part of the North Sea near the entrance of the Channel, in the area between the Netherlands and the southeast corner of the British Isles.

Isabella

Cover name for defense measures to be taken in the event of an Allied invasion of Spain.

Kairo

Code name for the mine-laying mission of the German supply ship and blockade-runner DOGGERBANK in the Capetown area. 15 EMC mines were laid off Cape Agulhas on 13 Mar. 1942 and another 80 EMC during the night of 16 Apr. 1942.

Kirschbluete

German cover name for voyage of Japanese submarine J 30 to Europe. The submarine, under Commander Endo, left Japan the middle of April and arrived in Lorient in the beginning of August. She crossed the equator on 18 Jul. at 20° W. She had expected to reach France in the middle of July but was delayed en route.

Komponisten area

The area between 25° S and 32° S, and 12° W and 22° W; in this area were located points named after composers, such as Wagner, Mozart, etc.

Korsika

See Cerberus.

Labyrinth

See Cerberus.

LMF

Aerial mine, type F. Moored parachute mine with magnetic firing device.

Mandarine

See Cerberus.

News Analysis "Foreign Navies" (Nachrichtenauswertung "Fremde Marinen")

A daily analysis of foreign newspaper reports concerning foreign naval news, compiled by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Sk1).

Political Review (Politische Uebersicht)

A daily review of political developments abroad published by the



Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Sk1).

PQ

Designation of convoys proceeding eastward from the United Kingdom to northern Russia.

Prachtstrasse Nord

German shipping route through the Channel: Except for a very short stretch near Cape Gris Nez, it ran well to the west of "Weg rot" and "Weg rosa" from Den Helder, Holland to a point off Fecamp, France, where it joined "Weg rosa".

QP

Designation of convoys returning to the United Kingdom from northern Russia.

QQQ signal

Distress signal sent by ships when sighting or under attack by armed raider. QQQ was also used when suspicious merchant vessels were sighted.

Rack mine, type A

The German SMA mine. A moored influence mine laid by a specially constructed minelaying submarine. Its charge weighed approximately 350 kilograms. This mine was designed for waters of 50 m. to 300 m. depth.

Route "Anton"

A German shipping route. Its geographical borders were: The French coast at 27° 30' N; 47° 30' N, 29° W; 43° N, 40° W; 37° N, 40° W; continued on 37° N; the southern and eastern borders of route "Anton" were defined by the borders of the operations zone of the submarines in the South Atlantic.

Route Beta

A German shipping route, the points of which were designated as follows:

Darm	-	52° 27' S, 93° 41' W.
Niere	-	38° 30' S, 150° 00' W.
Knie	-	42° 00' N, 180° 00' W.
Galle	-	34° 00' N, 139° 50' E.

Route "Bruno"

A German shipping route via 30° N, 36° W; 32° N, 30° W; 37° N, 17° W; 44° 30' N, 11° W. From then it continued the same as route "Anton", which see. Route "Bruno" was to be used only upon express orders from the Naval Staff when evasive action became necessary.

Route "Lila"

A German shipping route to the west of route "Rosa", branching off the latter near Ostend and rejoining it near Calais.

Route "Rosa"

German shipping route along the western coast of France.

Route Uhunest

A sea lane for submarines out of St. Nazaire. It ran from Point N I (47° 07' N, 2° 36' W) to Point 34 U (46° 50' N, 02° 37' W), thence in a 211° direction via Point Uhu (46° 05' N, 03° 18' W) to 45° 38' N, 03° 41' W.

RRR signal

Distress signal sent by ships when sighting or under attack by enemy warship.

SC bombs

Thin-shell high explosive bombs.

Seehaus (Sonderdienst Seehaus)

A service under the German Foreign Office for monitoring foreign radio programs (such as those broadcast from BBS, CBS, etc.); similar to the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission.

Seeloeve

Cover name for the planned invasion of England.

SMA mine

Rack mine, type A. A moored influence mine dropped from a specially constructed minelaying submarine. Its charge weighed 350 kilograms. This mine was designed for waters of 50 m. to 300 m. depth.

Sportpalast

Code name for the transfer of the SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN to Norway on 21-23 February 1942. Originally the GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST were to participate in this operation.

SSS signal

Distress signal sent when sighting or under attack by a submarine; could also indicate being damaged by a mine.

Standard mine, Type C

See EMC

Suedsee

Cover name for a planned voyage of German steamers to and from Japan along the northern coast of Russia and Siberia. The German auxiliary cruiser KOMET (ship "45") sailed this route in 1940 with Russian cooperation (operation "Gruen").

Todt Organization (O.T.)

A construction organization (named for the founder) which built the German superhighways, the Westwall, and the Atlantic fortifications. It employed domestic and foreign labor on military projects both in Germany and in the occupied countries.



Type VII C

A 500 ton sea-going submarine (of earlier construction). It was 67.1 meters (221.43 ft.) in length, had diesel-electric propulsion, and was armed with 4 bow tubes and one stern tube.

Type X B

A 1600 ton minelaying submarine. It was 296.34 ft. (89.8 m.) in length and had normal diesel-electric propulsion. It was equipped with 30 mine shafts and two stern torpedo tubes.

U A

The ex-Turkish submarine BATIRAY.

Westwall

A system of mine barrages in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway. Geographically it constituted an extension of the Westwall fortifications on land.

Wuerzburg apparatus

Anti-aircraft radar equipment.







